------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------ "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ---------------------------------------------------------- The BurmaNet News: March 16, 1997 Issue #668 HEADLINES: ========== NATION:REFUGEES GIVEN CHETTHA'S SAFETY ASSURANCE THAILAND TIMES:7,000 RELOCATED REFUGEES IN NEW CAMP US STATE DEPT.: NARCOTIC REPORT-BURMA 2/97 KYO-KAW THOO LEI: STATEMENT REGARDING SLORC KYO-CANADA STATEMENT: SAFETY OF KAREN REFUGEES BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NATION:REFUGEES GIVEN CHETTHA'S SAFETY ASSURANCE March 15, 1997 Thailand will not force refugees back into the war zone in Burma but will enforce stricter rules to ensure law and order in refugee camps on Thai soil, Army Commander in Chief Chettha Thanajaro said yesterday. His statement came in response to charges form Amnesty International that Thailand is forcibly repatriating ethnic Karen refugees to Burma. "I would like to reassure you that we will not send the refugees back until the situation is back to normal where we are able to guarantee their safety," he said. The London-based rights group said it was concerned that Thailand was continuing to force Karen refugees back into Burma. "The organisation fears that the Thai authorities may repatriate all Karen refugees once fighting between the Karen National Union (KNU)... and the Burmese army has stopped," Amnesty said. The KNU is the last major ethnic insurgency group still fighting against Burma's military government. Last month the KNU suffered a major setback when Burmese troops sacked their mobile camps inside Burma, causing thousands of refugees to flee into Thailand. "Amnesty International appeals to the Royal Thai government to allow all refugees to remain in Thailand until ...they will no longer be at risk of human rights violations in (Burma)," the rights group said. **************************** THAILAND TIMES:7,000 RELOCATED REFUGEES TO GET GOVT PROVISIONS IN NEW CAMP March 15, 1997 TAK : Over 7,000 Karen refugees from Sho Klor refugee camp have asked Thai government to provide some necessities before moving them to another refugee camp, Mae Lah. In respond to the refugees demand the government has prepared water supply and decent accommodation for the displaced Karen at Mae Lah camp, a source at the Sho Klor said. Tha Song Yang district chief Wira Phothisuk, after a meeting with a Karen representative, said yesterday Thai government has made a decision to commission non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to dig artesian wells at Mae Lah camp. He said the camp will be able to take in 7,000 newcomers in addition to 20,000 Karen refugees already sheltered there, without over population problem. Local authorities said discussions with refugee representatives are expected to be successful within this month and gain satisfaction from the refugees. "They will immediately move to Ban Mae Lah when everything is completed," he cited. The proposal to reduce the number of refugee camps in Tak province's Umphang district, however, does not meet the government approval for fears of possible risks to the nearby wildlife preserve areas and forests, Tak Governor Phongphayom Wasaphuti said. Charoeen Singhayakul, Umphang district chief, has been assigned to urgently search for a suitable location, Governor Phongphayom said. ************************************ US STATE DEPT.: NARCOTIC REPORT-BURMA 2/97 February 1997 "Thomas R. Lansner" 1997 US State Dept International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2/97 pp 249-56 BURMA I. Summary Burma is the world's largest source of illicit opium and, potentially, heroin, as opium cultivation and production in 1996 increased to near record levels. The 1996 crop estimates indicate there were 163,000 hectares under opium poppy cultivation which could yield up to 2,560 mt of opium gum -- enough to produce 250 mt of heroin and to satisfy the US heroin market many times over. Although there were some limited improvements in the Burmese Government's counternarcotics performance with regard to drug and precursor chemical seizures, these efforts fell far short of what is needed to cope with Burma's burgeoning drug trade. Burma's antidrug efforts suffer from a lack of resources as well as the lack of a strong and consistent commitment. Although the "surrender" of drug lord Khun Sa and the dismantling of his Mong Tai Army (MTA) was portrayed by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as a positive development, Khun Sa has not been brought to justice and has apparently been granted personal clemency from prosecution or extradition. He is said by authorities to be under a form of house confinement in Rangoon and permitted to engage in business activities, but not narcotics-related activities. Reports suggest, however, that he and his MTA colleagues continue to be involved in the narcotics trade. The ethnic drug trafficking armies with which the government has negotiated cease-fires, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang Chinese), remain armed and heavily involved in the heroin trade and have to some extent moved into territory vacated by Khun Sa's former MTA. The top leaders of these ethnic groups are: U Sai Lin (Lin Ming-Shing) of the Eastern Shan State Army (ESSA); Yang Mao-Liang, Peng Chia-Sheng and Liu Go-Shi of the MNDAA; Pao Yu-Chiang, Li Tzu-Ju and Wei Hsueh-Kang of the United Wa State Army; and U Mahtu Naw of the Kachin Defense Army (KDA). Nevertheless, the government's limited efforts to extend law enforcement into the ethnic areas during the year resulted in some seizures of narcotics and precursor chemical and the destruction of some heroin refineries. These seizures pale in comparison with overall production, however, and are less than those in neighboring, non-producing states. Money laundering is a growing problem in Burma, and there is reason to believe that the laundering of drug profits is having a substantial impact on the Burmese economy. An underdeveloped banking system and lack of enforcement against money laundering have created a business and investment environment conducive to the use of drug-related proceeds in legitimate commerce. Drug abuse -- in particular intravenous drug use -- is increasing, as is the incidence of HIV/AIDS infection. II. Status of Country Burma provides the bulk of the world's opium supply. It produces about 84 percent of the opium cultivated in Southeast Asia. Most of this supply of illicit opiates is produced in ethnic minority areas of Burma's Shan State, such as the Kokang and Wa territories over which Burmese authorities have minimal control. Since 1989, the SLORC has negotiated cease-fire agreements with the drug trafficking groups that control these areas, offering them limited autonomy and developmental assistance in exchange for ending their insurgencies. Because the SLORC's highest priority has been to end the fighting and the threat to its national security, counternarcotics efforts in these areas have been a secondary consideration, even though the groups are said to have agreed to the gradual phaseout of opium cultivation and drug trafficking within their areas. Nevertheless, we have seen no discernible effort by these groups to reduce trafficking or production. Following the surrender of Khun Sa, the Kokang, Wa and Essa areas in particular became drug trafficking havens where opium was produced and refined with relative impunity. As part of the SLORC's efforts to bring the ethnic groups under its control, it granted leaders of these drug trafficking armies significant political legitimacy, and several participate in the government's National Constitutional Convention. These leaders have exploited their relationship with Rangoon to expand their businesses -- legitimate and illegitimate -- although their prosperity has not filtered down to the ordinary people of the ethnic areas. III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996 Policy Initiatives. Burmese counternarcotics activities increased from a very low base during 1996, especially with regard to heroin, precursor chemical, and amphetamine seizures, but remained grossly inadequate compared to the magnitude of Burma's drug problem. The "surrender" of Khun Sa allowed the Burma Army to project its authority into the former MTA area. The military disrupted, at least temporarily, trafficking routes and destroyed a number of heroin refineries in the area. There are also reports, however, of officials turning a blind eye to refining activity in return for bribes. The SLORC did not announce any new drug control policy initiatives during 1996. It continued limited efforts to implement its "Master Plan for the Development of Border Areas and National Races." This plan calls for a program of integrated development combined with law enforcement. The stated aim is to improve the living standards in the ethnic areas and provide viable economic alternatives to opium cultivation. In 1993, the Government of Burma (GOB) and UNDCP launched the China/Myanmar project and the Thailand/Myanmar project in Mong Yang and Tachilek districts, respectively. These projects, while improving living standards and introducing alternative crops to farmers within the project areas themselves, had little, if any, impact on the enormous problem of opium cultivation even in neighboring areas, much less other areas of eastern and northern Burma. The projects drew to a close in December 1996. The GOB and UNDCP initiated a 12-month pilot integrated rural development project in 1994 in the Wa region in an effort to take advantage of the United Wa State Army's decision to establish five "opium poppy-free zones" in its area of control. The stated goal was to bring about a gradual reduction of opium cultivation in the WA area. The pilot project was designed to test the feasibility of a planned five-year, $15 million rural development project aimed at crop substitution. Negotiations on the "Drug Control and Development in the Wa Region of Shan State" project between the GOB, the UNDCP, and the Wa leaders were concluded in November 1996. The SLORC raised a number of obstacles to implementation of the project. Protracted negotiations between UNDCP and the Burmese resolved many of these issues, but some remain, and donors are concerned about implementation. The Burmese cabinet has not yet formally approved the project. In contrast to UNDCP's previous projects in Mong Yang and Tachilek, the Wa project will incorporate a monitoring and evaluation component designed to measure progress in eliminating opium cultivation. As an integrated development scheme, it will also focus on infrastructure, as well as on the provision of educational and health facilities in the Ho Tao and Mong Pawk districts of the Wa region. Accomplishments. The GOB negotiated the "surrender" of the notorious drug lord Khun Sa and his MTA in January 1996. According to the GOB, the terms of the surrender stipulated that in return for ending his insurgency and surrendering his weaponry, Khun Sa would be allowed to live under close government supervision in Rangoon, where he could engage indirectly, via third-party investors, in legitimate business -- but not drug trafficking -- and would not be prosecuted for his trafficking activities or extradited to the US. The MTA drug trafficking network has been disrupted, but reports suggest that Khun Sa and his MTA associates are still involved in the trade. Overall trafficking from Burma has not diminished, as other groups, particularly the Wa, took up the slack caused by the dissolution of Khun Sa's army. Moreover, Khun Sa has not been brought to justice in Burma, and the GOB has refused USG requests to turn him over for prosecution in the US. Indeed, the SLORC treats him with respect, addressing him with the traditional honorific. Seizure of drugs and precursor chemicals, while still minimal, increased from a low base during 1996. The combined police and military narcotics task forces seized 493 kgs of heroin, as opposed to 72 kgs in 1995. In October, the authorities seized for the first time the amphetamine precursor ephedrine -- more than three mt -- which apparently originated in China for conversion at labs in Burma. They also seized 5.6 million tablets of amphetamines. Seizures of acetic anhydride more than doubled from 1995 totals to 2,668 gallons. However, opium gum seizures continued to decline from previous years, totaling 992 kgs versus 1,060 kgs in 1995. In the July-October period, the Burmese reported that they destroyed 11 heroin refineries compared to the 12 destroyed from 1988 through June 1996. The GOB conducted these counternarcotics activities in areas controlled by ethnic drug trafficking groups such as the Kachin Defense Army, the Kokang Army, the MNDAA, and the United Wa State Army. These limited inroads into the ethnic areas do not, however, constitute a serious challenge to the drug trafficking armies, which by and large continue to conduct their trade unimpeded. Unlike previous years, when heroin seizures involved small quantities, this year the SLORC claimed some larger seizures, including the largest ever recorded in Burma -- 143 kgs seized near Kutkai in Northern Shan State in August. Authorities seized another 44.8 kgs in Hopong in Northern Shan State in August and 45 kgs in Tachilek in September. These seizures are small in comparison with Burma's actual production and with seizures in neighboring countries. The unprecedented precursor and amphetamine seizures have alarmed the Burmese authorities because they signal a possible future stimulants problem for the Burmese populace. Thus far, the amphetamines produced in Burma have been primarily for export to Thailand and China rather than for domestic consumption. The 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law brought the Burmese legal code into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention. As such, the 1993 law contains useful legal tools for addressing money laundering, the seizure of drug-related assets, and the prosecution of drug conspiracy cases. However, to date these provisions remain largely unused as Burmese police and judicial officials have been slow to implement the law, targeting few if any major traffickers and their drug-related assets. Undermining SLORC credibility, a Burmese official involved in counternarcotics declared flatly in December that money laundering did not exist in Burma because of the country's strict banking laws. In one instance, however, the authorities reportedly seized buildings belonging to the Wa of the southern military region as the result of the heroin seizure in Tachilek mentioned above, although the disposition of these assets is unknown. Law Enforcement Efforts. The GOB's coordinated drug enforcement effort is led by the Office of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC), which is comprised of personnel from various security services, including the police, customs, military intelligence, and the army. CCDAC now has 18 drug enforcement task forces around the country, most located in major cities and along key transit routes near Burma's borders with China, India and Thailand. While CCDAC and its task forces are responsible for effecting the bulk of narcotics seizures and arrests, the agency suffers from a lack of adequate resources. The UNDCP and DEA in the past provided various CCDAC units with modest equipment and training, but they were unable to do so this year. CCDAC's resources are inadequate to support its law enforcement mission. Corruption. There is no evidence that the government, on an institutional level, is involved in the drug trade. However, there are persistent reports that lower level officials, particularly in outlying areas of the border regions, take bribes in return for looking the other way and that some local officials and commanders are actively involved in the drug trade. The lack of a vigorous enforcement effort against money laundering leaves Burma vulnerable to the growing influence of traffickers through the use of drug proceeds in legitimate business ventures. Although there is no concrete proof that drug money is involved, businesses owned by family members of known traffickers invested heavily during the year in infrastructure projects, such as roads and port facilities, as well as in hotels and other real estate development projects. Agreements and Treaties. Burma is a party to the 1971 and 1988 UN drug conventions. The SLORC deposited instruments of ratification to the 1988 Convention with the UN International Narcotics Control Board in Vienna. However, the Rangoon regime maintains its reservations on two of the Convention's Articles, one on extradition of Burmese citizens to third countries, and one on the use of the International Court of Justice to resolve disputes relating to the Convention (Articles 6 and 32, respectively). The US does not have a mutual legal assistance treaty with Burma. It is the opinion of the USG, however, that a US-UK extradition treaty, which was accepted by the post-independence Burmese Government in 1948, remains in force and is applicable to the extradition of drug fugitives from Burma to the US. The SLORC refuses to recognize the applicability of this treaty, as well as the US request to render Khun Sa to face trial in the US. In May, the GOB and the UNDCP signed a six-nation (Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam) memorandum of understanding on a sub-regional action plan aimed at controlling precursor chemicals and reducing illicit drug use in the highlands of Southeast Asia. Cultivation and Production. Burma is by far the world's largest producer of opium, as opium poppy cultivation increased six percent and production increased nine percent over 1995 levels due to good weather, growing conditions and lax enforcement. The 163,100 hectares cultivated in 1995-96 had the potential of producing up to 2,560 mt of opium. The bulk of Burma's opium poppy cultivation traditionally has been in the mountainous regions of the Shan Plateau, which extends the length of the Shan State, from the Chinese border to the Thai border. Since 1989, however, cultivation has been expanding into areas under Burmese Government control on the west bank of the Salween River. Drug Flow/Transit. Until 1996, heroin tended to be produced in large, relatively static refineries in the Shan State, well ensconced in ethnic enclaves protected by drug trafficking armies. These labs, run by the ESSA, MNDAA (Kokang), KDA, UWSA, and MTA, were left untouched by the GOB, in keeping with the SLORC's cease-fire agreements with these drug militias. However, in 1996 the GOB made inroads into these defended areas, reportedly destroying a number of labs and forcing some traffickers to use smaller and more mobile labs to refine heroin. A growing amount of methamphetamines reportedly is produced in labs co-located with heroin refineries along the Chinese, Thai and Lao borders. Heroin produced by Burma's ethnic groups is trafficked largely through unmarked transit routes crossing the porous Chinese and Thai borders and, to a lesser extent, the Indian, Bangladeshi and Lao borders. Although Thailand was once the primary route for Burmese heroin to exit Southeast Asia, trafficking through China is now increasing. As in 1995, traffickers moved a growing amount of heroin through central Burma, often from Lashio, through Mandalay to Rangoon or other seaports such as Moulmein, for sea-borne export to Singapore or Malaysia. Trafficking routes leading through Kachin and Chin States and Sagaing Division in northern Burma to India also are used to a lesser extent. Traffickers import acetic anhydride, an essential chemical in the production of heroin, primarily from China, India and, to a lesser extent, from Thailand. Demand Reduction/Domestic Programs. Drug abuse is a growing problem in Burma. Official estimates put the addict population at approximately 60,000, but UNDCP and NGO's working in the health sector estimate the actual population is at least five times that figure. Heroin is the drug of choice and its intravenous use is contributing to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in the Kachin and Shan states. According to the GOB's "Rapid Assessment Study of Drug Abuse in Myanmar," sponsored by the Ministry of Health and UNDCP in 1995, drug treatment services are not reaching most drug users because of a lack of facilities, lack of properly trained personnel, and inadequate treatment methods. IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs Policy Initiatives. Direct USG counternarcotics aid to Burma has remained suspended since 1988, when the Burmese military brutally suppressed the popular pro-democracy movement. Initiatives such as an aerial eradication program, which had been effective in containing the expansion of Burmese opium cultivation, have not been carried out by the Burmese Government since 1988. Currently, the USG engages the Burmese Government on a very limited level. DEA shares drug-related information with the GOB and conducts joint drug enforcement investigations with Burmese police and military intelligence. Various US agencies have twice joined Burmese counterparts in conducting annual opium yield surveys in the mountainous regions of the Shan State; the Burmese Government invited USG participation in a third such joint survey in February 1997. However, the Burmese Government cancelled a planned survey in 1996 at the last minute, shortly after the "surrender" of Khun Sa. Results from the surveys gave both governments a more accurate understanding of the scope and magnitude of Burma's opium crop. The USG continues to urge the SLORC to take serious steps to curb Burma's runaway opium production and heroin trafficking. Specifically, the Rangoon regime has been encouraged to: --undertake opium poppy eradication on a wide scale in areas under its direct control or immediate influence; --press ethnic groups such as the Wa, the Eastern Shan State Army and the Kokang, with which it has made political accommodations, to undertake credible measures to reduce opium cultivation and end heroin trafficking and production; --actively enforce existing antidrug, conspiracy and money laundering legislation; --provide strong support to multilateral drug control projects in the Shan State; --hold Khun Sa accountable for his decades of drug trafficking and deprive him of assets derived from the drug trade; --take action against drug-related corruption, including prosecution and appropriate punishment of corrupt officials and money launderers. Bilateral Cooperation. USG counternarcotics cooperation with the Burmese regime is restricted to basic law enforcement operations and involves no bilateral material or training assistance from the US, due to concerns over Burma's shallow commitment to the counternarcotics effort, disregard for the rule of law, and violation of basic standards of human decency. DEA's liaison with Burmese police and military -- conducted through DEA's three-person office in Rangoon -- will continue at its limited level. Although DEA was unable to provide training to Burmese counternarcotics personnel during the year, it did encourage cooperation by the CCDAC on two major investigations of international drug trafficking groups operating in Burma. The Road Ahead. Based on experience in dealing with large-scale narcotics trafficking problems elsewhere around the world, the USG recognizes that ultimately large-scale international aid, including developmental assistance and law enforcement aid, will be needed to curb drug production and trafficking. The USG is prepared to consider such assistance, contingent upon the GOB's demonstration of a strong commitment to counternarcotics, the rule of law and significant movement toward political reform. BURMA Chart ------------------------------------- Excerpt From Report Executive Summary: HEROIN AND OPIATES A deadly partnership between cocaine and heroin has been developing over the past few years. Though cocaine long ago displaced heroin as America's most dangerous illegal drug of choice, heroin has been gradually creeping back onto the US drug scene, not as rival, but as a partner Taken along with cocaine, it can moderate cocaine's stimulant effects. By itself, it can provide a mellow euphoria. Once dÈclassÈe as the drug of dead-end derelicts, heroin unfortunately may be acquiring a false respectability among younger drug users. Though just as deadly and addictive as cocaine, heroin, as an opiate, has a special property that appeals to the drug trade and the addict alike: it permits many addicts to develop a long-term tolerance to the drug. Whereas constant cocaine use may kill a regular user in five years, a heroin addiction can last a decade or more, as long as addicts have access to a maintenance "fix." Some heroin addicts on maintenance doses have been known to preserve the facade of a normal life for years. For the drug trade, this insidious property holds out the long term promise of a steady customer base. Unfortunately the US customer base may be on the rise. Estimates of the US heroin addict population, which for two decades had remained steady at 500,000 individuals, are being revised upward. Evidence of combined drug use suggests that more of the US's 2 million-plus hard-core cocaine addicts are using heroin to cushion the "crash" that follows the euphoria of using crack. Moreover, the heroin addict no longer need be the archetypal junkie shooting up heroin with a dirty needle. The high purity Colombian heroin now available in the US can be snorted like cocaine. This not only frees the user from the need for syringes but from the fear of contracting AIDS from infected needles. In order to develop an assured and profitable market in the United States, the drug trade seems to be counting on a new generation's ignorance of the devastating consequences of heroin use. Heroin's popularity elsewhere in the world seems assured. Since opium poppies can grow in almost any country, there is no dearth of heroin. The USG estimates for 1996 place potential opium production at nearly 4,300 metric tons, probably a record amount. Sixty percent of that quantity grows in Burma, which by itself probably could satisfy world heroin demand. A bumper crop in Southeast Asia more than offset a drop in Southwest Asian production, which by itself meets most of Europe's heavy heroin needs, while satisfying important domestic demand in many of the source countries. As the chapters in this report indicate, heroin availability--and addiction--is rising throughout Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. The Balkan Route's northern, central, and southern branches form the artery carrying high quality Afghan heroin into every important market in Europe. With Nigerians controlling much of the intercontinental heroin trade, Africa is an important region for not only heroin trafficking but for transshipment to European destinations. Southeast Asia, the world's largest source of heroin, not only contributes to the bulk of world supply but is an important consumer of heroin itself. As the region's economies boom, we can expect to see an even greater rise in heroin consumption. Even China, which once had all but eliminated heroin addiction, is experiencing a serious rise in teenage addiction. In short, except from the vantage point of the heroin trade, the near-term outlook is not encouraging. Source and Transit Country Highlights. In Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle region, the world's major source of opium, opium poppy cultivation increased for a second consecutive year. Burma remains the bread-basket of the opium trade, since it accounts for 65 percent of estimated total world opium poppy cultivation and 60 percent of estimated total potential opium gum production. Estimated production in Burma increased by nine per cent in 1996, for an estimated total of 2,560 metric tons, sufficient to produce 256 metric tons of heroin-probably more than enough to meet most of the world's heroin needs. Production in Laos also increased by 11 per cent, for an estimated total of 200 metric tons, or about 7 per cent of the Southeast Asian total. Production in Thailand increased in 1996 despite an aggressive eradication campaign, but remained minimal, accounting for only about one per cent of Southeast Asian production. From these figures it is clear that Burma remains the leading producer of heroin worldwide, and it remains the main overall source for heroin sold in the U.S. The USG's first survey of drug cultivation in Vietnam revealed 3,150 hectares of opium poppy, potentially capable of yielding 25 metric tons of opium gum. Opium poppy cultivation dropped by 9 percent in Southwest Asia, after a 45 percent rise the year before. Afghanistan's poppy crop, the largest in the region, declined marginally. Pakistan's cultivation, on the other hand, fell by more than half following extension of the poppy ban in the Northwest Frontier Provinces. Afghan opium is the source of most of Europe's heroin. Sophisticated Pakistani trafficking organizations operating out of Quetta, Pakistan, smuggle heroin base and morphine out of Afghanistan to the international market. These groups place orders with the Afghani processors and arrange for transshipment of the drugs from Afghanistan through Pakistan and to Iranian or Turkish buyers who move it through Iran and into international drug channels. Most Afghan opium is destined for processing into heroin in Turkey. The finished heroin is sold primarily in Europe, while a limited quantity goes to the United States Southwest Asian heroin continues to pour into Europe along the Balkan Route. With the branching of the route--northwards to Romania, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics; southwards through Croatia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece and Albania--each of these countries now faces important domestic drug problems. Turkish trafficking groups, with distributors in ethnic enclaves in major European cities, control much of the Balkan Route heroin trade. Russia is playing an increasingly pivotal role in Europe and Central Asia. Criminal organizations that had successfully operated under the Soviet regime entered the post-Cold War era with smuggling and distribution networks already in place. Using heroin sources established during the Soviet Union's war with Afghanistan, ethnically based gangs--many from the Caucasus--have burgeoned into major players in the European drug trade. They can use their networks to move Southwest Asian heroin through Central Asia to Russia and then onto destinations in the Baltics and Western Europe. Russian authorities noting a rampant increase in domestic drug use believe that there are now over 2 million drug users in Russia, with the numbers growing every year. The Central Asian countries of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, formerly important poppy growing regions for the Soviet Union, are well placed to be conduits for much of this drug traffic. Kazakstan provides a bridge for Southeast Asian heroin to move to Europe and Russia from Asia. The other countries offer profitable access routes for Southwest Asian, primarily Afghan, heroin into Russia, the NIS and Europe. Heroin, which can fetch high prices in Russia and Europe, has been a tempting source of cash to finance the civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Nigeria is critical to the heroin trade. Nigeria is Africa's most significant transshipment point. But Nigerians also surface as the heroin traffickers par excellence on every continent. Though they are among the principal smugglers of Southeast Asian heroin into the United States, Nigerians are regularly arrested in Bangkok, Rio de Janeiro, New York, Moscow, Riyadh, Bombay, etc. Unfortunately, rampant corruption at all levels of government in Nigeria virtually assures Nigerian trafficking organizations a favored place in the heroin trade. Colombia is the Western Hemisphere's largest grower of opium poppies. Colombian heroin is being sold in greater quantities in the United States, and poses a particular threat because of well established marketing strategies and channels developed by cocaine traffickers. In addition, Colombian heroin is of high purity. For 1996, USG estimates showed Colombian opium poppy cultivation at 6,300 hectares, four percent less than last year, but enough to yield an estimated 63 metric tons of opium gum, or 6.3 tons of heroin, assuming no losses. Venezuela's border with Colombia has made it a potential poppy growing country. So far, however, USG-assisted eradication efforts have kept growth to insignificant levels. Over the past three years, the eradication program has destroyed over 3,000 hectares of opium poppy in the Sierra de Perija region along the Colombian border. Mexico is Latin America's second largest cultivator of opium poppies. The 1996 crop was almost identical to the previous year's. After Mexican government eradication operations destroyed 7,900 hectares of poppy, there were 5,100 hectares available for exploitation by the drug syndicates, with an estimated potential yield of 54 metric tons of opium gum, or 5.4 metric tons of heroin. Though most of this heroin is destined for US markets, a USG-supported national drug use survey revealed a significant rise in intravenous heroin use in Mexican cities along the northern border with the US. ******************** KYO-KAW THOO LEI: STATEMENT REGARDING SLORC OFFENSIVE March 14, 1997 KYO-USA Statement of Karen Youth Organization Kaw Thoo Lei (KYO-KTL). Pertaining to an intensive military operation waged by SLORC against KNU. 1). The SLORC broke off peace talk with KNU arbitrarily after the fourth meeting. They are now trying to annihilate the Karen by means of intensive military operations against (KNU). We KYO strongly oppose and severely condemn the inhuman action of the SLORC. 2). The war of annihilation waged against the KNU by SLORC will not end the civil war which has occurred between the opposition armed forces and SLORC, instead all the ethnic nationalities and people of the country will suffer loss of life, deterioration of health poverty and uncertain security. 3). Because of the SLORC military operation, all the displaced persons including Karen who seek refuge in the THAI territory are discouraged and disappointed. All are fearful due to the threat of the SLORC and it's lackey the DKBA as their brutality is well known. 4). The SLORC proclaimed "non disintegration of the soldarity of the people is our cause, non disintegration of the union is our cause" but in practice their action contravene their proclamation, moreover the SLORC has no sympathy for the ethnic nationalities including the Karen. We the Karen youth organization KYO are very disppointed by the SLORC's action. 5). We KYO earnestly implore that the international benevolent organizations and UNHCR may kindly take care of those many thousands of displaced Karen people and other ethnic nationalities who take care refuge in the THAI territory, to promote their well being, their health, education for young folk and guarantee their security. 6). The risk is that the war of liquidation against the KNU will prolong the civil war and engender a chaotic situation for all the nationalities including the Karen people. Such action will only create more suspicion fear and disppointment. Therefore to be able to establish internal peace by an early date and procure genuine human rights, we KYO earnestly request the international communities to be sympathetic and consider our cause and give the Karen the necessary help. KAREN YOUTH ORGANIZATION KAW THOO LEI KYO-KTL ************************** KYO-CANADA STATEMENT: SAFETY OF KAREN REFUGEES March 14, 1997 email: tin00001@algonquinc.on.ca Karen Youth Organization-Canada statement concerning the safety of Karen refugees in Thailand We are seriously concerned about the recent attacks and intrusions into the Karen refugee camps and the safety of Karen refugees. We also oppose the full repatriation of Karen refugees into the war zone in Burma. The SLORC attacked the Karen refugee camps and set the camps on fire in late January and early February. Many thousands of Karen refugees, mostly children, women and the elderly became homeless. Thai authorities failed to protect the refugees. They refused to criticize the SLORC as well. We, KYO-Canada, strongly condemn the SLORC for their brutal attacks on these innocent people. We are also concerned for the safety of thousands of refugees fleeing the Burmese army offensive against the KNU. Some local civilians in the area of KNU 4th and 6th Brigade were not allowed to take refuge in Thailand. On Feb. 24th, around 500 men from the 4th Brigade were not allowed to enter Thailand. On Feb. 25th, around 230 men were sent back into the area in Burma from which they had fled. Thousands of Karen refugees in Thailand are fearing that they will be repatriated into unsafe areas, referred to by Thai authorities as a "safe corridor". We request the Thai government not to violate the international human rights principles which prohibit a state from returning refugees against their will to countries where they risk serious human rights violations. We ask the Thai authorities to protect the refugees and provide humanitarian assistance. We also request the international community such as Canada, the US and the EU to impose economic sanctions against the SLORC. For more information, contact: KYO-Canada email: tin00001@algonquinc.on.ca ********************************** BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST BurmaNet regularly receives enquiries on a number of different topics related to Burma. If you have questions on any of the following subjects, please direct email to the following volunteer coordinators, who will either answer your question or try to put you in contact with someone who can: Campus activism: zni@students.wisc.edu Boycott campaigns: [Pepsi] ai268@freenet.carleton.ca Buddhism: Buddhist Relief Mission: brelief@gol.com Chin history/culture: [volunteer temporarily away] Fonts: tom@cs.colgate.edu High School Activism: [volunteer needed] History of Burma: zni@students.wisc.edu International Affairs: Julien Moe: moe@interport.net Kachin history/culture: 74750.1267@compuserve.com Karen history/culture: Karen Historical Society: 102113.2571@Compuserve.com Mon history/culture: [volunteer needed] Naga history/culture: Wungram Shishak: z954001@oats.farm.niu.edu Burma-India border Aung San Myint: aungsan@giasd101.vsnl.net.in Pali literature: "Palmleaf": c/o burmanet@igc.apc.org Pipeline Campaign freeburma@irn.org Resettlement info: refugee_help@mail.serve.com Rohingya culture volunteer needed Shan history/culture: Sao Hpa Han: burma@ix.netcom.com Shareholder activism: simon_billenness@mail.cybercom.net Total - France Dawn Star: cd@utopia.EUnet.fr Tourism campaigns: bagp@gn.apc.org "Attn. 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