------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------ "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ---------------------------------------------------------- The BurmaNet News: September 10, 1997 Issue #817 Noted in Passing: If any villagers returned to pick fruit or harvest rice to ward off starvation on their new junta-approved but foodless land, they were shot on sight. -the situation in Shan state for villagers subjected to forced relocations [see South China Morning Post: Don't Harm Civilians, Rebels Told] HEADLINES: ========== BURMANET: VIRUS HOAXES DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF BURMA: STATEMENT SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST: DON'T HARM CIVILIANS SCMP: RANGOON SHOT DOWN HELICOPTER: CLAIM ALTSEAN: DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI VIDEO INTERVIEW REUTER: UNOCAL: ALMOST READY TO EXPLOIT BKK POST: BURMA RELIEF BKK POST: BURMESE WORKER KILLS FACTORY OWNER WATERSHED: KAWTHOOLEI AND TEAK: KAREN FOREST ANNOUNCEMENT: AUNG SAN SUU KYI IN REALVIDEO ANNOUNCEMENT: LEE AND ARROW CO. BOYCOTT NEW ENGLAND BURMA ROUNDTABLE: SEPTEMBER MEETING BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST -------------------------------------------------------------------------- BURMANET: VIRUS HOAXES September 9, 1997 BurmaNet would like to ask burmanet subscribers to stop posting “virus warnings” on burmanet-l. Viruses CANNOT be transmitted in the text of e-mail messages. Viruses CAN be transmitted in attached files, but only if you save and run (open) those files. If you receive an attachment from someone you don’t know, you can run a virus check before opening the file. Or just delete it. Thank you, BurmaNet Editor *********************************************************** DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF BURMA: STATEMENT September 9, 1997 From: plfb@cm-sun.cm.ksc.co.th Statement of the Democratic Alliance of Burma A meeting of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) was held on September 5 to 7, 1997. The following resolutions were made in the meeting: 1. In light of the current situation in Burma, the DAB resolves to continue striving for increased solidarity between the democratic forces and the ethnic nationalities. The people of Burma are currently suffering extreme hardship as a result of the oppressive rule of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the SLORC-controlled market economy, and the DAB resolves to support them in every way possible in their struggle against the SLORC. 2. The DAB upholds fully the spirit of the Mae Thaw Rah Hta Agreement, which calls for the ethnic nationalities to unite with the democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in struggling against the military dictatorship, and calls for tripartite talks between the ethnic nationalities, the democratic forces and the SLORC to solve the country's problems and lead to the setting up of a federal union. The agreement was significant in its unification of the various ethnic nationalities, and the DAB commends the groups that are sticking resolutely to this agreement. We will cooperate with them fully to struggle against the SLORC. 3. The DAB strongly condemns the repeated acts of lawlessness, torture and other human rights violations committed by the SLORC in the border areas and in Central Burma. The DAB is gravely concerned at the effects of the unbridled corruption, religious divisions and racist killings spawned by the SLORC. 4. The SLORC has used cunning persuasion and force in its attempts to crush the revolutionary forces, but the DAB remains committed to withstanding and exposing such trickery. The DAB will continue striving towards its goal of a country free from military rule, where justice, human rights and prosperity prevail. 5. The DAB appreciates the support given by foreign countries, in particular the USA and EU members, in giving economic and political pressure to the SLORC. The DAB calls on all these countries to give further pressure to the SLORC to hold tripartite talks with the democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the ethnic nationalities. 6. Tripartite talks will be a first step in opposing the military dictatorship and establishing democracy, peace and a federal union. The DAB calls on the people of Burma to help bring about the talks by opposing the SLORC's National Convention and boycotting the SLORC in any way possible. The time is ripe for this. For tripartite talks, Unity of the oppressed And democracy! Executive Committee Democratic Alliance of Burma September 9, 1997 ********************************************* SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST: DON'T HARM CIVILIANS, REBELS TOLD September 10, 1997 by William Barnes in Bangkok The leader of a rebel war being fought across the vast Shan state has told supporters not to take out their bitterness against the ruling military on ethnic Burmese. The warning comes two months after about 25 Burmese civilians were dragged from two ordinary passenger buses, herded away and shot. No one has owned up to the attack, which smacks of retaliation for brutal attempts to crush independence fighters by the State Law and Order Restoration Council. "Wherever we go, it is imperative that we refrain from any act of injustice towards the people and abstain from any form of racial discrimination," said Yord Serk, in recent orders to his Shan United Revolutionary Army. "When we meet good and just civilian Burmese nationals, we should tell them that we are not brutal soldiers like the junta troops and that it would be advisable for them to return to Burma proper for their own safety." Shan human rights monitors have reported that the bus massacre whipped the junta's Army into an even uglier mood than usual. They are said to have killed some 400 people over the following month alone. These figures are impossible to verify. But even before the bus incident, Shan refugees fleeing across the border into Thailand routinely told of whole villages being uprooted at a few hours' notice to try to break support for the insurgents. If any villagers returned to pick fruit or harvest rice to ward off starvation on their new junta-approved but foodless land, they were shot on sight. The refugees have also repeatedly complained that the Burmese Army has been selling off their land to Chinese and Burmese newcomers. Even in his short public warning, Yord Serk painted a dismal picture of life in the Shan state. "The situation has become chaotic and many people are on the verge of starvation, robbers are rampant and there are several armed groups, some with no identity, that roam the highways." The Shan resistance leader added: "In the end, justice will certainly prevail." A Rangoon-based diplomat argued that the depth of the bitterness in this little-known war showed how fragile was the "peace" claimed by the junta. "They use raw military muscle to keep the minorities under control where they can," the diplomat said. "But how can there ever be real peace without a political settlement that even begins to address the minorities' concerns?" ********************************************** SCMP: RANGOON SHOT DOWN HELICOPTER: CLAIM September 10, 1997 by Robert Horn of Associated Press in Bangkok A Thai army helicopter which disappeared near the Burmese border last month was shot down by the Burmese Army, dissident students said in Bangkok yesterday. They said the four-man crew was killed in the crash. Naing Aung, chairman of the All Burma Students Democratic Front, said rebel units at the border had intercepted the information via Burmese army radio transmissions. Spread along the mountainous border, the Front's armed units share bases with the Karen National Union, an ethnic group fighting the military Government in Rangoon. Despite nearly two weeks of searches by hundreds of soldiers and civilians on the Thai side of the border, no trace has been found of the surveillance helicopter and crew, which disappeared on August 28. A Thai army officer said the last radio contact with the helicopter was shortly after 1 pm as it flew near Umphang inside Thai territory, 350 kilometres northwest of Bangkok. The officer said he did not believe the helicopter had been shot down because it was flying at an altitude of 2,130 metres, which is beyond the range of ground fire. Weather was bad and the crew reported poor visibility, so an accident was most likely, he said. But Mr Naing Aung said the intercepted radio messages indicated the helicopter had strayed over a portion of Burmese territory jutting into Thailand, near the mouth of the Salween River. Burmese battalion commanders radioed Rangoon for permission to shoot down the helicopter, he said. And because of the rapid response needed, they did not bother to encode the transmission. "It will be okay, we will honour you," the Rangoon command reportedly replied. Burmese and some Thai military officials had speculated Karen rebels might have shot down the helicopter. But Mr Naing Aung said that was impossible: "The insurgents don't control that area any more. It is controlled by the Burmese Army. "If we're lying, then why haven't the Thais been able to find any wreckage?" Burmese military authorities did not respond to the students' allegations. In the past, Rangoon has accused the Karen and the Front of trying to sour relations between Burma and Thailand. Burmese army units have crossed the border several times to sack refugee camps. --------------------------------------- [excerpts from related article] THE NATION: DISSIDENT SAYS BURMA DOWNED THAI HELICOPTER September 10, 1997 Thai authorities, particularly the Defence and Foreign Affairs ministries and security agencies, have not, confirmed nor denied the Burmese dissident's statements. The provincial Army units recently suspended an almost two week search for the jet helicopter. "Two Burmese army captains, Thein Lwin and Kyaw San, led the shooting. They used G3 automatic rifles and as well as machine guns that could shoot down aircraft," [Naing Aung] said. The Burmese side even went to the crash site a few days later and dismantled the helicopter, he added. The same Burmese dissident said Rangoon believed that the Thai helicopter was a surveillance craft and had intruded into Burmese airspace on a secret mission. A senior Thai security source yesterday argued that the Thai-Burmese border line was still unclear pending demarcation. "The Thai helicopter did not intrude into Burmese airspace or land, as the area is still in question," he claimed. If the report of the shooting is accurate, the source said, Thailand should have received a warning from the Burmese beforehand, according to international practice. ************************************************ ALTSEAN: DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI VIDEO INTERVIEW September 9, 1997 From: altsean@ksc.th.com MEDIA RELEASE SUU KYI: NO ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT WITHOUT POLITICAL CHANGE Bangkok, Tuesday: - In her first interview since June, Burmese democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said that Asean's help was needed to improve the political situation in her country in order to allow an economic take off. "I do not think that there can be real economic progress without democracy. The economy is going downhill. There isn't the kind of accountable transparent government that is necessary to make an economic success out of an open market system. "I think the Asean countries have now realised they are not going to get the economic benefit that they'd hope to get out of Burma … if they want economic improvement in Burma, they've got to help the political situation to improve. I think they should let Burma know what they think is necessary for the economy to take off," said Ms Suu Kyi who is Secretary General of the National League for Democracy (NLD) which won 82% of the seats in Burma's last elections. Ms Suu Kyi also clarified that the July meeting between NLD Chairman U Aung Shwe and General Khin Nyunt, Burma's military intelligence chief, was not a dialogue. Ms Suu Kyi said that the meeting, held days before the Asean Ministerial Meeting, was held to allow Burma's military regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc), to repeat accusations against Ms Suu Kyi and the party. In the recent interview contained in a 17-minute video "Asean, NLD and political dialogue in Burma - an interview with Aung San Suu Kyi", the democracy leader also spoke animatedly and with humour, about her recent illness, the party's desire for political dialogue, the Slorc's harassment of the NLD, a Slorc general's "green card" speculation and her commitment to the people of Burma. The video "Asean, NLD and political dialogue in Burma - an interview with Aung San Suu Kyi", is available in VHS PAL format for US$10 from ALTSEAN-BURMA (Alternative Asean Network on Burma). ENDS For more information, please contact ALTSEAN-BURMA at tel: ++ 66 2 275 1811, fax: ++ 66 2 693 4515 or email . A L T S E A N - B U R M A ALTERNATIVE ASEAN NETWORK ON BURMA *tel: [662] 275 1811/693 4515 *fax: [662] 693 4515 *e-mail: altsean@ksc.th.com ***************************************** REUTER: UNOCAL: ALMOST READY TO EXPLOIT FROM BURMA'S YADANA FIELD GAS PIPELINE September 9, 1997 BANGKOK, Sept 9 (Reuter) - Construction on the Yadana gas pipeline from Burma to Thailand is 60 percent complete and deliveries should begin next July, a senior Thai energy official said on Tuesday. Piti Yimprasert, president of state-run Petroleum Authority of Thailand's natural gas section, said construction of the project which would move gas from the offshore Burmese Yadana field overland to Thailand was now 60 percent completed. The 16.5 billion baht ($471.43 million) project was slightly behind an earlier schedule as PTT had been forced to seek approval from the Office of Environmental Policy and Planning before construction could resume. The hitch followed protests from environmentalists that a section of the project might harm flora and fauna in the area. However, Piti said in a statement that he expected gas deliveries could begin in mid-July 1998. The length of the pipeline from Yadana into Thailand will be 699-km (434.08-mile). The project will initially provide 325 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd) of natural gas to Thailand. Under the 30-year contract, the supply will increase to 525 mmcfd in 1999. Yadana's gas in place is estimated to be over five trillion cubic feet. PTT Exploration and Production Plc, a unit of PTT, holds 25.5 percent interest in the field, Unocal 28.26 percent, Total SA 31.24 percent and Burmese state-run oil firm Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise 15 percent. ************************************* BKK POST: BURMA RELIEF September 9,1997 Japan will give $150,000 worth of relief aid to Burma, which has been badly hit by floods since late July. **************************************************** BKK POST: BURMESE WORKER KILLS FACTORY OWNER September 9, 1997 Mae Sot - An elderly Taiwanese businesswoman was stabbed to death by a Burmese worker at a garment factory here yesterday. Police found the blood-strained body of Yib-Ngor Saeyab, 80, at the canteen of SCP Garment Co. She had many knife wounds. According to eyewitnesses, Mrs Yib-Ngor, the factory owner, was killed by Maung Thoo, 27, who fled by crossing the Moei River to Myawaddy. No valuables were reported lost. Police have sought cooperation from the Myawaddy authorities to help arrest the suspect. ******************************************************* WATERSHED: KAWTHOOLEI AND TEAK: KAREN FOREST MANAGEMENT ON THE THAI-BURMESE BORDER Vol 3, No. 1 July — October 1997 [abridged] By Raymond Bryant The Karen state of Kawthoolei has been heavily dependent on teak extraction to fund the Karen National Union struggle against the Burmese military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Raymond Bryant explores the social and economic structure of Kawthoolei, and the way in which resource extraction was more than simply a source of revenue—it was also an integral part of the assertion of Karen sovereignty. In late January 1995 the Karen National Union (KNU) suffered a major military defeat when Mannerplaw—its headquarters near the Thai- Burmese border since 1974—was captured by the Burmese army. In subsequent days, KNU leaders fled to Thailand in a move that appeared to mark the end of the KNU's 47-year struggle against the Burmese state. As Mannerplaw (which means "Field of Victory") was reduced to ashes, so too were the hopes of those who believed in Kawthoolei—the Karen Free State proclaimed by KNU President Saw Baw U Gyi in June 1949. The world's longest running insurgency had seemingly run its course. Forests as a source of refuge >From the start, the forests have been crucial to Karen political and military efforts insofar as they have served as a source of refuge from the Burmese army. Except during the first years of the insurgency, the Karen have been involved in an unequal struggle with a much larger and better equipped military adversary. The trend in the fighting between the Burmese army (tatmadaw) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA, previously the Karen National Defence Organization) has been a gradual retreat of the KNLA from central Burma to the remote border area. Confronted by the superior fire-power of the tatmadaw, the KNLA have used the forests strategically as a source of refuge in which to regroup and replenish supplies. In doing so, the KNLA have relied on local Karen for food, directions, recruits and intelligence about the tatmadaw. In the early 1950s, Karen forces took refuge in the Pegu Yoma forests, but subsequently shifted east into the more inaccessible hills along the Burmese- Thai border. The Burmese army has long sought to undermine the role of the forests as a source of refuge for the KNLA. A primary goal has been to cut the KNLA off from villagers through the Four Cuts (pya ley pya) campaign. Under this counter-insurgency campaign (which aims to cut links to local food, funds, intelligence and recruits), local Karen were forcibly removed from their villages and resettled in army-controlled settlements. Initially focused on the Pegu Yoma forests, the campaign was continued by the tatmadaw in the border region. In addition to forced resettlement, the Burmese army has press-ganged Karen into service on the front line as porters. Between 1989 and 1993, the State Law and order Restoration Council (SLORC)— the military junta ruling Burma since 1988—also supported clear-cut logging along the border. Other than providing the junta with revenue (and denying revenue to the KNU, as discussed below), such logging also removed forest in contested areas, thereby eliminating strategic military cover for the KNLA. Forests as a source of livelihood The forests have also provided an important source of revenue to the KNU, making an essential contribution to Kawthoolei state finances. The role of the forests as a central part of the livelihood strategies of individual Karen farmers has persisted in the post-colonial era. Just as in pre-colonial and colonial times, Karen farmers since 1948 have pursued forest-based agrarian practices, at least in the more remote regions of Kawthoolei. Nevertheless, the ability of individual farmers to earn a livelihood from the forests has been progressively eroded in recent decades. To some extent, this may be linked to population growth among the Karen. However, it is the growing intrusion on the lives of Karen farmers of the Burmese civil war that is the main cause of declining forest livelihoods. To begin with, the war has resulted in the displacement of thousands of Karen formerly living in the Irrawaddy and Sittang River deltas or adjacent hills. There are over 70,000 Karen refugees from Burma living in Thai refugee camps along the border alone, with many more displaced within Burma. Some internally displaced Karen have cleared forest for agriculture, thereby putting added pressure on residual forests. Further the war itself has shifted over the years, such that by the 1980s it was largely centred on the border area, disrupting local farming practices and forcing many Karen farmers to flee or face an advancing Burmese army infamous for perpetrating human rights abuses on the Karen. Karen farmers have thus been unable to avoid being caught up in the fighting between the tatmadaw and the KNU. The significance of the forests as a source of livelihood has often been as great to the KNU as it has traditionally been to individual Karen farmers. Significantly, a Kawthoolei Forestry Ministry was created in 1950—only one year after the start of the insurgency. Using Karen foresters trained under the British, the ministry was established on colonial lines with a hierarchy of posts ranging from guards and rangers in the field, through district and headquarters conservators, and on up to the minister. The forests of Kawthoolei were divided into districts, within which reserved forests were created—notably where teak was abundant. The forests were a significant but not a crucial source of revenue to the KNU in the 1950s. The reasons for this reside in the political and economic context of the early years of the insurgency. The need for revenue to buy arms was then limited, as arms were still plentiful after the Second World War. During the early 1950s, the KNLA was one of the most powerful insurgent armies in Burma—in 1949 it controlled much of the Irrawaddy and Sittang River delta areas, including the outskirts of Rangoon. The revenue base of Kawthoolei was also wider at this stage than in later years. Considerable revenue was obtained from agriculture and mining as well as from forestry throughout the extensive territory then controlled by the KNU. Finally, in terms of forestry itself, there was little work that was initially required as the KNU was able to seize logs left in the forest or at timber depots by the departing British in 1948. This relatively favourable situation had ended by the mid 1950s. As the Burmese army advanced, the Karen were cut off from revenue, first in the Irrawaddy and Sittang deltas and subsequently in the adjoining hills. In November 1953, for example, the Burmese army captured the mines at Mawchi—a significant source of revenue to the Karen at that time. Following the coup d'etat of March 1962 which brought General Ne Win to power, the advance of the tatmadaw into hitherto KNU-controlled areas continued, and by the 1970s Karen forces were largely confined to the Thai-Burmese border. As the territory controlled by the KNU contracted so to did the range of opportunities available to Karen leaders for earning a livelihood. An illicit border trade in natural resources and consumer goods partly concealed the growing financial plight of the Kawthoolei state. This trade linking Burma and Thailand via KNU-controlled areas developed during the 1960s and 1970s as a response to the catastrophic economic policies of Ne Win's Burmese Way to Socialism, which drove much of the Burmese economy underground. Teak, cattle, rice, rubber, gems and even archaeological artifacts were transported from Burma to Thailand while televisions, videos, cosmetics and other consumer goods were dispatched in the other direction. The KNU served as an intermediary in this trade, imposing a five per cent tax on all goods passing through Kawthoolei. For many years, the KNU thus had easy access to funds with which to buy military equipment. However, there were evident dangers associated with dependency on the border trade. The adoption of a pro-market economic policy in Rangoon could undermine the trade. A change in policy by the Thai authorities—for example, as a result of a desire for closer links with Burma—would also jeopardize the KNU controlled trade. Finally, the development of alternative trade routes—notably along the Burma-Chinese border— might result in a drying up of the trade through KNU territories. To the misfortune of the Karen state, since 1988 all three of these possibilities have become realities. It is in the context of such uncertainty that the importance of the forests as a source of revenue to the KNU becomes apparent. Of the revenue available to the Kawthoolei state, forest revenue (mainly derived from teak extraction) was one of the important sources over which it had some control. Another, tin mining, was significant in the 1970s but collapsed with the price of tin in the early 1980s. Not surprisingly, therefore, the forest sector assumed growing political and economic importance to the KNU from the 1960s. The importance of the forests was reflected in the growing power of the Forestry Ministry. From only a handful of foresters in the 1950s and early 1960s, the ministry had become a key pert of the Karen state by the 1980s. In 1994, there were 463 forest officials at work in Kawthoolei's forest districts, with additional staff at Mannerplaw. Field offcials were responsible for reforestation and wildlife protection, but their main task was to monitor teak extraction. Just under two-thirds of the 5,000 teak logs annually extracted in the early 1990s came from Pazpu district. The importance of the teak industry is reflected in the power of the Forestry Minister Saw Aung San, who was appointed to the post in 1980, and who was second only to General Bo Mya and Prime Minister Saw Ba Thinn in terms of political power within the KNU in the early 1990s. Although the KNU has never published revenue data, forest earnings were understood to constitute most of total state revenue in 1994. Given the importance of the forests to the KNU, the SLORC's decision to grant logging concessions all along the border to Thai firms in early 1989 was a serious blow to the KNU. As much as 18,800 square kilometres were alienated by the SLORC to Thai loggers who invariably enjoyed close links to senior Thai military officers. Many of the Thai logging concessions were located in KNU- controlled territory. However, as the loggers were supported by the Thai military, there was little that the KNU could do to stop their advance into Karen forests without risking completely alienating the Thai state—something that a KNU weakened by military setbacks was scarcely in a position to do. The KNU was forced to acquiesce in this deal between the SLORC and the Thai state. The end result was that logging restrictions originally imposed by Kawthoolei's Forestry Ministry to ensure sustainable forestry were waived. Indeed, between 1989 and 1993 (when the SLORC terminated the Thai logging deal) the KNU permitted over cutting as part of a desperate attempt to maintain forest-based revenues in the face of SLORC's efforts to cut the KNU's income of US$40-80 per cubic metre (m3) of teak timber. At the same time these companies were also paying the SLORC US$80 per m3 on the same timber. Unable to cut the KNU off from this trade, the SLORC cancelled the Thai logging concessions in 1993. Yet the KNU were badly weakened by this teak war. Teak over cutting resulted in widespread deforestation in the logging concessions as Thai loggers extracted more timber than was allowed under the terms of their contracts. Further, logging outside designated areas was ubiquitous as loggers took advantage of the political turmoil along the border to extract extra timber free of charge. Illegal logging has persisted despite the SLORC's termination of border logging in December 1993, aided by the network of logging roads built in 1989-93. As a result, the border forests upon which the KNU relied have been largely depleted, undermining a key element of an already declining Karen resource base. Even before the fall of Mannerplaw in early 1995, therefore, Kawthoolei's finances were in difficulty.. The teak war also weakened the legitimacy of the Kawthoolei state in as much as the KNU had long based part of its local and international appeal on sustainable forest management. As the next section highlights, forests have always been at the heart of Karen identity. Yet here was a state purporting to represent the Karen people that had sanctioned the destruction of wide areas of Kawthoolei's forest. It is a measure of the sheer desperation of Karen leaders that, in order to maintain forest revenue, they were prepared to destroy the forest resource on which Karen culture itself was based. Forests as a source of identity In addition to its political and economic rationale, the SLORC-engineered assault on the border forest also resonates with cultural meaning. An attempt to undermine the military and financial advantages derived by the KNU from the forests, this assault simultaneously attacked the foundations of Karen national identity. As the forests have always been an integral part of Karen identity, their large-scale elimination after 1988 has had cultural as well as political and economic significance. Traditionally, lowland Burmese and Thais viewed the Karen as an integral part of the forests—the former called them "the wild cattle of the hills," whereas the latter classified the Karen as "wild animals." The British held similar views. Colonial missionaries, for example, considered the Karen to be a primitive people ("noble savages") at home in their forest habitat. Colonial foresters, meanwhile, acknowledged the Karen's detailed forest knowledge (at the same time as they decried their allegedly destructive methods of shifting cultivation). Indeed, the introduction of the taungya forestry system noted earlier reflected a British desire to harness that knowledge to the teak-centred forestry management then being introduced in Burma's forests. Certainly, Karen refugees from the Irrawaddy and Sittang deltas do not fit the popular image of the Karen as a forest people. Karen from the deltas often differ from their hill brethren in terms of religion, education and forest knowledge. Yet, even for the delta Karen, the forests resonate with meaning. Thus, the forests in which they took refuge are a reminder of the historical origins of the Karen people, symbolized most vividly in the many Karen myths and prophecies that are set in the forests. Even among the Christian Karen from the deltas, the notion of the Karen as a lost tribe of Israel wandering in the forests (first suggested by colonial missionaries) serves as a powerful symbolic reinforcement of the link between the forests and Karen identity. The insurgency reinforced the role of the forests in Karen culture. As noted, they have served as a source both of refuge and of livelihood for the KNU throughout the struggle. Many senior political and military leaders have lived in the forests for more than 30 years, and a new generation has been born in Mannerplaw and other forest strongholds. In as much as these Karen have made the forests their home in exile they have become forest dwellers. Karen refugees have kept alive memories of their previous urban existence (reinforced by satellite TV as well as journeys to Bangkok by the elite). However, as their fate has been linked to the forests now for nearly 50 years, these Karen have been de-urbanized—in other words, they have become a "forest people." The territory the Karen called the "Flower Land" has already been changed beyond recognition. A hitherto forested landscape has been converted in many areas into an environmentally degraded and treeless territory as a result of indiscriminate logging. The SLORC's plans to build a series of dams on the Salween River and its tributaries near and along the border (to meet Thai electricity demands) will further alter the landscape. With this loss of the forests, the Karen have been denied refuge, livelihood and even a cultural referent. In asserting a sovereign Kawthoolei, the KNU posed a challenge that the Burmese state (indeed any state) could scarcely ignore. For Kawthoolei to be born, the old Burma would have to die—something which Burmese politicians (whatever their other differences) have always refused to countenance. As a result, the Karen have been fighting a Burmese state which not only possesses superior military capabilities, but which also enjoys the tacit support of a world of nation states anxious to avoid any alteration of political boundaries. Even western states which condemn the brutality of the Burmese state have refrained from sanctioning the alteration of Burma's boundaries. In this regard, the lack of international recognition for Kawthoolei over the past 50 years is eloquent testimony to the futility of Karen efforts to overcome the consensus over sovereignty issues among the community of nations. That alternative solidarity has been shown outside this community demonstrates the limits to internationalism among nation states. Indeed, the fact that SLORC has been able to brutally suppress the Karen insurgency without serious opposition from any outside power is a reminder of the overwhelming priority that the international community continues to attach—even in the New World Order—to political sovereignty. Watershed is published three times a year by TERRA 409 Soi Rohitsuk, Pracharajbempen Rd. Huay Khwang, Bangkok 10320 Thailand E-mail BOYCOTT THE LEE CO. and ARROW SHIRT CO. FOR BURMA Both companies failed to respond to the democratic government of Burma in exile (NCGUB), which asked them to withdraw 2 months ago (7/97), citing the killings, torture, gang-rape, forced labor and relocation, etc., under Burma's military dictatorship SLORC. All companies in Burma must form joint ventures with the SLORC, thus becoming business partners with a regime consistently criticized by the UN, U.S., Amnesty International, AFL-CIO, and the Sierra Club, among others. Workers are no exception to the SLORC's abuses. A BBC hidden camera revealed that sweatshops run by Burma's junta pay only $1/day for an excessively long workday. The International Labor Organization has repeatedly condemned the SLORC for prohibiting unions and collective bargaining; any labor organizing is crushed by military force, as was the 1995 Dae Woo garment factory sit-down strike near Rangoon. Remind Lee and Arrow Shirt that industry leaders Levi Strauss, Eddie Bauer, Liz Claiborne, and Ralph Lauren withdrew, and that you will boycott them until they do. Clothing constitutes the bulk of U.S. imports from Burma; most of the SLORC's share of profits is converted into arms and ammunition. FAX, WRITE, PHONE: 212 984-8925 fax 913-384-0190 FAX (tel: 212 984-8930) 913-384-4000 PHONE CEO Bryan Marsal Pres. Terry Lay Arrow Shirt Co. The Lee Co. 48 W. 38 St. POB 2940 NYC 10018 Shawnee Mssn, KS 66201 ************************************************ NEW ENGLAND BURMA ROUNDTABLE: SEPTEMBER MEETING September 8, 1997 From: sbillenness@frdc.com Welcome Back Students!!! 1. September Roundtable Meeting: Tuesday, September 16, 6:30pm Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, 130 Prospect Street, Cambridge. Take the red line to Central Square T stop, or the Number 1 bus. The UUSC office is on the corner of Prospect and Harvard streets, a 2- block walk from Central Square. Use the buzzer outside the front door to gain entry into the building; take the elevator to the first floor. For more information or update on Massachusetts law contact: Simon Billenness * for the New England Burma Roundtable * c/o Franklin Research & Development Corporation / 711 Atlantic Avenue / Boston MA 02111 phone: 617-423-6655, extension 225 / Email: sbillenness@frdc.com *********************************************** BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST BurmaNet regularly receives enquiries on a number of different topics related to Burma. If you have questions on any of the following subjects, please direct email to the following volunteer coordinators, who will either answer your question or try to put you in contact with someone who can: Campus activism: zni@students.wisc.edu Boycott campaigns: ai268@freenet.carleton.ca Buddhism: Buddhist Relief Mission: brelief@gol.com Chin history/culture: [volunteer temporarily away] Fonts: tom@cs.colgate.edu High School Activism: [volunteer needed] History of Burma: zni@students.wisc.edu International Affairs: Julien Moe: moe@interport.net Kachin history/culture: 74750.1267@compuserve.com Karen history/culture: Karen Historical Society: 102113.2571@Compuserve.com Mon history/culture: [volunteer needed] Naga history/culture: Wungram Shishak: z954001@oats.farm.niu.edu Burma-India border Aung San Myint: aungsan@giasd101.vsnl.net.in Pali literature: "Palmleaf": c/o burmanet@igc.apc.org Pipeline Campaign freeburma@irn.org Resettlement info: refugee_help@mail.serve.com Rohingya culture volunteer needed Shan history/culture: Sao Hpa Han: burma@ix.netcom.com Shareholder activism: simon_billenness@mail.cybercom.net Total - France Dawn Star: cd@utopia.EUnet.fr Tourism campaigns: bagp@gn.apc.org "Attn. S.Sutcliffe" volunteering: refugee_help@mail.serve.com World Wide Web: FreeBurma@POBox.com Geographical Contacts: Massachusetts simon_billenness@mail.cybercom.net [Feel free to suggest more areas of coverage] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FREE BURMA WEB PAGES: http://FreeBurma.org This single page serves only as an easy to remember URL and departure point to resources promoting the establishment of democracy in Burma. Please write to FreeBurma@pobox.com to add a site or for further information." - Glen, system administrator FREE BURMA COALITION: to get involved in the Free Burma Coalition, send a message to: zni@students.wisc.edu or visit their homepage, accessible through: http:// FreeBurma.org There is also an e-mail list-server especially for Free Burma activists BURMANET SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION: The BurmaNet News is an electronic newspaper covering Burma. Articles from newspapers, magazines, newsletters, the wire services and the Internet as well as original material are published. It is produced with the support of the Burma Information Group (B.I.G) and the Research Department of the ABSDF. We are also grateful to many other friends around the world who send us articles to post. The BurmaNet News is e-mailed directly to subscribers and is also distributed via the soc.culture.burma and seasia-l mailing lists. For a free subscription to the BurmaNet News: send a message to: majordomo@igc.apc.org a. For the BurmaNet News only: in the message, type: subscribe burmanews-l b. For the BurmaNet News and 4-5 other messages a day: in the message, type: subscribe burmanet-l (NOTE: all lower case letters, last letter is a lower case "L", not the numeral one). Letters to the editor, comments or contributions of articles should be sent to the editor at: strider@igc.apc.org ***************************************************