------------------------- BurmaNet --------------------------- "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" -------------------------------------------------------------- The BurmaNet News: 7th May 1995 Issue #167 NATION: BORDER TENSION RISES AFTER ATTACK NATION: BURMA CALLS FOR THAI HELP IN FIGHT TO CRUSH DRUG-KING KHUN SA NATION: BURMA COUNTERFEITERS COULD GET LIFE NATION: LETTERS REUTERS: GUNSHIPS POUND INTRUDERS FROM BURMA AP: BURMA'S INSURGENCY NOT OVER BKK POST: BURMA SAYS 'NO MAJOR PROBLEMS' BKK POST: OVER 2500 KAREN RETURN TO BURMA BKK POST: US SENATE MAY SOON JOIN MOVES TO PUNISH BURMA BKK POST: REFUGEES ALLEGE SLAVE LABOUR ON GAS PIPELINE NOTES ON KAREN REFUGEE SECURITY TRAFFICKING OF BURMESE WOMEN BILL INTRODUCED IN U.S. SENATE PAPER by THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF BURMA REPORT: A MEETING OF NCUB'S CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE -------------------------------------------------------------- o-------------------------------o The BurmaNet News is an | | electronic newspaper | Iti | covering Burma. 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Burma Issues is a Bangkok-based non-governmental organization that documents human rights conditions in Burma and maintains an archive of Burma-related documents. Views expressed in The BurmaNet News do not necessarily reflect those of either NCGUB or Burma Issues. -------------------------------------------------------------- ===== item ===== BORDER TENSION RISES AFTER ATTACK PM still wants Burma at Asean and insists on no policy changes 7.5.95/ The Nation Tensions were rising along the frontier with Burma last night with Katen rebels threatenning to sack a Thai border town in retaliation for Friday's blitz on their Salween River camp and reports that Rangoon was moving thousands more trooops into the area. Intelligence sources said yesterday leaders of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army [DKBA] had vowed to burn the riverside township of Mae Sariang, in Mae Hong Son province, if Thai security forces did not cease their retaliatory action within five days. Police in Tha Song Yang district, Tak province,said they had reports that Burmese troops had announced yesterday they intended attacking and burninig Chokona Camp, about 300 metres inside Thailand from the Moei River. The camp houses 3-4,000 followers of both the Karen National Union [KNU] and the DKBA, which broke away from the KNU in December and allied itself with Rangoon. On Friday, a radio broadcast in Burmese which jammed the police redio network in Mae Sai, Chiang Rai province, said regular Burmese army troops intended to raze the town's border market, which adjoins theBurmese town of Tachilek. The message prompted provincial governor Khamron Buncherd to call an urgent meeting of border authority in the middle of the night to prepare for the possible attack. As of last night, no incident had been reported. Police sources speculated the Burmese announcement was just meant to scare Burmese people from crossing into Thailand. They said Burmese troops often jammed their redio network. Border sources said three Burmese helicopters on Friday flew near Tachilek in an appaarent attempt to unnerve Thai security forces. Meanwhile , fighting was reported in Shan State, an estimated 15 kiometres inside Burma opposite Mae Sai, as Burmese troops continued to assault the strongholds of opium warlord Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army. Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai yesterday stood firm on his government's policy of constructive engagement with the Rangoon junta and said Thailand would continue to back Burma's attendance at the annual meeting of Asean in Brunei in July. He said the current border tension should not affect policy. "The border battles are specific incidents. We should not let them undermine the main policy. We must stand firm and not be shaken by the problem," he said Chuan said he believed available Thai-Burmese border committees would be able to deal with the problem. He would welcome the return to Burma of the Karen refugees in Thailand if Rangoon wanted them back , but that could be done through negotiations involving various government and military groups In Rangoon , the powerful first secretary of the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC], Lt Gen Khin Nyunt, echoed similar sentiments. Speaking ahead of a visit by Laotian President Nouhak Phomsavanh, he said Burma did not regard any " existing misunderstanding" with its neighbours as a serious problem . But " external instigations"may distort the situation, and "minor problems can be exacerbated into major ones, "Khin Nyunt said . Political analysts linked the remarks to Burma's relations with Thailand rather than Laos. State-owned newspapers in Burma have carried a series of articles recently criticizing Thailand for its failure to cooperate with Rangoon in its bid to crush Khun Sa and his followers. Police and Army intelligence sources said Burmese army had moved an extra 4-5,000 troops to Myawadi and Maetawaw camp, opposite Thailand's Tak province. According to the sources, three Burmese helicopters on Friday flew near Tachilek in an apparent attempt to unnerve This security forces. On Friday , four Thai Army helicopter gunships operating from Thai airspace sprayed rebel positions just across the Salween and Moei rivers in Burma with gunfire and rockets , inflicting heavy samage. There was no official casualty toll, but unconfirmed reports said as many as 100 Karen guerrillas were killed. The Thai attack followed several weeks of cross -border incursions by raiders from Burma on Karen refugee camps, which they targeted for arson, abductions and murders. Border intelligence squads yesterday confirmed the Burmese had reinforced Myawadi and Maetawaw with troops and artillery . They also quoted DKBA fighters operating in the area as confirming that the Burmese army did supply both provisions and arms for DKBA operations against KNU followers residing in Thailand . Government and military leaders yesterday confirmed Thai security forces had hit Karen camps from the air in Friday , but gave no further details . They defended the actions as " appropriate" . Defence Minister Vijit Sookmak said the Army had responded according to the situation . Foreign Minister Krasae Chanawongse also defended the reprisal raids. *Reuter reports from Rangoon : A leading Burmese military official said on Friday the government expects to hold peace talks with the Karen rebel group within the next few months. The Karen are one of the few remaining ethnic rebel groups still fighting Burma's military government. More than a dozen other groups have signed cease fire agree ments in recent years. " We won't be meeting with them this month ," said Col Kyaw Thein, a defence spoksman." But we will be meeting each other in the next few months." ===== item ===== BURMA CALLS FOR THAI HELP IN FIGHT TO CRUSH DRUG-KING KHUN SA The Nation/7.5.95 Agence France-presse RANGOON-_ With cooperation from Thailand, Burma could crush drug- king Khun Sa and his troops in a matter of months a military spokesman said on Friday. Speaking in the border town of Tachilek, regional control commander Brigadier General Kyaw Win said the Burmese government has already urged the Thais to cooperate in coping with Khun Sa. With cooperation from the Thai side, we could crush Khun Sa in a matter of months, he told a group of foreign military attaches and reporters flown to this town, some 440 kilometers northeast of the capital in eastern Shan state this morning. Kyaw Win also said a sox-point proposal to this effect had been submitted at the recent joint-border committee meeting in Thailand last month but there has been no response yet from the Thai side. In a briefing on the latest government offensive against Khun Sa, Kyaw Win said between March 11 and May 4, Burmese soldiers had fought 55 major battles against Khun Sa's Mon Tai Army (MTA) forces in the Patumaing area in Shan state. He added that 218 enemy had been killed against 76 government dead and 176 wounded. This was the first time in recent weeks that the military government here made public its continuing offensives against the opium warlord. The reports in state-run newspapers have hitherto been confined to isolated incidents where innocent people were killed by followers of Khun Sa in different parts of Shan state. Military attaches from the United States, Japan and China were taken along with a selected group of journalists to the site of one of Khun Sa's strong-holds which had just been captured. Some 38 of Khun Sa's other outposts in the area were also overrun by government troops during the fifty-five days fighting, the officer said. Khun Sa alias Chang Chi-fu, 60 has in recent weeks become one of the main targets of the military here which has vowed to crush him. In a series of officially inspired newspaper articles, authorities here have criticized Thailand for lack of cooperation in their offensives against Khun Sa expressing doubts as regards Thailand's "good-neighbourliness." ===== item ===== BURMA COUNTERFEITERS COULD GET LIFE The Nation-The Region/7.5.95 RANGOON_ Burma has amended a central bank law whereby counterfeiters of bank notes and coins will receive prison terms of 10 years to life, the government newspaper New Light of Myanmar reported yesterday. On April 9, three Thai men arriving from Bangkok were arrested at Rangoon airport with five suitcases filled with 100 million kyats worth of fake Burma bank notes. Six Burma kyats equal one US dollar.--Kyodo ===== item ===== THE NATION- LETTERS Rangoon disclaims ties with DKBA Whether it is independent or not, the voice of a newspaper should not only reflect and promote the interest of its country but also cultivate and promote goodwill, friendship and understanding among nations. We believe that a newspaper, especially in dealing with bilateral issues and a neighbouring country, should promote this principles rather than breed hatred and misunderstanding, which may blow out of proportion into confusion among its readers. It is depressing to find that certain newspaper reportage seem to be trying their best to make the recent border situation look really bad. A title in bold face on the front page of a local newspaper dated May 4, 1995, such as "Burmese raiders killed three policemen", is misleading indeed. The raiders the newspaper wished to refer to are, in fact, the members of DKBA , a breakaway faction of the KNU. The recent incursion of the DKBA into Thai soil are neither backed by Myanmar government nor its armed forces involved in any way. The DKBO is solely liable for these incursions. The Myanmar government is not in the position to control the activities of the DKBA, which still has to come into the legal fold. AT the same time it is understandable for us they whatever action taken by Thai security forces to defend it territory from the DKBO is within its own rights. Embassy of the Union Of Myanmar Bangkok ------------- DKBA fright After a protracted stay with a dear friend in Papua New Guinea, I flew to Bangkok last evening with utter trepidation of having the aircraft brought down in the outskirts of the city by DKBA anti- aircraft fire. I am making a novena to our lady in lady thanksgiving for my safe arrival. Perhaps it is time to give emergency training to the boys scouts and girls guides of the nation and get them out to the borders to defend the country, if the army is incapable or unwilling to face the task. Florence S.Parker S.Sathorn Road Bangkok ------------- Move UNHCR As I understand it, the Royal Thai government does not acknowledge that there are any Burmese refugees living in Bangkok, only illegal Burmese aliens, who are promptly deported after being rounded up by the local police. If that is the case, can anyone tell me why the UNHCR maintains such an extensive, well-paid staff here in Bangkok? The UNHCR refuses to feel that it is obligated to assist anyone in Bangkok rather than individuals whom they have designated as "persons of concern". However, it is alleged too often to be doubted that Burmese wishing to travel to Bangkok from the border area generally have to pay bribes to authorities in the neighbourhood of baht 2-3000 thousand to get pass the check points. If that is the case - as it appears it is - then how can these people even get to the offices of the UNHCR to apply for status as "person of concern"? Isn't it time the UNHCR moved most of its staff out to the border areas where Burmese actually have ready access to their services? All that is needed here in Bangkok is one or two social workers for the immigration detention unit, liaison for the student safe area and for other social programmes. It's only fair to get most of the UNHCR staff, including its administration, out to where they can do the job they were sent to do. Roger Lyder Sukhumvit3 Bangkok ===== item ===== GUNSHIPS POUND INTRUDERS FROM BURMA May 6 (Reuters) MAE SAM LAEB, Thailand (Reuter) - Thai army helicopter gunships, firing machine guns and rockets, Saturday attacked a group of Burmese-backed guerrillas dug in on a northwestern Thai border mountain. The gunships flew at least four sorties against about 150 guerrillas who Thai army officers said crossed a border river and dug in on a Thai mountain about one mile south of this deserted border trading settlement. The guerrillas are members of a faction which broke away from Burma's Christian-led anti-Rangoon Karen guerrilla army and joined Burmese government forces in December. Hundreds of members of the faction, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), crossed into Thailand last week and burned hundreds of bamboo-and-thatch houses in several refugee camps. The DKBA say they want all 70,000 Karen refugees in camps in Thailand, most of whom fled military offensives and human-rights abuses in Burma, to return and live under their control. Outraged by the cross-border raids that have killed several Thais as well as refugees, Thailand has sent more than 1,000 reinforcements and a formidable array of military hardware to reinforce the frontier. Thai forces launched a cross-border attack on the guerrillas Friday, hitting one jungle camp at the confluence of the Salween and Moei rivers with salvos of missiles from helicopter gunships, a Thai army spokesman said. Meanwhile hundreds of refugees at the center of the confrontation are returning to Burma convinced it is the only place they will find tranquillity. One diplomat said Saturday the raiders from Burma appeared to be achieving what they intended. The attacks were making life for the refugees in Thailand so precarious they saw returning to Burma as the only way to find some security. Since the DKBA stepped up cross-border attacks on the refugees last week the flow of people going back to Burma has surged from a few dozen to more than 250 a day, Thai authorities said Saturday. According to Thai statistics more than 5,000 Karen refugees have gone back in recent months and the pace of returns was picking up, officials said. ===== item ===== BURMA'S INSURGENCY NOT OVER May 6 (AP) RANGOON, Burma (AP) -- In less than seven years, Burma has accomplished something noteworthy to other nations wracked by separatist fighting: peace deals with almost all the rebel groups that have battled the central government for a half-century. But the peace with Burma's ethnic minorities could prove illusory unless authoritarian military rule gives way to greater democracy for all, critics say. Some minority leaders are complaining the government is not living up to its promises. Analysts say a failure to solidify the peace could leave Burma facing a Yugoslavia-style dismemberment or endemic conflict that saps the potentially rich nation. Keeping the peace will require a government system that harmonizes the goals of the Burman majority with some 70 minority groups, they say. The junta, which seized power in 1988 after crushing a democracy uprising, largely used negotiations to bring 14 of 16 insurgent groups into what it calls ``the legal fold.'' Secreted in jungles and mountains, some of the rebels had been fighting since Burma gained independence from Britain in 1948. ``Right now these armed groups are not fighting ... Right now they are quite satisfied with the agreement reached between the government and their groups. We have tried to solve this problem forever,'' Lt. Col. Kyaw Thein, a key officer in the talks with rebels, told Western reporters recently. But despite the success in stilling the insurgencies, opponents of the junta say it has not eliminated the roots of rebellion -- the quest by minorities for greater autonomy and eradication of poverty in long-neglected regions. As part of the cease-fire pacts, the rebels are still armed and control their own territories. Some groups, such as the powerful Wa, use profits from the world's largest opium and heroin trade to buy more arms. The government ``didn't defeat anybody in the field,'' said Josef Silverstain, an American expert on Burma with close ties to rebel groups. ``The civil war isn't over by a long shot. Everybody still has their weapons and they're not getting promised aid.'' Gen. Khin Nyunt, a leading member of the ruling junta, said recently that the government has spent more than $20 million since 1989 to help ethnic minorities under the cease-fire agreements. But reports from Kachin and Wa areas of northern and northeastern Burma challenge this assertion and say disillusionment about the truces could bring renewed conflict. Two groups, the Karen National Union and New Mon State Party, are still fighting. Asked about the junta's claims on money spent for minorities, Chao Nyi Lai, secretary-general of the United Wa State Party who signed a peace accord, said, ``It's a lie.'' He spoke earlier this year with journalist Thierry Falise who traveled to the Wa area. The Wa and seven other armed groups formed the Peace and Democratic Front late last year, calling for greater democracy, access to the national leadership and a say on development in their regions. The front, which could field some 40,000 soldiers, is discussing military options. Minority leaders say a national convention working on a new constitution for Burma is stage-managed by the military and minority representatives have no power to shape it. Thus any charter coming out of the convention will not prove lasting, they say. Aung San Suu Kyi, the pro-democracy leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner now in her sixth year of house arrest, has stressed that civil war can end only when all of Burma's people democratically decide on a course for the country. But with one of the most complex ethnic mixes in the world, some analysts fear even democracy and a federal union might prove inadequate. Bertil Lintner, author of a recent book on Burma's insurgency and narcotics trafficking, notes ethnic turmoil erupted in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union following political liberalization. Lintner thinks the rebel groups face a new world. ``The geopolitics have changed,'' he said in an interview. ``I think the rebel armies belong to the past, to history.'' Previously, Thailand, China and India for various reasons supported Burma's insurgents, but now its neighbors are more eager for a stable country where economic profit can be reaped. Still, Lintner and others warn, even without actual fighting, smoldering tensions and unresolved differences would undermine Burma's efforts to end its international isolation and build the economy. ===== item ===== BURMA SAYS 'NO MAJOR PROBLEMS' AFP/Rangoon BKK Post/7.5.95 A Key Burmese leader claims there are no major problems with any of the country's neighbours, although he warns that outside interference could stir up trouble. Speaking ahead of a visit to Rangoon by Laotian President Nouhak Phomsavanh, Lt- Gen Khin Nyunt, first secretary of the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council, said Burma did not regard any "existing misunderstanding" with its neighbours as a serious problem. But "external instigation" may distort the situation, and minor problems can be exacerbated into major ones," he said. Political analysts in Rangoon linked the remarks to Burma's relations with Thailand rather than Laos. The remarks were seen as significant in light of tensions between Burma and Thailand. ===== item ===== OVER 2500 KAREN RETURN TO BURMA TAK More than 25,00 Karen refugees in Tha Song Yang District have returned to Burma in the past two weeks following the raids of three Karen refugee camps by Democratic Karen Buddhist Army troops. Informed sources here said the refugees from Huay Ma Noke and Kamaw Lay Kho camps reluctantly went back because they were afraid of further attacks by renegade Karens. Most of the returnees hire hired long tailed boats which took them to Mae Ta Wah camp on the Burmese side after they underwent searches by Thai border officials. They were received upon arrival at the pier in Mae Ta Wah by members of DKBA. Informed Border Patrol Police sources said between 100-200 Karen refugees had returned to Burma through Mae Ta Wah each day since last month. At least 6,000 Karens have returned since the beginning of this year, said the sources. Pu Aye Daw, leader of Hway Ma Noke camp which was touched by DKBA forces, complained that the remaining refugees have been living in temporary shelters around the burned-out camp. The conditions, he said, are bad and will get worse with the arrival of rain. He said that most refugees wanted to be relocated as quickly as possible. ===== item ===== US SENATE MAY SOON JOIN MOVES TO PUNISH BURMA BKK Post/7.5.95 The United States' Senate may soon join several city and state legislatures that have passed or are considering measures calling for economic sanctions against Burma. Senator Mitch Mc Connell, the Kentucky Republican who initiated sanction legislation against South Africa in 1986, said he was considering a similar bill against a Burmese regime that has been harshly criticised for allowing widespread human rights abuse and drug smuggling. "This is a fairly simple issue for me," Mr. Mc Connell said in a telephone interview with The Washington Times. He called on the US to take a leadership role in its opposition to the illegitimate Burmese government. Burma has been ruled by the military State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC],since 1988, when it instituted martial law against a student pro-democracy movement. Mr McConnell anticipates sanction legislation could be introduced in the next few weeks. There is strong bipartisan support for such a bill, according to Robin Cleveland, an aide to Mr McConnell. Just last week , the Seattle City Council unanimously passed a resolution that urges an international economic boycott of Burma until the human rights violations cease and control of the government has been transferred to the winners of the 1990 democratic election. The measure also named several corporations whose continued investment in Burma " supports the military government and its cruelty toward the Burmese people". That action followed the Berkeley, California, city council's February 28 decision to boycott the goods and services of companies doing business in Burma. The city was the first to pass such a bill in the anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa. The Massachusetts legislature's House Ways and Means Committee is also considering a no-business-in -Burma bill that would prevent the state from purchasing or doing business with companies that invest in the country. The state passed a similar bill against South Africa in the 1980s. The involvement of many of the same politicians and legislatures active in the South African campaign in no coincidence . Supporters of divestment in Burma say the successful efforts against apartheid prove such sanctions can succeed. The new South Africa demonstrates that economic pressure can be effective in moving government away from oppression, according to state representative Byron Rushing ,who introduced the massachusetts bill. Legislation like that passed in Berkeley and Seattle could cause corporations doing business in Burma to lose millions of dollars of municipal and senior analyst at the Franklin Research firm in Boston. "As cities and states penalise companies doing business in Burma, the process will build political support for federal economic sanction." he said. Burma is barred from receiving US government aid because of the drug problem. The Macy's department store chain last month announced its decision to end business activity in Burma. ===== item ===== REFUGEES ALLEGE SLAVE LABOUR ON GAS PIPELINE 7.5.95/Bangkok Post Thai French and American oil companies, already under fire for the Tavoy pipeline they are building in collaboration with Burma's military regime, now face allegations from refugees arriving at the Thai border of wide-scale slave labour directly on the pipeline. These are the first detailed accounts of slave labour on the pipeline itself. Previous allegations have focused on the Ye-Tavoy railway line, which is being built by tens of thousands of slave labours, but which the oil companies claim is not related to their project. If the accounts given by the refugees prove accurate, the number of villagers subject to forced labour on the pipeline could be will into the thousands. RELATED REPORTS see Sunday perspective 17,24 " They took my field for the pipeline ," says Kyaw Myint, one of the refugees from along the Thai border. "They took my income. Before the pipeline , there was forced labour, but it was possible to live. Now it [forced labour ]is all the time. " Now ,I cannot eat with my family openly and in peace. I cannot sleep with my family openly and in peace. When they see a man , they take him for labour. I had to leave." Another refugee gives a similar account of the situation along the pipeline route , saying : " When they [Slorc] ask for money, I always gave. When they asked for forced labour , I went. But in the night, the soldiers still come to take `emergency forced labour'". The natural gas pipeline is being built by French and American oil-giants Total and Unocal, in partnership with Burma's ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council [Slorc]. The sole consumer for the gas is the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand [Egat] with pipeline construction on the Thai side being done by the PTTEP [Petroleum Authority of Thailand Exploration and Production Public Co Ltd], a subsidiary of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand . Under the terms of a 30 year contract signed on February 2, Thailand will initially pay the companies and the Slorc $400 million per year for gas pumped from the Yadana field in the Gulf of Martaban. The pipeline will cut through 65 kilometers of land belonging to members of the Tavoyan, Karen and Mon ethnic minorities in Burma. On February 2, in a ceremony in held in Rangoon, representatives from Unocal, Total and the PTTEP and the Burmese gathered to sign a final contract. At the signing, J.M. Beuque, signatory for Total, refused comment on allegations that the pipeline would lead to human rights abuses, saying: "This is not the time to talk politics, this is the time to celebrate." At 6 a.m. the next day, land clearing using slave labour began at a village called Hpaungdaw, claims refugees from the area. According to the refugees, they were ordered to clear 300-foot- wide right-of-way for the pipeline and accompanying roadway, starting at the sea. By the refugees' accounts, forced labour on the pipeline consisted of cutting trees and vegetation, pulling stumps, knocking down structures and breaking rocks. Work began at 6 a.m. and went on each day until 5 p.m with a two- hour break at midday. The villagers claim that no one was paid and that workers and their families had to provide their own food. Laying of the pipeline is not a scheduled to begin until later this year or in early 1996, under the supervision of French engineers. By then, the forced labour phase of the construction is likely to be over. According to Kevin Heppner, a Canadian working with the Karen Human Rights Group, the Slorc has used forced labour in the preparatory phases of several previous oil developments before foreign personnel were brought for technology-intensive phases of construction. "That way", claims Heppner, "the white guys can say with a straight face that they didn't see anything. ===== item ===== TRAFFICKING OF BURMESE WOMEN BILL INTRODUCED IN SENATE by SENATOR PATTY MURRAY U.S.A. (D-WA) Dear Burma Watchers, The Seattle group was successful in persuading Senator Murray to introduce in the Senate the sense of Congress resolution (see below) that was introduced earlier by Rep. Louise Slaughter in the House. This is important because most Congressional offices don't really take such resolutions seriously unless there are bills in both the House and Senate. Having it introduced in both places is indicative that there are real plans to pass it, rather than just have it introduced to appease some group of constituents. The Murray bill is exactly the same as the Slaughter bill (H. Con. Res. 21). I have spoken to both Murray and Slaughter's staff persons and their view is to try and line up as many co-sponsors as possible in the next few months. Slaughter and Murray are both planning to issue "Dear Colleague" letters urging their colleagues to co-sponsor but the grass-roots will have to do its part too with letters and phone calls. When an elected representative reads the actual text of the bill, there is really very little they could be opposed to -- after all, everyone is against forced prostitution and trafficking of women (with the exception of the corrupt Thai police and brothel owners profiting from it). It's just focusing their attention to get them to co-sponsor that is difficult. Please take the time to write or call your Senators to tell them to examine the bill and co-sponsor it. If they want additional information on this situation in Thailand, they should talk to Human Rights Watch/Asia in Washington, D.C. at (202) 371-6592. The report they want to obtain from them is called "A Modern Form of Slavery: Trafficking of Burmese Women and Girls into Brothels in Thailand". It's very comprehensive in detailing this horrible situation. According to Slaughter's staffperson, Kate Keplinger, Human Rights Watch/Asia was thrilled to learn about the introduction of the bill in the Senate and will also be making calls to Senate offices. I will be continuing to monitor the situation and staying in touch with Murray and Slaughter's staff. You can reach me at (301) 270-1009 (h), (202) 778-4517 (w) or reaproy@cais.com for updates. Thanks for your interest -- good luck! Cheers, Phil Robertson ------------------------------------------------------------------ 104th CONGRESS 1st Session S. CON. RES. 12 Expressing the sense of the Congress concerning the trafficking of Burmese women and girls into Thailand for the purposes of forced prostitution. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 4 (legislative day, May 1), 1995 Mrs. Murray submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of the Congress concerning the trafficking of Burmese women and girls into Thailand for the purposes of forced prostitution. Whereas credible reports indicate that thousands of Burmese women and girls are being trafficked into Thailand with false promises of good paying jobs in restaurants or factories, and then forced to work in brothels under slavery-like conditions that include sexual and physical violence, debt bondage, exposure to HIV, passport deprivation, and illegal confinement; Whereas credible reports also indicate that members of the Thai police force are often actively involved in, and profit from, the trafficking of Burmese women and girls for the purposes of forced prostitution; Whereas the United States Government conducts training programs for the Thai police and United States arms and equipment are sold to the Thai police; Whereas the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women requires all States Parties `to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women'; Whereas Article 1 of the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery calls for the complete abolition or abandonment of debt bondage; Whereas forced labor, defined under the 1930 Forced Labor Convention as `all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily,' is internationally prohibited; Whereas the 1949 Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others finds the traffic in persons for the purposes of prostitution `incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person,' and calls on States Parties to punish any person who procures for the purposes of prostitution, keeps, manages or knowingly finances a brothel, or rents premises for the prostitution of others; Whereas Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck has testified that the United States `urgently needs to encourage countries in which trafficking of women and children goes on with impunity to enact new laws, and to enforce existing laws. A particular target of this stepped-up law enforcement should be government officials who participate in or condone trafficking, as well as brothel owners and traffickers'; and Whereas Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated before the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights that `(g)uaranteeing human rights is a moral imperative with respect to both women and men': Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that-- (1) trafficking in persons violates the fundamental principle of human dignity, and forced prostitution involving physical coercion or debt bondage constitutes a form of forced labor and a slavery-like practice; (2) the United States State Department should continue to press the Thai Government to strictly enforce all laws that can lead to the prosecution of those involved in trafficking and forced prostitution, including procurers, traffickers, pimps, brothel owners, and members of the Thai police who may be complicit; (3) the State Department should ensure that Thai police participants in United States Government-sponsored police training programs are systematically vetted to exclude those who are implicated in trafficking and forced prostitution; (4) the executive branch should take steps to assure that weapons and equipment provided or sold to the Thai police do not become available to members of those forces who might be involved in trafficking, forced prostitution, or abuse of women and girls who are apprehended; (5) the State Department should urge the Thai Government to protect the rights and safety of Burmese women and girls in Thailand who are freed from brothels or who are arrested as illegal immigrants because their status as trafficking victims is unclear; (6) the United States Agency for International Development should target a portion of its assistance to Thailand for AIDS prevention and control to the foreign population in Thailand, particularly Burmese women and girls in the Thai sex industry; and (7) the State Department should report to Congress, within 6 months of the date of this resolution, on actions that it has taken to advocate that the Thai Government implement the above steps. ===== item ===== PAPER by THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF BURMA Position Paper on the ASEAN Meeting Scheduled for July 21, 1995 in Brunei. INTRODUCTION: The National Council of the Union of Burma [NCUB] is the largest umbrella organization of Burmese opposition groups. The four groups that compose the NCUB represent the overwhelming majority of the organized Burmese political opposition to the military dictatorship of the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] . The four component groups are the: - National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma [NCUB]: A parallel government composed of representatives elected in the 1990 elections. - National Democratic Front [NDF]: A coalition group composed of the ethnic minority organizations. - Democratic Alliance of Burma [DAB] : A coalition group composed of both ethnic minority groups and multi-ethnic pro-democracy groups. - National League for Democracy[ NLD liberated area ]: The political party that captured 80% of the parliamentary seats in the May 1990 elections. The National Council of the Union of Burma [NCUB] recognizes the Association of South East Asian Countries [ASEAN] as the most important regional organization in this part of the world. Although a regional organization, the position and policies of ASEAN have direct and important internal effects on each country in the region. Recognizing the full significance of the role of ASEAN in regional affairs, and more specifically, the significant effects of ASEAN policy on the country of Burma, the NCUB, as the largest umbrella organization of Burmese opposition groups, submits this Position Paper regarding ASEAN's upcoming July 21, 1995 meeting. NCUB POSITION NUMBER ONE: The NCUB strongly objects to the invitation extended by ASEAN to the SLORC military dictatorship of Burma to attend the upcoming ASEAN meeting as an observer. NCUB asks ASEAN to withdraw this invitation. Analysis of Position Number One: ASEAN has been engaged in an official policy of "constructive engagement" with the SLORC military dictatorship in Burma. This policy was designed to stimulate significant improvement in the human rights situation and to promote the democratization of Burma through a series of mainly business contacts and connections between the ASEAN nations and the country of Burma. Unfortunately, the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC], which holds power illegally in Burma, has not responded to this policy of constructive engagement. The situation in Burma concerning human rights and democratization is as bad today as it was when the ASEAN policy of constructive engagement began. This is easily demonstrated by reviewing facts such as: -Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has not been released. This is a stain on the reputation of all of South East Asia. The only Nobel laureate anywhere in the world being held under arrest is held by a South East Asian government. -No effort is being expended by SLORC to implement the results of the May 1990 election. All international observers and SLORC itself admits this was a free and fair election which expressed the will of the people of Burma . But SLORC has consistently refused to recognize the results of this election, thereby turning itself into an illegal regime. -Instead of trying to implement the results of the May 1990 election, SLORC has attempted to hold a so-called " National Convention" to write a sham constitution that will permanently enshrine the military as the real government of Burma. SLORC knows that no such constitution would ever be approved in a free and fair referendum of the people of Burma. So it has resorted to the bogus and illegitimate device of calling a so-called "National Convention," which consists of delegates picked by and approved by SLORC. A smattering of token, so-called "opposition" delegates also approved by SLORC were cynically thrown into the process in a failed attempt to convey legitimacy on the bogus "National Convention". [ However, even with this hand-picked body, opposition to the SLORC military dictatorship runs so deep in Burmese society, that the so-called National Convention has so far refused to turn out a document acceptable to SLORC despite several years of work ] -The human rights situation in Burma has not improved. For example, in March 1995, Amnesty International released another report detailing how the SLORC government continues to systematically subject many thousands of its citizens to back breaking forced labor in order to move military supplies for the army and to build government construction projects. Once again, SLORC creates a stain on the reputation of all of South East Asia which now becomes the only region of the world where the practice of temporary enslavement of the population is employed by a government. This barbaric practice has been abandoned everywhere in the world except in the South East Asia country of Burma, and by inviting SLORC as an observer to the Brunei meeting, ASEAN will be seen by many as accepting temporary enslavement as a legitimate device of government . Such a perception can only hurt ASEAN's international reputation. SLORC's treatment of ethnic minorities has not improved. We need look no further than the latest offensive conducted against the Karen minority, to see an example of SLORC's continuing anti- minority policy at work. In December 1994, SLORC abruptly broke its own declared cease fire in the Karen area and launched a full scale military offensive against the Karens. In February 1995, the SLORC army eventually succeeded in occupying Marneplaw, the Karen capital, in February 1995 and in pushing thousands of Karen refugees over the border into Thailand. In order to carry out this operation, SLORC armed and financed a small bland of break- away Karens, establishing them as a SLORC ethnic front organization under the name of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization [DKBO]. This is an example of the cynical divide and rule policy that SLORC employs when dealing with Burma's ethnic minorities. Force , bribery, and the creation and stimulation of internal rivalries and divisions continue to be the hallmarks of SLORC's ethnic minority policy. Lasting peace in Burma can never come from such a policy - no matter how many temporary cease- fires are signed by ethnic groups under military duress. --------- Purely token gestures such as the recent SLORC release of several illegally imprisoned political opponents should be noted for what they are: cynical gestures designed to demonstrate bogus human rights improvement, at the politically correct moment, when in reality SLORC has shown no intention of improving Burma's human rights disaster. Merely let any one of the small handful of recently released prisoners try and exercise their universally accepted human right to publicly criticize their government, and SLORC's reaction would tell the true current story of human rights in Burma. In summary, SLORC has thumbed its nose at the ASEAN policy of constructive engagement .It has not followed through in any meaningful way on the democratization and human right's reforms that the policy of constructive engagement was designed to encourage . The military dictatorship of Burma should not be rewarded for this behavior with an invitation as an observer to the July 21st ASEAN meeting . The NCUB at this time formally urges ASEAN to retract the invitation at the earliest possible moment. NCUB POSITION NUMBER TWO: The NCUB urges ASEAN to either scrap its policy of constructive engagement, or at the very least, to modify the policy to make its continuance conditional on specific actions begin taken on the part of SLORC that would demonstrate a genuine commitment to making progress on the critical issues of human rights and democratization in Burma.[ The release of Aung San Suu Kyi would be an example of such an action.] Analysis of Position Number Two : Since the current policy of constructive engagement with SLORC was started by ASEAN, the following results can be listed: -No perceptible improvement in human rights or democratization. -A flood of opium production. Between 1988 when SLORC first took power and 1993, opium production in Burma more than doubled to 2,500 tons and this year some experts are predicting a record opium crop approaching the 4,000 ton level. Burma, under SLORC, is the growing, undisputed number one source of opium in the world. Once again the Southeast Asia region receives a stain on its international reputation because of the policies adopted by the Burmese military dictatorship . -A flood of refugees. Hundreds of thousands of Burmese refugees prefer to live in primitive refugee camps in Thailand rather than live in Burma under a brutal military dictatorship which has a policy of respecting neither human rights nor the rights of ethnic minorities .Hundreds of thousands of Burmese refugees are also to be found on the Bangladesh border as a direct result of SLORC's long-standing policy of discrimination against its Muslim minorities. -More regional instability. After the military offensive against Marneplaw , SLORC troops or members of ethnic SLORC front organizations crossed the river forming the international boundary with Thailand to kill, kidnap and rob refugees . This was a direct threat to the sovereignty of its neighbor, and Thailand closed its border with Burma on April 22. Explosion in the size of the army at the expense of national development. Even though it faces no current military threat from its neighbors, SLORC has added 150,000 men to its armed forces which now stands at 350,000. This staggering increase in military size has been necessary because SLORC is an illegal government, overwhelmingly rejected by the people of Burma in the May 1990 elections, and SLORC can only stay in power by deploying massive military force against its own people. As a result, SLORC spends 70% of the national budget on the armed forces in order to control the people of Burma who demonstrated in a free and fair election that they do not want SLORC to be their government. This leaves a pitifully inadequate 30% to be spent on national development. This is a very inappropriate way to try and run a modern nation. As can be seen by reviewing the list above, the results of the ASEAN policy of constructive engagement have not been encouraging. In fact, the results have been nothing short of disastrous for the great majority of the people of Burma, as well as for the reputation of the Southeast Asian part of the world. Only firm coordinated international and regional pressure against SLORC will change the situation for the better. For this reason, the NCUB proposes that at the July 21 meeting, ASEAN countries carefully reviews the policy of constructive engagement with an eye towards abolishing it because it has been a manifest failure in causing any constructive change in the behavior of the SLORC military dictatorship. At the very least, ASEAN countries should consider modifying constructive engagement by making continuance of that policy contingent on SLORC taking certain clear, well- defined actions [ such as the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi ] that would demonstrate a genuine commitment to change and reform . NCUB POSITION NUMBER THREE: The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma [NCGUB] should be invited, as an observer, to the July 21 ASEAN meeting. Analysis of Position Number Three: Both the SLORC and the NCGUB are governments with defects. The primary defect of SLORC is that it is an illegal government. It was openly and overwhelmingly rejected by the people of Burma and it continues to rule through force of arms only, which is to say it continues to rule illegally. The primary defect of the NCGUB is that it does not physically control the majority of the territory of Burma. The NCGUB nevertheless has the stronger legal claim to be the current legitimate government of Burma in that its members were at least elected to positions in the Burmese parliament by the people of Burma in the free and fair elections of May 1990. In a battle between defective governments, ASEAN should not be seen as favoring guns and force over ballots and free elections. The minimum required in this situation is a parallel invitation to the NCGUB, if SLORC is to be accorded observer status. NCUB POSITION NUMBER FOUR: Regardless of how the question of SLORC's attendance at the July 21, 1995 ASEAN meeting is resolved, ASEAN should use all of its available influence to persuade the SLORC: 1. to release unconditionally and immediately Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who is now in her sixth year of detention trial, and other political prisoners, as is specifically called for in UN General Assembly Resolution 49/100 of 13 December 1994, paragraph 4. 2.to take all necessary steps towards the restoration of democracy in accordance with the will of the people as expressed in the democratic elections held in May 1990, as is specifically called for in UN General Assembly Resolution 49/100 13 December 1994, paragraph 7. 3.to permanently dissolve the so-called "National Convention". This is a meeting of "delegates", (none of whom are elected by the people to be delegates for the purpose of writing a constitution, all of whom have been carefully pre-screened and pre-selected by SLORC) whose declared purpose is to prepare a national "constitution". The critical portions of this sham document have already been predetermined by the SLORC military dictatorship, and those critical portions naturally ensure continuing military control of the government in violation of the express will of the people voiced in the 1990 elections. The so- called National Convention should be permanently dissolved because in terms of legitimacy it is as illegal and illegitimate as the illegal body -- SLORC - that called it into being and controls its every move. 4.to initiate a " substantial political dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and other leaders, including representatives from ethnic groups " as expressly called for in UN General Assembly Resolution 49/100 of 13 December 1994 , paragraph 5. 5.to engage in this "substantial political dialogue " under the supervision of the UN secretary General or his representative. 6.to engage in substantive political dialogue with armed ethnic organizations which lead to a political settlement of the political problem underlying the long civil war, rather than simply a military ceasefire. Analysis of Position Number Four: The four numbered points 1,2,4& 5 above, which NCUB calls upon ASEAN to adopt at its July 21 meeting, require no analysis. They are well established positions that the international community, through the United Nations General Assembly has strongly endorsed, and they are positions which ASEAN, in its critical role as the leading regional organization in the South East Asia community, is undoubtedly well familiar with and should be ready to support with formal resolutions. With regard to point 6 above, it has always been the position of the opposition alliance that the political problems of Burma can only be solved by political means. The most appropriate approach to finding such a solution is for there to be a process of political settlement involving all the political and ethnic organizations. Unfortunately the SLORC has always refused to agree to negotiate with any opposition organizations other than the armed ethnic organizations, separately. Some ethnic organizations have negotiated ceasefires separately with the SLORC, some because of external pressure, some because of the intolerable level of suffering of their people during the long war, some because they have been prepared to see the ceasefire as a necessary precondition for political dialogue. What is clear, however, is that these ceasefires have not produced anything more than an unstable end to hostilities. They do not end human rights abuses by the Burmese military in ethnic areas, they do not open the way to economic development, nor have they opened the way to the necessary political dialogue other than an invitation from the SLORC to attend their so-called National Convention. The SOLRC must be persuaded that the negotiation of any ceasefire must be a process of political dialogue which moves towards genuine peace through a nation-wide ceasefire and a national political settlement. Point 3 above , calling for a permanent dissolution of the so- called National Convention, may, however, be less familiar to some ASEAN members, and the NCUB therefore offers the following facts and analysis concerning this so-called "National Convention". To fully understand the fraudulent nature of the so-called "National Convention", it is first necessary to return to the events preceding the nationwide multi-party elections held on May 27, 1990. These national elections were set up in response to statements made in a public speech by General Saw Maung, the Chairman of SLORC, eighteen months earlier on September 23, 1988. This speech was made just five days after SLORC had seized power in Burma and the Chairman, on behalf of SLORC, promised as follows: "We have no intentions to hold on power indefinitely .All the armed forces personnel, my colleagues and I would like to solemnly promise not to hold on power for a long time. We will not break this promise for any reason. Moreover, we additionally promise that the armed force, after transferring power to a democratically elected civilian government which will emerge from a free and fair election, shall perform its principle tasks of defence, security of the state and maintaining law and order and etc." Subsequently, SLORC issued an election decree that called for nationwide multi-party elections to held on May 27, 1990 for a People's Assembly. During the approximately 14 month period of electioneering activity preparatory to the elections, SlORC gave state funds and numerous other forms of state support to the National Unity Party [ NUP]. It was an open secret known to the overwhelming majority of Burmese citizens and to the diplomatic community in Rangoon that the NUP was the political party supported by SLORC. SLORC apparently believed that the use of significant amounts of state resources to support the NUP, combined with severe restrictions placed on the opposition parties [ for example , putting Aung San Suu Kyi, the leading opposition figure, under house arrest during much of the electioneering period] would insure a dominant NUP presence in the new people's Assembly. When the results of the May 27, 1990 election were tallied , however ,the NUP won only a minuscule 10 out of the 485 seats. It was thus clear that the will of the overwhelming majority of the Burmese people was that political parties not connected to SLORC should control the new People's Assembly. The Burmese people now waited for SLORC to announce when it would carry out its promise to transfer power to the newly elected People's Assembly which would then form an interim government. Instead , on May 30 ,1990 , SLORC issued a formal statement containing two parts . In the first part SLORC acknowledged that, " We have carried out significant, free and fair multi-party election." In the second part, SLORC made the following enigmatic statement: "Nevertheless, we have not yet finished our task. What we have to realize is that, until and unless legitimate government has been formed, we have to take responsibility for peace and maintaining law and order in the country". It soon became clear that SLORC would not allow the People's Assembly [ a body it had created and named itself] to meet . The promise publicly made by SLORC to the Burmese people and the international community on September 23, 1988, to transfer " power to a democratically elected civilian government which will emerge from a free and fair election" would simply not be honored by SLORC if it could not control the People's Assembly. This situation nevertheless left the military dictatorship with a very difficult problem. By refusing to honour the results of a multi-party election, that SLORC itself had officially labeled "free and fair", SLORC had turned itself into a completely illegal government. It no longer had the pretext that its power seizure was a legitimate temporary emergency measure designed to prepare the way for multi -party elections. The first outline of how SLORC would try deal with the problem of its own illegitimacy after the elections of May 1990 came to light on June 1, 1990 at a press conference. SLORC announced: " Multi- party democracy election was successfully held on May 27. However, until strong government has been formed constitutionally, we have to take responsibility... The new constitution must be drawn by the representatives from the winning political parties; and, accordingly, the power will be transferred to that legitimate government." This June 1, 1990 statement revealed for the first time SLORC 'S newly declared objective of writing a "new constitution" and then transferring power to the "government" formed under this new constitution. This idea of writing a "new constitution" was a radical alteration of everything that had been promised and planned before. The elections of May 27, 1990 had been for a people's Assembly according to SLORC's own election decree. This legislative body was to have received power from SLORC, formed an interim government, and only then decided which method and which timetable Burma would use in writing a new constitution. Not only was SLORC 'S newly declared need for a new constitution, before power could be transferred, a blatant example of changing the rules in the middle of the game, SLORC's announced method of writing this new constitution, by using "the representatives from the winning political parties", was equally illegitimate. These "winning representatives" had been elected by the people of Burma for the express purpose of forming a People's Assembly to govern Burma on an interim basis until a constitution was written some time in the future. Not one of these "winning representatives" had been elected by the people for the purpose of writing a constitution. They had been elected to serve in a People's Assembly, a legislature, not serve in a Constituent Assembly, a constitution writing body. This new SLORC objective [ a constitution ] and the SLORC method for writing the constitution [ using the representatives elected to form the People's Assembly for the completely different purpose of writing a constitution ] were both formally declared by SLORC in its Order No. 1/90 dated July, 1990. As to method for writing the constitution, SLORC could not have been clearer when it declared in paragraph 20 of Order No. 1/90 that: "the representatives elected by the people are those who have the responsibility to draw up the constitution of the future democratic state". Despite its formal written statement in Paragraph 20, however, SLORC could not use the representatives elected in May 1990 to write the constitution and still remain in power. Given the huge outpouring of anti-SLORC sentiment expressed in the May elections, quite clearly any constitution - writing body composed of people elected to parliamentary seats on May 27 1990 would write a constitution depriving SLORC, and the group of military officers whose interests SLORC represented, of power. It was obvious to most observers then in the summer of 1990 that SLORC would have to find another method- other than using freely elected representatives of any type- to try and obtain its declared objective of a new constitution. A long period of waiting subsequently ensued to see what scheme or new method SLORC would attempt to devise for writing a "constitution" that allowed the military officers to control the government. The waiting finally ended after nearly two years on April 24, 1992 when SLORC issued declaration No 11/92. This declaration announced an entirely new body that had never been heard of previously: the "National Convention". [ All mention of the People's Assembly, and all mention of paragraph 20 in Order 1/90, with "its representatives elected by the people" language, had simply disappeared from any official communications.] The purpose of this new body was to draw a new constitution, and a preliminary meeting of the National Convention was called for on June 23, 1992. The most significant part of this newest SLORC initiative, however, was not the call for drawing up a new constitution, an objective which SLORC had, after all, formally announced nearly two years earlier. Most attention was quite properly focused instead on how the delegates to this National Convention would be chosen. The methods employed by SLORC to ensure complete control of the so-called National Convention could not have been more blatant. There orders decreed that 702 delegates would attend. Of these, 603 delegates would be chosen directly by SLORC. The remaining 99 delegates would come from among the 485 representatives elected to serve in the never assembled People's Assembly two years previously - but exactly which 99 would attend the so-called National Convention would also be a decision made by SLORC. In addition, the entire delegate selection process was shrouded in deep secrecy. There was no explanation for how the totals of 702, 603 and 99 had been arrived at or what they were based on. There was no explanation of what criteria SLORC would use to pick these delegates (other than certain fixed numbers of delegates would come from broad undefined sectors of the society like "peasant groups" or the "intelligentsia"). To this day there is no list of the delegates who are attending the so-called National Convention, and equally ominous, no list of the numerous delegates who have withdrawn from or been kicked out of the so- called National Convention in the nearly three years its various proceedings have dragged on. In spite of having near absolute control of the delegates attending and of the procedures used at this sham meeting, SLORC, realizing the depth of its unpopularity among all sectors of Burmese society outside the military, felt it had to take one additional step to ensure it got a governing document that would give it a permanent grip on power in Burma. Accordingly, in SLORC's official National Convention Procedural Code [ January 1, 1993], the 702 delegates were ordered to limit their discussion to a document that would guarantee "Participation of the military in the leading role of national politics in the future". In other words, merely controlling the entire delegate selection process was not enough insurance for the worried SLORC generals. They felt only by predetermining the outcome of the "convention" in writing, in advance could they prevent their own picked delegates from perhaps rebelling and turning out a constitution that did not contain clauses designed to perpetuate an indefinite grip on power by the military clique that composes SLORC. This so-called national convention is a slap in the face of the entire international community. For SLORC to believe that such a transparently controlled and manipulated constitution drawing process could result in the international community eventually accepting the armed forces as the legal and legitimate government of Burma, is to show the depth of contempt SLORC holds for accepted international norms of governmental behavior, and indeed for the intelligence of the world community. The proper response from important international organizations, such as ASEAN, is to call on SLORC to cease its sham constitution writing process immediately, to dissolve the so-called National Convention, and, in its place, to engage in the "substantial political dialog" with Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders urged by the United Nations General Assembly. CONCLUSION: We, the NCUB, the largest umbrella group of Burmese opposition groups, urge ASEAN to review the situation in Burma from a perspective of justice and human suffering. The people of Burma spoke clearly in the free and fair election of May 27, 1990. That election ended any emergency period in which SLORC could legitimately claim to be governing Burma for the purpose of overseeing free and orderly multi-party elections. When on May 30, 1990, SLORC first indicated that it would not turn power over to the newly elected People's Assembly, from that day forward, SLORC became and remains to this day an illegal and illegitimate government. This illegal government, in spite of having no significant foreign enemies, has built an army of 350,000 men whose main role in Burmese society is to maintain the illegal government in power against the clearly expressed will of the Burmese people. SLORC's armed forces are little more than armed jailers and the people of Burma are SLORC's prisoners. SLORC's armed forces commit systematic and brutal human rights abuses all over the country [ a fact documented repeatedly by the United Nations and Amnesty International ]. SLORC's armed forces attempt to solve the problem of the ethnic minorities by using repeated military offensives, such as the one just completed against the Karens_ offensives that drive tens of thousands of Burmese people over neighboring borders as destitute refugees. SLORC's armed forces drain away such a high percentage of national wealth that Burma has become one of the poorest and least developed countries in its region. Yet these same brave armed forces, so successful at attacking defenseless civilians or outnumbered and under equipped guerrilla forces, are somehow strangely impotent when it comes to controlling the rampant opium production that has made Burma the world's number one opium producer. The people of Burma are suffering under the yoke of an illegal military dictatorship. We urge you as matter of simple justice to please consider the suffering such a government is inflicting on the enslaved Burmese people, and we ask you not to invite SLORC to the July 21 ASEAN meeting as an observer, to review the policy of constructive engagement in light of the facts indicating its failure to modify SLORC behavior, and to formally adopt at your July 21 Meeting the five resolutions we have suggested in this position paper. April 28, 1995 ===== item ===== To all NCUB members, ABSDF representatives and friends, The above mentioned NCUB position paper is compiled by the NCUB Campaign Committee. It was outlined by all concerned leaders from various pro-democracy groups of the NCUB, in order to organize the ASEAN countries through the Nations from Seven Dialogue Partners of ASEAN. Here we urge all NCUB members in different countries to effectively organize each concerned country in solidarity as a part for the struggle for restoration of democracy in Burma. "Down with military dictatorship" Sincerely yours, Win Min Joint-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Central Committee, ABSDF Tel/Fax: 66 2 379 2002 ===== item ===== A MEETING OF NCUB'S CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE ON 21/5/95 (? ed.) It was attended by: 1. U Khine Soe Naing Aung NCUB secretary/NDF Secretary 2. U Tin Maung Win NCUB member/CRDB Chairman 3. Moe Thee Zun NCUB member/ABSDF Chairman(ABSDF-MTZ) 4. Aung Htoo ABSDF Secretary-1(ABSDF-NA) 5. Saw Ka like KNU Foreign Affairs 6. Ko Maung Maung FTUB 7. Ko Than Lwin DSF Topic Discussed: A CAMPAIGN FOR ASEAN MEETING Resolution: 1. To object to the invitation for the Slorc to attend the forthcoming ASEAN meeting in July under observer status. 2. To submit a report on Slorcs inhuman deeds which is compiled by all opposition groups under this NCUB Campaign Committee, in solidarity, to this ASEAN meeting. 3. Approach to organize the ASEAN members through the Seven Dialogue Partners of ASEAN. 4. Establish four main workshops: Workshop In Charge Nations Workshop 1- U Tin Maung Win Singapore, United states, India, Japan Moe Thee Zun Workshop 2- Aung Htoo Germany, Canada, Australia Ko Than Lwin Workshop 3- Saw Ka Lite U Maung Maung Lat United Kingdom, Japan, Indonesia, Brunei Workshop 4- U Tun Oo France, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, U Maung Maung Philippine For more information please contact here. Foreign Affairs Office ABSDF Bangkok Thailand (379 2002) Date: 25th April, 1995 ===== item ===== NOTES ON KAREN REFUGEE SECURITY 1.5.95 Notes for discussion concerning the security and ************************************************* protection of Karen refugees ***************************** Background: ---------- The problem of refugees on the Thai-Burma border became a significant one with an influx of about 10,000 in 1984 as a result of an increase in fighting between the Burmese army and the armies of the ethnic groups of the border region. In response, a simple but effective relief operation was set up to provide food and medical assistance through a small group of NGOs. The nature of the relief operation was determined by Thai reluctance to accept international attention which would have resulted from a call for UN assistance. From the Thai viewpoint, a locally managed, limited programme of assistance would facilitate early voluntary repatriation as soon as the fighting ceased. At the appropriate time, it would be necessary only to provide transport and basic supplies to help the refugees to re- establish themselves. From the humanitarian viewpoint also there were seen to be advantages. Such a system ensured that basic needs were met but self reliance and self respect maintained. The refugees' culture was not much affected and the community would not become aid-dependent. Of course it was assumed the problem was a short-term one. But such was not to be the case. By the end of 1991 there were 55,000 and by now there approximately 95,000 refugees inside the Thai border. Reconsideration of the value of international protection -------------------------------------------------------- There was always the potential for a conflict of interest between the Thai government and the refugees. It might occur over the level and kind of assistance provided but it was always more likely to occur over timing and associated condition for repatriation [i.e. whether it has become appropriate safe for them to returned and whether satisfactory provision has been made for their re-integration into the Burmese community]. Such a conflict occurred during 1994 when a situation arose in which it was clear that Thai policy of non-internationalization was allowing the threat of repatriation of refugees to be used as political leverage against the Mon and Karen regarding the negotiation of ceasefires with the SLORC . Precipitate involuntary repatriation was seen as a clear possibility following the achievement of cease-fires. The issue initially was whether the refugees should be regarded as `displaced by war' [in which case it could be argued, as Thai authorities did, that repatriation was appropriate once hostilities had ceased] or as `refugees from persecution ' [ in which case they should be protected from return to likely further persecution]. It was argued at that time that despite non-internationalization of the Thai-Burma border refugee regime, the de-facto refugees should be regarded as subject to international protection and that repatriation should occur only in accordance with international protection principles which specifically preclude involuntary repatriation. The issue of the status of the Mon refugees came to ahead, however, in mid 1994 when Mon refugees, who had been repatriated in late 1993 to a location just inside the Burma border, were attacked by SLORC troops and fled again into Thailand. At that time it was argued that the physical security of the refugees could only be achieved by allowing them to remain in Thailand . It was assumed that whether or not subject to formal international protection, their physical security could be assured by their being located inside Thailand. Security and protection for refugees ------------------------------------ The current crisis in the Karen refugee camps arises from attacks on de-facto refugees inside Thailand. Being inside Thailand clearly is not a guarantee of security. There are approximately 75,000 Karen refugees currently in camps inside Thailand along the Thai-Burma border as a result of the long-running civil war and systematic abuse of the civilian population by the Burmese military. This includes approximately 10,000 recent arrivals who fled Burma as a result of the recent military offensive by SLORC troops against the KNU and the resulting withdrawal of the KNU from its headquarters at Manerplaw and its base at Kawmoorah. The refugees have been allowed by the Royal Thai government to take refuge in Thailand and have been cared for by the Karen Refugee Committee with the help of a consortium of NGOs working in conjunction with the Thai authorities. Their welfare is monitored informally by representatives of Bangkok -based embassies and from time to time by a representative of the UNHCR. In the past, the security of the refugees has not been a major problem . Before the recent offensive against Manerplaw, security of the Karen refugees was not a major problem because the KNU controlled most of the Salween -Moei river border. Undoubtedly the loss by the KNU of that control has totally changed the situation. Immediately following the recent SLORC offensive, SLORC troops, together with renegade Karen who defected from the KNU to the SLORC, began intruding into Thai territory, harassing unarmed refugees, distributing leaflets urging Buddhist refugees to return to Burma, threatening to destroy refugee camps and even abducting refugees. A number of deaths occurred as a result. These actions caused fear and confusion amongst the refugees. Many fled from established camps to new and less accessible locations and, in many camps, the refugees are still struggling to complete the establishment of adequate shelter in advance of the coming wet season. The earlier threats to the security of the refugees caused by the intrusion of SLORC troops into Thailand, and efforts by the SLORC to force the refugees to return to Burma, prompted the KNU, on 25th February, to appeal for monitoring of the refugee situation on the Thailand-Burma border by an appropriate international body. Subsequent announcement by the Thai military that they would take steps to secure the camps were welcomed by the KNU. It is known that the UNHCR requested the Thai government for permission to play at least a nominal monitoring role through the placement of a protection officer somewhere near the border, but as yet there is no official response. At first the incidents of harassment were frequent and frightening, and after some delay arrangements were made for camp security which seemed appropriate. It was hoped that the situation would stabilize once it was made clear to the SLORC that such incursions would be resisted unfortunately, the SLORC has chosen instead to send larger armed groups which are able to overcome the security provided, and these larger armed groups have been able to carry out their harassment on a much larger scale. Obviously with hindsight, we can say that the security measures were not adequate. The underlying cause of the current insecurity of Karen refugees ---------------------------------------------------------------- It must be recognized that what is happening now in the camps in Thailand is an extension of the Burmese civil war into Thailand. In a sense, what we have seen in the camps in the last few weeks is what the Karen civilians have had to live with in Burma for a long time. The SLORC has been trying for a long time to defeat the KNU by attacking the civilian population. Inside Burma the SLORC succeeded in making it dangerous for the people to go along with the KNU. The emergence of the DKBO both resulted from and further facilitated SLORC efforts to discredit the KNU amongst the non- Christian section of the Karen community. The internal situation of the KNU may will have contributed to the alienation of many Karen from the KNU, both inside Burma and in the refugee camps. But the people know well what life is like for them in Burma under SLORC control and most have shown they will not willingly return to Burma. Possibly the escalation of violence reflects this i.e. recognition that it is necessary to raise the level of pain in the camps in order that return to Burma, despite its known perils, begins to become a preferred option . The recent escalation of violence against the refugee camps has thrown into question how security of the camps can best be achieved, and how the issue of security should be related to international protection. A number of options have been put forward. 1. Return the refugees to Burma ............................... This option has been put forward most strongly by Thai Army Commander in Chief, General Wimol Wongwanich, who has said that, * If we were not afraid of being criticized by the world community on humanitarian grounds and if it would not give the country problems, then this army chief would take only one week to push them all out, regardless of how many hundreds of thousands of Karens were now in the country. [Bangkok Post 30.4.95] Gen Wimol acknowledged that the Foreign Ministry held a different view on the matter. 2. Re-locate the refugees in a single secure camp ................................................. Again, General Wimol has been most vocal in advocating this option , assuming that his first option is not viable. He has advocated re-location to a site deep inside Thailand, well- protected with a fence and land mines and one or two companies of troops. [Nation 27.4.95, Bangkok Post, 30.4.95] Wimol's re- location plan has the support of the Minister for Interior, Maj Gen Sanan Kachornprasart, and Commander of the Third Army Region [Which has responsibility for that section of the border], Lt Gen Surachat Dechatiwong. 3. Secure the existing camps ............................ One of the obvious problems with the re-location is that it will take time, will be logistically difficult, and may have adverse repercussions on the Thai community in the vicinity of the re- location site. [Bangkok Post 29.4.95, 30.4.95] For these reasons, National Security Council Deputy Chief, Kachadpai Buruspattana, suggested that, " it would be better to make some adjustments at refugee camps which are located at a vulnerable location". Gen Surachat and Gen Wimol apparently believe that this option is the more difficult one to implement. According to Gen Surachat, there were, "so many Karen camps near the border they created a problem for the Third Army to keep the situation in check". [ Bangkok post 29.4.95] Gen Wimol stated that the army was ," unwilling to waste funds and man-funds and man-hours taking care of the refugees " [ Nation 30.4.95] Discussion; =========== 1.Regarding repatriation """""""""""""""""""""""" The KNU has on a number of occasions stated its view that it is undoubtedly in the interests of the refugees that they return to Burma, but insists that this should only occur through a systematic programme of voluntary repatriation in accordance with international principles and practices. On a number of occasions the NGOs, the NDF and the KNU have stated what they believe should be the elements of a satisfactory repatriation programme. Essentially, " In accordance with international guidelines, the repatriation of refugees from Burma must be voluntary and to an area and situation where their safety is ensured. International monitoring, and protection as well as appropriate humanitarian and reintegration assistance must be available "[NGOs, Statement On Repatriation Of Burmese Refugees Staying In Thailand, 1994] Clearly the SLORC also understands what constitutes a proper repatriation programme since the SLORC is currently working in conjunction with the government of Bangladesh and the UNHCR to bring about the voluntary repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Arakan state. The situation in Karen state is different from that of Arakan and it can be argued that implementation of a repatriation programme of this kind for Karen refugees could only occur when a political solution is found to the political problems underlying the long civil war, not just as a result of a temporary ceasefire. That is why the KNU has continued to demand that cease-fire negotiations with the SLORC include negotiation of the necessary political settlement. Arrangement for a satisfactory programme of repatriation and resettlement of refugees and post-repatriation assistance to refugees should be an integral part of cease fire negotiations . 2. Re-location to a new secure camp """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Most of the refugees are rural villagers used to living in small communities. There has always been agreement in the past that although the refugee camps in Thailand look rough, they provide an environment not too much different form the conditions which the people come from. In many case the people are able to make gardens and become at least semi-self sufficient and in these fairly small camps, the people can more or less organize their own lives. Such a system ensured that basic needs were met but self reliance and self respect maintained. The refugees' culture was not much affected and the community would not become independent. One big camp would provide a situation more like the big Cambodia refugee camps in which such self-reliance, self- respect cultural integrity are difficult to maintain. The one big camp solution should only be the last resort. It is up to the KRC in conjunction with agencies of the Royal Thai Government actually responsible for the refugees and their security together with appropriate international agencies to decide if and when that point has been reached. If it appears that re-location deep inside Thailand is the only effective way to provide security, a) it should be implemented in a way which minimizes the undermining of self-reliance, self-respect and cultural integrity, should be accompanied by formal recognition of the refugee status of the camp population and b) it should be administered in conjunction with appropriate international bodies responsible for the protection of refugees such as the UNHCR(The UNHCR has previously proposed that refugees should be moved away from the border.) 3. Securing existing camps """""""""""""""""""""""""" Any large scale relocation is of course a very large logistical problem, made more difficult in the physical circumstances of the Thai-Burma border once the rainy season begins. It may be worth examining carefully the situation, camp by camp. In some case, may be the camp security needs to be reinforced. In other cases, may be a more securable location can be found. If the resources require to make existing camps secure is the major problem, possibly assistance of the international community should be sought in the form of an international security force as well as an international monitoring force. The UNHCR had earlier sought agreement from the Thai government for the placement of a protection officer at the border. Clearly in the current circumstances this would be inadequate and ineffective. In the wake of the recent attacks, the UNHCR in Geneva has expressed its concern at the lack of security (Nation 29.4.95) and the UNHCR representative in Bangkok has stated that, "Bangkok and international community should provide an effective international presence able to provide security to the refugees". (AFP, Bangkok 26.4.95) KNU President Gen Bo Mya has approached the UNHCR in Bangkok asking that the UNHCR provide Karen refugees with "official protection and assistance". It is open for conjecture just what kind of international presence might effectively deter further violent attacks on the refugees. The need for the political solution ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: The SLORC, using the pretext of Karen defectors which it can't be control, has been prepared to allowed armed incursions across the border and harassment of refugees with the declared purpose of bringing about repatriation. In the short term, of course, hopefully Thai government will take the necessary measures to show the SLORC that they are not prepared to tolerate armed forces carrying out armed incursion into Thailand. As well strong signals must be given to the SLORC that repatriation can be placed on the agenda, but that an appropriate path must be followed. The international community must encourage the Thai government to adopt this stance with an indication of willingness to take the pressure of Thailand. The international community must indicate its willingness to provide the necessary resources, to both protect and care for the refugees and at the same time insist in direct input into the design of an appropriate model for the necessary protection and care. It is to be hoped that the current situation will help the authorities in Thailand to acknowledge the reality of the situation inside Burma and greatly expand Thailand's interest in securing a political settlement between the SLORC and the KNU such as will enable the refugees to be safely repatriated, and that it will see the value of mobilizing international and regional support to persuade the SLORC of the need for such an approach. (Compiled by a political academics) -------------------------------------------------------------- BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST BurmaNet regularly receives enquiries on a number of different topics related to Burma. 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