------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------ "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ---------------------------------------------------------- The BurmaNet News: November 17, 1997 Issue #869 HEADLINES: ========== SLORC: NOTIFICATION 1/97 - STATE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT SPDC NOTIFICATION NO. 1/97 SPDC NOTIFICATION NO. 2/97 SPDC NOTIFICATION NO. 3/97 BURMANET: COMMENT ON THE NEW MILITARY REGIME (SPDC) AP: BURMA CHANGES KEEPS GENERALS UNITED OPPOSITION GROUPS REACT TO SLORC'S NEW IDENTITY KNU: REPORT ON NEW REFUGEES IN THAILAND KNU: UPDATED REPORT ON THE THAY PU LAW SUE SITUATION BKK POST: KARENS SEEK PEACE TALKS THROUGH PM AP-DOW JONES: BURMA'S SUU KYI IN 11-HOUR STANDOFF U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT: BRIEFING ON BURMA AP-DOW JONES: U.S. ARCO TO SELL 29%-39% IN BURMA GAS -------------------------------------------------------------------------- SLORC: NOTIFICATION 1/97 - STATE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL November 15, 1997 OKKAR66127@AOL.COM The Annoucencement of State Peace and Development Council's Notifications The State Law and Order Restoration Council ( Notification No. 1/97 ) The First Waning Day of Tazaungmon, 1359, M.E. 15th November, 1997. With a view to ensure the emergence of an orderly and democratic system and to establish a peaceful and modern state, the State Law and Order Restoration Council has henceforth been dissolved. Signed- Than Shwe Senior General Chairman The State Law and Order Restoration Council ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ The Union of Myanmar State Peace and Development Council ( Ordinance No. 1/97 ) The First Waning Day of Tazaungmon, 1359, M.E. 15th November, 1997. Formation of New Ministerial Portfolios The State Peace and Development Council has formed additional ministerial portfolios as follows to ensure greater effectiveness and success in the functions of Government. 1. Ministry of Military Affairs 2. Ministry of Electric Power Signed- Khin Nyunt Lieutenant General Secretary (1) The State Peace and Development Council ************************************************ SPDC NOTIFICATION NO. 1/97 November 15, 1997 OKKAR66127@AOL.COM The State Peace and Development Council Notification ( Notification No. 1/97 ) The First Waning Day of Tazaungmon, 1359, M.E. 15th November, 1997. In the interest of the State and the nation peoples, the State Peace and Development Council has been formed as follows:- 1. Senior General Than Shwe Chairman 2. General Maung Aye Vice-Chairman 3. Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt Secretary (1) 4. Lieutenant General Tin Oo Secretary (2) 5. Lieutenant General Win Myint Secretary (3) 6. Rear Admiral Nyunt Thein Member Commander-in-Chief (Navy) 7. Brigadier General Kyaw Than Member Commander-in-Chief (Air) 8. Major General Aung Htwe Member Commander, Western Command 9. Major General Ye Myint Member Commander, Central Command 10. Major General Khin Maung Than Member Commander, Yangon Command 11. Major General Kyaw Win Member Commander, Nothern Command 12. Major General Thein Sein Member Commander, Triangle Area Command 13. Major General Thura, Thiha Thura Sitt Maung Member Commander, Coastal Area Command 14. Brigadier General Thura Shwe Mann Member Commander, Southwest Command 15. Brigadier General Myint Aung Member Commander, Southeast Command 16. Brigadier General Maung Bo Member Commander, Eastern Command 17. Brigadier General Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo Member Commander, Northeast Command 18. Brigadier General Soe Win Member Commander, Northwest Command 19. Brigadier General Tin Aye Member Commander, Southern Command Signed- Than Shwe Senior General Chairman The State Peace and Development Council *************************************************************** SPDC NOTIFICATION NO. 2/97 November 15, 1997 OKKAR66127@AOL.COM The State Peace and Development Council Notification ( Notification No. 2/97 ) The First Waning Day of Tazaungmon, 1359, M.E. 15th November, 1997. The State Peace and Development Council, to fulfill its goal of bringing forth a new developed and modern nation in the interest of the State and all the national peoples, has hereby formed the following Cabinet of Ministers. 1. Prime Minister Senior General Than Shwe 2. Deputy Prime Minister Rear-Admiral Maung Maung Khin 3. Deputy Prime Minister Lieutenant General Tin Tun 4. Ministry of Defence, Minister Senior General Than Shwe 5. Ministry of Military Affairs, Minister Lieutenant General Tin Hla 6. Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Minister Major General Nyunt Tin 7. Ministry of Industry No. (1), Minister U Aung Thaung 8. Ministry of Industry No.(2), Minister Major General Hla Myint Swe 9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister U Ohn Gyaw 10. Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, Minister Brigadier General Abel 11. Ministry of Transport, Minister Lieutenant General Tin Ngwe 12. Ministry of Labour, Minister Vice-Admiral Tin Aye 13. Ministry of Co-operatives, Minister U Than Aung 14. Ministry of Rail Transportation, Minister U Win Sein 15. Ministry of Energy, Minister U Khin Maung Thein 16. Ministry of Education, Minister U Pan Aung 17. Ministry of Health, Minister Major General Ket Sein 18. Ministry of Trade & Commerce, Minister Major General Kyaw Than 19. Ministry of Hotels & Tourism, Minister Major General Saw Lwin 20. Ministry of Communications, Posts & Telegraphs, Minister U Soe Tha 21. Ministry of Finance & Revenue, Minister Brigadier-General Win Tin 22. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Minister Major General Sein Htwa 23. Ministry of Construction, Minister Major General Saw Tun 24. Ministry of Science & Technology, Minister U Thaung 25. Ministry of Culture, Minister U Aung San 26. Ministry of Immigration & Population, Minister U Saw Tun 27. Ministry of Information, Minister Major General Kyi Aung 28. Ministry of Progress of Border Areas & National Races and Development Affairs, Minister Colonel Thein Nyunt 29. Ministry of Electric Power, Minister Major General Tin Htut 30. Ministry of Sports, Minister Brigadier-General Sein Win 31. Ministry of Forestry, Minister U Aung Phone 32. Ministry of Home Affairs, Minister Colonel Tin Hlaing 33. Ministry of Mines, Minister Brigadier-General Ohn Myint 34. Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief & Resettlement, Minister Brigadier-General Pyi Sone 35. Ministry of Livestock Breeding & Fisheries, Minister Brigadier-General Maung Maung Thein 36. Office of The Chairman of The State Peace and Development Council, Minister Lieutenant General Min Thein 37. Office of The Chairman of The State Peace and Development Council, Minister Brigadier-General Maung Maung 38. Office of The Prime Minister, Minister Brigadier-General Lun Maung 39. Office of The Prime Minister, Minister U Than Shwe 40. Office of The Prime Minister, Minister Major General Tin Ngwe Signed -Than Shwe Senio r General Chairman The State Peace and Development Council ****************************************** SPDC NOTIFICATION NO. 3/97 November 15, 1997 OKKAR66127@AOL.COM The State Peace and Development Council Notification ( Notification No. 3/97 ) The First Waning Day of Tazaungmon, 1359, M.E. 15th November, 1997. The Formation of The State Peace and Development Council The State Peace and Developmemt Council hereby announces the formation of the Advisory Group consisting of the following members:- 1. Lieutenant General Phone Myint 2. Lieutenant General Aung Ye Kyaw 3. Lieutenant General Sein Aung 4. Lieutenant General Chit Swe 5. Lieutenant General Mya Thinn 6. Lieutenant General Myint Aung 7. Lieutenant General Kyaw Ba 8. Lieutenant General Tun Kyi 9. Lieutenant General Myo Nyunt 10. Lieutenant General Maung Thint 11. Lieutenant General Aye Thoung 12. Lieutenant General Kyaw Min 13. Lieutenant General Maung Hla 14. Major General Soe Myint Signed- Than Shwe Senior General Chairman The State Peace and Development Council **************************************************** BURMANET: COMMENT ON THE NEW MILITARY REGIME (SPDC) November 16, 1997 On November 15, the SLORC was disolved and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) came into being. The same top four SLORC leaders are at the head of the SPDC: Than Shwe, Tin Oo, Maung Aye, and Khin Nyunt. Many analysts have suggested that this is merely "old wine in new bottles". In many ways, yes, but it may signal a shift in tactics although probably not overall strategy. One reason for forming a new government may have been so that the military leaders could distance themselves from the 1990 election issue. Before the 1990 election, the SLORC assured the people that it would transfer power to the winning party. After the SLORC-backed National Unity Party lost, the SLORC refused to hand over power to the NLD and insisted that a new constitution needed to be drafted first. Hounded by criticism for not having transferred power to the legitimate government, the military leaders may think that by changing the government, they can claim that they bear no responsibility for acting on the 1990 election results. The new regime's name, the State Peace and Development Council, is certainly more innocuous than "SLORC" was. The SLORC must have been tired of the negative press it had received for having such a fittingly odious name. The leaders clearly thought long and hard about what to call the regime. For instance, they have used "aye chan thaya ye" rather than "nyein chan ye" to mean "peace". "Nyein chan ye" implies an unstable situation to which peace is restored, and using this would remind the public of the fact that there is no real peace in Burma today. Instead, they have used ""ayechan thaya ye" which suggests peace and tranquility already exist and will be enhanced.by the regime. The decision to reorganize the government appears to have been made as a result of internal and external factors. Like the civilian population, the SLORC members themselves seemed to have felt that the situation could not continue as it had. Some change needed to be made to turn around the economy and the junta's image. At the same time, pressure from ASEAN governments may have influenced the SLORC, though what ASEAN seemed to be looking for was a government that appeared less brutal and could handle the economy more effectively. While the name of the regime sounds less evil, the SLORC did not put a civilian facade on the government as Burma watchers had predicted they might. Even such ministries as health, tourism,. amd trade are still being run by military men. Interestingly, the tension that existed in the SLORC between the Maung Aye/Tin Oo infantry faction and the Khin Nyunt military intelligence faction, has not been resolved in the new government. Most of the members of the SPDC, which consists of all the regional commanders, are more sympathetic to Tin Oo and Maung Aye. However, the Cabinet members are closer to Khin Nyunt. The advisory committee contains some of the more notably corrupt members of the SLORC, such as Tun Kyi and Kyaw Ba. Although they have been pushed aside into largely ceremonial roles, they could still play a role if they can form a power bloc with either of the other two factions. Nevertheless, Khin Nyunt appears to have the upper hand. For instance, Lt General Win Myint, who is the new Secretary 3, and therefore the fifth most powerful person in the SPDC, is close to Khin Nyunt. He was responsible for putting down the Karen uprising in the Irrawaddy Delta area in 1991 (extremely brutal, many civilians imprisoned and killed), and for dealing with the Rohingyas in the early 1990s. As the former commander of the 11th Battalion, he has played a key role, because the best troops from around the country are recruited into this battalion. Also close to Khin Nyunt is Tin Hla, the minister of the newly formed Ministry of Military Affairs. In 1988, he was the Commander of the 22nd Battalion, which was most responsible for crushing the pro-democracy movement in Rangoon. The 22nd Battalion is also considered to have been the most useful to the SLORC, and is highly favored by them. The Ministry of Military Affairs is a newly created Ministry. This ministry is not necessary but was probably established to appease Tin Hla, who is more senior than Win Myint, and theoretically should have become Secretary 3 instead of him. Because there is already a rivalry between the 11th and 22nd Battalions, there may well be jealousy between the two men. Other SPDC Cabinet members who are affiliated with Khin Nyunt include Major General Kyaw Than, who is the new Minister of Trade and Commerce, Major General Sein Htwa, the new Minister of Religious Affairs, and Major General Saw Lwin, the Minster of Hotels and Tourism. Because of his loyalty to Khin Nyunt, Brigadier General Win Tin has retained his his position as Minister of Finance and Revenue despite his inability to improve the economic situation in Burma. Likewise, Ohn Gyaw is still the foreign minister, even though he has not been able to convince the international community that the military junta has been working for the good of the country. The fact that Khin Nyunt has regained his power is important because he approaches the country's problems differently from Maung Aye and Tin Oo. While members of the SLORC and now the SPDC are united in their desire to maintain military control over the country, their tactics have differed. The Maung Aye/Tin Oo faction, whose power base comes from infantry commanders, has relied on the use of force to deal with the armed ethnic groups and the democratic opposition. Khin Nyunt, whose career has been in military intelligence, has favored using political tactics to divide and weaken the opposition. With regard to the ethnic groups, the Maung Aye/Tin Oo faction has sought to crush the armed opposition through brutal military campaigns. Meanwhile, Khin Nyunt has tried to convince the armed groups to sign ceasefires, and has used the promise of economic deals to entice resistance leaders. Once the ceasefires are signed, Khin Nyunt's men have tried to divide the leaders from their people by limiting the money that is distributed to the political organizations and their supporters, but giving generous gifts and business deals to individual leaders. As a result, the resistance leaders, who convinced their people that the ceasefire would bring benefits to everyone, have become distanced from their people, who see the leaders growing richer while they are as poor or poorer than ever. A similar difference can be discerned in how the two factions have dealt with the NLD and other pro-democracy activists inside Burma. The Tin Oo/Maung Aye faction has preferred physical aggression and intimidation. For instance, this faction is widely believed to have been behind the attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's car last year. Meanwhile, Khin Nyunt's faction has tried to weaken the NLD by dividing and exhausting them. For instance, when the SLORC came to Aung Shwe late one evening and told him he could meet with the SLORC the next day, Khin Nyunt was trying to drive a wedge in the NLD. If Aung Shwe didn't go meet with the SLORC it might look like the NLD was being uncooperative, but if he did go, he would be acting against party policy, which stated that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi must be present. Having no time to consult with other CEC members first, Aung Shwe risked polarizing other NLD members who might disagree with his decision, whichever way he decided. Likewise, allowing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to travel to meetings sometimes and then to block her at other times may be an attempt to wear her out and to make people bored with the NLD. The military junta and the NLD appear to be playing a cat and mouse game while the people's problems are not being resolved. Because the restrictions on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi are not absolute and she can move around somewhat, her situation does not attract much international media attention. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult for her or her party to carry out their work under these conditions. It is still too early to predict how extensive policy changes will be with the creation of the SPDC, but it is likely that the SPDC will try to marginalize their opposition (armed and unarmed) by using a combination of flattery, bribes, intimidation, and vacillating restrictions. Despite the size of its army and its control over the flow of information, the SPDC will find that the road ahead is not an easy one. With up to two thirds of the rice crop destroyed by floods, food shortages are likely in 1998. Meanwhile, many of the over 1 million Burmese migrant laborers working abroad will be coming home or at least remitting much less money, because of the economic downturn in Southeast Asia. Unless the SPDC can resolve the country's economic woes and initiate a genuine political dialogue with all the opposition groups, it will be viewed with as much disgust as its predecessor, the SLORC. ******************************************************** AP: BURMA CHANGES KEEPS GENERALS UNITED November 16, 1997, by Robert Horn BANGKOK, Thailand (AP) -- During Gen. Ne Win's decades-long rule of Burma, he had a simple method for periodically reorganizing his government: the purge. Whenever other generals became too powerful or popular, Ne Win jailed them or banished them to the borderlands. He retained power, but he also created enemies who either plotted against him or joined the democratic movement. The top four generals who rule Burma today are more clever than that. On Saturday, they dissolved the sinister-sounding SLORC, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which has ruled since September 1988, and replaced it with the State Peace and Development Council. Burmese democracy activists-in-exile said generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, Khin Nyunt and Tin Oo had done nothing more than give the government a more palatable name while furthering military rule. They did, however, manage to achieve more than that. In one sweep, they brought younger blood into the ruling body, broke up empires built by some of their rivals and essentially retired the old guard apparently without alienating them. The latter move could have created a rift in the government large enough to bring it down. The military leaders answer to no one and almost never explain their decisions to outsiders, but the changes appear to have been carried out in a way in which no one loses face or leaves embittered. Ne Win, who ruled from 1962 to 1988, rarely carried out a major change so smoothly. Life probably will be harder for the country's democratic movement, led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. By keeping most military officers relatively happy, it is less likely that the disgruntled among them will break ranks and push for democratic reforms. In moving former SLORC members into ceremonial posts on a 14-member advisory board, the leadership broke up a logjam in the upper echelons of the military that had denied younger officers upward mobility. The new makeup of the regime also consolidates power held by the top four, who are all in their 60s. Their new supporting cast is from the next generation. Most are in their early 50s, with a few in their 40s. With little known about the younger council members, it is unclear whether there might be any reformers among them, but it isn't likely. The generation gap gives the top four an added dimension of authority; age and seniority are important in Burmese culture. The new council members also are beholden for their new positions. The former SLORC members were contemporaries of the top four. Having held their positions for many years, several had built up virtual fiefdoms in the ministries they controlled. Stories of payoffs to SLORC members for business deals were common, and there were corruption investigations involving the SLORC forestry minister and commerce minister's underlings. Some corruption in Burma's military is unavoidable, as a general's salary is only about 3,500 kyats a month, or about $140 [sic, using the black-market exchange rate of 250 kyats per dollar, which the kyat has been at for several months now - although recent reports suggest it has risen at least as high as 280 kyats per dollar - this is only US$14 per month] on the widely-used black market exchange rate. But analysts said some SLORC members apparently had amassed enough wealth to displease the top four generals. In Ne Win's day, that would have been a one-way ticket to jail or some jungle outpost fighting guerrillas. Such humiliations and hardships turned some officers against him. The four generals have appeared more adept at ruling than Ne Win by maintaining military unity while at the same time overhauling their government. They also were able to sign cease-fire agreements to end ethnic insurgencies. But despite attempts to attract foreign investment, Burma's economy is deteriorating. Inflation is about 40 percent and the kyat is plummeting. The international community also is increasingly turning against the regime because of its repressive rule and alleged complicity in the drug trade. The top four generals have learned a few lessons, but it remains to be seen whether they are clever enough to deliver the ``peaceful and prosperous nation'' that they have promised the people of Burma. ---------------------------------- [related excerpts] SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST: JUNTA'S COSMETIC CHANGES 'MAY STRENGTHEN GRIP' November 17, 1997 William Barnes in Bangkok Ambitious scheming, gross corruption, a crashing economy and international disapproval - these may all have played a role in the Burmese military regime's surprise name change and reshuffle. "I suspect there are quite severe tensions within the military, but they've never appeared to disagree over their core belief - that they must never give up power," one Rangoon-based diplomat said yesterday. Observers are already saying it is no coincidence that the father of the Burmese military emerged from retirement to visit an old friend, Indonesian President Suharto, two months ago. ---------------------------------- REUTERS: BURMA'S MILITARY RULERS BRING IN A NEW FACES November 16, 1997 RANGOON, Nov 16 (Reuters) - One Western diplomat, who asked not to be named, said most SPDC members were new faces whose backgrounds were unknown. ``The trouble for all of us is many of the people coming in are new names. Nobody knows where they come from. It is very difficult to know what camps they belong to or how are they going to react when talking about improving dialogue with the NLD (the National League for Democracy),'' the diplomat said. ``This is clearly a major revamping of the government, a huge cabinet reshuffle,'' a foreign diplomat said. ``It probably relates to economic problems including worsening inflation and balance of payments,'' a diplomat said. Another diplomat said rampant corruption prompted the SLORC to improve its image. ``Growing economic problems have forced SLORC to look at themselves hard and say if there are any corrupt people, let's get them out...it may start with something like the corruption crackdown which may lead to something bigger and more positive.'' Analysts said it was no secret in Rangoon that foreign companies winning major government contracts had been asked to make hefty donations to public welfare organisations like the Karuna Foundation which opened remote rural health clinics run by the ministry of trade and commerce. Rangoon residents said Burma's inflation this year ran at about 40 percent although the government put the figure at only about 25 percent. *********************************************** OPPOSITION GROUPS REACT TO SLORC'S NEW IDENTITY [excerpts from statements by opposition groups in exile] NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA From: CCN November 16, 1997 Now that a chance has taken place, the SPDC has a good opportunity to rectify the sociopolitical and economic conditions in the country. The generals must prove that the chance is not in name only and show genuine interest in resolving the nation's ills. They would only be heading for trouble if by "disciplined democracy". The generals had a chance of becoming national heroes in 1988 when the people were looking to the military to take the lead toward delivering them the promised democracy. The opportunity is here again. A step in the right direction would be to initiate a dialogue without preconditions with the National League for Democracy led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The talks should be directed toward national reconciliation and an eventual return to democracy. ------------------------ ABSDF PRESS RELEASE: BURMA'S NEW RULING BODY A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING November 16, 1997 From: lurie@mozart.inet.co.th ABSDF spokesperson Aung Naing Oo says the top four generals in Burma have retained similar positions in the new organisation and that the change is one in name only. Since the military coup in 1962, Burma has only had a constitution from 1974 to 1988. Meanwhile over this 35 years, the military has changed the name of the country three times, changed the flag once, and has adopted four different names for its ruling body - the latest being the SPDC. "It is therefore not surprising that the military has once again made only cosmetic changes. At the same time, it is disturbing the military continues to look after itself, rather than tackle the severe economic problems facing the country and work towards solving the ongoing political crisis. ----------------------- STATEMENT OF ABSDO ON RULING JUNTA'S 'COSMETIC CHANGE' November 17, 1997 eyar@amaze.net.au We also believe that genuine peace and devalopment can not exist without meaningful dialouge with democratic forces. If they (SPDC-former SLORC) really want to solve the country's problem in the peaceful and democratic way, they must accept the meaningful dialouge which is proposed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and democratic forces rather than doing mere cosmetic changes. Central Excecutive Committee All Burma Students' Democratic Organisation, Australia -------------------- ABSL STATEMENT ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN THE BURMA. (November 15, 1997) From: shar@league.unv.ernet.in All Burma Students' League ...we consider the name of new of the new outfit, the Peace and Development Council, as meaning that they wish to restore peace in the country. Therefore, we the ABSL strongly urge the new military establishment of the SPDC; To stop military operation against resistance forces and declare unconditional cease-fire in the country, To recognise the verdict of the 1990 general elections, and to dialogue with Aung Sun Suu Kyi led democracy forces, And to release all the political prisoners in the country including student leader Min Ko Naing and Lower Ne Min immediately and unconditionally. ----------------------- ALTSEAN MEDIA RELEASE: A JUNTA BY ANY OTHER NAME WOULD STINK AS BAD (November 16, 1997) From: altsean@ksc.th.com Bangkok, Sunday: "It is unacceptable that Burma continues to be run by a military junta, regardless of it chooses to call itself. REAL change, not name change is what will help Burma out of its crises," said Altsean-Burma Coordinator Ms Debbie Stothard. "Changing the name of the country and then later, the name of the junta, won't make the crises go away. The peoples of Burma and the world are not so easily deluded. If they are serious about 'peace' and 'development', they need to dialogue with Ms Suu Kyi and the NLD and immediately stop the rampant human rights abuses," emphasised Ms Stothard. *************************************** KNU: REPORT ON NEW REFUGEES IN THAILAND From: November 16, 1997 (BurmaNet Editor's Note: The inhumane treatment of the Karen refugees described below is a result of Thai Army policy and was not ordered by the new civilian government led by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai. What is still not clear was whether the local units were acting alone or were ordered to push the Karen refugees back to the border by Thai Army Chief Chettha, who was in Rangoon meeting with General Maung Aye last week. Letters to the Thai government requesting that they investigate this matter would be appropriate.) A Thai officer came to No Poh refugee camp on 11/11/97 and ordered the camp leader to explain to the newly arrived refugees at Thay Pu Law Sue and Htee Saw Shee that they must move to the new site at Baw Ner Hta in three days. Baw Ner Hta is the site chosen by the Thai authorities. It is only ten minutes walk from a Burmese military post and is considered unsafe by the refugees. The Thai officer said that if the refugees do not move in this time, the Thai military would force them. On the 13th, a Thai officer came again to No Poh and ordered the refugees at Thay Pu Law Sue and Htee Saw Shee to move to the new site by 14/11/97. If they don't go, he said the Thai military would make them and that if someone is injured then the Thai military would not be responsible. The refugees at No Poh camp are not allowed to leave the camp. The new arrivals only have enough food for five days. Once that food is gone it is unsure if food authorities will allow food to be delivered to them from No Poh. The situation has now gone from bad to worse. At 0504 hours on 15/11/97, Thai soldiers entered Thay Pu Law Sue and began shooting in an attempt to force the refugees to move. One child was killed and three people were injured, including one seriously. The injured have not been allowed to go to the clinic at No Poh camp.There is no clinic in Thay Pu Law Sue and the medics do not have the necessary supplies for this situation. The Thai military promise to use force on the refugees has now come true. Karen National Union ****************************************** KNU: UPDATED REPORT ON THE THAY PU LAW SUE SITUATION From: November 16, 1997 An updated report concerning the Thay Pu Law Sue Situation The Thai commander Captain Tho Wee and Lieutenant Narohchar, led their company to the Thay Pu Law Sue refugee area on November 15. The Thai soldiers arrived there in the early morning hours where over one thousand Karen refugees were sleeping. The refugees had initially refused to move to Baw Ner Hta when they were ordered on November 11. The Thai soldiers ordered the refugees to move by November 14. The refugees continued to stay in Thay Pu Law Sue out of fear since the new relocation site is only a ten minute walk from a Slorc army post. The Thai soldiers proceeded to rudely awaken the Karen refugees, the refugees state that they were awoken by kicks, punches and beatings by the Thai soldiers. The soldiers then divided the large number of refugees into three groups, the reason for this is unclear. Some Thai soldiers burnt down the temporary structures protecting the refugees. After the refugees were divided, the Thai soldiers opened fire, shooting their weapons for five minutes. Their aim was not to kill, but to threaten the refugees into moving to Baw Ner Hta. At the sound of gun fire, panic spread through the crowd quickly. These refugees had recently fled fighting in Burma, they had sought safety in Thailand, and now the Thai soldiers were firing their weapons. Fear caused the crowd to run in every direction. One three day old infant was killed after it was knocked out the mother's arms. In the raw panic of the crowd, the child was mortally injured by the crowd's stampede. The previous report mentioned three injured refugees, however, that number is growing. One previously mentioned injury, a forty-five year old man who was shot in the abdomen, died today, November 16. There is doubt whether he received any treatment at all. During the forced move to Baw Ner Hta, some refugees were able to run away to the jungle. Upon arrival to Baw Ner Hta, the Thai soldiers allowed some Karen refugees and some AMI Karen medics to return to No Po. The purpose of this action is unclear. Karen National Union **************************************** BKK POST: KARENS SEEK PEACE TALKS THROUGH PM November 15, 1997 Supamart Kasem TAK --A Karen rebel leader has appealed to Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai to persuade the Burmese military regime to hold talks with Burma's pro-democracy and minority rebel groups. General Bo Mya, president of the Karen National Union, made the appeal on Thursday in an open letter to Mr Chuan congratulating him on his appointment as prime minister. The Karen leader, who is also chairman of the National Council of the Union of Burma, an umbrella organisation for dissident groups, also asked Mr Chuan to help push for negotiations between the military junta and Burma's pro-democracy and minority groups so as to bring peace to Burma. There had been no progress after several rounds of talks between the regime and the KNU. A source in the Democratic Alliance of Burma, an alliance of dissident groups, said yesterday he agreed with a pact signed recently by dissident groups. The agreement supports talks between the junta and Burmese prodemocracy groups led by Aung San Suu Kyi and minority rebel groups. ********************************************** AP-DOW JONES: BURMA'S SUU KYI IN 11-HOUR STANDOFF WITH POLICE November 14, 1997 [slightly abridged] RANGOON (AP-Dow Jones)--An 11-hour standoff between riot police and Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi didn't deter the vice chairman of her political party from vowing Friday the democrats would continue their attempts to meet supporters. 'Despite all these restrictions we are determined to proceed with the organizational work of the party,' said Tin Oo of the National League for Democracy. The military government blocked Suu Kyi from leaving her home Thursday for the second time in two weeks. The police surrounded a car carrying Suu Kyi and three members of her party as it left her lakeside compound about 8:30a.m. heading for their Hlaing township party office in Rangoon. Traffic police, riot police and women police officers encircled Suu Kyi's sedan and threw up barbed wire barricades and spiked saw horses Thursday morning. Hearing of the standoff,about a hundred NLD members gathered at the party's main office on nearby Shwegondine Road to await news of the outcome. Suu Kyi remained in her car with the windows rolled up, snacking on bread, biscuits and milk as the women police officers pulled out chairs around midday after standing for hours in the hot sun. At about 7 p.m. the government cut off the electricity to the nearby NLD office and the hundred or so supporters dispersed. Police then removed the barriers and Suu Kyi drove to Tin Oo's home, without the car full of military intelligence officers that usually accompanies her. ***************************************************** U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT: BRIEFING ON BURMA November 14, 1997 BURMA -- The spokesman read a statement concerning reports that the military regime running Burma, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) erected barbed wire barricades that blockaded Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi's automobile outside her compound for more than ten hours to keep her from attending a meeting of the National League for Democracy (NLD) opposition party. The statement called this action "the latest in a long line of repressive measures taken by SLORC in an attempt to marginalize the NLD, a legal political party which won overwhelming support in the 1990 elections." It urged the Burmese military authorities to allow NLD activities to be held peacefully, without intervention. "The United States," said the statement, "renews its call for a meaningful political dialogue between the Burmese authorities and the democratic opposition leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi and representatives of the ethnic groups as the only path to a solution to Burma's political crisis." **************************************** AP-DOW JONES: U.S. ARCO TO SELL 29%-39% IN BURMA GAS BLOCKS BY END-1997 13 November 1997 SINGAPORE -- U.S. oil and gas company Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARC) expects to reach an agreement by the end of 1997 to sell a 29%-39% stake in the two exploration blocks offshore Burma, also known as Myanmar, an Arco official close to the project told Dow Jones Friday. 'We have been looking for an additional partner for the project all along,' and the sale would not be in response to political pressure from the U.S. government, the official said. Los Angeles-based Arco plans to retain at least a 55% stake in the blocks and remain operator, he said. However, the official said Arco is prevented from taking stakes in new projects in Burma by trade sanctions the U.S. imposed in May this year on the country. Arco acts as operator and currently holds a 94% stake in offshore blocks M7 and M9 in Burmese waters of the Andaman Sea. China's state-owned Chinese National Offshore Oil Co. holds the remaining 6% stake. Arco has spent about $55 million on the Burma project so far, drilling two exploration wells on block M9. One of the wells tested natural gas at a rate of 25 million cubic feet a day, but it's too soon to say whether the discovery is commercially viable, the Arco official said. The company plans to conduct two-dimensional and three-dimensional seismic evaluation of the discovery before drilling another well in block M9 during the fourth quarter of 1998, the official added. Blocks M7 and M9 lie east of the Yadana natural gas field in blocks M5 and M6. The Yadana field, operated by Total SA (F.TTL) of France, has estimated recoverable gas reserves of 5 trillion cubic feet. Total and its project partners plan to begin production of Yadana field in July 1998, transporting the gas via pipeline to the Burmese coast and on to Thailand under a long-term sales contract. The Arco official said it's too early to say whether its discovery could be tied in to the Yadana gas pipeline. **************************************************