------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------ "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ---------------------------------------------------------- The BurmaNet News: September 11, 1997 Issue #818 HEADLINES: ========== BKK POST: HELICOPTER SEARCH KNPP: SITUATION REPORT NO. 5 KNU: PRESS RELEASE NO. 53/97 THE ECONOMIST: COOK'S ORDER BKK POST: BURMESE DAZE KYODO: JAPANESE EMBASSY ANNOUNCES FLOOD RELIEF THE NATION: PTT TARGETS VILLAGE HEADS BURMANET: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT: ASSESSING ASEAN ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW BOOKS ON BURMA -------------------------------------------------------------------------- BKK POST: HELICOPTER SEARCH September 10, 1997 200 more troops join hunt Tak - The two-week-old search for a missing army helicopter was yesterday reinforced by the addition of another 200 soldiers as the search moved to the mountains of Umphang district of this province bordering Burma. The search team began scouring Umphang on Monday. In the preceding weeks it combed the adjoining Phop Phra district and the area opposite the district in Burma for the wreckage of the copter and its four occupants, presumed dead, but without success. The Jet Ranger helicopter with Lt Chanvej Kiddee and Lt Adisak Pongpes, the pilots, and two passengers, Anek Panchaeng and Sgt Krisda Thamsorn, went missing on August 28 while flying over Phop Phra and Umphang districts in a rainstorm. *************************************** KNPP: SITUATION REPORT NO. 5 September 10, 1997 From: ooreh THE GOVERNMENT OF KARENNI MINISTRY OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND INFORMATION KARENNI HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION COMMITTED BY SLORC Human rights violations continued by the Slorc troops of LB No. (102), LB No. (261) and LIB No. (426) in Karenni. The said troops have been forcing hundreds of local people of Mawchi, Karenni, and prisoners from different parts of Burma to act as porters without payment since the end of July 1997. Recently, about one hundred villagers of Dee Maw So town, Dee Maw So Township, were arrested and tied up, and then loaded to Pasaung town. Those who were seized were forced to carry supplies and ammunition from Pasaung town to the area, where they have been operating military offensive against innocent Karenni people. Many of those forced to act as porters have been subjected to torture and ill-treatment if they could not carry loads of supplies and ammunition. Others who were seized as porters have been extrajudicially killed if they attempted to escape or were enable to carry their loads. Those who were seriously sick were left to dead beside roads. Conditions of the porters are often harsh, in many cases amounting to cruel, inhuman treatment. The porters have been subjected to ill-treatment, receiving inadequate food. The Porters are receiving only one meal per day while they are forced to carry heavy loads. The porters are forced to walk through rocky areas and mountainous areas. Those who are sick are also forced to continue to carry their loads. So far about 50 porters have died of sickness, tiredness and starvation. Most of them were shot to dead by the military (SLORC) according to Zaw Win, private soldier of LB No. (102) and one sergeant (requested not to use his name) of LB No. (261), 27 years old who have recently surrendered to the Karenni Army and some porters who escaped to the Karenni controlled area. Prisoners of Mg Sein, Thaung Htay, Win Kyaw, Than Naing and Mg Naing were among the deaths. On August 23, 1997, husband Saw Kalo, 58 years old, and wife Naw Moo, 50 years old, were arrested in Lo Po village of No. (2) District by a Slorc troops of LB (102) under the command of Sein Hlaing (unknown position). The troops killed the husband. The wife Naw Moo died after being repeated raped by the troops. The said three units if Slorc troops have so far destroyed about one hundred acres of planted rice paddy which belonged to a number of villages of No. (2) District. Conditions of villagers in No. (1) District, who were forced to move to Slorc relocation sites on 7 July 1997, have been getting from bad to the worst. Villagers are dying of sickness and starvation every day especially in Sha Daw relocation site. The dead numbers of children have already reached to over one hundred. ______________________________________________________ Battle News On 7 September 1997, 6 Slorc soldiers of LIB No. (336) and LIB No. (421) were killed by Karenni land mines which laid in Ywa Thit area, east of Bawlake, and Hway Aw Lay area, BP-11 area. 10 September 1997 ************************************************ KNU: PRESS RELEASE NO. 53/97 September 10, 1997 win1@psnulok.loxinfo.co.th OFFICE OF THE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS KAREN NATIONAL UNION KAWTHOOLEI Press Release No. 53/97 Regarding SLORC 1997 Military Offensive against KNU September 10,1997 Nyaung-lay-bin District * 11.8.97: Troops from SLORC LIB 706 came to Maladaw village of Mone township and arrested villagers Saw Poe Tha, Saw Maung Pway and Maung Pyi Than, without reason, and fined them 500 Kyat each. On the same day, the troops arrested 4 Burmans in the village, who were on a visit, and fined them 100 Kyat each. The troops also confiscated the villagers' rice. Toungoo District * 8.8.97: Troops from SLORC LIB 706 came to Play-hsa-lo village in Tan-ta-bin township and looted the villagers of 3 pigs, 66 chickens, 7 ducks, 10 baskets of rice, 25 viss of durian jam, 300 durian fruits, 25 viss of beetle nuts, 5 viss of tobacco, 16 rice pots, 5 thermos flasks, one watch, one radio, 10 rain coats, 20 shirts, 6 blankets, 2 mosquito nets and 15,000 kyat of cash. * 16.8.97: Troops from SLORC IB 73 and LIB 701 seized 300 Baw-ga-li villagers including children, women and the aged. On 17.8.97, LIB 701 troops similarly seized 90 Gor-the-doe villagers. Starting from 18.8.97, these 390 villagers were forced to carry supplies to Nor-soe front line camp, every day. At last report on 21.8.97, the villagers were still being held and forced to work. Forced labor by the SLORC military has left the villagers with no time to work for their livelihood. Pa-an District * 13.8.97: Troops from SLORC IB 24 came to Naw-der-kee village of Hlaing-bwe township and looted 1,100 Baht from villager, Saw Du and 3,000 Bath worth of clothes and a jade stone valued at 7,000 Baht from villager, Par Beh. * 26.8.97: Troops from SLORC IB 24 came to Tee-kray village of Hlaing-bwe township and killed and ate a pig of the villagers. In rural areas, the Karen civilians have to face a great hardship and much distress as the SLORC troops are ransacking and destroying their villages, forcing them to work like slaves in front-line areas, at the military camps and on economic projects and extorting inordinately large amount of money. (Translated, printed and distributed by the Karen Information Center) *************************************************** THE ECONOMIST: COOK'S ORDER September 6 1997 BANGKOK --MEMBERS of the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN, knew there would be a price to be paid for admitting Myanmar in July to full membership of their well-regarded club. But they may not have guessed that they would have been faced with it so soon. Mahathir Mohamad, the 71-year-old prime minister of Malaysia, recently back from a two-month holiday but evidently none the mellower for it, thinks ASEAN countries should boycott the next summit of the Asia- Europe Meeting, which is due to take place in London next April. The meeting is designed to bring together heads of government of the European Union, China, Japan, South Korea and most of ASEAN in a bid to give relations between the two blocks some of the substance enjoyed in Europe- America and America-Asia ties. Dr Mahathir, however, has a bone to pick about Myanmar. The new British foreign secretary, Robin Cook, speaking in Singapore after a tour of four ASEAN countries, made it clear that Myanmar would not be invited to the London meeting. European sanctions against Myanmar introduced recently include a ban on visas for its officials. Mr Cook spelt out the rationale for the sanctions. The ruling military junta "is not only a deeply repressive regime," he said, "but it is also a deeply irresponsible regime in that it is one of the few governments in the world whose members are prepared to profit out of the drugs trade rather than to seek to suppress the drugs trade." Mr Cook had said much the same a few days earlier in meetings with Malaysia's foreign minister, Abdullah Badawi, and the deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim. From those and other meetings in the region Mr Cook gained the impression that ASEAN governments share many of his concerns, even if they choose to represent them in a more emollient, "Asian" way. But Dr Mahathir sees matters differently. Discrimination against Myanmar means discrimination against ASEAN," he tartly observed. "You may find other countries in ASEAN also deciding not to attend." The Malaysian leader has some experience of boycotts. Only in the past year have ties with Britain seemed back on track after the "buy British last" campaign he launched in his outrage over British press coverage of aid and arms deals. Before that, the target was Australia. His reaction to Mr Cook was just what the junta in Myanmar was hoping for. "It's one for all and all for one," enthused a Myanmar official. Maybe. Officials of other ASEAN countries note that membership of the Asia-Europe Meeting is not automatic for members of either ASEAN or the EU, but is decided by consensus. After Dr Mahathir's remarks, the ASEAN countries will have to decide whether the interests that prompted members such as Singapore to push for the first Asia-Europe summit should be subordinated to solidarity with the Myanmar junta. ******************************************* BKK POST: BURMESE DAZE September 10, 1997 A traveller recently returned from Burma reports a mini-renaissance in the publishing industry, with several new magazines on the stands, some of them even mildly entertaining. One such publication carried a colourful cover photograph of Slorc chairman Than Shwe playing golf at Pagan. His caddie was a very attractive young woman bedecked in gold. Gen Than Shwe's wife did not appreciate the artistic merit of the photograph. The magazine is no longer in business. Elsewhere, a publishing house issued a Burmese translation of Alice in Wonderland. The censors got around to it belatedly, and were heard to be scratching their heads about a .passage describing birds walking around in circles. The guardians of public decency decided that some people might draw parallels between the birds (which became extinct) and ... well, you know. Result: Alice doesn't live in Rangoon anymore. ************************************************************ KYODO: JAPANESE EMBASSY ANNOUNCES FLOOD RELIEF DONATION September 8, 1997 Yangon, Sept. 8 Kyodo -- The Japanese Government will donate materials and cash totaling nearly 150,000 U.S. dollars for flood victims in Myanmar, the Japanese embassy said in a press release Monday. Emergency flood relief includes 11.75 million yen (98,000 dollars) worth of relief materials and a cash grant of 50,000 dollars, it said. "According to the recent report compiled by the UN disaster management team, the unusually heavy rainfalls in the last week of July 1997 caused flash floods in many parts of Myanmar, particularly in Mon state, Bago and Ayeyarwaddy divisions, resulting in the loss of lives and materials," the statement said. Material assistance includes blankets, sleeping mats, electric torches and batteries, towels, soap and detergents. ******************************************** THE NATION: PTT TARGETS VILLAGE HEADS September 10, 1997 Kamol Sukin IN AN effort to gain support for its controversial Yadana gas pipeline project, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) has changed its public relations strategy and is now trying to win over kamnan and villages heads instead of the affected villagers. But environmental activists warn that the new tactic will only aggravate ongoing conflicts between the PTT and Kanchanaburi villagers, who are suffering as a direct result of the pipeline construction. Songkiat Thansamrit, director of PTT's public relations department, said his department has developed two new strategies - a campaign for the villagers to protect the remaining forest and to provide them with alternate occupations. "To save money during the economic crisis, we will only pay for what is necessary. We've decided to only deal with the provincial authorities in regards to general environmental awareness, instead of focusing on the doubts surrounding the project," he said. 'We will contact the provincial authorities, such as kamnan and village heads and then they can explain our project to the villagers." According to the plan, the PTT will organise training courses for the village heads and ask them to speak at seminars organised by opponents of the pipeline. Songkiat said the PTT will continue to try and create an understanding with the affected villagers who oppose the project, but that it is not of priority to the company "The environmental groups don't understand that we've done our best. We would like to stop the project temporarily for the debates but it's just not possible because we would have to compensate the developers if we fail to finish the pipeline on time," Songkiat said. Suraphol Duangkhae, deputy secretary-general of the Wildlife Fund Thailand, said PTT's new plan would ensure that significant, necessary questions about the project would be left unanswered. "Not everything is known about the project because the PTT only provides general information. Instead of directly answering questions, PTT officials only say 'please trust us and we'll do our best'. That is not enough," he said. "We need a lot of necessary information for our monitoring system, such as who are the contractors for each part of the construction, what are the details of the contracts and what environmental protection measures are included in the contracts?" Suraphol said the PTT had hired former activists from Ramkhamhaeng University to promote the project among the villagers. *********************************************** BURMANET: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN BURMA - ASSESSING ASEAN POLICY September 9, 1997 BurmaNet Staff At an international conference held in Bangkok from August 20 - 23 1997 academics and journalists discussed "Economic and Political Dimensions of Constructive Engagement in Asia". The moral dimensions of constructive engagement naturally also surfaced during the course of the conference. Below are excerpts selected from several of the papers presented at the conference and a brief analysis by BurmaNet. The selections highlight the evolution of constructive engagement and non-interference in Southeast Asia, breeches of policy by ASEAN members in pursuing bilateral relations with Burma, and recommendations for a future policy of constructive intervention. Amitav Acharya contextualizes the birth of the doctrine of non-interventionism, enshrined in ASEAN policy during the Cold War era. Rather than portraying non-interference as consonant with 'Asian cultural values', Acharya demonstrates that it was a response to outside threats. The threats to sovereignty faced by ASEAN members have clearly shifted over the past three decades, thus posing the question of whether or not ASEAN's policy has undergone a corresponding shift to accommodate change in the post Cold War era. --BurmaNet -------------- SOVEREIGNTY, NON-INTERVENTION, AND REGIONALISM Amitav Acharya Associate Professor of Political Science at York University "No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State." Excerpts from UN General Assembly Resolution, 23 3 (XX), 23 December, 1965. The doctrine of non-intervention is a corollary to the principle of sovereignty. Imperialism and colonisation led to the globalisation of the European state-system, with the principles of sovereignty and non- intervention forming the basis of statehood in what came to be known as the Third World. The salience of the doctrine of non-interference in Southeast Asia's state-system predates the founding of ASEAN in 1967. It was the key principle behind the Afro-Asian summit at Bandung. Non- communist countries were enthusiastic proponents of the doctrine at the UN through the 1960s and 1970s. This not only reflected the general concern of the Non-Aligned countries against superpower interference in the Third World, it was also inspired by a more pressing need to counter the threat of subversion (primarily communist-backed) in the region. Few regions provided more case studies in which the violation of the doctrine of non-intervention was at stake than Southeast Asia in the postcolonial era. The 1960s were a time when the governments of North and South Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia all complained of being subjected to foreign interference in a variety of ways including, as a Thai delegate to the UN General Assembly debates on non-intervention put it, "verbal intimidation, infiltration, and subversive activities directed and supported from outside." Not surprisingly therefore, the doctrine lay at the heart of ASEAN regionalism and was reaffirmed in all the major political statements of ASEAN from the very outset. The founding Bangkok Declaration of 1967 called upon Southeast Asian states to "ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation". This injunction was intended to apply not only to interference by extra-regional powers, including the big powers such as the US, Soviet Union, and China, but also by the Southeast Asian countries in the affairs of their own neighbours. In operational terms, the obligations imposed by ASEAN's doctrine of non- interference on its members have had four main aspects: (1) refraining from criticising the actions of a member government towards its own people, including violation of human rights, and from making the domestic political system of states and the political styles of governments as a basis for deciding their membership in ASEAN; (2) criticising the actions of states which are deemed to constitute a breach of the non-interference principle; (3) denying recognition, sanctuaries, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilise or overthrow the government of a neighbouring state; (4) providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against subversive and destabilising activities. Such a policy does not necessarily mean that ASEAN will oppose the use of force by a government against its own people. This policy is not as much a departure from the past as was originally interpreted by some analysts. It upholds the view that while human rights abuses in a member country are not a matter for foreign commentary or interference, overthrow of established governments is a threat to the security interests of ASEAN. ------------------- BurmaNet: Thus constructive engagement means engaging with the regime in power; the means by which power was obtained are irrelevant. This view was substantiated by Mahathir Mohammad's careless remark that if 5 million Burmese citizens were killed by the junta ASEAN would consider delaying membership. Clearly, stability is a primary concern for ASEAN members, particularly for those nation-states with shared borders. In the next section Silverstein catalogues violations of the doctrine of non-interventionism by ASEAN members in their bilateral relations with Burma. The doctrine was breached due to national security concerns, the desire for economic gain, and concern over the fate of Burmese Muslims. ---------------------- CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH BURMA: HAS IT WORKED IN THE PAST? WILL IT WORK IN THE FUTURE? Josef Silverstein Professor Emeritus, Rutgers University [Following SLORC's seizure of power] neither ASEAN nor its members individually joined the outcry against SLORC nor halted trade. Although as a group ASEAN followed its doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, it left it to each member state to relate to Burma as it saw fit. Almost immediately, Singapore found a new market for the sale of weapons which Burma used in its war against the ethnic minorities. Two weeks after SLORC's announcement of a new economic open-door policy and the promulgation of a foreign capital investment act on November 30, 1988, Thailand's Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Gen. Chavalit, visited Rangoon and met with Gen. Saw Maung, leader of SLORC. There was no talk of "constructive engagement" and non-interference in the internal affairs of another nation when Gen. Chavalit agreed to Gen. Saw Maung's request for help in repatriating Burma students who had fled to Thailand for sanctuary because they feared brutal and inhumane reprisal from SLORC for their part in the summer demonstrations. The Burma General responded by granting logging concessions to forty Thai companies, many with military connections, in the border regions where the Burma army was engaged in its latest drive to suppress ethnic minorities resistance. The capture of the forest areas allowed the Thai leaseholders to replace traditional logging practices with machine intensive methods as selective gave way to clear cutting. By the end of 1993, the Thai loggers had despoiled so much of the forests in their drive to extract teak logs, SLORC canceled all but four contracts in order, belatedly, to save the forests in the leased areas. By initially ignoring Burma military intrusions onto Thai territory and allowing Burma military units to attack Karen border strongholds from there, Thailand became involved directly in Burma's civil war and gave the Burma army an important advantage over its enemies. In May 1989, during a Burma military operation inside Thailand, its armed forces shelled the Thai village of Ban Wangkaew, destroying two hundred houses and killing several people. Following the 1990 election victory of the party of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the overwhelming defeat of the party backed by SLORC, the military rulers issued Declaration 1/90 on July 27, 1990 defining and justifying its right to rule and its refusal to transfer power to the NLD. Again, while most of the nations in the West, Japan, and India protested, Thailand and the other ASEAN nations continued their silence. It was at the Post-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 that ASEAN embraced the policy of constructive engagement for dealing with Burma. In rejecting the U.S. call for the ASEAN nations to support its policies toward Burma, the Thai Foreign Minister, Arsa Sarasin, said that ASEAN would adopt a policy of constructive engagement toward Burma and would not interfere in its internal affairs. Before the year ended, ASEAN became involved in another Burma matter: the mistreatment and expulsion of Burma Muslims (Rohingas) from their villages and lands in western Burma by SLORC who denied their rights and citizenship. ASEAN was divided over how to deal with the situation... Malaysia's Foreign Ministry summoned the Burma Ambassador on March 10, 1992 and protested the treatment of the Rohingas. The Foreign Minister issued a statement saying, "we believe the time has come for a firm stand to be taken as there seems to be no slackening of attacks on Muslims." Even after an agreement was reached between Burma and Bangladesh on the return of Rohingas who could prove citizenship, Malaysia opposed extending an ASEAN invitation to Burma to attend the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila. When the meeting ended, the Malaysian Foreign Minister said, "It is their [SLORC's] desire to come out from isolation but they will have problems if their credentials on human rights and freedom are bad." In 1992, and again a year later, Thailand played an important role in the internal affairs of Burma. In the earlier year, SLORC publicly announced that it was going to defeat the Karens and capture their headquarters, Manerplaw, by March 27--Burma Armed Forces Day--and end their long rebellion... Early in the fighting the Karens, short of ammunition and unable to purchase and receive any from their usual sources in Thailand, feared they might not be able to hold their headquarters... Early in March, Thailand suddenly allowed ammunition to cross the border and made it possible for the Karen to continue holding back the Burma army. On the 23rd of March, SLORC declared a unilateral cease-fire without achieving their promised goal, leaving their enemy intact and in place. Thailand's changed policy toward the contesting forces was crucial to this outcome. Thailand became even more involved in SLORC's war against the ethnic minorities in 1993. Following an agreement with SLORC leader Gen. Khin Nyunt, the Thais suddenly and without warning closed their country to transit by Burma ethnic minorities and members of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). The NCGUB leaders were abroad attending the UNGA meeting in New York and were unable to return to their headquarters inside of Burma. By this action, the Burma military rulers hoped to separate the NCGUB from the minorities, cut off contact the Burman and minorities leaders had with the outside world, halt the remaining illegal trade at the border and end the civil war. Thailand hoped that by helping SLORC against its enemies, it would see a reopening of border trade on a regularized basis once all fighting ended. Meanwhile, other ASEAN members have pursued bilateral relations with Burma in a manner consistent with the ASEAN interpretation of constructive engagement: Singapore and Malaysia have become two of the largest investors in Burma with hotel construction, department stores and other projects, largely aimed at serving and profiting from tourism. They and Indonesia have invested in clothing factories, taking advantage of the low paid workers and low-tech machinery investment necessary for quick startup, recovery of investment and profits. Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines have invested in resource extraction and tourist related projects. Foreign investment, contrary to the claims of SLORC and the members of ASEAN, is not neutral... If there is supposed to be a trickle-down effect of money into a widening pool of people, it has not occurred after nearly a decade of SLORC-managed open economy and foreign investment. ---------------------- BurmaNet: 'Constructive engagement' is a rationalization selectively invoked by ASEAN governments to defend a policy of continued economic engagement. In reality, ASEAN member nations have intervened in Burma's "internal affairs" in an inconsistent fashion as different issues assume priority at different times. When Muslim states refused to comment on the pleas by Burmese Muslims to recognize their plight under SLORC in 1997 it was a reversal of the earlier Malaysian policy of condemning the junta's human rights violations. Thai policy toward Burma has oscillated between supporting Karen refugees and a buffer zone against Burma to tolerating incursions of Burmese military on Thai soil for the purpose of attacking Karen refugee camps. Many observers commented that the real reason behind ASEAN's desire to bring Burma rapidly into the fold was Burma's increasing dependence on China. We can only analyze the effectiveness of their maneuver in the long term future, but at the moment Chinese investment is continuing apace, as is the flow of Chinese arms into Burma. China also lauded ASEAN's move in flaunting Western nations. In the wake of Burma's admission and the collapse of the baht, China was one of the first countries to offer to contribute to an aid package for Thailand. In the future, if relations between the East and the West are polarized over Burma, we may actually see ASEAN moving closer to China's orbit. -------------------------- Adnan, an observer of ASEAN process and policy making, advocates policy reform, pro-active constructive intervention, and a perhaps idealistic but noble "human agenda" for ASEAN. The objectives Adnan outlines can be used as a yardstick to measure progress, or the absence thereof, in Burma. CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: INTERVENTION OR INDIFFERENCE? Abdul Rahman Adnan Director, Institute for Policy Research (IKD), Malaysia In the past, advocates of Southeast Asian regionalism have generally emphasised the nation-state as the point of reference and the achievement of its security as the measure of progress. Now, at the threshold of the twenty-first century, the achievement of national and regional resilience is such that the survival of Southeast Asian nation-states is no longer such a critical issue. Thus, while the nation-states continue to be crucial frameworks and mechanisms for providing physical security and well-being, the process of community-building requires a shift of focus to the people, from appraising progress solely in terms of survival and stability of the nation-state, to measuring it more in terms of the human predicament...we need to pursue a "human agenda". [following are excerpts from Adnan's suggestions] - peace at all levels, international, regional and domestic. Peace for the people is not only the absence of war, but also involves the presence of positive conditions, supportive of security of life and property at all levels and conducive to mutually beneficial exchanges among nation-states and peoples. - the promotion of open market mechanisms... without state intervention except when it is necessary to ensure fair play and to protect those who cannot protect themselves... It also requires massive investment in human resources development as a source of longer-term growth and prosperity. - the need to safeguard and to enhance the dignity of the human person by the rule of law, traditional values, and provision of opportunities for education and employment. People empowerment is the key, and every effort should be made to promote the individual's capacity to participate in the various political social and economic processes taking place in the community and society. - the need for more just, equal, tolerant and caring societies, where the poor, the underprivileged, the disadvantaged and the diverse cultural groups can receive protection and assistance, where their basic requirements of food, shelter, clothing, healthcare and education are met, and where there is respect for political rights and the accountability of governance. Implementing the human agenda will require a new policy of "constructive intervention". ---------------------- Another ASEAN observer, Djiwandono, also advocates ASEAN policy which takes account of more universal human rights values. CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA J. Soedjati Djiwandono Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia I am, however, for one, concerned over the possibility that ASEAN's reticence on Myanmar is basically due to a tacit recognition that its own records on human rights, at least with respect to some of its member states, are not particularly brilliant. Indeed, the ASEAN states themselves should first put their own houses in order. Who are we, then, to criticise the Myanmarese? If, however, "constructive engagement" should not imply turning a blind eye to what goes wrong, nor burying our heads in the sand, pretending as though everything was fine and in good order, then it needs to be clearly translated into policy. In pursuing a policy of constructive engagement towards Myanmar, not only should ASEAN take into account its possible impact on its relations with the USA and the European Union on pragmatic considerations, but it should also maintain its credibility and respectability in the international community by adhering to certain internationally accepted standards and norms of behaviour. This, however, must be made unmistakably clear to the Myanmarese regime. It is not that ASEAN should try to teach the Myanmarese a lesson on how to manage their internal affairs. But a clear expression of common concern would precisely reflect our sympathy and understanding as fellow Southeast Asians. And more importantly, despite our imperfections, just as the rest of the world, we Southeast Asians should demonstrate our commitment to universal values in the common interest of humankind. The promotion of good governance and the establishment of a civil society marked by democratic pluralism, equality and justice for everyone, and respect for basic human rights, which often relate to domestic stability or instability, are problems that are common to all the ASEAN member states. Concern with and attention to such common problems may be translated into a common or at least co-ordinated policy and form part of security co-operation, be it on bilateral or multilateral basis, in addition to exchange of views, information and experience on such matters. This would give the policy of constructive engagement its real value. -------------------------- BurmaNet: In response to Hun Sen's seizure of power and the collapse of the coalition government in Cambodia, Anwar Ibrahim outlined a new policy of pro- active involvement. The new policy was named "constructive intervention", and entails the following: (1) direct assistance to firm up electoral processes (2) an increased commitment to legal and administrative reforms (3) the development of human capital (4) the general strengthening of civil society and the rule of law The application of these policies, devised for Cambodia, to Burma would be welcomed by the majority of the population and the international community. However, the financial stakes in Burma in terms of resources, a government-disciplined labour force, and potential market, are much higher than in Cambodia. Since 1988 ASEAN members have been solidifying political and economic ties in Burma by engaging in joint venture projects with SLORC, therefore the regional grouping is less likely to interfere. However, where interference would lead to greater transparency and economic stability in Burma ASEAN investors would themselves benefit. ASEAN is already encouraging the regime to implement reforms. Now that Burma has been admitted to ASEAN it is unlikely that the group will be expelled. Therefore the task for opposition groups and international observers is to ensure that any changes wrought by constructive engagement or intervention are genuine steps toward democracy, rather than mere cosmetic changes. So far investment has marked a period of growth without real development. The recent talk between U Aung Shwe and the SLORC is another good example of cosmetic improvement. Aung San Suu Kyi was not included thus the NLD does not consider the talks "dialogue", and ASEAN cannot claim credit. Supporters of democracy are concerned that Burma's ASEAN membership and a continued policy of constructive engagement may impede rather than assist progress towards democracy. *********************************************** ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW BOOKS ON BURMA September 10, 1997 From: "Moe K. T." "Burma : The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society (St. Antony's Series)" by P. B. R. Carey List: $65.00 Subjects: Burma; Politics and government; 1948-; Foreign relations; Ethnic relations; Contemporary Politics - Asia; Ethnic Politics; POLITICS/CURRENT EVENTS; Asia - Indochina Publisher: St Martins Pr (Short) Binding: Hardcover Expected publication date: September 1, 1997 ISBN: 0312174225 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Gender Ideology and Psychological Reality : An Essay on Cultural Reproduction" by Melford E. Spiro List: $30.00 Subjects: Sex role; Burma; Gender identity; Ethnopsychology; Interpersonal relations; Sociobiology; PSYCHOLOGY; Anthropology - Cultural Publisher: Yale Univ Pr Binding: Hardcover Expected publication date: September 1, 1997 ISBN: 0300070071 ********************************************