From: BurmaNet ------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------ "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ---------------------------------------------------------- The BurmaNet News: SPECIAL ISSUE - HEARING ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA Issue# 222 September 10, 1995 CONTENTS: ========== STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEF SILVERSTEIN STATEMENT BY HOLLY BURKHALTER STATEMENT BY KENT WIEDEMANN ------------------------------------------ HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Hearing on RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA Thursday, September 7, 1995 - 9.30 AM Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building ---------------------------------------- STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEF SILVERSTEIN Professor Emeritus, Rutgers University September 7, 1995 Recent developments in Burma and U.S.-Burma relations in the light of the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. I greatly appreciate and am honored by the opportunity to testify this morning on recent developments in Burma and U.S. relations in the light of the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. I have been studying, writing and teaching about Burma and Southeast Asia for four decades. I hold degrees from UCLA, 1952, BA with honors,; Cornell University, 1960, Ph.D. I was a member of the faculty at Wesleyan Univ., Conn. 1958-64 and later at Rutgers University, 1964-92. Until 1992, 1 was a Professor II; upon retirement, I was named Professor Emeritus. I was a Fulbright Scholar in Burma in 1955-56 and returned to Burma in 1961-62 as a Senior Fulbright Lecturer at Mandalay University. In addition, I was a Fulbright Senior Lecturer at the University of Malaya in 1967-68 and Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore in 1970-72. Since then, I have made numerous study trips to Southeast Asia and most recently have published widely the results of my research. Two years ago, in 1973, 1 was invited by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific to testify on U.S. Policy Toward Burma. 1. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN BURMA AND ITS BACKGROUND. This hearing comes at an important point in Burma's recent history. You are not alone in trying to understand the reasons for and the implications of the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at this time. Since 1992, the military rulers in Burma, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), have been making changes which have not always been understood by the outside world; were they real or cosmetic? All seem to agree that the military has strengthened its control of the country but, while gaining backing from many states around the world, has not found any support from the people of Burma. Beginning with the 1992 leadership change in SLORC--General Than Shwe replaced General Saw Maung--the ruling junta began releasing political prisoners, allowing the immediate family of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to visit, calling a national convention to begin the process of writing a new constitution, halting its war against the Karens and other minorities and urging all of them to sign ceasefire agreements. It also seemed to be taking a more conciliatory attitude toward the Muslims who fled across the western frontier to Bangladesh by signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN High Commissioner of Refugees about their return. Later, it appeared to be signaling a change in its human rights policy by signing the Hague Conventions and discussing visiting and reviewing domestic prisoner care and rights with the International Red Cross. It continues to open slowly its economy to foreign investment. Other changes have taken place; together, they gave rise to the hope, expressed by many outsiders, that an easing of the military dictatorship is in progress and will be followed by the restoration of democracy and respect for human rights. Many would like to believe that the release from house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi signals the beginning of the return of power to the people. But, is that in fact happening? Is SLORC really easing up and genuinely taking steps to return power while it seeks outside help in developing and modernizing its economy; or is it laying the foundation for a long-term military dictatorship disguised as a constitutional democracy and developing the economy in partnership with foreign investors to enrich its members and friends at the expense of the people. Today, there are signs pointing in both directions. All discussion must begin by examining the political situation as it stands today and its immediate background. It can be argued that SLORC has forced nearly all of the population under its control. The opposition in the heartland is in disarray and disillusioned; its leaders are in prison, exile or missing and presumed dead. Whatever their status, they are silent; with the 1988 decrees limiting public gatherings to no more than four persons and other internal security measures still in place, and as intimidating as they were when SLORC declared them, the people remain fearful and resigned to a long period of military dictatorship. Since 1992, SLORC has slowly revealed its plans for the political future of Burma by assembling a national convention to select delegates to draw up the principles for the future constitution of the nation. Bringing together hand-picked representatives of social classes, political parties and distinguished citizens, it directed them to adopt principles which will give permanent power to the military: 25% of the seats in each house of the future legislature much be reserved for the armed forces; the future president must have long military experience as a major qualification for office; the Minister of Defence must be a member of the military and in times of emergency the head of the armed forces will have power to declare a state emergency and take power; the military budget will not be subject of approval by the elected/appointed legislature. And, to insure that Aung San Suu Kyi will not be able to serve as president, the delegates approved the principle that the office-holder cannot be married to a foreigner and must have lived for 20 continuously in the country. At this juncture in their deliberations, the delegates are being coerced to adopt a political structure which, while appearing to grant some forms of autonomy and recognition to the minorities, will, in fact, erect a unitary state controlled from the top and united in an administrative web with military representatives serving in the legislatures and councils in all subunits. Throughout the more than two years the national convention has been in existence, the military has exercised tight control, binding the delegates by rules which prohibit discussions amongst themselves outside the general session and committee meetings; the sessions appear to be tightly scripted as the delegates are forced to submit all their speeches and reports to the convenors before presentation and are barred from discussing the issues and the workings of the convention with the people, whom they theoretically represent. In the hill areas surrounding the heartland, 13 minority groups which had been at war with the State, some for more than 40 years, have signed cease-fire agreements. Of the remaining two, the Karen National Union (KNU) seem on the verge of signing while the Mong Tai Army of Khun Sa seems determined to fight on as SLORC has not offered it any ceasefire terms. War between the Kayahs and the Burma army re-ignited, despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement because, according to the Kayahs, the Burma army broke the accord. It should be noted that the ceasefire agreements are not surrenders or peace treaties; the SLORC initiated them in 1989, following the breakup of the Burma Communist party. They give the opposition the right to retain weapons, hold its territory, manage its economy and exclude the army from its areas in exchange for a promise from its former enemies to halt their war against the Burma army. All questions are put off until a new constitution is in place and a government is functioning under it. Thus, as in the case of the Kayah, war can resume at any time. It is the inability to discuss any political question which has blocked Karen-Burma army talks in the past and it may yet frustrate the achievement of an agreement. The minority groups, who were at war with SLORC before the national convention was convened, are not represented in its ranks; to be added, they would have to surrender their weapons and change the terms of the ceasefires in political ways; thus far, none are willing to do so. There is a war-weariness in the hill areas working in the army's favor. With the military ruthlessly forcing the villagers to serve the army as porters, to move out of their villages and live under military control, with human rights violations against women, men and children, many of the minorities have come to believe that true peace based on equality will never be achieved; they fear that they will not be included in a democratic constitution-making process where they can work for a federal form of government and gain a degree of autonomy in states of their own and will be unable to preserve and protect their cultures, identities and ways of life. If these fears become reality, war-weariness will be shrugged off and large-scale fighting will resume. It is for these and other reasons that real peace in Burma does not exist. The only vocal opposition, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), is now without a foothold inside of Burma. It came into existence in December 1990, when several elected leaders fled from the Burma heartland to the border area and there, with the backing of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (minorities, monks and student exiles), was recognized as the legitimate government until those elected in 1990 are seated in the national parliament. Although the NCGUB received no international recognition, its ability to travel and raise its voice around the world, especially at the UN, keeps alive the issue of Burma. In November 1993, Thailand, operating under its policy of constructive engagement, closed the Thai-Burma border to the NCGUB and the minority leaders in opposition to SLORC. Thailand's objective was to help SLORC achieve ceasefires and peace in Burma; as a reward, it hoped to regain access to the large cross-border trade it enjoyed before the events of 1988. From its present headquarters in Washington, D.C. and with the radio station, "Radio Free Burma", in Norway, the NCGUB keeps alive the international struggle it is waging on behalf of the people who elected its members to the parliament, SLORC never permitted to assemble. Although SLORC's unity appears to the outside world, to be intact, there are indications suggesting that there may be serious divisions amongst its members. If the divisions are as strong as some suggest, they could have important ramifications for the future. Since the beginning of the changes in 1992, there has been strong rumors and some evidence of disagreement in the top leadership. The failure of a hardline faction, which appears to be centered around officers who made careers as field commanders, to defeat the Karens after SLORC announced that it would do so by March 27, 1992, came the ascendancy of a more moderate faction, headed by Lt. General Khin Nyunt, who made his way to the top through the Intelligence Branch. This group sought to soften the image of the military through reforms discussed above and culminated in November 1993 with a peace campaign aimed at the minorities in revolt. But SLORC failed to achieve its objective and leadership in SLORC appears to be reverting to the hardliners, now under the leadership of General Maung Aye, the second highest ranking officer in the military. The defeat of the Karens in their last stronghold, earlier this year, violated SLORC's 1992 promise to halt its war against the minorities; the Burma army also violated the Thai border when the Burma army and the Karen Buddhists, who defected from the KNU and joined forces in the campaign against the KNU, clashed with the Thais and disrupted Burma-Thailand diplomatic relations. The international dispute carried over into the economic realm Burma closed its border to Thai traders and halted the building of the peace bridge across the Moei River--still closed at the time of writing--which was intended to facilitate trade between the two nations. Evidence for the rise and fall of the two factions is found in the change of leaders in field commands and in the administration in Rangoon as well as in the prominence given to leaders on the pages of the local newspapers. It also must be remembered that, despite its preponderance of personnel and weapons, the Burma army has not done well in the field against organized armed forces; the 1992 failure against the Karens, noted earlier, the recent failure against the army of Khun Sa and its embarrassment over the success of the Mong Tai Army in overrunning and holding Tachilek--on the Burma-Thai border--for a short while, has not matched its success in bullying and brutalizing unarmed villagers. If there is growing factionalism inside of SLORC, which reflects differences in policies as well as personnel, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, which will be discussed below, may have resulted from internal rivalry and the possible triumph of one group over the other. Despite the strong resolutions against Burma passed in the UNGA, UNHRC and the endless reports of human rights violations by NGOs, Burma relations with the outside world continue to improve. Even its unwillingness to comply in spirit and letter of the UN and UNHRC resolutions, has not harmed or interfered with SLORC's determination to pursue its policies as it sees fit. The UNGA 1994 resolution called upon the Secretary General to assist SLORC in national reconciliation; SLORC responded in the world body by saying that the issue was an internal matter; although the representatives of the SG have met four times with SLORC, there is no indication that Burma complied with the resolution. Also, it should be remembered that while SLORC took credit for holding discussions with the Red Cross about access to jails and prisoners and freely check on prison conditions, SLORC refused Red Cross conditions, causing it to withdraw without accomplishing its mission. In spite of the recent border issues and clashes between Burma and Thailand, the latter continues to hold fast to its policy of constructive engagement, welcoming SLORC as a guest of the host of the ASEAN Foreign Minister's meeting in Brunei and took no steps to block ASEAN from accepting Burma's signature on the 1976 Treat of Amity and Cooperation, a first step toward membership. Of equal importance, SLORC agreed to receive an official visit by General Chavolit, a cabinet minister in the new Thai government who, Thailand hopes, will repair the breaches in Burma-Thailand relations. Foreign investment is growing, despite the efforts of the U.S. and others to refuse aid and loans and not encourage private investors. SLORC reports that through mid-May foreign investment, at US$2.6 billion, rose from US$2.38 billion, reported at the end of January. Private investors, especially oil companies, have invested large sums and their discovery of natural gas and its sale to Thailand promises large profits by 1998 for themselves and their partner, MOG, the state oil company of Burma. Thailand and other ASEAN countries have invested heavily in mineral extraction, timbering, hotel construction, department stores and consumer goods. In northern Burma, China has been the major investor in similar pursuits, particularly in Mandalay and near the border. It also provided Burma with large credits to purchase nearly US$2 billion in weapons which the SLORC uses to coerce the people and to fight against the minorities. It has no threatening foreign enemies. The foreign investment figures are deceptive. SLORC never speaks about the amounts actually invested and promised. With a currency that has a fixed rate of approximately 6 kyats to 1 dollar and a blackmarket value of approximately 110 to 1 and with inflation a constant, the kyat has no real value; with Burma's international debt estimated at $5.5 billion, its debt service obligation at approximately 1 billion and its foreign exchange reserves reported at a half billion, Burma is not in a position to allow a free market to exist. Also, with Burma's inability to borrow money from the World Bank and other international institutions, it cannot raise funds in large amounts through normal banking channels and thereby is limited in its ability to stabilize the currency, modernize the banking system and allow international banks to function inside the country alongside local banks. It also is limited in making investments on long-term infrastructure projects such as power plants, water projects, roads and commercial transportation. According to the ADB Annual Outlook (April 1995) industrial growth slowed in 1994; an IMF report in November 1994 indicated a continuous decline in foreign investment from 1990 to 1993; more important, it found a shift from capital to consumer goods in imports and this is reflected by the growing number of hotels, karaoke bars and department stores. Exports have been chiefly in unfinished timber, minerals and agricultural products, suggesting little or no growth in secondary industries and little value-added to the raw produce or conversion to higher level exports. Investors whose products are directed at the local markets, such as soft drink producers, cannot take their profits out directly; instead, they must purchase some local commodity, such as agricultural products or some kind of local manufacture, and export it; the oil and gas companies, who sell their products to foreign purchasers, realize their profits directly from sales. Given this pattern, Burma resources are not fueling industrialization and long term growth. 2. THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI. It is against this background of changing policies and activities that the release from house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi must be seen. The release came unexpectedly. After a visit by Congressman Richardson in May to see Aung San Suu Kyi and talk with the government about her release, he returned certain that it not about to happen and distressed by what he had seen and heard. "My trip to Burma was unsuccessful, frustrating, and disappointing.. .Here is my conclusion after my trip: there is serious repression, regression, and retrenchment by the SLORC in the area of human rights and democratization since the first of the year.... The reasons for her release on July 10 remain unclear. Many argue that the up-coming ASEAN meeting at the end of the month may have been a strong influence; General Than Shwe, the Chairman of the SLORC, met and spoke with Indonesian and Malaysian leaders during his visit to their countries and may have been persuaded of the need for the Burma leadership to make a bold gesture which ASEAN could interpret as being responsive to its constructive engagement policy; and he may have passed the recommendation on to his colleagues in SLORC. There are those who say that after nearly six years of house arrest, SLORC could no longer legally hold her. That argument is valid only if one can show that SLORC is law-abiding. Since, from the time it seized power, it has ruled as it liked on the basis of martial law and picked and chose the laws on the books it wished to observe, this seems to be the weakest of the arguments put forward. More persuasive is the argument that SLORC chose the time to act when it could not be seen as the result of foreign interference. In addition to the rebuff to Congressman Richardson, Gen. Khin Nyunt spoke a week before the release and was reported to have said that the rights of Burma's 45 million people had to come before the rights of "any single person." Thus, despite the resolutions of international bodies and appeals from world leaders, the release was timed to make it appear that it was an internal decision and not the result of outside pressure. There is a second internal factor argument. As suggested above, SLORC is at the peak of its power. It, no doubt, felt strong enough to release Aung San Suu Kyi under conditions it can continue to control. But its power rests on force, not willing compliance with authority. The question of how long this situation will last had to be factored in: there is silent growing discontent in northern Burma over the extent of Chinese penetration of the economy and cultural influence in the Mandalay area. There also is discontent in the rural population over shortages, misrule and abuses. Together these suggest that SLORC had to make a dramatic move in order to keep these forces from exploding and to transform public antagonism into support. There is probably an even more compelling reason for SLORC to have released Aung San Suu Kyi--the need for money. Some have argued that the Japanese tied the resumption of aid and financial grants to her release. They point to the fact that Japan reported her release before anyone else, therefore, implying that there was a linkage between request and decision. Without significant financial changes, the U.S., in particular, and other powerful nations can block the flow of funds, causing SLORC to slowly drown in debt while economic development and progress sputter on; the backing of small friendly nations and tourism will not be enough to overcome the problem. By releasing Aung San Suu Kyi, SLORC made its boldest move. The Japanese quickly came forward, at the end of the ASEAN meeting, and announced resumption of some aid and tied additional aid to further steps toward democratization. Burma now awaits other positive responses. Finally, there is Aung San Suu Kyi's explanation, "I think they had realized that the time was right, and it does help that I had friends all over the world who were working for my release.. People say that it makes no difference, that international pressure gets nowhere but we don't live in an isolated country anymore.. .I think that opinion of other countries, of the international community does matter. And I don't think anybody with any sense can really ignore it." On balance, while the military has the weapons and holds the nation prisoner, Aung San Suu Kyi has the backing of the people. After seven years, this equation has not changed; thus, in order to win the voluntary support of the people, the SLORC needs Aung San Suu Kyi's help; without her, they will never be able to move Burma from a garrison to a political state. 3. WHAT IS UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE UNDER SLORC? When SLORC released Aung San Suu Kyi, it was reported have that her freedom was completely unconditional. Since SLORC has not defined "unconditional," it is well to consider her status since July 10. She is free to leave her house, to have visitors, talk to the international press and to speak at the gate to any and all at the gate to any and all who assemble. She can leave the country and her immediate family can visit her. But is she free? Since obtaining her new status, Aung San Suu Kyi has been exploring the limits of freedom. She hopes it means freedom to talk with SLORC. In her first public statement, she seized upon the phrase in the release order that Gen. Than Shwe would like her help toward achieving peace and stability and saw it as an invitation to dialogue. She responded her readiness to enter into discussion on establishing "certain" principles, recognizing "critical objectives" and "joint approaches to the ills besetting the country..." In a statement reported in the foreign press, she appealed to the minorities to establish mutual trust with SLORC, "It is because they (ethnic minorities) do not have confidence in the central Burmese government that we have all these problems.. .1 feel that establishing trust with the government, showing them that we value them and understand their feelings would enable us to achieve unity... In the end, if they feel they can trust us, I think we can build a strong union." In these and other statements she has signaled to SLORC that she wants to work with the military rulers and find peaceful solutions which all can accept and is even willing to give SLORC the benefit of the doubt. Will this approach open the Burma media to her words and ideas? Will SLORC make any gesture that it is willing to trust her to mediate between itself and the people? Does freedom mean that she can travel about the country without restrictions and organize meetings with her followers? So far, she has only gone outside her house once, and that was to participate in the memorial for the assassination of her father. So far holding meetings with more than four persons is unclear. She is reported to have seen more than that number at one time inside of her house. It seems that so long as people come unannounced to her gate and she calls no formal meetings, numbers do not count. But what if she ventures out, can she call and address meetings of her followers? Will SLORC allow her to visit the minority areas and talk freely with the leaders who, until recently, were at war with the state and now only have the most minimal agreement with the military. That is unclear. What, if any, are the limits of freedom of speech. When she called for foreign investors to wait and see if there are any real changes in Burma, SLORC responded by saying, without mentioning her name, that her comments were contrary to Buddhist principles and "much to the detriment of the nation's interests" It went further and said that the remarks "ran counter to [her] usual rhetoric of forgiveness, unity and cooperation." A week later, Aung San Suu Kyi seemed to have reversed herself by saying that, "There has been a debate over how far pressure and constructive engagement have worked.. .when economics and politics are so closely linked, those who are involved economically can hardly avoid being more positive in bringing about the necessary changes." Does this long-distance debate suggest that she realized that there are limits on how far she can go in criticizing a major government policy--the encouragement of foreign investment--or had she really changed her view on the subject? Thus far, with the exception of a very brief report of her visit to her father's tomb, reported on radio and seen on television, there has been no word of her release in the media. Thus far, there have been no interviews with her by the Burma press and the means of communications, radio and television, have not been made available to her. If the international press--print, radio and television-could be silenced inside of Burma, the people would have no information about her status and what she has told interviewers and reporters. SLORC appears to be applying the same rules to her in regard to freedom of speech as it does to all others. In short, she has no unconditional freedom of speech, only nominal free speech. Aung San Suu Kyi has made no public protest about these and other serious limitations on her freedom. In indirect and nonconfrontational ways, she seems to be testing the meaning of free speech as she is testing other freedoms theoretically available to her. Given the emphasis she has placed on urging her followers to remain united and not give the military cause for worry that her party will fracture and threaten the stability it has imposed, and given the cautious remarks she has made about the next steps she and the people must take in order to recover democratic popular rule, she is giving SLORC no grounds for returning her to house arrest and arresting the people who have rallied publicly to her side since July 10. What of the freedom of outsiders, especially journalists and diplomats, to see and talk with her? Journalists flew in from around the world to interview and report her thoughts with no apparent interference from the military rulers. SLORC may not have liked it, but the Ambassadors of Japan and Thailand have made public visits to her house to see her and, in the case of the latter, brought a symbolic bouquet of roses. But, when the Ambassador of Malaysia tried to organize an ASEAN ambassador's luncheon for her, SLORC said no. Apparently, diplomats can visit her in their independent capacity, but they cannot come as a group as this might be interpreted as giving her a kind of diplomatic recognition; this, SLORC will not tolerate. It should be remembered that much earlier, when ASEAN asked the Philippine Foreign Minister to go on its behalf to Burma and report conditions, SLORC rejected the visit, saying, the FM was welcome to come in his independent capacity, but not as a representative of an organization of States. SLORC also has not allowed the Special Rapporteur of the UNHRC or the representative of the Secretary General to see her, even though both were specifically requested to do so by mandates stemming from the UNHRC and UNGA. Until Aung San Suu Kyi tests the limits further, unconditional freedom must mean partial at best, or nominal at the very least. 3. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA. Two weeks after Aung San Suu Kyi's release, Asst. Secretary of State, Amb. Winston Lord restated U.S. policy toward Burma in testimony before a Senate subcommittee. Its two objectives remain intact: 1. real progress in Burma in human rights, democracy and counternarcotics; 2. better relations with Burma will be based on progress in those three areas. He also repeated, what Dep. Asst. Secretary Tom Hubbard told SLORC a year ago, that U.S.-Burma relations either could improve or worsen, depending on the degree of progress made in the three areas. In the year between the two statements, U.S.-Burma relations seem to be at the same place as a year ago--no better, no worse. There has been no real advance toward democracy; the national convention continues to resist, but slowly does the bidding of SLORC in drafting the principles for a new constitution. The people have not been asked to approve the substitution of the national convention for the parliament and the handpicked delegates for the elected representatives. In the meantime, SLORC continues to rule by decree under martial law, as announced five years ago in Decl. 1/90. Human rights continue to be violated with impunity as political prisoners remain in jail without international verification of their condition. Slave labor continues in the building of the railroad, the clearing of the land where the Unocal-Total pipeline will be laid, in serving the army elsewhere in the country while suffering from brutality, rape and murder; those who are able, flee abroad. This was made eminently clear during the Burma army campaign against the Karens from December through February. There was a decline in opium production this past year, but it did not result from the efforts of SLORC: instead, adverse weather conditions proved successful where all else failed. The U.S. partially funded a joint US-UN-SLORC crop survey and humanitarian aid in opium growing areas, under programs developed by the UNDP and UNDCP and approved by SLORC. With improved weather conditions predicted for this growing season, there is general belief that the size of the crop will increase, once again. The release of Aung San Suu Kyi was a major step forward but, as noted above, it is unclear how free she really is. With other political prisoners still under arrest and no movement by SLORC to start a dialogue with her and her colleagues, the full import of her release is yet to be realized. Amb. Lord said that the U.S. will continue to tie genuine political reforms to development assistance and will not change its policy of suspending direct assistance, opposing lending from international lending institutions and its embargo on arms sales. In the light of Aung San Suu Kyi's release, the U.S. will continue its dialogue with SLORC. In addition, it will solicit her views on the situation in Burma and how the international community can help move Burma forward. The U.S. also will give assistance to the UNDP and UNDCP because Aung San Suu Kyi "has endorsed the development and counternarcotics objectives of these organizations." Amb. Lord said that, "we share Aung San Suu Kyi's view that these and all UN activities in Burma should contribute to promoting democracy in the country." Finally, Amb. Lord said that the Administration needs time to allow dialogue to develop between Aung San Suu Kyi and SLORC and it needs flexibility in responding to changing conditions in Burma. It opposes unilateral trade and investment sanctions at this time because there is no international support for such a move. Amb. Lord made a reasonable case for the Administration's need for flexibility in pursuing its Burma policy. The release of Aung San Suu Kyi is important but, by itself, it does not signal real political change in Burma. Thus far, there is no evidence that her "unconditional" freedom begins to approach the world standard enshrined in the Declaration of Human Rights. It also is important to note that after nearly two months, there have been no other important prisoner releases. There is no evidence that SLORC intends to allow the Pyithu Hluttaw (national parliament), which was elected five years ago, to be seated. There is no evidence that the apparatus of the police state, which has existed since September 18, 1988, is being disassembled. I agree that the Administration should be in a position to respond, once the local situation becomes clearer. But, U.S.-Burma relations should not be seen as a trading match--for each move Burma makes which appears to lead to popular democratic rule, the U.S. will give something in return. Since 1988, U.S. administrations have followed a single policy toward Burma; the Administrations have said repeatedly what they expect to see occur in Burma and Amb. Lord restated that in his last appearance before the Senate. The U.S. must see real change toward democracy; individual acts which gain world attention, but make no meaningful change in the political system or relieve the burden of oppression from the backs of the people are not moves toward democracy. When meaningful change occurs, the U.S. should react, but not before. The answer to change in Burma is money. SLORC has none and having given away natural resources at bargain-basement prices, having allowed the Chinese to establish a commanding position through selling arms and consumer goods, acquiring property in northern Burma and a dominant position over portions of the economy, it still has none. Asian investors have promised that tourism will bring money and oil companies assure SLORC that, once gas begins to flow to foreign purchasers, money will follow. In the meantime, the U.S. and other nations which find SLORC's rule abhorrent have a money weapon which they have only partially used. Blocking Burma from securing large loans from international financial institutions has limited SLORC from revaluing its currency and remodeling its banking system to enable the nation to participate fully in the world financial system. It was reassuring to hear Amb. Lord say, "In the absence of genuine political reforms in Burma, we do not believe it is appropriate to resume development assistance, restore GSP benefits or resume Eximbank and OPIC programs." The U.S. should do more; the Congress and the President should call upon the American business community and businesses in other democratic states to voluntarily halt their investments, grants and loans to Burma, until democratic government is restored and human rights are recognized. All businesses will not comply, but many of the larger ones will respond if they are convinced that it is in the national interest. Finally, we should support the Administration's policy of offering steady and clear support for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's efforts to enter into dialogue with SLORC on the questions of national reconciliation, the restoration of democratic civilian government, the end of human rights abuses, narcotic trafficking and attacks on ethnic groups. Aung San Suu Kyi is the major figure in the politics of Burma. She has the support of the people, she wants the SLORC to realize that she is nonthreatening and that the people will be patient a while longer, if real change is in sight. The Administration is right to focus upon her situation, ideas and efforts and to back them in ways that will not be seen as directly interfering in internal affairs. But, if Aung San Suu Kyi is the key to open the locks that SLORC has placed on the stockades that separate and isolate the people and keep them from enjoying the political and personal rights to which they are entitled, she needs the help of her fellow democrats--leaders and members of her party, nonpartisan leaders and citizens and the leaders and members of the minorities who are silent and unable to freely communicate with her except under very limited circumstances. The U.S. must do what it can to help these people gain freedom to aid and support her as she and they together seek a transition from dictatorship to democracy. //end Prof. Silverstein's testimony// ************************* STATEMENT BY HOLLY BURKHALTER Washington Director Human Rights Watch On Human Rights in Burma September 7, 1995 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for taking the leadership to hold this important hearing on Burma at a most critical time. I also want to thank you for inviting us to testify. My name is Holly Burkhalter and I am the Washington Director of Human Rights Watch. I appear here today on behalf of Human Rights Watch/Asia(formerly Asia Watch). Since 1985, our organization has carried out independent monitoring of human rights in Asia, conducting investigations, publishing repoits, engaging in dialogue with governments, and wherever possible collaborating with and supporting the work of local human rights monitors. Human Rights Watch has consultative status at the United Nations. In my testimony this morning, I would like to give a brief overview of the current human rights conditions in Burma, then outline our recommendations to the international community and the U.S. government. Human Rights Developments The release of Aung San Suu Kyi on July 10, 1995, one day before the end of her legal period of detention, was a welcome move on the part of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Her release comes after years of international pressure on SLORC, including five unanimous resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly and numerous appeals from individual governments, including the United States, Japan, and members of the European Union. The decision to release Aung San Suu Kyi was also a measure of the SLORC's confidence in its ability to hold down the lid on dissent. Indeed, it is difficult to know whether her release will lead to an improvement in the human rights situation in Burma, or whether it may only lead to a further entrenchment of the current military government. This could occur if SLORC succeeds in attracting increased international investment and economic assistance and, as a result, finds less need to respond to calls from the international community for fundamental change. We believe it is certainly far too early to reward the SLORC with further investment and bilateral or multilateral assistance. Just two days after her release, Aung San Suu Kyi said. "In the long run, I think we would need international investment, but I don't think we should rush into this.. .1 want to study the situation very carefully before I can say whether 1 truly believe this is the right time for investment." {1} In late July, Human Rights Watch/Asia published a major report documenting current human rights conditions in Burma. Even while Burma's most prominent democracy leader has been freed, the overall human rights situation in the country is worsening. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recently closed its office in Rangoon after the failure of'negotiations with the Burmese government to allow the organization access to Burma's detention centers. Offensives have been renewed against ethnic minority groups, including the Karenni Nationalities People's Party, which signed a cease-fire agreement with the SLORC in March 1995. In areas where fighting has resumed, tens of thousands of villagers have been forcibly taken from their homes and fields to work for the army. Many have died from beatings and exhaustion. After the fall ofthe Karen National Union headquarters in January 1995, a breakaway group of ethnic Karen Buddhists, which has formed an alliance with the Burmese army, attacked refugee camps in Thailand, killing several refugees and Thai villagers and abducting scores of others. Discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities across Burma has increased in 1995. Many of these communities have been forcibly relocated into government-controlled villages, while religious buildings and land have been confiscated. In Arakan State, from which 270,000 Muslims fled during 1991-92, reports of forced labor and forced relocations of Muslims have continued. As the SLORC has moved to attract international investment and tourism, at least two million Burmese citizens since 1992 have been forced to work for no pay under brutal conditions to rebuild the country's infrastructure. Human Rights Watch/Asia estimates that at least 1,000 political prisoners remain in Burmese jails, including sixteen members of parliament elected in May 1990. The names of the detained M.P.'s are attached to my testimony, Mr. Chairman. We learned just recently that three veteran politicians were arrested and sentenced during July 1995. They are U Tun Shwe, former diplomat and politician; U Thu Wai, a close associate of U Nu who worked with him to form the Democratic Party; and U Htwe Myint, also a political activist. All of them are in their late sixties or early seventies. While we do not have all of the details from their trials, we do know that U Tun Shwe was sentenced to seven years under Section 5J of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, which allows for imprisonment of up to seven years of any one who "infringes upon the health, conduct and respect of state or military organizations... or spreads false news about the government." It is also worth noting that while Daw Aung San Sun Kyi has been permitted to meet with foreign diplomats, in early August, ASEAN ambassadors were warned that a lunch meeting planned with Suu Kyi would be considered as violating the principles of non-interference. And a Thai non-governmental organization had planned to tape a speech from Aung San Suu Kyi to be broadcast at the NGO forum in Beijing, but the Burmese Government denied the group a visa to travel to Rangoon for that purpose. However, a tape of her speech was smuggled out of Burma and was played at the Beijing conference. In it, she stated that "It is fear of persecution for their political beliefs that has made so many of our people feel that even in their own homes they cannot live in dignity and security." We believe that the SLORC must take significant action to improve the human rights situation in Burma, as spelled out in detailed recommendations by the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Recommendations: We urge the international community to respond to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi by engaging in dialogue with the SLORC about what specific steps it will take to implement United Nation's resolutions on Burma, while at the same time initiating direct, ongoing contacts with Aung San Suu Kyi in order to discuss the human rights situation. Unfortunately, the visit to Burma by the Assistant Secretary General, Alvaro DeSoto, in mid-August was not particularly successful, as he was unable to meet with the SLORC Secretary, Khin Nyunt. He did have several meetings with the Army Chief of Staff and with Aung San Suu Kyi. But there have been no indications that the UN team might be able to broker direct negotiations between Aung San Suu Kyi, the SLORC, and the ethnic minorities. It is crucial that Mr. DeSoto's mandate be extended when the bilateral Assembly convenes this fall. Diplomatic contacts with the SLORC must be accompanied by internationally coordinated measures to continue and increase pressure on the SLORC to undertake fundamental human rights reforms. Among the measures we would recommend to the international community for exerting pressure on the SLORC: -- a freeze on all further private investment unless and until all forced labor in Burma has ended and this can be verified by independent human rights monitors. -- continued suspension of bilateral assistance; -- a clear statement from the donor countries at the World Bank that multilateral assistance cannot be resumed until basic human rights and political reforms are undertaken, a decision by the International Labor Organization to conduct a Commission of Inquiry into forced labor; -- a concerted effort to stigmatize China for its role as the SLORC's major arms provider {2} U . S. P O L I C Y The United States was a leader in drafting and supporting the passage of the March resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and should work vigorously at the upcoming General Assembly session to assure passage of a strong resolution which will be considered in December. Secretary Christopher was very outspoken about human rights in Burma at the post-Ministerial ASEAN meeting on August 3, when he urged the ASEAN nations to demand greater progress before admitting Burma to the association. He noted that "...problems continue, including grave human rights violations, massive forced labor and drug trafficking. We believe that the true significance of Aung San Suu Kyi's release depends on whether it leads to real movement toward restoration of a government accountable to its people. We welcome this strong diplomatic support by the United States in international fora, which has played an important role in isolating SLORC and pressing the regime for change. President Clinton ordered a high-level review of Burma policy in mid-1993 The review was completed in October 1994, at which time Thomas Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, went to Rangoon to present the new policy directly to Gen. Khin Nyunt. He offered the SLORC "two visions of a future relationship with the U.S., either increased cooperation based on positive movement on human rights, democratization and counter-narcotics issues, or increased isolation." No immediate progress was announced as a result of the visit, and Mr. Hubbard was denied access to Aung San Suu Kyi (then under house arrest). Burmese officials told him that they would continue talks with her (as of today, no further talks have yet taken place), and that they would allow prison visits by the lCRC. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) also asked to undertake a joint opium survey in Burma. Since Mr. Hubbard's visit, the United States has enhanced relations with Burma considerably in the area of anti-narcotics assistance On June 21, 1995, at a hearing in the House of Representatives, the administration announced that it would reward the SLORC for all allowing the DEA to conduct an opium yield survey in December 1994 by stepping up some forms of anti-narcotics program narcotics assistance to Burma. This decision seemed to contradict the administration's earlier statements that without progress on all three fronts -- human rights, democratization, and narcotics control -- an upgrading of U.S. cooperation could not take place. in its March 1995 presentation to the Congress, the administration denied counter-narcotics certification to Burma, as the U.S. has done every year since 1989. According to State Department figures, heroin production has nearly tripled since the SLORC took power in 1988. {3} On June 21, 1995, the administration announced a "compromise" between those who wanted to hold the line and those who had argued for substantially increased anti-narcotics assistance. It said the U.S. would hold discussions with SLORC officials on drug policies, provide in-country training to SLORC anti-drug enforcement units, exchange intelligence information, and increase funding for the U.N. Drug Control Program's activities in ethnically- controlled areas of Burma. Meanwhile, the Administration has taken no action to impose further economic sanctions beyond those already in place, and it has been reluctant to in any way restrict or discourage private investment in Burma. The U.S. is now the fourth largest investor in Burma, according to Burmese government figures.{4} The SLORC has said it expects foreign investment to reach billion by the end of the current fiscal year. {5} Mr. Chairman, we believe there should be no increased anti-narcotics assistance or cooperation extended to the SLORC until there is a genuine improvement in the overall human rights situation, and an end to abuses committed against ethnic minorities. (We note with pleasure that the House of Representatives in a 359-38 vote in June passed an amendment to the foreign aid appropriations bill prohibiting all foreign aid (including anti- drug assistance) to Burma. We understand that U.S. policy options are still under review, in light of the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. The administration's initial reaction to word of Sun Kyis release was positive, but appropriately cautious. President Clinton welcomed the news but expressed "concerned about a number of serious and unresolved human rights problems in Burma..." We believe the Administration deserves credit for playing a leading role in maintaining the international consensus on Burma, and hope it will continue to do so. As essential first steps to follow on Suu Kyi's release the ASEAN governments and dialogue partners should call on the SLORC to unconditionally release all political prisoners, and to begin by immediately freeing all detained Members of Parliament; to resume negotiations with the ICRC and promptly allow the ICRC prison access; to repeal or reform repressive laws which prohibit freedom of association, expression, and the right of citizens to participate freely in the political life of the country.{6} The U.S. and other governments should also support the renewed effort by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma, Prof Yozo Yokota, who will attempt to visit Burma this fall, and urge the authorities to permit him to travel without interference, and establish an ongoing human rights monitoring presence in Rangoon. {7} The Burmese government's continued violations of international law and refusal to fulfill the U.N.'s resolutions should not be tolerated by the international community. Unless firm steps are taken to back up the numerous diplomatic appeals, massive human rights violations in Burma are likely to continue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ---------------------------- Footnotes: {1) British Broadcasting Corporation, July 12, 1995. {2} Since 1988, China has supplied at least $1.4 billion worth of arms to Burma, including two deals in November 1994 worth $440 million. Beijing has never revealed the precise details of its arms transfer to Burma. {3} State Department estimates: Opium production (in metric tons): 68 tons in 1988; 190 tons in 1993. {4} On March 9, 1995 the Burmese government published the following figures showing all investment in Burma since 1989: France ($1.05 billion), Singapore ($293.4 million), Thailand ($265 million), the U.S. $203 million): Japan ($101 million.) Total SA accounted for almost all French investment it is an oil company in which the French Government and state-owned enterprises own 25 percent of the voting rights {5} Investment Target is $4 Billion,"Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, July 10 1995: "Despite criticism of Burma;s human rights record, foreign investors led by France, Singapore, the U.S. and Thailand have moved in to the resource-rich nation, taking advantage of recent economic liberalization." {6} This includes SLORC Orders 2/88, 4/9l, 10/91, the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, 1957 Unlawful Associations Act, 1962 Printers' and publishers' Registration Act, 1975 State Protection Law, and the 1908 Villages and Towns Act which permits village councils to order citizens to work as forced laborers. {7} Prof. Yokota last visited Burma in November 1994.His mandate was continued by the U.N. Human Rights Commission at its March 1995 meeting. ------------------------------ Attachment Detained Members of Parliament in Burma (as of July 1995) U Ohn Kyaing, M.P.-elect for Mandalay Southeast-2 U Tin Htut, M.P.-elect for Einme-l U Win Hlaing, M.P.-elect for Tatkon-2 Saw Naing Naing, M.P.-elect for Pazundaung U Tin Aung Aung, M.P.-elect for Manalay Northwest-l Dr. Zaw Myint Aung, M.P.-elect for Amarapura-1 Dr. Myint Aung, M.P.-elect for Kanbalu-2 U Kyi Myint, M.P.-elect for Latha Dr. Zaw Myint, M.P.-elect for Henzada-2 U Mya Win, M.P.-elect for Ingapu-1 U Hla Than, M.P.-elect for Coco Islands U Tin Soe, M.P.-elect for Kyauktada U Saw Win, M.P.-elect for Htilin U Hla Tun, M.P.-elect for Kyimyindine U Khin Maung Swe (released May 1, 1992; re-arrested August 1994) U Sein Hla Oo (released May 1, 1992; re-arrested August 1994) ********************************************** STATEMENT BY KENT WIEDEMANN Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs September 7, 1995 U.S. Policy Toward Burma ------------------------ > | Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before > | the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee on behalf of the > | Department of State. I am pleased to discuss with you today > | our common concerns about the situation in Burma and explore > | how we can best advance U.S. interests there. > | > | > | THE RELEASE OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI > | > | The release of Aung San Suu Kyi July 10 was a dramatic > | development in Burma. After many years of determined effort by > | the United States and the international community, the > | democracy leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate was released > | after nearly six years of house arrest. As the courageous hero > | of the opposition forces in Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi has earned > | the support of her people and the respect and admiration of the > | world for her determination and steadfastness in holding to her > | principles throughout the long years of house arrest. > | > | Importantly, her release appears to be unconditional. She has > | been free to meet with her family, key supporters, the press > | and other visitors. In her meetings and statements, Aung San > | Suu Kyi has been remarkably conciliatory and magnanimous. She > | said she personally bears members of the SLORC no ill will and > | emphasizes her commitment to engage in a dialogue with them to > | seek national reconciliation. She wants to hold the SLORC to > | its avowed aim of creating a multi-party democracy. She has > | emphasized that the divisions in Burma are not insurmountable > | and has called for all the citizens of Burma to work together > | for the good of the country. > | > | Aung San Suu Kyi has also called upon the international > | community to remain steadfast in support of democratic change > | for Burma. As she herself has pointed out, her release is only > | the beginning of what promises to be a long, slow process. > | > | Aung San Suu Kyi's release does not diminish our serious > | concerns about human rights abuses in Burma or about the extent > | to which the drug trade remains ingrained in the political and > | economic life of the country. The Administration will continue > | to press the SLORC to make progress on these concerns. Our > | ultimate goal, one that we will continue to express clearly, > | remains the same: a stable democratic Burma that respects > | international norms. But we do not hold unrealistic > | expectations that the SLORC will transform itself overnight. > | Nor do we underestimate its intent to retain its grip on power > | and to dictate the pace of change. > | > | > | U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA > | > | In order to place Aung San Suu Kyi's release and re-emergence > | on the political scene into context, I would like to review > | briefly recent U.S. policy toward Burma. > | > | In November 1994 Deputy Assistant Secretary Tom Hubbard led the > | most senior U.S. delegation to visit Burma since 1988. The > | purpose of his mission, which was dispatched by the President, > | was to emphasize to the Burmese government the strong U.S. > | interest in progress on human rights, democracy, and > | counternarcotics. He made clear to senior SLORC officials that > | the United States wants to have better relations with Burma, > | but stressed any improvement must be based on progress in these > | critical areas of concern. He told them that U.S. relations > | with Burma could improve if the SLORC made progress in each of > | these areas, but would worsen if it did not. > | > | Since Mr. Hubbard's visit, the SLORC has had a decidedly mixed > | record in responding to the "two roads" he outlined for > | U.S.-Burma relations. > | > | The most dramatic positive step, of course, was the release of > | Aung San Suu Kyi. She has been able to confer on an almost > | daily basis with her chief advisers and to meet with National > | League for Democracy officials from throughout the country. > | She continues to address crowds in front of her residence on > | weekends. Some 130 other political prisoners also have been > | released, including Aung San Suu Kyi's close advisers Kyi Maung > | and Tin Oo. > | > | However, the SLORC's actions fall far short of what is needed > | to end its abuses of its citizens' rights and thus to lay the > | foundation for improved relations with the United States. Aung > | San Suu Kyi's release must be followed by meaningful efforts to > | engage her and other members of the democracy movement in a > | process aimed at national reconciliation and the restoration of > | democracy. Thus far, unfortunately, the SLORC has sought to > | marginalize Aung San Suu Kyi, including keeping her from > | participating in the national constitutional convention set to > | reconvene in October. That convention has been manipulated by > | the SLORC to perpetuate authoritarian military rule. In > | addition, hundreds of political prisoners remain jailed, and > | the SLORC continues to arrest and sentence Burmese for the > | slightest political infraction. No indigenous organizations in > | Burma are allowed to function truly independently of the > | government. The International Committee of the Red Cross > | closed its office in Burma at the end of July after being > | unable to conclude a prison visit agreement with the SLORC. > | > | Egregious human rights violations continue. Burmese citizens > | are routinely rounded up and forced to carry military equipment, > | weapons and ammunition for the Burmese Army. In addition to > | being denied adequate food and water, these porters are often > | forced to work, at great risk, in areas of armed conflict. The > | SLORC also compels its citizens to carry out forced labor on > | roads, railroads and other infrastructure projects. We > | understand the SLORC recently introduced an internal decree > | calling for the suspension of forced labor by the army, but we > | have yet to see indications this is being enforced. > | > | The SLORC's renewed military offensives against the Karen and > | Karenni minorities have led to serious humanitarian concerns > | and sent more than 10,000 refugees fleeing into Thailand. > | The refugees have put a substantial new burden on the Thai > | government and the NGO's whvernment. The Burmese Army has also > | continued to attack the Shan United Army and taken significant > | casualties in an effort to regain control of the territory > | Khun Sa controls. Although not the main reason for the Burmese > | Army's attacks on the Shan United Army, this has had the welcome > | effect of disrupting Khun Sa's ability to traffic in drugs. The > | military attacks are part of an overall SLORC offensive to > | maintain national unity in the face of longstanding ethnic > | insurgencies. However, the SLORC must still take serious steps > | to deny legitimacy to other important narco-traffickers and to > | end corruption. The authorities in Rangoon are not likely to > | succeed in the fight against drugs unless they find a way to > | exercise legitimate authority in drug-producing areas, which > | principally are those controlled by ethnic insurgents. > | > | In the past several years, the United States has steadily > | increased our pressure on the military regime in Rangoon. We > | suspended our own economic aid program and have urged other > | potential donors like Japan to limit strictly any development > | assistance to Burma. We do not provide GSP trade preferences > | and have decertified Burma as a narcotics cooperating country, > | which requires us by law to vote against assistance to Burma by > | international financial institutions. This and our influence > | with other countries have in practice prevented most assistance > | to Burma from the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development > | Bank. Neither Eximbank nor OPIC provides loans or insurance > | for American companies selling to or investing in Burma. The > | United States has not had an ambassador in Burma since 1990. > | > | On the international level, the Administration has strongly > | supported efforts in the United Nations General Assembly, the > | UN Human Rights Commission and the International Labor > | Organization to condemn human and worker rights violations in > | Burma. We have urged the UN to play an active role in > | promoting democratic reform through a political dialogue with > | Aung San Suu Kyi. We refrain from selling arms to Burma and > | have an informal agreement with our G-7 friends and allies to > | do the same. > | > | These measures have had an impact on the SLORC. While the > | regime has sought, increasingly, to open the countress of > | political reconciliation and eventual installation of a > | democratically-elected government. The President also > | emphasized the seriousness of the unresolved human rights > | problems in Burma and the humanitarian concerns connected with > | ongoing military campaigns against ethnic insurgents. Our > | objective is to respond to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in a > | way to help the process of democratization and promote progress > | on other U.S. national interests. > | > | We must let Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratic opposition take > | the lead in pursuing political reform and national > | reconciliation. We should offer steady and clear support, but > | obviously cannot dictate the outcome or pace of the dialogue. > | Rather, we want to look for ways to promote the dialogue that > | Aung San Suu Kyi is seeking with the government, as the next > | logical step in fostering national reconciliation and improving > | the political situation on which so much depends: the > | restoration of democratic civilian government and an end to > | human rights abuses, narcotics trafficking, and military > | attacks on unarmed members of ethnic groups. > | > | In order to encourage a political dialogue to begin, the > | Administration will maintain the existing U.S. measures in > | place in Burma for the time being. In the absence of genuine > | political reforms in Burma, we do not believe it is appropriate > | to resume development assistance, restore GSP benefits or > | resume Eximbank and OPIC programs. Of greatest impact, we will > | also continue to oppose lending from the international > | financial institutions and seek, with other friendly > | governments, to maintain our informal arms embargo. > | > | > | VISIT OF AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT TO BURMA > | > | To underscore our support for Aung San Suu Kyi's call for a > | genuine dialogue toward national reconciliation, U.S. Ambassador > | to the United Nations Madeleine Albright will visit Burma > | tomorrow after leading the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Fourth > | World Conference on Women. She also will travel to Jakarta and > | Manila. > | > | Ambassador Albright's principal objectives will be to convey > | U.S. views of the situation in Burma to the SLORC in the wake > | of Aung San Suu Kyi's release and to reaffirm U.S. support for > | human rights and democratization. She also will meet with Aung > | San Suu Kyi, other senior Burmese government officials, and > | representatives of UN agencies operating in Burma, such as > | UNICEF, UNDP and UNDCP. > | > | In her meetings with the SLORC, Ambassador Albright's message > | will be clear and direct: the United States warmly welcomes > | the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, but it is essential the SLORC > | begin a dialogue with her, other democracy leaders and the > | ethnic minorities. > | > | In her meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, who has welcomed the > | visit, Ambassador Albright will ask for the Nobel laureate's > | evaluation of the situation in Burma and the outlook for > | progress toward democracy and respect for human rights. > | > | Make no mistake: Ambassador Albright's visit does not represent > | a warming of our relations with the SLORC. She will carry a > | tough message, and we have so informed key Asian and European > | capitals. We have strongly urged other countries to continue > | to limit assistance to Burma and to join us in maintaining a > | ban on IFI lending to Burma until the GOB makes significant > | progress on democracy and human rights. > | > | We believe that Ambassador Albright's visit provides an > | excellent opportunity for the SLORC to signal whether it > | intends to move forward toward reconciliation and democracy. > | We hope the SLORC will realize that Burma's prospects for > | prosperity and stability depend on the extent to which it > | respects the wishes of its people by restoring democratic > | government and the rule of law. > | > | In her meetings with representatives of UN agencies operating > | in Burma, Ambassador Albright will look for ways the U.S. can > | support the work of the important UN programs there. In > | support of these goals, the Administration proposes to continue > | U.S. support and funding for UNDP and UNDCP activities in > | Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi, who worked for the UN in New York at > | one time, has endorsed the development and counternarcotics > | objectives of these organizations. In her first press > | conference, she said she strongly supports the UN being allowed > | to play an important role in all countries, including her own. > | > | We note that UNDP's programs have been thoroughly revamped and > | redirected at meeting the urgent needs of the poorest Burmese. > | UNDCP, meanwhile, is working to address the scourge of the drug > | trade, an affliction for Burmese citizens as well as American. > | We share Aung San Suu Kyi's view that these and other UN > | activities in Burma have a beneficial effect in the country. > | > | > | PENDING LEGISLATION ON BURMA > | > | The Administration believes that the visit of Ambassador > | Albright is an important opportunity for us to stress our > | concerns to the SLORC and Aung San Suu Kyi. As it becomes > | clearer how the SLORC will respond to the olive branch offered > | by Aung San Suu Kyi and the visit of Ambassador Albright, the > | Administration's reaction will be considered and appropriate. > | I have already indicated the Administration will keep in place > | the existing measures with respect to Burma for the time being. > | The Administration, however, also needs the flexibility to > | respond to what is clearly a changing situation in Burma. > | > | In the wake of Aung San Suu Kyi's release, we do not want to > | restrict our options. Increased sanctions should remain one of > | those options. But if we are to be successful in our efforts > | to encourage dialogue in Burma, we must do more than penalize > | the SLORC at every turn. We must also make clear to the SLORC > | that punitive measures can be avoided if they continue to take > | positive steps, such as the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. What > | the Administration will do in the coming months on Burma > | depends on the SLORC. The Administration needs the flexibility > | to respond appropriately. > | > | While the sanctions legislation under consideration in Congress > | represents a serious effort to address continuing violations of > | human rights in Burma, we believe it would be counterproductive > | to impose sanctions now, in the wake of the Nobel laureate's > | release. While international pressure helped produce Aung San > | Suu Kyi's freedom, we must now allow time for a dialogue of > | national reconciliation to begin before seeking to raise the > | pressure, which could have consequences opposite to those we > | seek. > | > | We have discussed multilateral sanctions with interested > | countries, and there is no support for them against Burma, > | particularly in the wake of Aung San Suu Kyi's release. > | Furthermore, we are concerned that some sanctions provisions, > | which call for actions against third countries, might violate > | our obligations under the WTO. We would not want to be > | required to take punitive action against countries on whom we > | need to rely to make common cause in other ways on Burma. > | > | Second, we believe Congress should support continued U.S. > | funding for UNDP and UNDCP programs in Burma. As I have > | already indicated, the Administration believes these programs > | help needy Burmese and address the opium menace without > | strengthening the SLORC. > | > | Finally, and while I recognize that this hearing is not focused > | on narcotics matters, I need to mention that the Administration > | believes Congress should not limit funding of U.S. counternarcotics > | programs with Burma. These programs are already very limited -- > | as is appropriate. We believe that the minimal efforts now > | underway do not undermine our human rights goals. > | > | > | CONCLUSION > | > | Mr. Chairman, Congress and the Administration share the same > | objectives in Burma. We want to see a dialogue of national > | reconciliation that will help lead to a new democratic future > | for Burma. We want an end to human rights abuses and the > | installation of a democratically-elected government in Rangoon. > | We want an end to trafficking in heroin. Our hope is that we > | will look back on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi as a turning > | point in Burma's history. Thoughtful, reasoned measures by the > | U.S. Government can help make these hopes a reality. > | > | I look forward to continuing to work with the Committee and > | other Members of Congress on these and other issues. > | > | Thank you.