------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------ "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ---------------------------------------------------------- The BurmaNet News: November 24, 1997 Issue #875 HEADLINES: ========== BURMANET: WHITHER SPDC? DPNS: INSIDE NEWS REUTERS: BURMA'S RULERS SAY BUILDING A MODERN NATION AP: INFLUENTIAL BURMESE OFFICER DEFENDS MILITARY WASHINGTON POST: SPIN CONTROL FOR DICTATORS ASIAWEEK: CHANGING OF THE GUARD BBC: VIEWS ON RECENT POLITICAL CHANGES IN BURMA NCGUB: A CHANCE FOR THE GENERALS TO REDEEM THEMSELVES ABSDF: OPINION ON THE CURRENT REGIME CHANGES DAB: STATEMENT ON THE MERE CHANGE OF NAME FROM SLORC TO SPDC PLF: STATEMENT REGARDING THE NAME-CHANGE OF SLORC TO SPDC SPDC INFORMATION SHEET No.A-0220(I) ---------------------------------------------------------- BURMANET: WHITHER SPDC? November 24, 1997 A week and a half has passed since the formation of the SPDC, and no policies have been announced. What has been happening instead is that some of the more visibly corrupt senior generals have been called in for interrogations, and some of their family members and staff have been arrested. The more powerful members of the junta are using the excuse of corruption to purge their rivals, and are hoping to improve their tarnished image at the same time. Now the power struggles in the military have become more clear, and the younger regional commanders and zone commanders in the SPDC will be watching closely to see who's star is rising, and therefore with whom they should align themselves. The debate continues as to who really has the upper hand: Maung Aye or Khin Nyunt. Since 1962, no military intelligence chief has been able to achieve absolute control. Will Khin Nyunt be the exception? Clearly he has tried to make himself invaluable, and even though he does not have authority over troops, he is the chairman of almost every important national committee (health, education, etc) and he has intelligence information on all the regional commands. According to reports, he has stopped drinking and he gives the appearance of leading a modest lifestyle in comparison to the likes of Tun Kyi and Kyaw Ba. Known as a tireless worker, every night, he is featured on television visiting schools, hospitals, and lately, satellite towns (following in Aung San Suu Kyi's footsteps? - recently she attempted several meetings with NLD offices in satellite towns, where the residents are generally extremely poor and many cannot find jobs) . Burma today is not the same place it was in 1962. As the country moves toward greater integration into regional and international political and economic groupings, military control on the ground is not enough. Foreign policies, economic policies that can satisfy foreign investors, and development policies must be crafted and implemented. Khin Nyunt seems to be able to handle the changed environment better than the other military generals, and therefore perhaps can't be dispensed with. However, he is not liked by many who have risen through the infantry, and the changes that have taken place seem, at this point, to have only exacerbated rather than resolved the conflicts within the military. ************************************************************** DPNS: INSIDE NEWS November 24, 1997 From: mingla@cm-sun.cm.ksc.co.th (note: English slightly corrected by BurmaNet) - It is learnt that, at the gate of two monastries in Mandalay (Ma-Soe-Yein Tide-thit and Ma-Soe-Yein Tide-hong), authorities have set up check-points for each, and monks at these two compounds must get permission from the authorities to go out from their compounds. If monks are invited to come for meals by people in their houses, they must also get permission and give details about the people who invited them. - The authorities have not issued application forms for the Sanghas' (monks) exams to every monastery but only to a few selected monasteries. Especially, no monastery in Pegu township was given application forms . A group of six monks must fill out the application form together. If one of the monks does not meet the conditions set by the authorities, none of the 6 monks on the same application form will be allowed to enter this exam, said a reliable source. - On (23-11-97), at a dinner party held for the 33rd anniversary of the founding of Institute of Economics, Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt admitted that the reason the 1988 uprising occured was because of the country's economic crisis and the difficult conditions for people's survival. Politics is always connected with the economic situation in a country so the current economic crisis may lead to political unstablity in Burma, said Secretary (1) of the SPDC. ************************************************************ REUTERS: BURMA'S RULERS SAY BUILDING A MODERN NATION November 22, 1997 (abridged) RANGOON, Nov 22 (Reuters) - Burma's new ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) said its formation presented an opportunity to build a modern and peaceful nation based on disciplined democracy, state newspapers reported on Saturday. State media said on Saturday that former SLORC intelligence chief and now SPDC Secretary One Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt told government workers at Phaaggyi 100 Km (60 miles) north of Rangoon on Friday that they should work with ``new conviction'' to help the SPDC build a modern, peaceful nation built on ``disciplined democracy.'' ``Now is the time for the entire people to work with all seriousness and enthusiasm for peace and development of the nation,'' he said. ``As demanded by the time and situation, the State Peace and Development Council was formed to work with added momentum in the interests of the entire people and for the emergence of a peaceful, modern and developed nation,'' he said. In the first comments about the SLORC by an SPDC leader since the changes were announced, Khin Nyunt said the SLORC, which was abolished when the new ruling body was formed, had helped save the nation from disintegration, the papers said. ***************************************** AP: INFLUENTIAL BURMESE OFFICER DEFENDS MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS November 19, 1997 Rangoon: A high-ranking officer in Burma's influential military intelligence agency said Wednesday that the armed forces' role is not only to defend the country but also to serve national development. At a symposium, Col. Thein Swe said the military ''made every effort to develop its human resources and assist in nation building.'' Thein Swe, who serves with the military's office of strategic studies, also said the military was ''utilizing its defense budget appropriations to reap the most benefit for the country as a whole.'' (section cut) (S)ince 1988 pro-democracy uprisings, the government has been under strong international pressure to justify its role in politics, if not give it up. Many observers believe it will try to adopt the model of Indonesia, where the military's role in national development is institutionalized by the country's constitution. ''Human resources development is of special importance in the area of defense, which will transform the armed forces into an organization that will be able to contribute know-how and other forms of assistance for the crucial task of nation building,'' Thein Swe said Wednesday. He explained in detail the infrastructure projects that the armed forces had undertaken and the sacrifices the armed forces had made to combat narcotic drugs. Thein Swe also said that with high-tech advances in weaponry, it is vital to raise the capability and efficiency of the armed forces. In today's world, he said, there were advocates of the view that ''maintaining a standing armed force in peacetime is an unjustifiable expense'' so it was necessary to shrink the armed forces and cut defense expenditures. But in Burma, he said, the armed forces not only take sole responsibility for defense, but also have been ''structured as a productive establishment and rendered services to the country.'' ******************************************************** WASHINGTON POST: SPIN CONTROL FOR DICTATORS November 22, 1997 DICTATORSHIPS WITH image problems -- and what other kind is there these days? -- generally have two choices. They can permit genuine reform and risk losing their grip on power, or they can make cosmetic changes and hope to get credit for them overseas. All things being equal, tyrants tend to find the second alternative more appealing. Only internal and international pressure can force them toward the first. Take Burma, also known as Myanmar, where as unsavory a regime as you can find holds sway. Until this week, its military junta was known by the appropriately repellent acronym SLORC, for State Law and Order Restoration Council. Now the 21-member SLORC has been replaced by a 19-member State Peace and Development Council; no doubt the Burmese generals paid some image-shop handsomely for this brilliant move. But while some SLORC generals have been replaced, the same four hard-liners remain atop the government, and there's no apparent change in policy. Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace laureate and (according to a nullified 1990 election) rightful leader of Burma, remains under virtual house arrest, and many of her supporters are still in jail. The Burmese generals are seeking to spruce up their reputation because international sanctions against them are beginning to bite; the economy in this nation of 45 million people is deteriorating. Now potential investors should maintain the pressure until the junta changes in more than name only. An appropriate first step would be to begin a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi. Cambodian dictator Hun Sen, who took over in a coup last July, offers a second case. Hun Sen has promised to hold elections next May: The question is whether he will hold a sham poll or truly allow people to express their will. Again, international pressure is key; Cambodia depends on outsiders for half of its budget. The United States, Japan, Cambodia's neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and others are pushing for the safe return of opposition politicians, for a truly independent election commission and for other measures that could ensure a free and fair election. Their pressure seems to be moving Hun Sen and his regime slowly in the right direction, but nothing is sure yet. When President Clinton, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and other Asian leaders meet at a forthcoming Vancouver summit, they should make clear to the dictators of both Burma and Cambodia that reform isn't a matter of spin control. *************************************************** ASIAWEEK: CHANGING OF THE GUARD November 28, 1997 (abridged) By Jose Manuel Tesord and Dominic Faulder Bangkok SLORC fixes its name - and purges some faces Be still. Crouch. Be pressed down. Be flattened. If one translates each of the words that make up the phrase "law and order" in Burmese, these are what you get. Little wonder the name "State Law and Order Restoration Council," which the military junta that has ruled Myanmar since late 1988 calls itself, has evoked such widespread dislike. But as of Nov. 15, SLORC is no more. Its replacement is the sweeter sounding "State Peace and Development Council." That is not the only change. The same day Senior Gen. Than Shwe, SLORC's chairman, announced the dissolution of the 21-member council, the government released the names of those in the new 19-man SPDC. Most are major and brigadier-generals, more junior than the old soldiers who made up the now defunct SLORC. And gone are a number of controversial personalities. Among those who survived is Brig. Gen. Win Tin, minister of finance. This even though the free-market value of the country's currency, the kyat, has almost halved in the past year and inflation is unofficially at about 40%. The departure of Myo Nyunt has many observers scratching their heads. Of humble origin and proud of his poor education, Myo Nyunt also chairs the National Convention, the body created by SLORC to draft Myanmar's third Constitution. Leading dissident Aung San Suu Kyi has often criticized the body as being no more than a forum for reading papers. Myo Nyunt expelled her National League for Democracy representatives from the Convention in 1995. His manifest lack of formal education has invited cynicism about the Junta's sincerity in drafting a meaningful document. His removal has raised questions over whether he will continue as the Convention's chairman. In place of the aged generals are a number of younger commanders. Tin Hla, head of the new Ministry of Military Affairs, and Kyaw Than, who took over trade, are both believed to be close to the relatively moderate Khin Nyunt, whose position may now be stronger. Khin Nyunt recently invited League members for talks that excluded Suu Kyi. Criticism of her continues in government media. If there is one thing the SPDC is likely to inherit from SLORC, it is the military's determination to cling to power. ***************************************************** BBC: VIEWS ON RECENT POLITICAL CHANGES IN BURMA November 19, 1997 Commentary by Larry Jagan The State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] has been dissolved in Burma and the State Peace and Development Council [SPDC] has been formed. The SLORC had ruled Burma since the 1988 events. Burmese newspapers have announced the names of new members of the cabinet and the SPDC includes four former members of the SLORC. Power in Burma is seen to remain concentrated in the hands of few generals. Although Sr. Gen. Than Shwe formed the SPDC with himself as the head, day-to-day work and decisions are handled by Gen. Maung Aye, commander in chief of the Army and Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, intelligence chief. The two other generals--Lt. Gen. Win Myint and Lt. Gen. Tin Hla--are expected to closely oversee the implementation of decisions. Only four top generals have retained their posts in the newly formed council. Other members of the council are regional commanders. They continue to hold their positions as commanders and are expected to come down to Rangoon regularly for quarterly meetings. Political analysts believe the recent changes are aimed at strengthening the participation of the Defense Services in politics, with the power remaining in the hands of the five top generals. Some members of the SLORC cabinet were shoved aside or lost their power by being included in the Advisory Group. The new government's system of operations has already come into force throughout the country with the formation of the peace and development councils at divisional, state, township, and wards. The major cabinet reshuffle includes new ministers. Leaders of the Union Solidarity and Development Association [USDA] formed by the military govenrment are included in the cabinet. Observers believe this is expected to ensure an increased role for USDA in future politics of Burma. While the military leaders claimed that the changes are aimed at ensuring the emergence of an orderly democratic system, diplomatic circles in Rangoon believe there is very little hope for the prospect of sudden change. The changes are aimed at making the leadership of the military government more effective and corruption disappear. The most important point is to boost the prestige of the Defense Services. The Burmese Government has recently contacted an American public relations firm which had once advised the Beijing government on its international image. Many political observes note that the new changes were ordered by former Burmese leader, Gen. Ne Win, soon after his trip to Indonesia. They claimed that Gen. Ne Win was believed to have discussed Burma's problems during his trip. The observers believe that the SPDC was formed before the regional commanders were summoned to Rangoon--just like when SLORC was formed. ************************************************************ NCGUB: A CHANCE FOR THE GENERALS TO REDEEM THEMSELVES November 16, 1997 From: NYUNTPAUNG A-SO-YA The abolishment of the notorious State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was long over due. It was an entity synonymous with mass murder, brutality and repression, and it was formed for the sole purpose of perpetuating military rule. It should never have been there in the first place. The replacement ruling body, State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), made up of four senior SLORC members and a new crop of generals, has declared that its objective was to bring "disciplined democracy" and "peaceful development" to the people of Burma. The change, which came after several months of investigation into the corrupt practices and scandalous deals of the SLORC generals, only confirms what we have known all along - that the generals are divided and only their survival instinct is holding them together. Now that a change has taken place, the SPDC has a good opportunity to rectify the sociopolitical and economic conditions in the country. The generals must prove that the change is not in name only and show genuine interest in resolving the nation's ills. They would only be heading for trouble if by "disciplined democracy" they mean, "guided democracy." The generals had a chance of becoming national heroes in 1988 when the people were looking to the military to take the lead toward delivering them the promised democracy. The opportunity is here again. A step in the right direction would be to initiate a dialogue without preconditions with the National League for Democracy led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The talks should be directed toward national reconciliation and an eventual return to democracy. Without taking into account the NLD, a party chosen by the people to lead them, and without a sincere intention to build a democratic nation, where rights of all the ethnic nationalities are guaranteed, the country will continue to encounter the problems it faces today. Under the conditions today, peace and development will remain unattainable even if the generals call themselves the State Peace and Development Council. ***************************************************** ABSDF: OPINION ON THE CURRENT REGIME CHANGES (WRITTEN BY MOE THEE ZUN) November 24, 1997 From: lurie@mozart.inet.co.th The SLORC started restructuring itself into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on November 15,1997, announcing a series of notifications: No. 1/97, 2/97, 3/97. Burma watchers have offered different opinions about what the changes really mean. In fact, the military always makes superficial changes whenever it faces a political crisis. Over the past 35 years, the military junta has changed the name of country three times, changed the constitution twice and has adopted four different names for its ruling body - the latest being the SPDC. Now the military junta has again changed its name and changed some positions, but there has been no move toward the much-needed democratisation process. Also, the military junta could not yet come up with an appropriate strategy in the areas of politics, economics, social welfare and education. As there has yet been no clear policy explanation in the notifications, the junta does not seem to have considered or even recognized the current demanding issues in Burma; in particular, national reconciliation, democracy, human rights, and tri-partite dialogue. As the change is only one in name, the transformation from the SLORC to the SPDC should be considered as the same as the previous change from the BSPP to the SLORC. Like the Burmese saying, no matter how many times a snake sloughs off its skin, it is still the same (poisonous). Moreover, the change did not come about as the result of a legal process and the SPDC has no more legitimacy than the SLORC did. Therefore, we are not pleased with the latest transformation. Why did the SLORC change? ----------------------------------- It is necessary to question why the SLORC changed its name to the SPDC. The junta has been facing a serious crisis and the possibility of a general uprising. There are three main reasons for the change, namely: 1. Economic crisis in the country 2. Discrepancy among the military factions. 3. International pressure Obviously, the current economic woes have an impact even on the military itself as well as the general public. Prices of basic necessary foodstuffs such as rice, cooking oil, chili, onion, garlic, beans, etc... are skyrocketing. Also the price of meat, including chicken, beef, pork has also increased incredibly up to round about 500- 600 kyats per viss (1.53 Kg). One viss of prawns is now 3000 kyats. Shortages of petrol and electricity in the country have resulted in rising petrol prices. For example, a gallon of gasoline now costs 180 kyat in Rangoon and Mandalay, and it is not available as necessary in the rest of the country. A normal truck can get only two gallons of petrol a week. Consequently the transportation of commodities from one place to another has decreased. The monthly salary of government employees is 1500 kyat per month maximum. Every month, they have to repay 500 kyats for the government loans which they were forced to take last year. Also, 200 kyat is cut for rice rations. Moreover, other taxes are deducted for so many reasons such as social welfare, electricity, water supply, house rental, fire brigade, entertainment, religious ceremonies, horse parades and boat racing ceremonies, and finally they are usually left with only 6-7 kyats in hand. They have no money for health care and education for their children, and they are hardly surviving with rice in the amount of 200 kyat. Unfortunately, the widespread destruction of rice fields following the recent floods in Mon State, Irrawaddy division, Arakan State, Karen State and Pegu division will lead to the shortage of food in the very near future. The problem of currency inflation is also getting much worse, and it is because of the military's unlimited printing of kyat notes, laundering money from the drug trade, and the uncontrollable circulation of counterfeit kyats. One dollar is now equivalent to almost 300 kyat and the kyat is expected to drop even further in the future. Because of the serious instability of the Kyat, business people have lost faith in it. As a result, the prices of land, housing, and gold have risen dramatically. For example, the price of land in Golden Valley in Rangoon is almost as high as became almost similar to that of Mac Helton in US. Rental charges for opening offices are now US $ 1000 to 2000 per room. As the 1996 Visit Myanmar Year campaign failed, hotels are left with many empty rooms. In one recent check at the Traders Hotel, only 10 rooms out of 400 were occupied. There were only a few visitors at the Novotel as well. Two months ago, 500 employees, including nine foreigners, from the hotel business were let go. The unemployment rate has increased and almost one million Burmese workers have crossed into Thailand to find jobs. Universities have been shut down for one year already, causing the anti-government sentiments of the students to grow more and more. At the same time, the monks' anger toward the government has also grown because the monks' examinations have been postponed since April 1997, many monks continue to be detained in prisons, and the military's theft of precious stones from the abdomen of the Mahamyatmuni Buddha image in Mandalay. And these issues are causing resentment to build not only amonng the general public but also within in the military itself. With the peoples' anger at the military elites growing, general strikes could take place at any time for any reason. Secondly, rivalries among different military factions are also becoming more obvious. It is mainly because of the corruption and unequal opportunities for personal profit, particularly among the Military Intelligence Units, Army, Navy and Air Force at different levels. At the same time, there have been long-standing power struggles between the OTS (Officer Training School) and the DSA (Defense Service Academy) batches in the military. These conditions are likely to lead to the collapse of the junta. Three major factions can be clearly identified in the military since a long time ago. These are the Kyaw Ba-Tun Kyi-Myint Aung faction, the Maung Aye-Tin Oo faction and Khin Nyunt's intelligence faction. As usual, in the military history of factional politics, two factions always become allied to beat the other one. Here again, the Maung Aye- Tin Oo faction and the Khin Nyunt faction made a temporary alliance in order to defeat the Kyaw Ba- Tun Kyi- Myint Aung faction. There have been reports that the corrupted Lt. Generals faction (Kyaw Ba et al.) have recently faced interrogation by other members of the SPDC. In reality the issue of corruption was just an excuse to remove them from power, and this should be seen as the result of a power struggle among the military factions. Later, it is likely that a power struggle will emerge between Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt's groups. Thirdly, international pressure has been mounting. SLORC generals become depressed when the US imposed economic sanctions on the junta. It is still impossible for the junta to improve their bad image for their appalling human rights abuses, their involvement in the drug trade and their money laundering activities. ASEAN governments and other governments which are friendly to the junta such as Japan and other potential business partners have been really worrying about the junta's worsening image and its instability. They have been quietly suggesting that the junta make some superficial changes so that it looks more respectable. Moreover, it is also obvious that U Ne Win played an important role in this restructuring as it happened just after his trip to Indonesia and Singapore. The general scenario of the country is much worse than the situation was in 1988. The junta also realises that the current bad situation is likely to lead to a general strike. Therefore, the junta has made some preparations in case there is a mass movement, in particular, the emptying of Insein prison by transferring prisoners to other prisons in order to arrest more activists and even some critics in the military itself. My opinion on the current change ---------------------------------------- The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) ------------------------------------------------------------ (1)Rivalaries among the different military factions have become more intense than ever before. In this current change, the Maung Aye- Tin Oo faction got the upper hand over the Khin Nyunt faction. Most of the new faces in the SPDC, in particular Khin Maung Than, Sit Maung, Ye Myint and Kyaw Win are Maung Aye's absolute followers while the remaining members will not dare to oppose him. But, both factions seem to share the same negative opinion about the democracy movement. In fact, the only issue which at times unites and at times divides them is their own personal interest. 2. The SPDC is primarily a policy-making body, and it has much more power than the other two branches: the Cabinet and the Advisory Board. Basically, the SPDC consists of two main groups, the four old top brass and the other 15 new faces who do not have much experience yet. Than Shwe appears to have a symbolic post but no power. He is getting old and is not in good health. Now 67 years old, he should retire, but the problem is that if Than Shwe retires, Maung Aye who has the same seniority as many other generals_ in particular, Kyaw Ba, Maung Hla, Ket Sein, Hla Myint Swe and Tun Kyi who are still in the military_ would have to replace him. Maung Aye doesn't want to replace Than Shwe until he can put his own supporter in his current position. Maung Aye handled this move cleverly by kicking his rivals out of influential roles through sending them to the newly formed advisory board and cabinet posts. At the same time, he brought in new faces and also young regional commanders to take over economically profitable and influential posts in the SPDC. Overall, what we can say is that Maung Aye now has relatively more power than his rivals. But, as the new faces are not very experienced, the new body will be not do much work and will not last long. This new formation cannot last long and we expect there will be more changes soon. 3. Regarding the rivalries between the factions of Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt, Maung Aye's group has been getting the upper hand but still cannot not absolutely beat Khin Nyunt's faction. Tension between the factions and more private dissention are likely in the days ahead. There will be conflicts between the three different branches and problems because of differences in seniority. 4. One unusual feature of this new structure is two newly-created posts, Secretary 3, and the minister for Military Affairs. Previously Tin Hla was supposed to be promoted to Secretary 3, but it didn't happen. Now, Win Myint has been appointed as Secretary 3 instead. So, another new post had to be created for Tin Hla so he wouldn't be disappointed. Win Myint was previously the quartermaster general and before that the Western divisional commander, an unpopular post because there are few opportunities for financial gain in the western region. (The military junta usually appoints less capable individuals to this post.) Cabinet ------- It is comprised of 40 members in 40 ministerial posts. Than Shwe is still in the prime minister's post together with two deputy prime ministers, Maung Maung Khin (Air force) and Tin Htun (Navy). The Navy and Air Force have never had any real influence or power in the history of dictatorial rule in Burma. It merely looks like the power of the Navy, Air Force and Army are somewhat balanced in this structure. The Cabinet members have much more experience than most of the SPDC members. Almost all of the Lt. Generals who were in Ministerial posts under the SLORC have been transferred to the powerless advisory board. 29 out of the 40 are old men while only 11 are new to the ministerial structure. The formation looks inflated as some posts are really not needed but just created for the appearance of power sharing, for example the newly created military affairs ministry. Tin Hla, the minister for military affairs, was once a former 22nd division commander, and is a hardliner and one of Maung Aye's men. The minister of cooperatives, U Than Aung (a former Lt. Col. and also a Maung Aye man), is almost as corrupt as Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba and Myint Aung and is still in the same ministerial post. The railway minister, U Win Sein (former Lt. Col), who is considered as having one of the most hardline policies against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is also still left in the same ministerial post (U Win Sein even told a SLORC meeting this year that DASSK should be sentenced with the death penalty). These two examples show that the newly formed SPDC might not change its policy on Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratic forces, and that those with good support from above are not removed, regardless of their activities and policies. Advisory board ------------------ This board is very unusual, and the military has never created this kind of advisory board before. One thing for sure is that this board was created for the Lt Generals; in particular, Kyaw Ba, Phone Myint, Myint Aung, Tun Kyi. They will have no power to influence the newly formed SPDC. Will the SPDC resolve the current political problems or is it committed to launch a real change? The debate on whether the transformation of the SLORC to the SPDC will lead to a real change or not will, in fact, be proven very soon through the means it uses to tackle the current political problems. -How will they deal with the national convention? - Will they try to solve the underlying political problems following the agreements on mere ceasefires with the armed ethnic groups? -What will be the SPDC opinion on the KNU and the KNPP? -What will be their opinion on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi? -What kind of relationship will the SPDC have with Ne Win, the person who is most responsible for human rights violations in Burma? (Because the relationship between the SLORC and Ne Win was very close.) In conclusion, the new structure was formed not to resolve the country's current political problems but just to resolve the military's own internal conflicts. Maung Aye's group has gotten the upper hand over Khin Nyunt. Their aim is also to fool the people of Burma and the international community that some changes are being made to handle the current political and economic woes. They will probably issue an amnesty and start releasing some political prisoners who have already finished their prison terms. They will announce that they do not recognise the results of the 1990 general election, which was held under the SLORC. They will put more pressure on the ceasefire groups in many ways, including military pressure. They may launch a military offensive against the United Wa State Party (UWSP) and some other ethnic groups under the pretext of an anti-drug campaign. Our campaign against the SPDC -------------------------------------- Instead of taking a wait-and-see approach toward the SPDC, we should do the following campaigns. 1. Pressure the SPDC for tri-partite dialogue by public mobilisation and international campaigns 2. Follow up on the US sanctions on Burma by organising other potential countries such as Japan, Australia, ASEAN and EU countries. 3. Convince the Thai government, military, National Security Council, Thai opposition parties, and Thai activists to support the democratisation process in Burma. 4. Start a campaign against the SPDC members at the international level because of their involvement in the drug trade, money laundering and human rights violations. (For example- ban on visa, raising the issues in an international court of justice) Finally, as the SPDC cannot resolve the current political and economic crisis, the people may well take to the streets again like in 1988. As a result of this general strike, the SPDC will be terminated and discarded like previous military led organisations. Anyway, I do believe that the latest military-led body, the SPDC, will be the last one, and will be a stepping stone toward a democratic future. Let's bravely move forward and achieve victory. ******************************************************* DAB: STATEMENT ON THE MERE CHANGE OF NAME FROM SLORC TO SPDC November 21, 1997 (Democratic Alliance of Burma) From: PLF The SLORC, which was always just another name for the old BSPP dictatorship, has now changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on November 15, 1997. Since 1962, there have been so many empty name changes and promises made by the regime, but the essence of the dictatorship has remained unchanged. In 1962, when Ne Win seized power from U Nu's civilian government, he called his regime the Revolutionary Council. This Council pretended to hold "peace talks," then changed its name to the Burmese Socialist Program Party; it then held a so-called "referendum" and set up a "parliament." All these fine-sounding terms were simply cloaking the fact that the regime was entrenching itself firmly in power. The SLORC's attempt to legitimize itself with its name change after nine years in power, is in fact depressingly similar to the BSPP's "referendum" in 1973, ten years after the military coup that brought Ne Win to power. The referendum was simply a charade rigged to prove that people throughout the country supported BSPP rule. The DAB believes that the SLORC is seeking by its latest name change simply to divert the attention of the peoples of Burma and the international community, and to mend the rifts and rivalry within the SLORC inner clique. If the SLORC and the SPDC were really different in essence, the SPDC should have declared a new policy. The people of Burma, with their long and painful experience under dictatorial military rule, have no more trust in the military rulers. The fundamental cause of this distrust is that the military rulers are not the elected representatives of the people. If the SPDC was really sincere in wanting to unify the peoples of Burma and ensure the country's stability, it should be seeking to solve the political problems of Burma by political means. If, according to its name, the SPDC really aims to promote peace and development of the state, they should abandon their tactics of solving political problems by means of force. Moreover, the SPDC should immediately allow freedom of the press, freedom of movement and association, and allow a multi-party system so that people can develop their political consciousness. Only this will lead to the genuine development of the nation. The ruling elite of the army should realise that their days of using force to control the people and exploiting the country's wealth for their own benefit are numbered. It is time for them to start working for the betterment of the people as well as the nation. Unjust tactics, pretence, and the granting of favours to particular groups or individuals are not the proper means to solve the prevailing political problems. Instead, the military leaders are simply sowing the seeds of further discord. We demand that the SPDC take the following actions immediately: 1. Establish a genuine multi-party system. 2. Release all political prisoners. 3. Stop the sham national convention. 4. Hold a tripartite dialogue in order to achieve national reconcilitation. 5. Allow freedom of the press and freedom of association. Only if the mistakes of the BSPP and SLORC are not repeated, will Burma be able to enjoy peace prosperity and stability. Work for the people. Democracy is the basic means for development. Central Excutive Committee, DAB 18. November. 1997. ******************************************************* PLF: STATEMENT REGARDING THE NAME-CHANGE OF SLORC TO SPDC November 22, 1997 (The People's Liberation Front is an armed group fighting against the SLORC in Eastern Burma) SLORC changed their name to SPDC, the State Peace and Development Council, on 15 November 1997. This is a clear attempt to distance themselves from the wrongdoings they have committed under the name of SLORC. However, it is obvious that the military regime in Burma has undergone no fundamental change. It is just another to attempt to trick the people of Burma and the world. The regime has already changed its name several times in the past. When it first seized power in 1962, it was the Revolutionary Council, which became the BSPP -- the Burmese Socialist Program Party --, then the SLORC in 1988, and now the SDPC. Throughout this period they have continually played with words to justify their rule. However, no real transitions of power have been made, and there has no been representation of the people's wishes in any of the regime's incarnations. The regime is still a military dictatorship, and the new name is just another attempt to pander to international criticism and deceive the simple-minded. All that has changed is that the ruling elite have reshuffled their ranks and invented some extra positions to provide an extra income for some retired military officers. Burma is sinking deeper and deeper into political, economic and social crisis, yet the regime continues to cling on to power, in contempt of the people's wishes. It is certain that the suffering of the peoples of Burma will only increase while this handful of military officers remains in control. Although SLORC uses words like multi-party systems and democracy, in practice there is only coercion and military force, no matter what name they like to give themselves. It is the duty of our time to overthrow the military dictatorship, wherever we are and with whatever means we have. Although they claim to be moving to democracy, it is obvious that the SLORC military dictatorship is aiming for a lifelong monopoly on control. We strongly urge people not to be deluded by the mere name change. If the renamed SLORC, or the SPDC, really wants to establish a peaceful and developed state, they should: 1. abolish the SLORC's sham National Convention 2. release all political prisoners immediately 3. announce a nationwide cease-fire 4. recognize the results of the 1990 elections 5. hold a nationwide multi-party conference Until these measures are taken, the PLF will continue to fight for democracy and against the military dictatorship by organizing people's demonstrations and armed struggle to achieve democracy as our goal. Overthrowing the military dictatorship is the duty of our time. We cannot expect any compassion from the enemy We will win democracy 17. November 1997 Central Committee, People's Liberation Front ***************************************************** SPDC INFORMATION SHEET No.A-0220(I) November 22, 1997 From: OKKAR66127@aol.com (BurmaNet Editor's note: These information sheets which are distributed by e-mail are also sent by fax to journalists who cover Burma regularly. They originate in the DDSI [Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence], and the DDSI press liaison responds to journalists' questions based on these statements and other news.) National Convention Convening Commission Meets National Convention Convening Commission held a meeting at the commission office on 21 November. Officials of National Convention Convening Work Committee and National Convention Convening Management Committee submitted reports on the National Convention. NCCC members gave suggestions on the reports. **************************************************