------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------ "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ---------------------------------------------------------- The BurmaNet News: February 8, 1996 Issue #340 HEADLINES: ========== US CONGRESS: FOREIGN OPERATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS (BURMA) INDEPENDENT REPORT: THE NEW THREAT TO DEMOCRACY IN BURMA S.H.A.N. : FORMER MTA HARDLINERS SNEAK AWAY ASIAN AGE: BURMESE MILITARY FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO IGNORE SUU KYI INDEPENDENT REPORT: TOTAL SIGNS FINAL EXPORT SALES NATION: ROAD TO MANDALAY NOT QUITE READY NATION: DRUG BOSS KHUN SA MOVED TO RANGOON NATION: MON REBELS COOL TO JUNTA'S ECONOMIC OFFERS BKK POST: SOLDIERS ARE THERE TO HELP *************** US CONGRESS: FOREIGN OPERATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS (BURMA) February 4, 1996 FreeBurma@aol.com (Note: The following bill was reported in both U.S. House and Senate last year. The bill is about 60 pages long, but Burma has just a couple of pages as follows. If you would like the whole bill, go to the ftp site -- ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/c104/h1868.enr.txt) ----------------------- H.R.1868 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President)) H.R.1868 One Hundred Fourth Congress of the United States of America AT THE FIRST SESSION Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, the fourth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-five An Act Making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, and for other purposes, namely: ------------------ BURMA Of the funds appropriated by this Act to carry out the provisions of chapter 8 of part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, not less than $2,380,000 shall be made available to support activities in Burma , along the Burma -Thailand border, and for activities of Burmese student groups and other organizations located outside Burma , for the purposes of fostering democracy in Burma , supporting the provision of medical supplies and other humanitarian assistance to Burmese located in Burma or displaced Burmese along the borders, and for other purposes: Provided, That of this amount, not less than $200,000 shall be made available to support newspapers, publications, and other media activities promoting democracy inside Burma : Provided further, That of this amount, not less than $380,000 shall be made available for crop substitution activities in cooperation with the Kachin people of Burma : Provided further, That funds made available under this heading may be made available notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further, That provision of such funds shall be made available subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. ------------------ LIMITATION ON FUNDS FOR BURMA SEC. 567. None of the funds made available in this Act may be used for International Narcotics Control or Crop Substitution Assistance for the Government of Burma . ***************************************************** INDEPENDENT REPORT: THE NEW THREAT TO DEMOCRACY IN BURMA February 5, 1996 From: reaproy@cais.cais.com (Phil Robertson) The New Threat to Democracy in Burma: The Re-engagement of International Financial Institutions with the SLORC Regime by Philip S. Robertson Jr. e-mail: reaproy@cais.com phone: (301) 270-1009 I. The Imperative to Act Unknown both to many Burma activists world-wide as well as important policy- makers in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere, Burma is far closer to receiving major financial assistance from the International Financial Institutions (or IFIs, in this case the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank) than most believe. Unless we act now there is a significant possibility that the U.S. Government's important efforts to prevent IFI assistance from reaching Burma may fall short. What is at stake in this issue is nothing less than all the gains made in bringing international economic pressure against SLORC in order to force the regime to negotiate a transition to democratic rule with the National League for Democracy (NLD). Clearly one of the worst human rights abusers in the world, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime has massacred thousands of people in the streets, annulled a free and fair election in 1990 and imprisoned many of the victorious candidates, and been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations General Assembly and the International Labor Organization (ILO). This regime, which refuses to conduct negotiations with the democratic opposistion lead by 1991 Nobel Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, does not deserve financial assistance from the IFIs because it will further strengthen SLORC's illegitimate control of the country. Fortunately, it is not too late to bring pressure to bear to stop the IFIs from providing the SLORC with the financial support it seeks if we begin now, work on multiple fronts to lobby the G-7 governments and the U.S. Congress, and understand from the outset that this will be a difficult fight. We must move quickly to lay the groundwork to make economic and political arguments that Burma should not be assisted at this time because once the SLORC decides to devalue (or "float") the kyat at market or near-market rates, the countdown to IFI involvement in Burma begins in earnest. The IFIs offer SLORC the solution to economic inflation (running at 30-50%), the key economic problem that undermines their attempts to legitimize their rule. At the moment, inflation results from SLORC's budget deficits (high military expenditures a big part of that) and its inability to secure external financing for its approximately $5.5. billion external debt. All SLORC can do at the moment is force the Central Bank of Myanmar to cover the debt by printing more money (and by cutting social programs, like education and health) which further destabilizes its rule. Symbolically, IFI support would lend to the appearance of stability in Burma and further encourage foreign investment which Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have clearly said should not take place at this time. Everyone who reads this should seek to obtain the following reports so that they are conversant with some of the basic economic issues involved. These reports are in the public domain, so they should be obtainable: World Bank report No. 14062-BA, "Myanmar Policies for Sustaining Economic Reform", Country Operations Division, Country Department I (East Asia and Pacific Region), October 16, 1995; and International Monetary Fund "Myanmar Recent Economic Developments", prepared by J.R. Dodsworth, Michael Braulke, Ulhas Gunjal and Paul Heytens (Central Asia Department), October 11, 1995. I imagine (thought I haven't looked) that the World Bank and IMF both have web pages were inquiries could be made. In this paper, I will first outline the role that each of these organizations (and the Paris Club) play. I will then concisely explain actions have been taken by the IFIs in Burma since the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in July 1995 and why I believe the U.S. alone cannot stop them. Finally I will then what they want to do (if we allow them) in Burma. I will then offer several strategies that we, the international activists for a free and democratic Burma, should pursue immediately to keep the IFIs out of Burma, thereby maintaining economic pressure on the SLORC. II. Who the IFIs Are: A Primer International Monetary Fund (IMF): Based in Washington, D.C., the IMF provides technical advice for governments seeking to reform economic policies and non-project financial assistance when governments undertake these reforms. Since this money is not tied to projects, governments can essentially use IMF funds they receive they way that they like -- in essence, a pay off for undertaking a reform. Think of it as giving SLORC a multi-million dollar cash payment for finally getting around to fixing the economy that they and their military brethren have been mismanaging since 1962 and you get the picture. Approval of projects must be made by the IMF Board of Directors, which is comprised of representatives of the governments which contribute operating funds to the IMF and dominated by the G-7 nations. Weight of votes is assigned based on amount of contribution to the IMF that the government makes -- i.e. the U.S. has 18% of the votes because that is how much they contribute -- but decisions are, by tradition, made by consensus. IMF staff are bound by the organization's charter to not consider "political issues" when proposing projects, but to only examine "economic issues". The Board of Directors are not IMF staff (rather they are employees of their respective governments) so they are not bound by this restriction. World Bank (WB): Also based in Washington, D.C., the WB gives technical advice, non-project assistance (like IMF), specific project assistance (for a road or other part of infrastructure, for instance), and "humanitarian" project assistance (health, education, etc.). Traditionally, the WB only enters a country after the IMF has gone in (in essence, give the IMF stamp of approval for reforms) but, as we shall see, Burma was almost an exception. The U.S. has 21% of the vote at the WB. Asian Development Bank (ADB): Based in Manila in the Philippines, the ADB is dominated by Japan and U.S. influence is much weaker (only 11% of the vote). Like the WB, it conducts four types of projects. However, the ADB is not bound like the WB and has no restraints in entering a country before the IMF. In fact, the ADB has already done several road projects in Burma (started pre-1988) and is plotting ways to start new infrastructure projects. The Paris Club: An informal group of lenders/creditors, this organization is lead by the French and its mission is to provide relief for "official debt", i.e. debts guaranteed by governments. They only operate once a country has the IMF's seal of approval. Unamity of creditors is required and they operate under rules set by the G-7 nations. What they can do for SLORC is re-schedule (at lower interest rates, or with long interest-free grace periods) perhaps 60% of the SLORC's $5.5 billion external debt. Most of that debt is held by the Japanese. The poorer a country, the more generous their terms tend to be -- up to and including just cancelling debts. Think of it this way -- debt relief for SLORC is tantamount to a new cash infusion, because now they can borrow more and buy more. And, as recent news reports show, they are still interested in buying things like new Russian attack helicopters which are 'cash on the barrel head' deals. The Japanese Government is already subverting the intent (although not necessarily the writ) of the international community against new loans to the SLORC. When SLORC pays back Japanese Government funds, it goes into a special account. All the proceeds in this account can be used by SLORC to purchase new commodities manufactured in Japan. So, in essence, the Japanese Government is not being paid back -- the balance of the loans remains the same while SLORC gets more Japanese equipment. III. What the IFIs Have Been Doing in Burma It is clear that the IFIs want to get back into Burma as quickly as possible. In August 1995, within a month of Aung San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest, both the IMF (on an annual monitoring mission) and the World Bank had come up with concrete plans for their immediate re-involvement in the country. At big bureaucracies like these, plans of this kind of complexity take longer than a month to put together -- signifying that the IMF and World Bank staff have been plotting these approaches for awhile, even when Aung San Suu Kyi was still in detention. While many have said that it was the possibility of aid from Japan that prompted SLORC to release her, a question worth asking is it also possible that the lure of millions of dollars from the IFIs was also a factor in SLORC's plans? And, if this is true, did the IFIs know this beforehand? The IMF does what is known as an "Article Four consultation" each year in each country around the world, examining economic trends, offering advice to the government and writing a report. Every August, it is Burma's turn for this service but August 1995 was different than previous years. Eager to get back into Burma after years when Western government pressure kept them out, the IMF staff had prepared what essentially constituted an end-run around the IMF Board of Directors. What was proposed (following a formal request from the SLORC Finance Minister, likely arranged in advance of the mission) is what is known in IMF terms as a "staff monitoring mission". The mission would monitor SLORC compliance towards economic reform targets, the most important of which is moving to a market-based exchange rate for the kyat. If the mission certifies that SLORC has satisfactorily met the reforms, then within as fast as 6 to 9 months a formal IMF project (putting millions of dollars in SLORC's pockets) could be set up. The length of this timeline, assuming full float of the kyat, could be a IMF project within a year and a half. It would have all taken place quietly and secretly, behind the closed doors of the IMF, but it appears some people in the Clinton Administration were paying attention and raised the issue. (The U.S. Government's representatives to the IFIs are all currently required by law to vote against all assistance to the SLORC Government because Burma has been identified as a country that is not cooperating in eliminating narcotics.) What followed was extraordinary. To its credit, the U.S. Government used the full array of diplomatic weapons at its disposal to stop the IMF staff's plan. It held a meeting in Rangoon with all the Ambassadors of the G-7 countries (Canada, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and U.S.) to outline U.S. opposition to the staff monitoring mission. The U.S. then called a similar meeting held at the State Department in Washington, D.C. with all the G-7 country Ambassadors based in Washington. Finally, the U.S. Embassy staff in each G-7 country were sent with a diplomatic demarche to the Finance Ministry which again explained why the U.S. was against the IMF staff's proposal. Despite this intense inter-governmental pressure, the U.S. was unable to stop the plan. When the IMF Board of Directors met to consider the matter on October 20, 1995 the U.S. was the only country which opposed the staff monitoring mission proposal. The issue was finessed to make it seem less confrontational -- the Board just made a statement of non-objection to the staff's proposal -- but the bottom line was the same: the staff monitoring mission was established. While the situation may be different in the future if the issue is a full assistance package and IMF members have to confront the appalling human rights record of SLORC straight on, we can't assume anything. We need to organize opposition right now in support of the position that all IMF Board of Directors (from whatever country) should vote against any future requests for assistance for Burma. Publicly the U.S. Government (or at least the State Department) presents the impression that its opposition will be enough to prevent IFIs from re-engaging with SLORC. For instance, when Winston Lord, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, went up to testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee (Foreign Operations Subcommittee) on July 24, 1995, he said "Of greatest impact, we will also continue to oppose lending from the international financial institutions..." When Kent Wiedemann, Lord's Deputy, went to testify before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific at the House International Relations Committee on September 7, 1995, the line was much the same: "...our influence with other countries have in practice prevented most assistance to Burma from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank." He continues optimistically that "...our actions and those of like- minded countries have made clear that Burma can not fully rejoin the international community and gain the assistance it needs to develop its economy until fundamental challenges are made." Well, those lines may sound good to the Congress but rather than placating them I would argue we need to get Congressional interest stirred up so that the Congress can work to apply additional pressure on the IFIs. All one can say about Lord's weapon of "greatest impact" is that it didn't work the first time. The U.S. went quite far out on a limb to oppose the staff monitoring mission (not even a full project proposal) and they weren't able to win that one. Let's be clear here. My purpose is not to beat up on the U.S. Government -- they are, after all, the only government in the G-7 that took a principled stand at the IMF -- but rather get the word out that we need to help them find allies who will make it clear to the IFIs that now is not the time to provide the financial support to SLORC. Approval of a formal IMF project in Burma could open the gates for hundreds of millions of dollars in financial assistance to the SLORC regime. The process will remain into suspended animation until the SLORC makes a decision about the kyat. Either it will fully float the kyat (i.e. abolishing the fixed official exchange rate of 6 kyat = $1.00 and following the market price) or partially float the kyat by establishing a new fixed rate, such as 60 kyat = $1.00. Once that reform begins, the clock starts ticking. It is this issue, how and when to deal with the exchange rate reform, which is allegedly being debated within SLORC at this time. As for the other IFIs, they are also working on ways to re-engage with SLORC. The World Bank has already outlined a full Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) for the SLORC regime to implement. In fact, some World Bank staff allegedly proposed that in the case of Burma, the World Bank violate its fundamental policy of waiting for the IMF to negotiate a project which demonstrates the seriousness of the host government to economic reform. The only other case where the World Bank has done this was Brazil in the 1970's, and the results were disastrous. Fortunately, this ill-considered proposal was stopped and know the World Bank is back to its initial position, waiting for the IMF to act. Once a IMF staff-monitoring mission certifies that SLORC is meeting reform targets, the World Bank will come on line with what could well be projects worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The Asian Development Bank has fewer constraints than the World Bank. They have finished many of the "left-over" infrastructure projects that the ADB committed to before the 1988 crushing of the democracy movement. A recent ADB staff mission to Burma in December 1995 allegedly held discussions with Minister for Foreign Investment General David Abel and other SLORC leaders to initiate a whole slew of new infrastructure projects in collaboration with the SLORC Government. There are ostensibly plans for a March 1996 ADB mission to Burma to examine the situation and make recommendations, with the idea of approving projects at the ADB's Board of Directors meeting in April 1996. This timeline shows that the March evaluation mission is just a cover, an empty exercise in political whitewashing, for a decision that ADB staff (and some donor countries, perhaps -- like Japan) have already made: that it is time for the ADB to return to Burma and support the projects of the SLORC Government. IV. Actions to Take Now The current balance of the game is running against those of us who feel that IFI support for Burma will further entrench SLORC's illegitimate and brutal rule and we need to do something about it. If we can't persuade the IFIs that it is not economically appropriate to do so because of basic macro-economic problems in Burma -- e.g. the SLORC has no legitimacy to seek revenue (taxes) from the people and is spending huge amounts of the budget on military arms -- then we must develop the necessary political pressure to stop them. Since the IMF is the key initiating agency in this process, we need to concentrate on the IMF. We need at least two or three of the remaining six members of the G-7 to support the U.S. position at the IMF Board of Directors. Another approach could be lifting the level of political heat in the U.S. Congress (which must authorize the U.S. contribution to the IFIs) to the level where the IMF and WB decide that their financing sources are more important than a risky enterprise in a remote country with a pariah regime. The key is to get the governments of the G-7 to raise these issues with the IMF and World Bank. IFIs are not democracies but bureaucracies -- so they don't care about what you, as an individual citizen, think. They do care a great deal about what your government thinks and says to them, especially if you happen to live in a Western country that gives significant financial support. Possible strategies include the following: (1) Express our support to the U.S. Government for its work so far in holding out against further IFI involvement in Burma and urge them to continue this important policy. (2) Approach key decision-makers in the U.S. Congress in the House Banking Committee and Senate Finance Committee and encourage them to demand explanations from the IFIs and the Ambassadors in Washington, D.C. from our G-7 allies about this situation. Concurrent with this effort needs to be further explanations about the appalling abuse of human rights and forced labor by the SLORC. (3) In Europe and Japan, activists need to approach their Members of Parliament and Government to demand explanations for the failure to oppose the IMF staff monitoring. After all, a Nobel Peace Prize winner has asked that foreigners not invest in Burma at this time -- her wishes, supported by the moral authority of the 1990 elections and the continuing support of the Burmese people, should be respected. The policy of those governments need to be changed, so any action that contributes to that objective is worthwhile. Europeans should concentrate on the IMF and World Bank first. Japanese activists should seek to focus their efforts on persuading government policy- makers to prevent the ADB from expanding in Burma. Japan controls the largest share of the ADB's votes so this is important. Japanese activists should also contact the IMF, where Japan has a large percentage of votes as well. (4) Develop further information on the huge percentage of the SLORC Government's budget that goes to the military. Using the data on the SLORC's expenditures in the IMF report of October 1995, rough estimates can be worked out that defense spending is over 50% of the budget. How does the World Bank square this figure with its purported interest in "development"? Obviously if the SLORC has decided that if the health of the people and the education of the children has to suffer in order that the Army can buy new weapons from China, Russia, Singapore or other nations, it doesn't care much about "development". (5) Bring into the public light as much information on Burma projects from the IMF, World Bank, and ADB as possible. For a starter, information and statements from the October 20, 1995 IMF Board of Directors meeting should be sought. Other reports and information should be found and made public knowledge. When these issues are discussed behind closed doors, we are at a significant disadvantage. So we need to take them into the public domain where issues like SLORC's horrendous treatment of the people of Burma matter. I welcome your suggestions to this issue and hope that you will join me in a campaign to stop the IFIs from tilting the political balance in Burma against Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD, and the vast majority of the Burmese people who voted for them in the 1990 elections. ************************************************************ S.H.A.N. : FORMER MTA HARDLINERS SNEAK AWAY February 5, 1996 From: "SHAN >From January 5 to 26, 1996, members of the Mong Tai Army ( formerly the most powerful rebel group in the Shan State ) have been surrendering to the SLORC, group by group, on various occasions and at different places. More than 10,000 are known to have surrendered so far. But there are still some hardliners who do not want to surrender to the Burmese. On January 30, 1996, Major Yord Serk, a prominent fighter, managed to sneak out of the area now under Burmese control, and crossed to the west of the Salween with a 7-800 strong force. This news became known on February 2. Their aim and destination is not yet known. But most people think they are heading for Kieng Lome, Kieng Kham, Kho Lam, Kieng Tong and Murng Pan areas to merge with SSNA (Shan State National Army) troops in the areas commanded by Zao Zai Yee. It appears that these troops do not want the armed struggle to be completely wiped out before their national aim is achieved. They could not keep following the MTA, because it does not represent the Shan State anymore and they wanted to remain faithful to the aims of Zao Korn Zurng, the late prime minister. Though their aims and policies are not yet clearly known, they are assumed to be as follows : - To try to contact all other ethnic groups which can become a national force of the peoples of the Shan State and try to rebuild national unity. - To strive to achieve democracy, collective leadership and protection of human rights. - To strive for the historical rights of the Panglong Agreement. - To strive to improve the life of the people. - To strive for peace in Shan State, Southeast Asia and the world. ********************************************************** ASIAN AGE: BURMESE MILITARY FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO IGNORE SUU KYI February 6, 1996 New Delhi From: chan@.unv.ernet.in Rangoon, Feb. 5: Burma's military rulers have notched up successes against ethnic insurgents and a backward economy, but they have failed to shift the political focus away from pro-democracy Aung San Suu Kyi. Regular commentaries in the state-run press refer to her dismissive and deride her views, but they also serve as a continual remainder of her existence to a broad spectrum of the population. "These articles win us a lot of support," Aung San Suu Kyi told AFP in a recent interview. "Some people feel we have a secret supporters (in the press)," she added with a smile. Realistically, she and her National League for Democracy are no closer to power than they were in 1990 when, although the party swept the general elections, the junta refused to acknowledge the results and step down. Officially known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, the junta maintains firm control over the government and the population in general. "But she puts them on the defensive," a political observer commented, referring to the pro-democracy campaigner. Both sides stubbornly insist they are in the right, and the atmosphere does not appear favorable for substantive talks at this time. "Perhaps the SLORC will offer some sort of `window-dressing' meeting with her before(Yozo)Yokota makes his report to the UN in February," one long-time resident of Rangoon speculated, referring to the UN special Rapporteur on human rights. But any talks could be dragged out for months or more, long enough for the SLORC to get a new Constitution adopted giving the military a permanent "guiding" role in the government. "Then they could hold new elections that come up with a result they can live with this time, however that result is obtained," another analyst said. Such speculation is only guesswork. The junta's membership is no secret, but its workings are opaque. The few indicators emerging include and obvious cosying up to other countries in the region, and particularly the ASEAN nations.(AFP) ********************************************************** INDEPENDENT REPORT: TOTAL SIGNS FINAL EXPORT SALES AGREEMENTS TO SELL BURMA OFFSHORE GAS TO THAI'S PETROLEUM AUTHORITY, February 2 1995 (UVI.net, Paris) By Dawn Star PARIS - Rebutting international furry over allegations that the Burmese junta engages in a national campaign of forced labor, Total France, the giant French gas and oil company, declared that the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprises (MOGE), Total, Unocal, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand Exploration and Production Public Co. Ltd (PTTEP), nonetheless, had recently signed an export gas sales agreemnt with the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT). In the deal, the group agress to sell to PTT natural gas produced from the controversial Yadana offshore field. The agreement is the conclusion of a process that follows last September's signing in of memorandum of understanding giving Total an edge over its partners. According to Total's press office at the company's Paris headquarters, since Thailand's PTTEP exercised its option to take an interest in the project, the present ownership structure is divided accordingly with Total, 36,75%, Unocal, 33,25%, PTTEP, 30%. However, Burma's national oil company, MOGE, retains an option to acquire up to a 15% interest in the project, which would thus reduce the different partners' overall stake. Total's share would drop to 31,2%, accordingly. Disregarding the democratic opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's appeal not to invest in Burma at this time, the development of the Yadana field falls within a carefully planned overall strategy by Total's senior management to extend the company's operations throughout Southeast Asian energy markets. Coupled with its existing natual gas production from Thailand's Bongkot field, and virtually ignoring reports in the international press and UN resolutions over the pipeline's alleged use of forced labor by the Slorc military regime, Total is betting that this latest development will secure it a profitable future as a leading energy supplier to Thailand. Since the Burmese government does not have trained engineers or technicians capable to supervise and manage their part of the pipeline, the French company has assumed full responsability as both operator for the development of the field, and, as well, on the pipleline to the Thai border, with PTT controlling operation of the pipeline within Thailand. With the country plunged between warring factions, Total is certain to risk more incidents of the kind that occured last March when five Total workers were killed and 11 injured by ethnic Karen rebels seeking revenge for the forced explusion of local villages along the pipeline route, and outbreaks of violence last month that left at least one death among security forces guarding the pipeline. Terms of the contract, says Total, give the French full authority to + take all the necessary actions to ensure that deliveries to PTT will begin by the scheduled date of July 1, 1998 ;. From the initial rate of 65 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd), deliveries are expected to rise progressively over the next fourteen months to a plateau level of 525 million cubic feet per day. Total's contract covers the next thirty years, with the gas to be delivered to the Ratchaburi region, where it will then be used to fire a 2,800 megawatt power plan managed by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). According to Total, production from the Yadana field, over the long term, may rise to 650 million cubic feet per day, with the additional output being used to supply Burma's domestic energy demand. The question, however, remains : will Total be forced to engage mercenary security forces to further protect its investment, thus propping up Burma's declining economy in order to fulfill its grand energy plan for South Asia's, at the cost of millions of suffering Burmese people who have been denied political freedom and a voice in determining the future of Burma's economic development. *********************************************************************** NATION: ROAD TO MANDALAY NOT QUITE READY February 7, 1996 (abridged) Next year "Visit Myanmar" year. But is the blighted country's infrastructure up TO it? MICHELE COOPER of AFP reports from Pagan, Burma's premier tourist site. According to a joke doing the rounds of foreign residents here, Burma's ideal tourist is one who flies into Rangoon, takes a suite at the Strand Hotel, spends US$555 and flies out again the next day. But the country has a lot to offer: from Rangoon 's landmark Shwedagon pagoda to the bustle of Mandalay, the 11th-13th century temples in Pagan and the picturesque floating village on Inle Lake in the Shan State. It also has substandard hotels, serious transportation problems - antiquated rail and road network and inadequate air links - and officials who are uncomfortable with undisciplined foreign tourists. "As long as people stay on the tourist circuit, they will come away happy. Those who get off the beaten track to try to get to know the "real Burma" will find their experience is less happy," a tourism professional commented. He was speaking after a group of 12 British and American tourists were forced to cut short a bicycle tour of the country because of a mix-up between Rangoon authorities and those in the provinces over authorizations. Tourism and Hotels Minister Kyaw Ba maintained in a recent speech that income from tourism-related business had a "miltiplier effect on the citizens of a nation." Manager Ohn Gyaw of the Thiripyitsaya the last remaining government-run hotel in Pagan, concurred, saying that in his four years in the area he had seen living standards rise significantly. The official view is that tourism helps everyone, from the laborers used in construction and the staff hired to operate business to the craftsmen who sell souvenirs to the tourists and the farmers who grow crops to feed them. Opposition leader Aunt San Suu Kyi disagreed. "Building one hotel probably means a lot more profits for the foreign countries involved than for Burma," she said in a recent interview in Rangoon. *********************************************** NATION: DRUG BOSS KHUN SA MOVED FROM SHAN STATE TO RANGOON February 7, 1996 Reuter (abridged) BURMESE opium warlord Khun Sa has been taken from his jungle headquarters in the northeastern Shan state to live in Rangoon, one of his officers and other sources said yesterday. Khun Sa who surrendered to government forces last month, was taken to Rangoon from his Ho Mong headquarters on the orders of military intelligence chief Lt Gen Khin Nyunt around Jan 20, a Thai intelligence officer added. He was accompanied by his right-hand man Chang Shu-chuan, who is also known by the Shan name Sao Hpalang, a former Chinese nationalist soldier who was worked with Khun Sa since the mid-1960s, the Thai source said. The sources said it was unclear why Khun Sa had been taken to the Burmese capital. An Agence France-Presse report yesterday quoted an official source as saying that the Burmese junta has set three conditions for the formal surrender of Khun Sa - that it be unconditional, that he halt drug-related activities and that he promise to obey the law. The terms were conveyed to Khun Sa after he relayed his offer to surrender through a Burmese army divisional commander. The source rejected as "total rubbish" international news reports that the military government in Rangoon had accepted 10 of Khun Sa's demands, including a full amnesty. ************************************************* NATION: MON REBELS COOL TO JUNTA'S ECONOMIC OFFERS February 7, 1996 SANGKHA BURI - Burma's ethnic Mon guerrilla movement is taking "a cautious view" concerning economic offers made by the ruling Burmese junta after both sides struck a ceasefire agreement last June. In an interview on Feb 4, Mon National Day, a senior leader of the New Mon State Party (NMSP) said that it was pressure from Thailand that forced them to enter into dialogue with the Burmese military rulers. Thailand had pushed for armed ethnic groups living along the Thai-Burmese border to enter ceasefire negotiations with the Slorc because of the "vast and ever-increasing economic benefits for itself in commercial engagements with the Burmese dictatorship", he said. "Pressure. Pressure from our neighbour (Thailand) ..... to facilitate trade, Thailand wanted to see its indigenous neighbours in Burma at peace with the Slorc," said the senior NMSP leader who asked that his identity not be disclosed. He criticized the Slorc, saying that their "Burmanization Policy" has failed to eliminate the desire for self-determination by all the ethnic nationalities in the country or " to win the hearts and minds of the Burmese (Burman) , especially of the new generations". Burman is the majority ethnic race in the country. He rejected the idea that it was another victory for Slorc when it struck a truce with the NMSP on June 29 last year, saying that the event, in fact, meant Rangoon accepted the Mon people's desire for self-determination. "On the contrary, it means the Burmese Army has had to come to terms with the NMSP and has accepted as legitimate the enduring aspirations of the Mons to achieve self-determination," he said. Slorc, he said, has tried to appease various armed ethnic groups including the Mons by economic concessions. But the NMSP "is in fact taking a cautious view", as Slorc's decision to allow them to engage in sea trade with Singapore and Malaysia "was only compensation for the revenue we have agreed to stop collecting (in the form of taxes from people passing through Mon territory)". He rejected recent media reports that the NMSP supreme leader, Nai Shwe Kyin, was excited by the ceasefire and economic concessions given by Slorc. "It is certainly not true as published in some reports that Nai Shwe Kyin is excited about our future. "Like most of our leaders, he hopes for the best but is prepared for the worst," he said. He contended that the ceasefire was only "a temporary peace" and insisted that all ethnic nationalities in Burma believed "in the absolute necessity of political reform". Asked about the fate of about 18,000 Mon refugees taking shelter along the Thai-Burmese border opposite Thailand's Kanchanaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan provinces, he said all would return and be resettled. He said a request for the UNHCR to monitor the resettlement of the refugees "has met with silence from Slorc". Therefore, the NMSP wanted to appeal to the American people, their Congress and their administration "for assistance, through existing relief channels in Thailand, for basic necessities and medicine for those Mon resettling" and for the 160,000 other Burmese victims taking refuge along the common border. (TN) ************************************************ BKK POST: SOLDIERS ARE THERE TO HELP February 6, 1996 Burma aims for US$36-40m windfall from 200,000 visitors Report: Nussara Sawatsawang and Supapohn Kanwerayotin, Rangoon Gun-toting soldiers patrol Heho airstrip in Shan State and roam markets in Taunggyi and Kalaw. They also guard the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism headquarters in Rangoon. Hotels and Tourism Minister Kyaw Ba, donning uniform for the interview, said the pervasive militarist presence would ensure safety and security for about 200,000 visitors expected in Burma this year. The State Law and Order Restoration Council, a military regime that has ruled Burma since 1988, has designated 1996 Visit Myanmar Year. The authorities expected tourism-related spending to reach US$36-40 million this fiscal year which begins in April and lasts until March next year, Lt-Gen Kyaw Ba told Inside Indochina. The figure excludes hotel earnings. Owing to inadequate infrastructure such as international flight connections, hotel rooms, transport and service personnel, the authorities have reduced the original target of 500,000 visitors to a more realistic 200,000. "Our target is 500,000 but international airlines cannot meet that capacity," Lt-Gen Kyaw Ba said. Besides, airports in Burma cannot cope with big aircraft. As a result, the government is stepping up airport expansion moves and negotiating with international flag carriers with a view to receiving more visitors. Burma's Transport Ministry is holding talks on opening flights into Burma by major international airlines including Lufthansa, Air France, Japan Airlines, All Nippon Airways and Korean Air. "Agreements are most likely to be clinched this year with the two Japanese airlines. If all these negotiations go through, we will be able to receive as many as one million visitors a year," Lt-Gen Kyaw Ba said. Bangkok and Singapore are the key entry points of international flight connections to Burma, served by Thai Airways International which operates 10 flight a week, Burma's national flag carrier Myanmar Airways International and Singapore's SilkAir. The Japanese top the list of foreign visitors to Burma last year, accounting for 14% of total arrivals, according to official statistics. Behind the Japanese are the Koreans, Taiwanese, Singaporeans and the Thais. From Europe, Burma has seen an increasing number of French, German, Italian and British travellers. In tandem with efforts to increase the number of international flights are expansion of airports and the opening up of more destinations inside Burma that were previously off-limits such as the states of Kachin and Kayah, as well as the Sino-Burmese border region. Travel to these areas still requires package tour purchase and permits. "Some tourists can instigate trouble and spread misinformation in the areas. We have to maintain stability, and security remains a key concern to us," the minister said. The military government is renovating the airport in the northern commercial centre of Mandalay and building a new one in the historic town of Pegu, which requires a two-and- a-half hour drive along a bumpy dirt-track although it is only 60 kilometres from Rangoon. In Mandalay, Italian-Thai Development Plc of Bangkok is carrying out the contract it inherited from a Singaporean firm to build a new runway that can accommodate jet aircraft. With the runway to be completed in two years, the Burmese government is seeking foreign investment to build a new terminal. Apart from foreign tourists and investors, Rangoon is courting the United Nations Educational, scientific and Cultural Organisation in a bid to revitalise ties that Burma allowed to lapse last year. "We have now decided to co-operate with UNESCO. We are holding talks so UNESCO an help conserve archaeological heritage sites such as Pagan and the Bayinnaung Palace in Pegu," Lt-Gen Kyaw Ba said, adding Burma planned to seek World Heritage Site status for pagoda-dotted Pagan, which has become a key tourist destination. promoting Burma to the world travel industry requires a big effort, as Gen Ne Win, the country's strongman, closed the country for three decades starting in 1962. The State Law and Order Restoration Council plans to spend up to eight million kyat (about 32.5 million baht at the official exchange rate) this year, mostly to produce promotional materials depicting the country as a tourist destination. "Most people I met in American mistook my country for Bahamas. As they'd say, Bahamas?" said U Htay Aung of the Directorate of Hotels and Tourism of an experience while studying for a master's degree at George Washington University. Slorc, which seized power in 1988 and suppressed the pro- democracy movement, renamed the country Myanmar, reasoning that Burma was a misnomer coined by British colonialists. Burma has an agreement with Singapore for the city state to assist in tourism promotion. The Tourism Authority of Thailand has offered similar cooperation but so far no formal agreement has been reached. Despite the increasing dynamism of the tourism sector, Burma's government has no plans to open up the country in every aspect for independent travel. Two rules that stay in force for now are visa requirements to safeguard security, and the compulsory purchase of a "foreign exchange certificate" for $300 by tourists not buying package tours. This guarantees foreign exchange earnings. The government has no plan to abolish this requirement, Lt- Gen Kyaw Ba said. "IN the past, some tourists could cover their weeklong expenses of travelling in the country by selling two bottles of whisky and two cartons of cigarettes on the black market. That's why we introduced the compulsory exchange rule, which we are going to maintain," he said. To boost Visit Myanmar Year, the government has lowered the tourist visa fee from 470 to 250 baht and can process applications within a day. Visas on arrival are granted only to pre-arranged package tours and tourists arriving on cruise ships and charter flights. "We are taking a little more time to ponder further relaxation of visa rules," Lt-Gen Kyaw Ba said, claiming that some "people who have a negative attitude" toward Rangoon might sneak in to "create trouble" if immigration regulations were liberalised. (BP)