Subject: [News] Yeltsin's pact on social accord and

From: Cyrill A. Buketov <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 01 May 94 15:03:00 GMT

From: kaskor (Cyrill A. Buketov)
Subject: Yeltsin's pact on social accord and

/* ����ᠭ�  3:57 pm  Apr 29, 1994 [email-masked] � glas:labr.cis */
/* ---------- "Yeltsin's pact on social accord and" ---------- */
From: austgreen ( )
Subject: Yeltsin's pact on social accord and workers

AGAINST WORKERS

#By Renfrey Clarke

#MOSCOW  --  On  the  afternoon  of  April  28,  several  hundred

representatives of  Russian state  structures, political parties,

trade unions  and religious  and social organisations gathered in

the Kremlin  to sign  President Boris  Yeltsin's Pact  on  Social

Accord. The  ceremony, Yeltsin  assured those  present, was proof

that Russia now possessed ``an alternative to confrontation''.

#Of those who signed the document, many seem to have done so with

a sense  that they  were taking  part in  a  pompous  but  rather

foolish piece of theatre. As originally announced, the pact would

have bound  participants to  join with  Yeltsin in  putting large

parts of  Russia's normal  political life  into mothballs. But in

order for  the range  of signatories  not  to  be  embarrassingly

narrow, presidential  staffers were  later forced  to  delete  or

smooth over a long series of the pact's more contentious points.

#As a  result, journalists  in pro-Yeltsin  newspapers complained

that the  final version of the document ``lacked clout''. Instead

of placing  an effective ban on the use by presidential opponents

of ``destructive''  tactics, the  pact  was  said  to  have  been

reduced to a list of pious wishes.

#This, however,  was not  strictly  true.  The  sections  of  the

document that  bear on  the Russian  labour movement  -- and that

sharply reduce  its  scope  for  action  --  passed  through  the

drafting process almost unchanged.

#The country's  mass trade  union formation,  the  Federation  of

Independent Trade  Unions of  Russia (FNPR),  then became  locked

into Yeltsin's new structure after FNPR leaders voted on April 27

to endorse  the pact.  As a  result, militants  who are trying to

defend the  jobs and  buying power of trade union members are now

likely to  face increased  pressures: not  just  from  the  state

authorities and  Russia's new nomenklatura-mafia bourgeoisie, but

also from central leaders of the workers' movement.

#Described in  one account as ``the focal point of Yeltsin's work

this year, and his only major domestic initiative,'' the pact was

presented in  a nine-page  draft on  April 5.  Under the terms of

this draft,  signatory organisations  were obliged  to renounce a

range of political goals and methods of struggle for the next two

years --  in effect,  until the  presidential elections  due  for

1996.

#Signatories were to refrain from trying to amend the new Russian

constitution,  widely   criticised  as   enshrining   a   virtual

presidential dictatorship.  No attempt  was to  be made  to  seek

early elections.

#Russia's 21  ethnically-defined republics  were to  bring  their

constitutions into  line with  the new  Russian charter, dropping

all claims to independent sovereignty.

#Trade unions  and producers'  organisations were  to desist from

calling strikes  around demands  for the  reallocation of  budget

funds and  the provision  of state  benefits. They  were also  to

refrain from violating obligations toward partners.

#An arbitration  commission was  to be  set up, with authority to

rule on  alleged breaches of the pact by signatory organisations.

In clear  breach of  the constitution,  this commission was to be

given wide  powers to  dismiss parliamentary  deputies accused of

violating the pact's general provisions.

#Of the  forces allied  with Yeltsin,  only those  closest to the

president sprang immediately to the pact's defence. Other liberal

groups were  sharply critical. Former Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov,

a key  figure in  the Russian  Movement  for  Democratic  Reform,

described the  document as  ``declarative''  and  reminiscent  of

Communist-era  May  Day  slogans.  Economist  Grigory  Yavlinsky,

leader of  the liberal  ``Yabloko'' bloc,  described the  pact as

misconceived, vague, and ultimately, unimportant. ``Yabloko'', he

indicated, would not sign it.

#However,   the    pact   was    neither   half-thought-out   nor

inconsequential; in  drawing it  up,  Yeltsin  had  a  deliberate

strategy in  mind. The  content of this strategy was suggested by

the president  in a  speech on April 20, when he pledged: ``We'll

tell Russians about those who don't sign the agreement. This will

show who  the people  are who have least concern for the lives of

Russians, for the revival of Russia.''

#Attacking those  who refused  to sign  his pact  as  extremists,

Yeltsin aimed to isolate and grind down his consistent opponents.

Meanwhile,  more  faint-hearted  critics  would  be  bound  in  a

straitjacket of  ``social accord''  from which  they could  break

free only  at peril of being blacklisted along with Stalinist and

ultra-nationalist groups.  #For this  strategy to  work,  Yeltsin

needed to  be able  to intimidate  most of  the factions  of  the

parliament into  signing his  pact  in  something  close  to  its

original form.  But it  quickly became  obvious  that  since  the

violent days  of last October, the president had lost much of his

ability to  twist the arms of reluctant supporters. Early backing

for the pact was sparse, and the idea of branding critics such as

Popov and  Yavlinsky as  ``communo-fascist extremists''  was  too

preposterous even to be tried. Yeltsin was forced into retreat.

#Several times  a day  after April  22, new  variants of the pact

appeared as  one interest  group or  another  was  appeased.  The

revisions and  accommodations extended  through the  night before

the signing.

#According to  the newspaper <I>Segodnya,<D> the signatories were

not given  a chance to make a detailed study of the final version

that was  set before  them on  April 28.  Most signatories do not

seem to  have been concerned by this, considering that so many of

the pact's  teeth had  been pulled  by this time that signing the

document had become no more than a symbolic act.

#For the trade unions, however, the stakes remained very serious.

As well  as binding  the FNPR  to oppose  the  demand  for  early

elections --  one of  the few  meaningful  demands  around  which

workers in  technically bankrupt Russian enterprises can campaign

-- the  pact also  banned strikes  connected in  any way  to  the

question of state budget funding.

#In the  case of  state-owned enterprises,  this obliged the FNPR

leadership to  oppose almost  all strikes,  even those  aimed  at

forcing the  government to  assign money  for the payment of back

wages.  In   privatised  industries   the  situation  was  little

different, since  there are  few sizeable  enterprises in  Russia

that are not closely dependent on government funding decisions.

#For the FNPR leadership, signing Yeltsin's pact thus amounted to

handing the government a sweeping no-strike pledge. This was at a

time when  unions had  an acute  need  to  be  able  to  use  all

effective methods  to defend  their members, and in circumstances

where the  pressures from  the  government  were  not  especially

strong; many  of Yeltsin's  liberal allies had rejected the pact,

as had the large and influential Communist and Agrarian parties.

#These points  were made  forcefully by  leaders of  sectoral and

regional  union  bodies  at  an  expanded  meeting  of  the  FNPR

executive on  April 27. Of the invited delegates who spoke on the

pact, almost  all condemned  it and demanded that the FNPR refuse

to sign.  Sentiment among  rank and  file  union  activists,  the

speakers argued, was solidly hostile to the document.

#Nevertheless, the  members of the executive voted overwhelmingly

in favour of signing.

#Yeltsin's success  in intimidating  the FNPR leadership has left

many  activists   in  the   Russian  labour  movement  angry  and

disillusioned. Strike  actions will  continue -- decisions of the

FNPR leadership  have the force only of recommendations to member

unions -- but the government now has another weapon for isolating

and breaking these struggles.

#Criticism of  the FNPR  executive's decision has been especially

sharp among  unionists in  Siberia, and  in the coal, oil and gas

industries. Rather than splitting from the FNPR, opponents of the

federation's present  course are  likely to  continue  struggling

within the  organisation, aiming  to redirect  its strategies and

replace its leadership at a special congress.

#One of  the long-term  effects of  the Pact on Social Accord may

thus be  to set  in train  a  political  renovation  of  Russia's

umbrella union  organisation. For  the present, however, the FNPR

leadership's capitulation  before Yeltsin's  latest  attacks  has

left the country's labour movement divided and weakened.