------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------ "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ---------------------------------------------------------- The BurmaNet News: August 6, 1997 Issue #790 Noted in Passing: The ceasefire "has given a relatively easy chance for [SLORC] to increase its conscription of forced labour from Mon State" - Mon Information Service (see BKK POST: JUNTA FORCES MON LABOUR) HEADLINES: ========== KNPP: ABOUT 50 PEOPLE DIED BY POISONING WATER BURMANET: SLORC OFFENSIVE IN KNPP AREA BKK POST: JUNTA FORCES MON LABOUR, SAYS REPORT SHAN REFUGEE UPDATE -- JULY 1997 THAILAND TIMES: KNU AND ABSDF TO JOINTLY ESTABLISH ASIA TIMES: TOKYO SENDS TOP-LEVEL OFFICIAL TO MYANMAR THE HINDU: AUSTRALIA TO PRESS MYANMAR FOR REFORMS THAILAND TIMES: LAO FM TO BURMA FOR MEETING SEMINAR ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DAVID STEINBERG: STASIS IN MYANMAR? DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK): TOUR FIRMS MOVE BACK INTO BURMA FBC: LIST OF UK-BASED COMPANIES TO BOYCOTT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- KNPP: ABOUT 50 PEOPLE DIED BY POISONING WATER AT SHADAW FORCED RELOCATION CAMP August 2, 1997 (Karenni National Progressive Party) [BurmaNet Editor's Note: This information is based on the report of a Karenni who managed to escape from the Shadaw forced relocation camp in Karenni State. Since the KNPP-SLORC ceasefire, which lasted only 3 months, broke down in late June 1995, the SLORC has forcibly relocated more than 100 Karenni villages in Northwestern Karenni State and has turned large areas of Karenni State into freefire zones. Up to 20,000 Karenni were sent to the Shadaw site, where they were forced to stay inside the camp, although there was not enough food or medicine for them. Many have subsequently fled to the Thai border or are hiding out in the mountains. There have been numerous reports of deaths in the camp due to malnutrition, unsanitary conditions, and the lack of medicine. According to a recent arrival, the SLORC has also used poison to kill off the camp residents. BurmaNet is seeking more information on this allegation.] from the Government of Karenni Ministry of Public Relations and Information SLORC Light Infantry Battalion No. 530 Commander ordered to the local germ reserach department services to put germicide powder in all wells and streams to kill germs at Shadaw in early July 1997. After using water from those wells and stream, about 50 residents and villagers who having been forcibly relocated to Shadaw immediately died according to the report of an escaped villager from Shadaw forced relocation camp on July 27, 1997. The health workers at Shadaw could not find any signs of disease. [According to the escaped villager] A similar incident occurred in August 1996 at Shadaw forced relocation camp and almost 300 people were dead by the use of poisoned water. ****************************************************** BURMANET: SLORC OFFENSIVE IN KNPP AREA August 6, 1997 According to the KNPP, the SLORC has launched a new offensive against the KNPP's Number 2 District with the objective of obtaining total control of this district. The SLORC has sent 4 battalions (Nos. 261, 102, 531, and 427) to the Mawchi area, southeastern Karenni State, under the command of Lt. Colonel Ye Aung. Before the operation began, General Maung Aye ordered the troops to kill all Karenni villagers that the troops met along the way, to take all the animals and use them for rations, to destroy all rice paddy barns and paddy fields, and to burn down all villages, especially larger villages. The entire population of the district is to be wiped out. The KNPP has been blocking the SLORC troops and trying to prevent their advance into District 2. Between July 31 and August 4 there have been several skirmishes and 8 SLORC soldiers have been killed. The villagers are fleeing in advance of the SLORC troops' arrival. ****************************************************** BKK POST: JUNTA FORCES MON LABOUR, SAYS REPORT August 5, 1997 AP CONSCRIPTION 'WORSE' SINCE 1995 CEASEFIRE The Burmese army is increasingly rounding up members of the Mon ethnic minority for forced labour since the Mons signed a ceasefire with Burma's military government, said a report issued yesterday. The ceasefire "has given a relatively easy chance for [the military] to increase its conscription of forced labour from Mon State", said the report issued by the Mon Information Service, based in Bangkok. The report documents a litany of human rights abuses committed by the Burmese army against ethnic minority peoples, including forced conscription as porters to carry supplies for the army, forced relocations and extortion. The Mon occupy the desperately poor, yet resource rich, Mon State and Tenasserim Division on Burma's southern peninsula. Leaders of the ethnic group, which had been fighting for independence for nearly 50 years, signed a cease-fire agreement with the military government in 1995. A few Mon, along with ethnic Karen insurgents and armed former students, are still waging a guerrilla style insurgency on the peninsula. In order to tap the timber, mineral and gas resources of the area, the government has been using forced labour to build infrastructure such as road and rail lines to transform the long-isolated region into a commercially viable corridor. The government does not deny using forced labour, but insists citizens participate willingly because it is a national tradition. ***************************************************************** SHAN REFUGEE UPDATE -- JULY 1997 by the Shan Human Rights Foundation A HIDDEN REFUGEE CRISIS: OVER 30,000 SHAN REFUGEES FLEE RELOCATIONS AND MASSACRES Despite the onset of the rainy season, refugees are continuing to flow out from central Shan State to Thailand to escape the SLORC's massive ongoing forced relocation campaign and repeated mass killings of villagers. Intensified forced relocation The forced relocation campaign, which began early last year, was aimed at cutting off civilian support for the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), which operates with a force of about 3,000 in Central and Southern Shan State. However, despite the relocation of over 600 villages in eight townships last year, the SURA has continued to operate, and clashes between SURA and SLORC troops occur frequently even near major towns. In apparent frustration at this, the SLORC has over the last few months been intensifying the relocation campaign, sweeping clear whole areas of the Shan countryside, moving new villages, as well as villages already relocated, to main roads and towns. For example, in the township of Laikha, where last year a total of only 80 villages were known to have been relocated, this year a further 87 villages have been relocated, bringing the total of relocated villagers to over 25,000. Whereas last year the villagers were relocated to relocation sites several miles outside the town, now all these villagers have been ordered to move to the town of Laikha itself, so the countryside east of Laikha is now totally depopulated. This pattern is also being repeated in other townships, for example in Murng Kerng, where last year only 24 villages were known to have been relocated, but this year on June 1, all the villages off the main roads were ordered to move to the roads, and all these villagers were forbidden from cultivating their fields. The areas of forced relocations have also expanded to the south, in response to SURA movement closer to the Thai border. In early June, 47 villages in Murng Pan, totalling an estimated 10,000 people, were forced to move to towns. This area had not been relocated last year. This indicates that at least twice the number of people affected last year (which was well over 100,000) are being relocated this year, bringing the figure of relocated villagers to over 200,000. Refugees state that in some areas as many as 70% of the relocated populations have fled to Thailand. Repeated massacres Refugees arriving in Thailand testify that it was not simply the loss of their homes and livelihood that drove them to Thailand, but terror at the unprecedented brutality of the SLORC troops in their area. Whereas last year there were only isolated reports of killings during the forced relocations, this year the SLORC troops are literally shooting anyone on sight who is found outside the relocation areas. The June 1997 SHRF report detailed the killing by the SLORC of 58 civilians in early June in the Kunhing area alone. They had been caught returning to their old villages. In the July 1997 SHRF report, as many as 400 civilians are reported to have been killed by SLORC troops in Kunhing since mid-June. On July 3 and 4, 96 villagers from the Keng Kham area of Kunhing who were found hiding near their villages were tortured by being suffocated with plastic sheeting, before being killed and their bodies thrown into the Nam Pang River. Over 100 villagers from Keng Kham were also massacred on July 22. They had been relocated to Kunhing and been given permission to return to their village to fetch wood from their old houses, but were caught and shot to death by another group of SLORC troops. In an apparent attempt to terrorize the Shan population into submission, SLORC troops have even been beheading civilians and lining their bodies along the roadside. Drivers passing along the main road through Kunhing to Kengtung and Tachilek on July 11 reported seeing beheaded corpses of 27 Shan villagers lined up along the road. On July 12, 17 headless corpses were also seen by drivers on the main road south of Kunhing. Refugee flow to Thailand Interviews with refugees and local villagers at border crossing points over the last few months indicate that numbers of Shan refugees crossing over into Thailand, mainly into Mae Hong Son and Chiang Mai provinces, have been as follows: average no. crossing total per month per day May 260 approx. 8,000 June 200 approx 6,000 July 130 approx 4,000 (It can be assumed that the decrease in June and July is the result of difficulty in travelling to the border during the rainy season.) Thus, given the total of at least 16,000 that had crossed over in March and April of this year (reported in the SHRF May refugee update), this means that at least 34,000 Shan refugees have fled into Thailand in the last five months. As last year, the refugees are mainly fleeing in family groups, including the very old and young. They are almost all farmers, who state that they would never have thought of coming to Thailand if they had not been driven from their homes. Situation of refugees in Thailand There continues to be no official acknowledgement by the Thai authorities of the Shan refugee problem, and no refugee camps have been allowed to be set up on the Shan-Thai border. On May 29, 1997, 430 Shan refugees who had fled from Shan State because of human rights abuses in March of this year, and settled inside the Thai border in Mae Hong Son province, were forcibly repatriated by Thai officials. The Thais claimed that the villagers were not refugees because "there was no fighting in Shan State." Thus, refugees arriving in Thailand continue to be forced to survive by working as illegal labourers. This is extremely difficult for families needing to support children and elderly dependents. They are also in constant fear of arrest, and are ripe for exploitation by unscrupulous employers and corrupt officials. This situation has worsened in recent months for various reasons. First, in the rural border areas of Mae Hong Son and Chiang Mai provinces, the high number of refugees searching for work has meant that there is less agricultural work available. Thus many refugees who might have preferred to stay in a rural environment similar to the lives they were used to have been forced to come to towns to look for work. Furthermore, the high number of refugees competing for construction work in northern towns like Chiang Mai has meant that it is an "employers' market." With a constant source of cheap labour available, employers find it easier to cheat their workers, for example, letting workers work for one or more months without pay, then calling the police to come and arrest them. They can then easily find new workers to find their place. Another problem for the refugees seeking work in Chiang Mai is that there have been increasing crackdowns by the police on migrant workers without work permits. The deadline for registering for these permits was the end of last year, so new refugees have no recourse to these permits. Employers are now preferring to hire workers with permits, which means new refugees have fewer work options, and employers can take advantage of this to offer them lower wages. Thailand's economic crisis has also already been affecting the number of construction projects in Chiang Mai. Construction is slowing down in the large housing estates in the outlying areas of the town, where thousands of migrant workers had been working, and few such new projects are being started. All of these factors have led an increasing number of Shan refugees to move further south, to find work in Bangkok and beyond. It is estimated that about half of the refugees now entering Thailand from Shan State are being taken by work agents straight down to Bangkok and other towns in the south, to work on construction sites, factories, or even fishing boats, where work still seems to be readily available. Most Shan refugees state they would much rather not go as far afield as Bangkok to seek work. They would prefer to work in Chiang Mai, where the local culture is less alien, and where there are existing Shan communities, which can relieve their feelings of trauma and isolation. The difficulties for illegal Shans caught in Bangkok are also even greater than for those caught in the north. They risk being deported to 3 Pagodas Pass, from where it is extremely difficult for them to find their way back to Shan State. In early July, social workers were alerted to the plight of 7 Shan girls between the age of 11 and 19, who were stranded in Sangklaburi having been deported from Bangkok to 3 Pagodas Pass. The SHRF is gravely concerned at the fate of the tens of thousands of Shan refugees now scattered around Thailand, and calls for urgent measures to solve this hidden refugee crisis. Call for Action The SHRF appeals to the international community to put pressure on the SLORC to immediately stop the forced relocations and summary executions in Shan State, and to let the displaced Shan villagers return home. The SHRF appeals to the Royal Thai government to allow the Shan refugees access to safe refuge in Thailand and the right to receive humanitarian assistance. August 4, 1997 The Shan Human Rights Foundation P.O. Box 201, Phrasing Post Office Chiang Mai 50200 Thailand ************************************************************* THAILAND TIMES: KNU AND ABSDF TO JOINTLY ESTABLISH NEW STRONGHOLD August 5, 1997 by Assawin Pinitwong TAK: A exiled Burmese student group and the Karen National Union(KNU) plan to set up a new base opposite Thailand's Mae Hong Son province in a bid to renew their arms struggle against the State Law Order and Restoration Council (SLORC), a Thai border source said yesterday. The source, who declined to be identified, said the planned base is expected to be constructed 15 kilometers away from the Thai territory or 10 kilometers up north of Dawn Gwin camp, a former stronghold of the Burmese students. The planned camp will be controlled by the KNU and the All Burmese Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF). The two dissident groups decided to join forces together in an attempt to consolidate their efforts after the military junta exerted severe pressure on the KNU, led by Gen Bo Mya during a recent peace talks. The ABSDF has repeatedly called for a round-table political dialogue with the ruling junta, pro-democracy forces led by Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic minority groups. Around 300 fully-armed students and the KNU's 5th Division have prepared military and political measures to fight the Burmese military regime, the source said. They also planned to call on other countries to protest against the SLORC's human rights abuses against their own people. The two groups are expected to take more effective action against the junta from their new base due to its strategic location which is mostly mountainous area with an adequate supply of water. The KNU has allied with the ABSDF since the students fled to the Thai-Burmese border after the SLORC staged a bloody coup in 1988. "Thailand, however, won't poke her nose into the matter, we will only keep our eyes their movements so as to prevent any untoward incident," the source added. ***************************************************************** ASIA TIMES: TOKYO SENDS TOP-LEVEL OFFICIAL TO MYANMAR August 1, 1997 Masahiko Komura, Japan's state secretary for foreign affairs, will visit Myanmar in mid-August, becoming Japan's highest-level government official to make a trip to the junta-controlled country, Foreign Ministry sources said on Wednesday. The government plans to send Komura to Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam from August 15 to 21, the sources said. In April, Japan dispatched Ryozo Kato, director-general of the ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau, to Myanmar, and he was followed in June by Hiroshi Hirabayashi, chief of the Cabinet Councillors' Office on External Affairs. Tokyo has suspended ministerial-level exchanges with Myanmar due to delays in progress in democratization since the military government took control of the country in September 1988. Komura, a former director-general of the Economic Planning Agency, is a member of parliament belonging to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. He is expected to urge the Myanmar government to promote dialogue with the National League for Democracy (NLD), Myanmar's biggest opposition party, led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. Japan is worried that Myanmar might become more isolated internationally, as the United States and the European Union are criticizing the country's entry this past week to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations without progress on democratization, they said. At the ASEAN meeting in Kuala Lumpur on Tuesday, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda urged Myanmar's ruling military junta to promote dialogue with the NLD. In a meeting with his Myanmar counterpart Ohn Gyaw, Ikeda said it was important for the government to expand dialogue with the NLD concerning the future status of the country. Ohn Gyaw said that the July 17 meeting between NLD chairman Aung Shwe and Khin Nyunt, first secretary of the junta, was held at the request of the opposition with the view to avoiding possible future problems. He indicated that the junta is ready to hold more such meetings. Ikeda suggested that the NLD be allowed to play a role in drafting a new constitution aimed at bringing the country closer to democracy, citing the party's landslide victory in the 1990 election. He warned the junta not to regard Myanmar's entry last Thursday into ASEAN as an international seal of approval for the junta's rule. ********************************************************** THE HINDU: AUSTRALIA TO PRESS MYANMAR FOR POLITICAL REFORMS August 5, 1997 (excerpt) by V. Jayanath SINGAPORE, AUG.4. Australia will depute a senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to Myanmar shortly to encourage the process of constitutional reforms and democratisation in that country. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Alexander Downer, told a press conference here today. "The process of constitutional reforms in Myanmar is painfully slow and I have conveyed this to its Foreign Minister, Mr. Ohn Gyaw, whom I met recently in Malaysia". He said Australia would like to see the reforms move forward quickly and early resumption of a dialogue between the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the opposition National League for Democracy. "Besides the lack of progress, we are deeply concerned about the breaches on human rights and the senior official should also meet up with Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi", Mr. Downer explained.. *************************************************** THAILAND TIMES: LAO FM TO BURMA FOR MEETING August 4, 1997 DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR BANGKOK: Lao Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavat will travel to Rangoon to attend the third Lao-Burma Working Committee from August 4-6, an official radio report said yesterday. The meeting will review cooperation agreements signed between the two countries last June, on border demarcation on other bilateral issues and map out cooperation plans for the coming year, said Lao National Radio in a broadcast monitored in Bangkok. Also to be discussed will be preparations for the two countries' integration into the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in which Laos and Burma became full members on July 23. ***************************************************************** SEMINAR ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN BURMA: STATEMENT July 30, 1997 A seminar on the Constitutional Protection of the Environment in Burma was held at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand, from the 28th to the 30th July, 1997. The seminar was organised by Forum Asia, Images Asia, Union for Civil Liberty, and the Burma Lawyers Council. In attendance were delegates from various deomcratic ethnic nationality organizations from Burma, and legal and non-legal environmental experts from Thailand, Japan, the United States, Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand. The seminar was convened due to the result of the growing concerns at the serious environmental devastation in Burma by the SLORC military regime and other parties, bu the unstustainable development and exploitation of the country's oil and gas reserves, forest and marine resources, minerals, river systems, and agricultural lands. This destruction is in addition to the ongoing environmental damage inflicted by the people as they exploit the natural resources out of ignorance, necessity, or desire for personal enrichment, or development. The seminar expressed concern at the current environmental degradation in Burma, which is intertwined with the worsening political, economic and human rights situation in Burma, and acknowledged that these concerns can be properly addressed only when a political solution is achieved in Burma with the restoration of democracy. It was also acknowledged that in the meantime urgent measures must be taken to address the deteriorating environmental situation in Burma, and the need for the long term protection of the environment by formulating avenues for its protection, conservation, and restoration; that such avenues should include the protection through the Constitution, designed to protect the rights of the people and to define the responsibilities of the government on the environment. The seminar then made recommendations which included the following, with respect to: 1. the rights of all persons to a secure, healthy and ecologically sustainable environoments. 2. the rights of the local people to information and community participation and to their informed consent, in the decision making of the conservation, protection, restoration, development and management of their environment and their national resources, and to the monitoring of the same. 3. educating and encouraging the government authorities and the local people, to practice restraint and self=responsibility in the conservation proteection and the restoration of the environment. 4. enacting laws and regulations that will secure such notification and disclosure of the details of all proposed developments which will affect the environment of individuals or the general population as a whole. 5. claiming and obtaining from the governmetn and responsible parties reparation and just compensation for damage to, or loss of life, health and/or property where such claims arise out of the damage to their environment. 6. every citizens' right of equal access to the use, management, and the protection of the clean and healthy air and water in their environment. 7. recognising the rights of the indigenous peoples to control their lands, territories, natural resources and traditional way of life including their right to preserve sacred sites. For more information please contact Burma Lawyers Council tel. 66-2-717-7314 ****************************************************** DAVID STEINBERG: STASIS IN MYANMAR? July 1997 (Dr David I Steinberg is Representative of The Asia Foundation in Korea. He was formerly a professor at Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA. He has long been a Myanmar watcher.) "IT is as if a large truck were rushing headlong into a small Volkswagen", as one anonymous observer in Yangon recently described the political situation in Myanmar, comparing the ruling SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) to opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD). But is that confrontation inevitable and is it so one-sided? The strength, citing its overwhelming popularity in the 1990 election that SLORC ignored and continuing evidence of anti-military feeling, and in spite of the determined effort by the SLORC to whittle down its leadership and destroy its organisation. The SLORC might also demur, claiming it is simply upholding the laws that it has enacted. These views may not express the subtlety of the situation, but rather a polarisation of opinion reflecting internal institutional views that are incessantly externally promulgated. Stasis may seem evident, but there are changes that are apparent beneath the stalemate of surface confrontation and beyond the rhetoric. Understanding reality may require more nuanced views. The SLORC seems at the moment to be in a position of enhanced power; it is most internally secure since its coup of Sept 18, 1988. The population at present seems disinclined to repeat the attempted revolution of 1988 that the coup repressed. Fifteen rebellions have ended through ceasefires that, however ephemeral they may eventually prove to be, have freed the military for broader deployment and control. The last major organised resistance, the oldest ethnic rebellion of the Karen, has had its major bases near the Thai border destroyed, and its leadership is talking through intermediaries with the SLORC about a ceasefire that some of its commanders, although not perhaps its top leadership, desire. The SLORC is reinforced by its admission into Asean, which may mean little at home but does carry some external weight. Although the sanctions on new investments imposed by the United States convey considerable moral force at least internally within the US, their economic effects on Myanmar will be minimal; even their moral influence is diminished by the selective imposition of such an action against Myanmar, only one of many repressive regimes in the world. But as one Congressman, who believed sanctions would not be effective but who planned to vote for them, remarked, "It is difficult to vote in favour of the SLORC." The economy in much of the country is vibrant and has evidently grown in the past few years, but whether its apparent growth, albeit unevenly distributed, can be maintained without more basic reforms is questionable. The SLORC has not addressed the fundamental economic problems that virtually all foreign observers recognise as required if economic growth is to continue. These include a comprehensive devaluation of a currency over 30 times its official value, control of the money supply to inhibit an annual inflation of some 30 per cent, rationalisation of inefficient public sector industries now put at even more risk by foreign competition, development of a competent and autonomous financial sector, and payment of public sector officials' salaries that will combat the cancer of corruption that is evident, ubiquitous, and even necessary for survival. The most difficult and basic task for any Burmese regime is freeing the economy from political influence without which economic rationality will not prevail. Chinese goods and influence are so apparent as to create concerns that should the SLORC falter economically it will be the Chinese, the most obvious of the newly rich, who will be the scapegoats for SLORC errors. Rumours are rife that drug money has been laundered into legitimate construction and other businesses. There are also rumours that the SLORC itself is divided and in danger of disintegrating into two factions reflecting the line military (led by General Maung Aye) and the support, specifically intelligence, wing (led by General Khin Nyunt). Veteran observers too describe the internal jealousies and rivalries, but comment that these two groups need each other and the SLORC needs both, so that overt splits that would threaten the stability of military rule at this juncture seem unlikely. The NLD may feel that it is becoming marginalised with restrictions on its activities and those of Aung San Suu Kyi. It walked out of, and then was expelled from, the National Convention in 1995, that hand-picked body that was designed to do SLORC's bidding in writing a new, heavily scripted constitution. The NLD now seems to want to return because, even if the results are predetermined to ensure perpetual military control, it is at least a forum for internal discussion, if not public debate. The military has taken two interlocking steps that will, it believes, ensure its control over the society into the future. It has, through the National Convention and based on an Indonesian model, sought to ensure the military's domination of the leadership and the administrative mechanisms of the state through a constitution in which it will play the legal, leading roles at all levels and in all branches of the government. It has, in tandem to writing a new constitution, created a mass base of support for the military and its policies through the formation and leadership of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), which now has over five million members. The pattern is reminiscent of the military's strategy in its Burma Socialist Programme Party incarnation in the early 1970s, when it expanded the party in preparation for the constitution of 1974. The USDA concentration on youth indicates the SLORC's intent for long-range control. Splits in the foreign community's reaction to the SLORC regime and recalcitrance in engaging in meaningful dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD are becoming more apparent as the SLORC consolidates its power. Entry into Asean puts the US at odds with that important body, as well as with China, SLORC's major military and moral supporter. Japan, which has been reluctant to break with the US on Myanmar in spite of strong internal pressures from its business community, has now expressed willingness to restart its most important foreign aid programme should the SLORC show even some modest (probably ineffective) signs of dialogue. Korea, with no such scruples, has a major economic role, with Daewoo Corporation being the most obvious of Korean conglomerates. The military's role in the economy is likely to remain powerful through its Myanmar Holdings Corporation Ltd, a wholly owned military venture, as well as through its direct management of numerous factories far beyond the immediate needs of military procurement, and at a local level through USDA- owned businesses designed to provide support to those local branches of that ubiquitous organisation. Similarly, there may be a movement to a multi-party political system as the military forms a constitution at some indefinite date, even though elections do not a democracy make. Some very modest local autonomy given under the new constitution to a variety of ethnic groups, along a Chinese model, will not grant them national power or influence, but it may placate some local concerns as will some controlled electoral process. The US call for SLORC honouring the 1990 elections won by the NLD becomes more anachronistic over time. There is ferment, not stasis, in Myanmar as events unfold. The SLORC at first may not have planned to remain in such an obvious position of power for so long, but it was evidently shocked by the 1990 election and anti-military attitudes, which it has been assiduously trying to change. It may continue in power until it feels its future (and that of the state in its terms) is assured. But the likely overall direction does indicate continuing military control in mufti and in uniform. The immediate future seems stable, but the longer-range problems remain unaddressed, let alone answered, and these will likely erode the enforced tranquillity of the present. **************************************************************** DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK): TOUR FIRMS MOVE BACK INTO BURMA August 2, 1997 by Tom Chosshyre Tour operators are stepping up their programmes in Burma now that the military regime's "Visit Myanmar Year" has ended. Several companies pulled out and others issued warnings in their brochures last year after Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the country's pro-democracy group, appealed to tourists not to visit because holiday cash helped to sustain the regime. Some British tour operators say that Suu Kyi's appeal applied only during Visit Myanmar Year, which finished in March. Human-rights activists believe this is a deliberate misinterpretation of her views, and claim that the militay regime continues to use forced child and adult labour to develop tourist sites. A spokeswoman for Noble Caledonia, which organises cruises along the Irrawaddy River, said that a letter expressing concern about human-rights abuses had been sent to the Myanmar minister for tourim. "We're not saying that Burma doesn't have its problems," she said. "But we feel that the money our tourists spend goes directly to gift shop owners, taxi drivers and waiters; very little is going to the generals running the regime, Anyway, Visit Myanmar Year is over, so it's OK to send tourists now." Travelsphere has launched the first Burma programmes this year. "We are the biggest UK escorted tour operator in China, but since we advertised our Burma holidays, three weeks ago, they have been selling faster than our Chinese tours," said a spokesman. "We are aware of the political situation, but it is up to the public whether they visit or not. It is sometimes better for a country like Burma to have visitors, because it is then opened to other cultural influences." Other tour operators increasing their involvement in Burma include Premier Holidays and Magic of the Orient (both offering a new Irrawaddy River cruise), and Venice-Simplon Orient Express (which says bookings are up for its Road to Mandalay cruise). Worldwide Journeys & Expeditions is offeringBurma for the first time. kuoni, Steppes East and Abercrombie & Kent are also hoping to increase Burma sales next season. Yvette Mahon, co-ordinator of the Burma Action Group, said: "Just because Visit Myanmar year is over, it does not mean that tourists can flood back. Aung San Suu Kyi has made it clear that she wants tourists to stay away." Derek Fatchett, Britain's Foreign Affairs minister, has introduced some punitive trade restrictions but has not called for a tourist boycott. However, the Foreign Office said the Government was considering further sanctions to bring pressure on Burma's generals, who assumed power in 1988. The Burmese government argues that tourism is a crucial part of its economy and that there will be widespread suffering if tourists pull out. A spokeswoman for the embassy in London said: "We do not think anti-tourism campaigns are fair because they badly affect our economic develop." ********************************************************************** FBC: LIST OF UK-BASED COMPANIES TO BOYCOTT August 4, 1997 Most of the companies listed below are members of the Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA), the UK's governing authority, who can be contacted at ABTA 55-57 Newman St. London W1P 4AH Tel: 0171-637-2444 Fax: 0171-637-0713 1) Noble Caledonia Ltd. 11 Charles St., London, W1X 8LE Tel: 0171-355-1424 Fax: 0171-409-0834 Managing Director: A. Cochrane Comments: Boat trips up the Irrawaddy River. 2) Travelsphere Ltd. Compass House, Rockingham Road, Market Harborough Leics, LE16 7QD Tel: 01858-410456 Fax: 01858-466477 Managing Directors: R. Mackay & M. J. Edwards Comments: Have just moved into Burma for the very first time. Downmarket. 3) Premier Holidays Westbrook, Milton Road, Cambridge, CB41YG Tel: 01223-516677 Fax: 01223-516615 Managing Director: Chris May Comments: Their Burmese is the Swiss-run Rangoon based Insight Myanmar. 4) Magic of the Oriented Ltd. 2 Kingsland Court, Three Bridges Road, Crawley West Sussex RH10 1HL Tel: 01293-537700 Fax: 01293-537888 Managing Director: T. Champion 5) Worldwide Journeys & Expeditions 8 Comeragh Road, London, W 14 8HP Tel: 0171-381-8638 Fax: 0171-381-0836 Managing Director: Nick van Gruisen Comments: Upmarket. Moving into Burma seriously for the first time. 6) Kuoni Travel Ltd. Kuoni House, Dorking, Surrey, RH5 4AZ Tel: 01306-740500 Fax: 01306-740719 Comments: one of the biggest tour operators in the UK--very expensive and with no morals whatsoever (Swiss origin) 7) Steppes East Ltd. Castle Eaton, Cricklade, Swindon, Wilts SN6 6JU Tel: 01285-810267 Fax: 01285-810693 8) Abercrombie & Kent Travel Sloane Square House, Holbein Place, London, SW1W 8NS Tel: 0171-730-9600 Fax: 0171-730-9376 Managing Director: M. Thompson Comments: very expensive *****************************************************