The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net Title: The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Sacred Books of the East, Volume 1 Author: Translator: George Thibaut Release Date: July 15, 2005 [EBook #16295] Language: English Character set encoding: ASCII *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS *** Produced by Srinivasan Sriram, David King, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team VEDANTA-SUTRAS _With the Commentary by_ SA@NKARACHARYA _Translated by_ GEORGE THIBAUT _Part I_ CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY SA@NKARACHARYA. ADHYAYA I. Pada I. Pada II. Pada III. Pada IV. ADHYAYA II. Pada I. Pada II. * * * * * Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East. [Transcriber's Note: This book contains many words with one or two letters in the word printed in italics; those letters are transcribed by enclosing them in slashes, e.g. "karmaka/nd/a" has the letters "nd" in italics. Also, the symbol "@" is used before the letter "n" to indicate a horizontal bar across the top.] INTRODUCTION. To the sacred literature of the Brahmans, in the strict sense of the term, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of complementary works without whose assistance the student is, according to Hindu notions, unable to do more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be understood, be read together with running commentaries such as Saya/n/a's commentaries on the Sa/m/hitas and Brahma/n/as, and the Bhashyas ascribed to Sa@nkara on the chief Upanishads. But these commentaries do not by themselves conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts, since they confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached passage without investigating its relation to other passages, and the whole of which they form part; considerations of the latter kind are at any rate introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a comprehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a whole, of systematising what they present in an unsystematical form, of showing the mutual co-ordination or subordination of single passages and sections, and of reconciling contradictions--which, according to the view of the orthodox commentators, can be apparent only--is allotted to a separate sastra or body of doctrine which is termed Mima/m/sa, i.e. the investigation or enquiry [Greek: kat ezochaen], viz. the enquiry into the connected meaning of the sacred texts. Of this Mima/m/sa two branches have to be distinguished, the so-called earlier (purva) Mima/m/sa, and the later (uttara) Mima/m/sa. The former undertakes to systematise the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that entire portion of the Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial action, and which comprises the Sa/m/hitas and the Brahma/n/as exclusive of the Ara/n/yaka portions; the latter performs the same service with regard to the so-called j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Vedic writings which includes the Ara/n/yaka portions of the Brahma/n/as, and a number of detached treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not action but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman. At what period these two /s/astras first assumed a definite form, we are unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature of those which constitute the subject-matter of the Purva Mima/m/sa must have arisen at a very early period, and the word Mima/m/sa itself together with its derivatives is already employed in the Brahma/n/as to denote the doubts and discussions connected with certain contested points of ritual. The want of a body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i.e. how to perform the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of the Veda, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether practical want, continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in ritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such rules was moreover a comparatively limited and feasible one; for the members of a certain Vedic sakha or school had to do no more than to digest thoroughly their own brahma/n/a and sa/m/hita, without being under any obligation of reconciling with the teaching of their own books the occasionally conflicting rules implied in the texts of other sakhas. It was assumed that action, as being something which depends on the will and choice of man, admits of alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be performed in different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or even by the followers of one and the same sakha. The Uttara Mima/m/sa-/s/astra may be supposed to have originated considerably later than the Purva Mima/m/sa. In the first place, the texts with which it is concerned doubtless constitute the latest branch of Vedic literature. And in the second place, the subject-matter of those texts did not call for a systematical treatment with equal urgency, as it was in no way connected with practice; the mental attitude of the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definiteness and coherence, may have perpetuated itself through many generations without any great inconvenience resulting therefrom. But in the long run two causes must have acted with ever-increasing force, to give an impulse to the systematic working up of the teaching of the Upanishads also. The followers of the different Vedic sakhas no doubt recognised already at an early period the truth that, while conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got over by the assumption of a vikalpa, i.e. an optional proceeding, it is not so with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation to it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the like. Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and it therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who look on the whole body of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate that their teaching forms a consistent whole free from all contradictions. In addition there supervened the external motive that, while the karmaka/nd/a of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of brahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins certain sacrificial performances connected with certain rewards, the j/n/anaka/nd/a, as propounding a certain theory of the world, towards which any reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox community could not but take up a definite position, must soon have become the object of criticism on the part of those who held different views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood in need of systematic defence. At present there exists a vast literature connected with the two branches of the Mima/m/sa. We have, on the one hand, all those works which constitute the Purva Mima/m/sa-/s/astra--or as it is often, shortly but not accurately, termed, the Mima/m/sa-/s/astra--and, on the other hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under the name Vedanta-/s/astra. At the head of this extensive literature there stand two collections of Sutras (i.e. short aphorisms constituting in their totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed authors are Jainini and Badaraya/n/a. There can, however, be no doubt that the composition of those two collections of Sutras was preceded by a long series of preparatory literary efforts of which they merely represent the highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by the analogy of other /s/astras, as well as by the exhaustive thoroughness with which the Sutras perform their task of systematizing the teaching of the Veda, and is further proved by the frequent references which the Sutras make to the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sutras (of the two Mima/m/sas as well as of other /s/astras) mark the beginning; if we, however, take into account what once existed, although it is at present irretrievably lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central position, summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary essays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand, the head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days, and may yet have some future before itself. The general scope of the two Mima/m/sa-sutras and their relation to the Veda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some importance between the two has, however, to be noted in this connexion. The systematisation of the karmaka/nd/a of the Veda led to the elaboration of two classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sutras on the one hand, and the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras on the other hand. The former give nothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices enjoined in the Brahma/n/as; while the latter discuss and establish the general principles which the author of a Kalpa-sutra has to follow, if he wishes to render his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of the Veda. The j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda, on the other hand, is systematised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mima/m/sa or Vedanta-sutras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing the special interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sutras. This difference may be accounted for by two reasons. In the first place, the contents of the karmaka/nd/a, as being of an entirely practical nature, called for summaries such as the Kalpa-sutras, from which all burdensome discussions of method are excluded; while there was no similar reason for the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place, the Vedanta-sutras throughout presuppose the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras, and may therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods already established in the latter. The time at which the two Mima/m/sa-sutras were composed we are at present unable to fix with any certainty; a few remarks on the subject will, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that common to all the so-called Sutras which aims at condensing a given body of doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and often even mere detached words in lieu of sentences. Besides the Mima/m/sa-sutras this literary form is common to the fundamental works on the other philosophic systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on sacred law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mima/m/sa-sutras occupy, however, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All Sutras aim at conciseness; that is clearly the reason to which this whole species of literary composition owes its existence. This their aim they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repetitions, and, as in the case of the grammatical Sutras, by the employment of an arbitrarily coined terminology which substitutes single syllables for entire words or combination of words. At the same time the manifest intention of the Sutra writers is to express themselves with as much clearness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The aphorisms are indeed often concise to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically obscure, the manifest care of the writers being to retain what is essential in a given phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied, although perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory and reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary Sutras. Altogether different is the case of the two Mima/m/sa-sutras. There scarcely one single Sutra is intelligible without a commentary. The most essential words are habitually dispensed with; nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple ommission of the subject or predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sutra occurs whose words construe without anything having to be supplied, the phraseology is so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a commentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sutra refers. When undertaking to translate either of the Mima/m/sa-sutras we therefore depend altogether on commentaries; and hence the question arises which of the numerous commentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to their right understanding. The commentary here selected for translation, together with Badaraya/n/a's Sutras (to which we shall henceforth confine our attention to the exclusion of Jaimini's Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras), is the one composed by the celebrated theologian /S/a@nkara or, as he is commonly called, /S/a@nkara/k/arya. There are obvious reasons for this selection. In the first place, the /S/a@nkara-bhashya represents the so-called orthodox side of Brahminical theology which strictly upholds the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as something different from, and in fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as Vish/n/u or Siva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects of popular worship in India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated by /S/a@nkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the view represented by /S/a@nkara nor any of the non-Vedantic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedanta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation. In the third place, /S/a@nkara's bhaashya is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant commentaries, and relative antiquity is at any rate one of the circumstances which have to be taken into account, although, it must be admitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. The /S/a@nkara-bhashya further is the authority most generally deferred to in India as to the right understanding of the Vedanta-sutras, and ever since /S/a@nkara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging to his school. If in addition to all this we take into consideration the intrinsic merits of /S/a@nkara's work which, as a piece of philosophical argumentation and theological apologetics, undoubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will be easily understood. But to the European--or, generally, modern--translator of the Vedanta-sutras with /S/a@nkara's commentary another question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not /S/a@nkara's explanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the Sutras. To the Indian Pandit of /S/a@nkara's school this question has become an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects to it being raised, as he looks on /S/a@nkara's authority as standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to make good his position he will, moreover, most probably not enter into any detailed comparison of /S/a@nkara's comments with the text of Badaraya/n/a's Sutras, but will rather endeavour to show on speculative grounds that /S/a@nkara's philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course follows that it accurately represents the meaning of Badaraya/n/a, who himself must necessarily be assured to have taught the true doctrine. But on the modern investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the authority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative wants, it is clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the outset in the interpretations given of the Vedanta-sutras--and the Upanishads--by /S/a@nkara and his school, but to submit them, as far as that can be done, to a critical investigation. This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if /S/a@nkara's views as to the true meaning of the Sutras and Upanishads had never been called into doubt on Indian soil, although in that case it could perhaps hardly be entered upon with much hope of success; but it becomes much more urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet in India itself with systems claiming to be Vedantic and based on interpretations of the Sutras and Upanishads more or less differing from those of /S/a@nkara. The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the right understanding of the fundamental authorities of the Vedanta must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to reject them. It appears that already at a very early period the Vedanta-sutras had come to be looked upon as an authoritative work, not to be neglected by any who wished to affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present, at any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Badaraya/n/a's teaching. Owing to this the commentaries on the Sutras have in the course of time become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing, much less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen commentaries, copies of which had been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for instance, Ramanuja's Vedanta-sara, No. XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the strict sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sutras; but, on the other hand, there are in existence several true commentaries which had not been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be practical--and certainly not feasible in this place--to submit all the existing bhashyas to a critical enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single out one or a few of the more important ones, and to compare their interpretations with those given by /S/a@nkara, and with the text of the Sutras themselves. The bhashya, which in this connexion is the first to press itself upon our attention, is the one composed by the famous Vaish@nava theologian and philosopher Ramanuja, who is supposed to have lived in the twelfth century. The Ramanuja or, as it is often called, the /S/ri-bhashya appears to be the oldest commentary extant next to /S/a@nkara's. It is further to be noted that the sect of the Ramanujas occupies a pre-eminent position among the Vaishnava, sects which themselves, in their totality, may claim to be considered the most important among all Hindu sects. The intrinsic value of the /S/ri-bhashya moreover is--as every student acquainted with it will be ready to acknowledge--a very high one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of /S/a@nkara, it not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of Ramanuja's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty tradition. This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance. If it could be demonstrated or even rendered probable only that the oldest bhashya which we possess, i.e. the /S/a@nkara-bhashya, represents an uninterrupted and uniform tradition bridging over the interval between Badaraya/n/a, the reputed author of the Sutras, and /S/a@nkara; and if, on the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern bhashyas are not supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts of clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised authority into the service of their individual tenets; there would certainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later bhashyas can help us in making out the true meaning of the Sutras. All we should have to do in that case would be to accept /S/a@nkara's interpretations as they stand, or at the utmost to attempt to make out, if at all possible, by a careful comparison of /S/a@nkara's bhashya with the text of the Sutras, whether the former in all cases faithfully represents the purport of the latter. In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the question as to how far we have to accept /S/a@nkara as a guide to the right understanding of the Sutras (Mr. A. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) that /S/a@nkara is the generally recognised expositor of true Vedanta doctrine, that that doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening between him and the Sutrakara, and that there existed from the beginning only one Vedanta doctrine, agreeing in all essential points with the doctrine known to us from /S/a@nkara's writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to prove this view, firstly, by a comparison of /S/a@nkara's system with the teaching of the Upanishads themselves; and, secondly, by a comparison of the purport of the Sutras--as far as that can be made out independently of the commentaries--with the interpretations given of them by /S/a@nkara. To both these points we shall revert later on. Meanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even if we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being confronted by a considerable number of essentially differing theories, all of which claim to be founded on the Upanishads. And with regard to the latter point I have to say for the present that, as long as we have only /S/a@nkara's bhashya before us, we are naturally inclined to find in the Sutras--which, taken by themselves, are for the greater part unintelligible--the meaning which /S/a@nkara ascribes to them; while a reference to other bhashyas may not impossibly change our views at once.--Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the unbroken uniformity of Vedantic tradition from another point or view, viz. by enquiring whether or not the Sutras themselves, and the /S/a@nkara-bhashya, furnish any indications of there having existed already at an early time essentially different Vedantic systems or lines of Vedantic speculation. Beginning with the Sutras, we find that they supply ample evidence to the effect that already at a very early time, viz. the period antecedent to the final composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present shape, there had arisen among the chief doctors of the Vedanta differences of opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but affecting the most essential parts of the system. In addition to Badaraya/n/a himself, the reputed author of the Sutras, the latter quote opinions ascribed to the following teachers: Atreya, A/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi, Karsh/n/agini, Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna, Jaimini, Badari. Among the passages where diverging views of those teachers are recorded and contrasted three are of particular importance. Firstly, a passage in the fourth pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 5-7), where the opinions of various teachers concerning the characteristics of the released soul are given, and where the important discrepancy is noted that, according to Au/d/ulomi, its only characteristic is thought (/k/aitanya), while Jaimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and Badaraya/n/a declares himself in favour of a combination of those two views.--The second passage occurs in the third pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 7-14), where Jaimini maintains that the soul of him who possesses the lower knowledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest Brahman, while Badari--whose opinion is endorsed by /S/a@nkara--teaches that it repairs to the lower Brahman only--Finally, the third and most important passage is met with in the fourth pada of the first adhyaya (Sutras 20-22), where the question is discussed why in a certain passage of the Brhadara/n/yaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are strictly applicable to the individual soul only. In connexion therewith the Sutras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relation in which the individual soul stands to Brahman. According to A/s/marathya (if we accept the interpretation of his view given by /S/a@nkara and /S/a@nkara's commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in the bhedabheda relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. Audulomi, on the other hand, teaches that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it, and Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is absolutely non-different from Brahman; which, in, some way or other presents itself as the individual soul. That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose speculations and discussions is embodied in the Vedanta-sutras, disagreed among themselves on points of vital importance is sufficiently proved by the three passages quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as showing that recognised authorities--deemed worthy of being quoted in the Sutras--denied that doctrine on which the whole system of /S/a@nkara hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman. Turning next to the /S/a@nkara-bhashya itself, we there also meet with indications that the Vedantins were divided among themselves on important points of dogma. These indications are indeed not numerous: /S/a@nkara, does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once /S/a@nkara also refers to the opinion of 'another,' viz., commentator of the Sutras, and in several places /S/a@nkara's commentators explain that the 'other' meant is the V/ri/ttikara (about whom more will be said shortly). Those references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and hence throw little or no light on important differences of dogma; but there are two remarks of /S/a@nkara's at any rate which are of interest in this connexion. The one is made with reference to Sutras 7-14 of the third pada of the fourth adhyaya; 'some,' he says there, 'declare those Sutras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhanta view, to state merely the purvapaksha;' a difference of opinion which, as we have seen above, affects the important question as to the ultimate fate of those who have not reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman.--And under I, 3, 19 /S/a@nkara, after having explained at length that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it is identical with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu vadina/h/ paramarthikam eva jaiva/m/ rupam iti manyante asmadiya/s/ /k/a ke/k/it,' i.e. other theorisers again, and among them some of ours, are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real.' The term 'ours,' here made use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or Vedantins, and it thus appears that /S/a@nkara himself was willing to class under the same category himself and philosophers who--as in later times the Ramanujas and others--looked upon the individual soul as not due to the fictitious limitations of Maya, but as real in itself; whatever may be the relation in which they considered it to stand to the highest Self. From what precedes it follows that the Vedantins of the school to which /S/a@nkara himself belonged acknowledged the existence of Vedantic teaching of a type essentially different from their own. We must now proceed to enquire whether the Ramanuja system, which likewise claims to be Vedanta, and to be founded on the Vedanta-sutras, has any title to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition. It appears that Ramanuja claims--and by Hindu writers is generally admitted--to follow in his bhashya the authority of Bodhayana, who had composed a v/ri/tti on the Sutras. Thus we read in the beginning of the /S/ri-bhashya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163), 'Bhagavad-bodhayanak/ri/ta/m/ vistirna/m/ brahmasutra-v/ri/tti/m/ purva/k/arya/h/ sa/m/kikshipus tanmatanusare/n/a sutrakshara/n/i vyakhyasyante.' Whether the Bodhayana to whom that v/ri/tti is ascribed is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sutra, and other works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient v/ri/tti on the Sutras connected with Bodhayana's name actually existed, there is not any reason to doubt. Short quotations from it are met with in a few places of the /S/ri-bhashya, and, as we have seen above, /S/a@nkara's commentators state that their author's polemical remarks are directed against the V/ri/ttikara. In addition to Bodhayana, Ramanuja appeals to quite a series of ancient teachers--purva/k/aryas--who carried on the true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedanta and the meaning of the Sutras. In the Vedarthasa@ngraha--a work composed by Ramanuja himself--we meet in one place with the enumeration of the following authorities: Bodhayana, /T/a@nka, Drami/d/a, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharu/k/i, and quotations from the writings of some of these are not unfrequent in the Vedarthasa@ngraha, as well as the /S/ri-bhashya. The author most frequently quoted is Drami/d/a, who composed the Drami/d/a-bhashya; he is sometimes referred to as the bhashyakara. Another writer repeatedly quoted as the vakyakara is, I am told, to be identified with the /T/a@nka mentioned above. I refrain from inserting in this place the information concerning the relative age of these writers which may be derived from the oral tradition of the Ramanuja sect. From another source, however, we receive an intimation that Drami/d/a/k/arya or Dravi/d/a/k/arya preceded /S/a@nkara in point of time. In his /t/ika on /S/a@nkara's bhashya to the Chandogya Upanishad III, 10, 4, Anandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of Sm/ri/ti on the same point is a reproduction of the analogous attempt made by the Dravi/d/a/k/arya. It thus appears that that special interpretation of the Vedanta-sutras with which the /S/ri-bhashya makes us acquainted is not due to innovating views on the part of Ramanuja, but had authoritative representatives already at a period anterior to that of /S/a@nkara. This latter point, moreover, receives additional confirmation from the relation in which the so-called Ramanuja sect stands to earlier sects. What the exact position of Ramanuja was, and of what nature were the reforms that rendered him so prominent as to give his name to a new sect, is not exactly known at present; at the same time it is generally acknowledged that the Ramanujas are closely connected with the so-called Bhagavatas or Pa/nk/aratras, who are known to have existed already at a very early time. This latter point is proved by evidence of various kinds; for our present purpose it suffices to point to the fact that, according to the interpretation of the most authoritative commentators, the last Sutras of the second pada of the second adhyaya (Vedanta-sutras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhagavatas--which tenet forms part of the Ramanuja system also--viz. that the highest being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyuha) as Vasudeva, Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those four forms being identical with the highest Self, the individual soul, the internal organ (manas), and the principle of egoity (aha@nkara). Whether those Sutras embody an approval of the tenet referred to, as Ramanuja maintains, or are meant to impugn it, as /S/a@nkara thinks; so much is certain that in the opinion of the best commentators the Bhagavatas, the direct forerunners of the Ramanujas, are mentioned in the Sutras themselves, and hence must not only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree of importance at the time when the Sutras were composed. And considering the general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhagavatas and the later Ramanujas, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were at one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedanta-sutras. The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to show that it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how Ramanuja interprets the Sutras, and wherein he differs from /S/a@nkara. This in fact seems clearly to be the first step we have to take, if we wish to make an attempt at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of scholiasts to the meaning of the Sutras themselves. A full and exhaustive comparison of the views of the two commentators would indeed far exceed the limits of the space which can here he devoted to that task, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage when the complete Sanskrit text of the /S/ri-bhashya has been printed, and thus made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is possible, and--as said before--even urged upon a translator of the Sutras to compare the interpretations, given by the two bhashyakaras, of those Sutras, which, more than others, touch on the essential points of the Vedanta system. This will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara/n/as of the Vedanta-sutras, according to /S/a@nkara; a review which--apart from the side-glances at Ramanuja's comments--will be useful as a guide through the Sutras and the /S/a@nkara-bhashya. Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of /S/a@nkara as well as of Ramanuja, which may be referred to when, later on discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted. In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details. Of /S/a@nkara's system we possess as it is more than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to Deussen's System of the Vedanta, in which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid sketch of the /S/a@nkara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra-bhashya, the Upanishad bhashyas, and some later writers belonging to /S/a@nkara's school. With regard to Ramanuja's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ramanuja chapter in the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the /S/ri-bhashya itself. What in /S/a@nkara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as follows.--Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Paramatman, the highest Self. This being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (/k/aitanya, j/n/ana). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance, Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it.--But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, in which we ourselves exist as individual beings?--Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a certain power called Maya or avidya to which the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called 'being' (sat), for 'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called 'non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of animate and inanimate beings. Maya thus constitutes the upadana, the material cause of the world; or--if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that Maya belongs to Brahman as a /s/akti--we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with Maya. In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called I/s/vara, the Lord. Maya, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive evolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of which the world consists; from it there spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole bodily apparatus belonging to sentient Beings. In all those apparently, individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Maya has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up--it is broken up, as it were--into a multiplicity, of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called jivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each jiva is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and distinguish one jiva from another, is the offspring of Maya and as such unreal. The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahara) thus consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for both are altogether due to Maya. But at the same time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are. The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond Maya, which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (upadhi), the fictitious offspring of Maya, and thus looks for its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ (manas), i.e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future embodied existences, the Lord--as a retributor and dispenser--allotting to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its previous actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called kalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion with upadhis, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted, they have again to enter on embodied existence as soon as the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old round of birth, action, death begins anew to last to all eternity as it has lasted from all eternity. The means of escaping from this endless sa/ms/ara, the way out of which can never be found by the non-enlightened soul, are furnished by the Veda. The karmaka/nd/a indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain actions, cannot lead to final release; for even the most meritorious works necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And in the j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda also two different parts have to be distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and passages which treat of Brahman in so far as related to the world, and hence characterised by various attributes, i.e. of I/s/vara or the lower Brahman; and, secondly, those texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman transcending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout meditation on Brahman as suggested by passages of the former kind does not directly lead to final emancipation; the pious worshipper passes on his death into the world of the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as a distinct individual soul--although in the enjoyment of great power and knowledge--until at last he reaches the highest knowledge, and, through it, final release.--That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose soul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher knowledge of Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying, 'That art thou,' have taught that there is no difference between his true Self and the highest Self, obtains at the moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he withdraws altogether from the influence of Maya, and asserts himself in his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman. Thus /S/a@nkara.--According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows.--There exists only one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self of the Lord. This being is not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 'intelligence,'--as /S/a@nkara maintains,--but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself whatever exists. While, according to /S/a@nkara, the only reality is to be found in the non-qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only be defined as pure 'Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a mere illusion; Brahman--according to Ramanuja's view--comprises within itself distinct elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute reality of one and the same kind. Whatever is presented to us by ordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications and the individual souls of different classes and degrees, are essential real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (a/k/it and /k/it) constitute, according to Ramanuja's terminology, the body of the Lord; they stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and subserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable body stands to its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and rules all things which exist--material or immaterial--as their antaryamin; the fundamental text for this special Ramanuja tenet--which in the writings of the sect is quoted again and again--is the so-called antaryamin brahma/n/a. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7) which says, that within all elements, all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls, there abides an inward ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual souls constitute.--Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord are also called modes of him (prakara). They are to be looked upon as his effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual existence which is theirs from all eternity, and will never be entirely resolved into Brahman. They, however, exist in two different, periodically alternating, conditions. At some times they exist in a subtle state in which they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily known, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form. Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta); the individual souls are not joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of contraction, non-manifestation (sa@nko/k/a). This is the pralaya state which recurs at the end of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in its causal condition (kara/n/avastha). To that state all those scriptural passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as being in the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman then is indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a germinal condition; but as in that condition they are so subtle as not to allow of individual distinctions being made, they are not counted as something second in addition to Brahman.--When the pralaya state comes to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of volition on the Lord's part. Primary unevolved matter then passes over into its other condition; it becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible attributes, visibility, tangibility, and so on, which are known from ordinary experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion with material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit acquired by them in previous forms of existence; their intelligence at the same time undergoes a certain expansion (vika/s/a). The Lord, together with matter in its gross state and the 'expanded' souls, is Brahman in the condition of an effect (karyavastha). Cause and effect are thus at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but the cause which has undergone a certain change (pari/n/ama). Hence the cause being known, the effect is known likewise. Owing to the effects of their former actions the individual souls are implicated in the sa/m/sara, the endless cycle of birth, action, and death, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study of the j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of the karmaka/nd/a does not lead outside the sa/m/sara; but he who, assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes--and meditates on--him in the way prescribed by the Upanishads reaches at his death final emancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the path of the gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an everlasting blissful existence from which there is no return into the sphere of transmigration. The characteristics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract the entire world. The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as follows.--Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the prak/r/iti and the purushas of the Sa@nkhyas, but there exists only one all-embracing being. While, however, the advaita taught by /S/a@nkara is a rigorous, absolute one, Ramanuja's doctrine has to be characterised as visish/t/a advaita, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a difference. According to Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality must be illusory. According to Ramanuja also, whatever is, is Brahman; but Brahman is not of a homogeneous nature, but contains within itself elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a diversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal Maya, but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self. The Brahman of /S/a@nkara is in itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless thought, transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only through its association with the unreal principle of Maya, so that--strictly speaking--/S/a@nkara's personal God, his I/s/vara, is himself something unreal. Ramanuja's Brahman, on the other hand, is essentially a personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room for the distinction between a param nirgu/n/am and an apara/m/ sagu/n/am brahma, between Brahman and I/s/vara.--/S/a@nkara's individual soul is Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal upadhis due to Maya. The individual soul of Ramanuja, on the other hand, is really individual; it has indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will remain a personality for ever--The release from sa/m/sara means, according to /S/a@nkara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from Brahman; according to Ramanuja it only means the soul's passing from the troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will remain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss.--As Ramanuja does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one result only [1]. I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedanta-sutras according to /S/a@nkara in which at the same time all the more important points concerning which Ramanuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of the different modes of interpretation which have been applied to the Sutras. The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the present nothing can be taken for granted or known.--In stating the different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/n/as), each of which comprises one or more Sutras, I shall follow the subdivision into adhikara/n/as adopted in the Vyasadhika-ra/n/amala, the text of which is printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Sutras. FIRST ADHYAYA. PADA I. The first five adhikara/n/as lay down the fundamental positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1) [2] treats of what the study of the Vedanta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedanta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedanta-texts represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent pradhana from which the world springs according to the Sa@nkhyas. With the next adhikara/n/a there begins a series of discussions of essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first adhyaya. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the jiva, the individual soul. /S/a@nkara remarks at the outset that, as the preceding ten Sutras had settled the all-important point that all the Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts of prima facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first adhyaya, appears neither from the wording of the Sutras nor even from /S/a@nkara's own treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the Sutras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured eyes--of whom the Chandogya Upanishad speaks in 1, 6, 6--is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord. /S/a@nkara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Maya. So that according to /S/a@nkara himself the alternative lies between the sagu/n/a Brahman and some particular individual soul, not between the sagu/n/a Brahman and the nirgu/n/a Brahman. Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the anandamaya, mentioned in Taittiriya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. /S/a@nkara begins by explaining the Sutras on the latter supposition--and the text of the Sutras is certainly in favour of that interpretation--gives, however, finally the preference to a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the Sutras teach that the anandamaya is not Brahman, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the anandamaya[3].--Ramanuja's interpretation of Adhikara/n/a VI, although not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of /S/a@nkara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the anandamaya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while /S/a@nkara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not, Ramanuja separates the adhikara/n/a from the subsequent part of the pada and connects it with what had preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be identified with the pradhana; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the system is thereby completed[4].--Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in Ch. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman.--Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to Ch. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest Brahman.--Adhik. IX (23). The pra/n/a also mentioned in Ch. Up. I, ii, 5 denotes the highest Brahman[5]--Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Ch. Up. III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman[6].--Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the pra/n/a mentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman. PADA II. Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in Ch. Up. III, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The Sutras of this adhikara/n/a emphatically dwell on the difference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence /S/a@nkara is obliged to add an explanation--in his comment on Sutra 6--to the effect that that difference is to be understood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.--The comment of Ramanuja throughout closely follows the words of the Sutras; on Sutra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul is [7].--Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food (Ka/th/a. Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.--Adhik. III (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul[8].--Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman.--Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within (antaraymin) described in B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sutra 20 clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord; hence /S/a@nkara is obliged to remark that that difference is not real.--Adhik. VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c, mentioned in Mu/nd/aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.--Adhik. VII (24-32) shows that the atman vai/s/vanara of Ch. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman. PADA III. Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c. are woven (Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.--Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhuman referred to in Ch. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.--Adhik. III (10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.--Adhik. IV (13) decides that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om, according to Pra/s/na Up. V, 5, is not the lower but the higher Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahma (jivasamash/t/irupoz/nd/adhipatis /k/aturmukha/h/).--Adhik. V and VI (comprising, according to /S/a@nkara, Sutras l4-2l) discuss the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the individual soul or Brahman; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative the purvapakshin pleads the two passages Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasada); for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to it the same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the heart.--But the reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true nature has become manifest, i.e. in which it is Brahman; so that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests itself in its true nature.--What Ramanuja understands by the avirbhava of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4. The two next Sutras (22, 23) constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (VII), proving that he 'after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted' (Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15) is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself.--According to Ramanuja the two Sutras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutras.[9] Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman. The two next adhikara/n/as are of the nature of a digression. The passage about the a@ngush/th/amatra was explained on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a question finally answered in the affirmative.--This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of beings stand to the words denoting them (Sutra 28). In connexion herewith /S/a@nkara treats of the nature of words (/s/abda), opposing the opinion of the Mima/m/saka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called 'spho/t/a,' which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX; Sutras 26-33). Adhik. X (34-38) explains that /S/udras are altogether disqualified for Brahmavidya. Sutra 39 constitutes, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (XI), proving that the pra/n/a in which everything trembles, according to /K/a/th/a Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the Sutra does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the decision arrived at under Sutras 24, 25, viz. that the a@ngus/th/amatra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sutras 24-39 form one adhikara/n/a in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25.--The a@ngus/th/matra is referred to twice in the Ka/th/a Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4, 12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a thumb'). To determine what is meant by the a@ngus/th/matra, Ramanuja says, we are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the two passages concerning the a@ngus/th/matra, and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in awe. The next Sutra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion. According to /S/a@nkara it constitutes by itself a new adhikara/n/a (XII), proving that the 'light' (jyotis) mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the Sutra continues the preceding adhikara/n/a, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a further argument, referring to Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15--a passage intermediate between the two passages about the a@ngush/th/amatra--which speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The Sutra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The a@ngush/th/amatra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening between the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).' The three last Sutras of the pada are, according to /S/a@nkara, to be divided into two adhikara/n/as (XIII and XIV), Sutra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms (Ch. Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vij/n/anamaya, 'he who consists of knowledge,' of B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the individual soul but Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the three Sutras make up one single adhikara/n/a discussing whether the Chandogya Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage immediately preceding ('Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes off his hair,' &c.). Sutra 41 decides that 'the ether (is Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else,' &c. (i.e. of something other than the individual soul; other because to the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)--But, an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as Brahman?--(The two, Sutra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as different' (from the soul)--which point is proved by the same scriptural passages which /S/a@nkara adduces;--and 'because such terms as Lord and the like' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to IV, 4, 14, where all jagadvyapara is said to belong to the Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of release. PADA IV. The last pada of the first adhyaya is specially directed against the Sa@nkhyas. The first adhikara/n/a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10; 11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped--both of them terms used with a special technical sense in the Sa@nkhya-/s/astra, avyakta being a synonym for pradhana.--/S/a@nkara shows by an exhaustive review of the topics of the Ka/th/a Upanishad that the term avyakta has not the special meaning which the Sa@nkhyas attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the subtle body (sukshma /s/arira), but at the same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the subtle one. Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to /S/a@nkara, that the tricoloured aja spoken of in /S/ve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhana of the Sankhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that power.--What Ramanuja in contradistinction from /S/a@nkara understands by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above of the two systems. Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the pa/nk/a pa/nk/ajana/h/ mentioned in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sa@nkhyas.--Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world. Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to /S/a@nkara, meant to prove that 'he who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman.--The subject of the adhikara/n/a is essentially the same in Ramanuja's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara/n/a being polemical against the Sa@nkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into an argument for the pradhana doctrine. The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the next adhikara/n/a (VI; Sutras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be seen, to be heard,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Ramanuja, made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sa@nkhya who is anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sa@nkhya purusha. Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (pari/n/ama; Sutra 26).--Ramanuja views this adhikara/n/a as specially directed against the Se/s/vara-sa@nkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord, but postulate in addition an independent pradhana on which the Lord acts as an operative cause merely. Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sa@nkhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyaya and the succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which is the principle on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sutras have been selected and arranged; and, secondly, if, where /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja disagree as to the subdivision of the Sutras into Adhikara/n/as, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in the Sutras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general question as to how far the Sutras favour either /S/a@nkara's or Ramanuja's general views cannot be considered at present.) The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by the consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations--which have occasionally been referred to in the notes to the translation--rest on the assumption that the Sutrakara in arranging the texts to be commented upon was guided by technicalities of the Mima/m/sa-system, especially by a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mima/m/saka employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position of scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyaya, such as given by Deussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in which the Sutras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the same time to exemplify the various prama/n/as of the Mima/m/sa in their due systematic succession. As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages discussed are taken from the Chandogya Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first adhyaya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those Chandogya passages of which it is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman or not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an opportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned to the Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sutrakara meant to begin the series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the Chandogya, and that hence the sixth adhikara/n/a which treats of the anandamaya mentioned in the Taittiriya Upanishad has, in agreement with Ramanuja's views, to be separated from the subsequent adhikara/n/as, and to be combined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the fundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature.--The remaining adhikara/n/as of the first pada follow the order of passages in the Chandogya Upanishad, and therefore call for no remark; with the exception of the last adhikara/n/a, which refers to a Kaushitaki passage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to account.--The first adhikara/n/a of the second pada returns to the Chandogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in the Ka/th/a Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason why that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly assigned in the /S/ri-bhashya, which remarks that, as in the preceding Sutra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a doubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest Self can be meant[10]--The third adhikara/n/a again, whose topic is the 'two entered into the cave' (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1), appears, as Ramanuja remarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding adhikara/n/a; for if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the 'eater' since the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under the same prakara/n/a, and must therefore be held to refer to the same matter.--The fourth adhikara/n/a is again occupied with a Chandogya passage.--The fifth adhikara/n/a, whose topic is the Ruler within (antaryamin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Ramanuja also, to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the preceding adhikara/n/a (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the argument [11].--The sixth adhikara/n/a, again, which discusses 'that which is not seen' (adre/s/ya; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 1, 6), is clearly introduced in this place because in the preceding adhikara/n/a it had been said that ad/ri/sh/t/a, &c. denote the highest Self;--The reasons to which the last adhikara/n/a of the second pada and the first and third adhikara/n/as of the third pada owe their places are not apparent (the second adhikara/n/a of the third pada treats of a Chandogya passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the Pra/s/na Upanishad treating of the akshara. O/m/kara is clearly due to the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been discussed in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--The fifth and sixth adhikara/n/as investigate Chandogya passages.--The two next Sutras (22, 23) are, as remarked above, considered by /S/a@nkara to constitute a new adhikara/n/a treating of the 'being after which everything shines' (Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 10); while Ramanuja looks on them as continuing the sixth adhikara/n/a. There is one circumstance which renders it at any rate probable that Ramanuja, and not /S/a@nkara, here hits the intention of the author of the Sutras. The general rule in the first three padas is that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the subject of the discussion, i.e. that being which in the end is declared to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a nominative form [12]. From this rule there is in the preceding part of the adhyaya only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may be due to the fact that there a new pada begins, and it therefore was considered superfluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent one; for, as remarked above, Sutra 19 does not in reality begin a new adhikara/n/a. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in their places.--Now neither Sutra 22 nor Sutra 23 contains any word intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration, and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Ramanuja, as continuing the topic of the preceding adhikara/n/a.--This conclusion receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next adhikara/n/a, which treats of the being 'a span long' mentioned in Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12; for the reason of this latter passage being considered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpa/s/ruti in Sutra 21, and, if so, the a@ngush/th/amatra properly constitutes the subject of the adhikara/n/a immediately following on Adhik. V, VI; which, in its turn, implies that Sutras 22, 23 do not form an independent adhikara/n/a.--The two next adhikara/n/as are digressions, and do not refer to special Vedic passages.--Sutra 39 forms a new adhikara/n/a, according to /S/a@nkara, but not according to Ramanuja, whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sutra does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference of opinion prevails with regard to Sutra 40, and it appears from the translation of the Sutra given above, according to Ramanuja's view, that 'jyoti/h/' need not be taken as a nominative.--The last two adhikara/n/as finally refer, according to Ramanuja, to one Chandogya passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sutra 42 does not comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be discussed. From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three first padas of the Vedanta-sutras comprise all the doubtful--or at any rate all the more important doubtful--passages from the Chandogya Upanishad. These passages are arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain Chandogya passage is followed by a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/n/as adopted by Ramanuja, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sutras. The fourth pada of the first adhyaya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sa@nkhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also--as is brought out much more clearly in the /S/ri-bhashya than by /S/a@nkara--in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world. Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sutrakara of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the passages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras are throughout Mima/m/sa i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a prima facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their meaning. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutras to assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is sufficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara/n/as; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/n/as of the first adhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta-sutras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sa@nkhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth adhikara/n/a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana, and the fourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an express polemic against Sa@nkhya interpretations of certain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhyaya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his own doctrine against Sa@nkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sa@nkhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious--and actually attempted--to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural passages. The Sa@nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedantin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or some product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the Sankhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedantin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sutrakara; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is--or can possibly be--sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sutras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the intricacies of the Mima/m/sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not. Notes: [Footnote 1: The only 'sectarian' feature of the Sri-bhashya is, that identifies Brahman with Vish/n/u or Naraya/n/a; but this in no way affects the interpretations put on the Sutras and Upanishads. Naraya/n/a is in fact nothing but another name of Brahman.] [Footnote 2: The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikara/n/a; the figures in parentheses state the Sutras comprised in each adhikara/n/a.] [Footnote 3: Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage conveying the second interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two objections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and explained by all commentators; in the second place, /S/a@nkara in the passage immediately preceding Sutra 12 quotes the adhikara/n/a 'anandamayo s bhyasat' as giving rise to a discussion whether the param or the aparam brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in that part of the bhashya which sets forth the former explanation, but only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates the latter interpretation.] [Footnote 4: Eva/m/ jij/n/anasya brahma/nas/ /ko/tanabhogvabhutaga/d/arupsattvara, istamomayapradhanad vyav/ri/ttir ukta, idani/m/ karmava/s/vat trigu/n/atmakaprik/ri/u sa/m/sangammittanamavidhan intadukhasagaranimajjaoni/s/addha/h/. /k/i pratya gaumano nyan nikhilaheyapratauika/m/ miatimyanandam brahmeti pratipadyate, anandamayo bhyasat.] [Footnote 5: There is no reason to consider the passage 'atra ke/k/it' in /S/a@nkara's bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p. 30). It simply contains a criticism passed by /S/a@nkara on other commentators.] [Footnote 6: To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text, which Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the remark made in the preceding note.] [Footnote 7: Givaysa iva parasyapi brahma/n/a/h/ /s/arirantarvaititvam abhyupagata/m/ /k/et tadvad eva /s/arirasainbandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir hi /k/en na, hetuvai/s/eshyat, na hi /s/arirantarvartitvam eva sukhadukhopabhogahetu/h/ api tu pu/n/yapaparnpakarmaparavasatva/m/ ta/k/ /K/apahatapapmana/h/ parahatmano na sambhavati.] [Footnote 8: The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the Sanskrit text (beginning with apara aha) Deussen considers to be an interpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi upanishad in /S/a@nkara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason whatsoever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 shows that /S/a@nkara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only in case of its having been quoted before by /S/a@nkara himself.--That the 'apara' quotes the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka not according to the Ka/n/va text--to quote from which is /S/a@nkara's habit--but from the Madhyandina text, is due just to the circumstance of his being an 'apara,' i.e. not /S/a@nkara.] [Footnote 9: Ita/s/ /k/aitad evam. Anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/a. Tasya daharakasasya parabrahma/n/o snukarad ayam apahatapapmatvadigu/n/ako vimuktabandha/h/ pratyagatma na daharaka/s/a/h/ tadanukaras tatsamya/m/ tatha hi pratyagalmanozpi vimuktasya parabrahmanukara/h/ sruyate yada pa/s/ya/h/ pa/s/yate rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartaram i/s/a/m/ purusha/m/ brahmayoni/m/ tada vidvan pu/n/yapape vidhuya nira/ng/ana/h/ parama/m/ samyam upaitity atos'nukarta prajapativakyanirdish/t/a/h/ anukarya/m/ para/m/ brahma na daharaka/s/a/h/. Api /k/a smaryate. Sa/m/sari/n/oszpi muktavasthaya/m/ paramasamyapattilaksha/n/a/h/ parabrahmanukara/h/ smaryate ida/m/ j/n/anam upasritya, &c.--Ke/k/id anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/api smaryate iti /k/a sutradvayam adhikara/n/antara/m/ tam eva bhantam anubhati sarva/m/ tasya bhasa sarvam ida/m/ vibhatity asya/h/ /s/rute/h/ parabrahmaparatvanir/n/ayaya prav/ri/tta/m/ vadanti. Tat tv ad/ris/yatvadigu/n/ako dharmokte/h/ dyubhvadyayatana/m/ sva/s/abdad ity adhi kara/n/advayena tasya prakara/n/asya brahmavishayatvapratipadanat jyoti/sk/ara/n/abhidhanat ity adishu parasya brahma/n/o bharupatvavagates /k/a purvapakshanutthanad ayukta/m/ sutraksharavairupya/k/ /k/a.] [Footnote 10: Yadi paramatma na bhokta eva/m/ taihi bhokt /i/taya pratiyamano jiva eva syad ity asankyaha atta.] [Footnote 11: Sthanadivyapade/s/a/k/ /k/a ity atra ya/h/ /k/akshushi tish/th/ann ity adina pratipadyamana/m/ /k/akshushi sthitiniyamanadika/m/ paramatmana eveti siddha/m/ k/ri/tva akshipurushasya paramatmatva/m/ sadhitam idani/m/ tad eva samarthayate antaryau.] [Footnote 12: Anandamaya/h/ I, 1, 12; anta/h/ I, i, 20; aka/s/a/h/ I, 1, 22; prana/h/ I, 1, 23; jyoti/h/ I, 1, 24; prana/h/ I, 1, 28; atta I, 2, 9; guha/m/ pravish/t/au I, 2, 11; antara I, 2,13; antaryami I, 2, 18; ad/ris/yatvadigu/n/aka/h/ I, 2, 21; vai/s/vanara/h/ I, 2, 24; dyubhvadyayatanam I, 3, 1; bhuma I, 3, 8; aksheram I, 3, 10; sa/h/ I, 3, 13; dahara/h/ I, 3, 14; pramita/h/ I, 3, 24; (jyoti/h/ 40;) aka/s/a/h/ I, 3,41.] SECOND ADHYAYA. The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more especially the Sa@nkhya system. The task of the two first padas of the second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedanta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the systems irreconcilable with the Vedanta can be satisfactorily established. PADA I. Adhikara/n/a I refutes the Sa@nkhya objection that the acceptation of the Vedanta system involves the rejection of the Sa@nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Sm/ri/ti, and as such has claims on consideration.--To accept the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, the Vedantin replies, would compel us to reject other Sm/ri/tis, such as the Manu-sm/ri/ti, which are opposed to the Sa@nkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of Sm/ri/tis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, but rather those Sm/ri/tis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause. Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-sm/ri/ti. Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes--as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted and thereby become simple gold again--do not continue to exist in those causes.--Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sa@nkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal substance participating in the same characteristics. Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the preceding adhikara/n/a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine. The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to /S/a@nkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water.--The /S/ri-bhashya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sutra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanuja's view, the Sutra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Ramanuja puts on the Sutra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears from a quotation made by Ramanuja from the Drami/d/abhashyakara[13]. Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedanta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the Vai/s/eshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause.--The divergent views of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems. Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutrakira remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sutras constituting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other is characteristic. Ramanuja throughout simply follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sutra 22 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sutra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts. Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds. Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to /S/a@nkara, because the world is unreal; according to Ramanuja, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition. Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses. Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse. Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity. Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world. PADA II. The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view.--The first adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sa@nkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvastitvavadins, or bahyarthavadins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vij/n/anavadins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.--The last Sutra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Ramanuja as a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world. The last adhikara/n/a of the pada (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pa/nk/aratras. But /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja totally disagree as to the drift of the Sutrakara's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.--Sutras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sutra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vasudeva, there is originated Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and Sutra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarsha/n/a there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.--The Sutra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to /S/a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sa@nkarsha/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sutra 42 against the Bhagavata doctrine).'--According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the Sutra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarsha/n/a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the Sutra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'va' and of the 'tat,' implied in Ramanuja's comment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/a@nkara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pada with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of objections--has to be viewed as the true one. PADA III. The third pada discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals. The first seven adhikara/n/as treat of the five elementary substances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else. Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it. Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission. Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist. The remainder of the pada is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the jiva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body. Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This Sutra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other. According to the former, the jiva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Ramanuja, the jiva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakara) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikasa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarupanyathabhava) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics. Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra declares that the soul is 'j/n/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Ramanuja, on the other hand, explains 'j/n/a' by 'j/n/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the Sa@nkhyas and the Vedantins of /S/a@nkara's school--maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the Sutra certainly seems to favour Ramanuja's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term j/n/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/n/at/ri/, not j/n/anam. Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyapin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.--In /S/a@nkara's opinion the Sutras 19-38 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the jiva is a/n/u, while Sutra 29 formulates the siddhanta, viz. that the jiva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is a/n/u--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sa/m/sara.--According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the siddhanta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/n/at/ri/) stands to knowledge (j/n/ana).--In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.--/S/a@nkara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with /S/a@nkara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that /S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word 'praj/n/avat') the Sutra runs as follows: 'But on account of that quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality--or qualities--of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or "the designation of that").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sara state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.--can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the sa/m/sara state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to /S/a@nkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false. There are no similar difficulties in the way of Ramanuja's interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/a@nkara in the explanation of Sutras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddhanta. Sutras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/a@nkara's, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vij/n/ana when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra which, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha, serves on Ramanuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate assumption. Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains, according to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as long as it exists in the sa/m/sara condition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Ramanuja the Sutra teaches that the soul may be called vij/n/ana because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists.--Sutra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sutra, according to Ramanuja, teaches that j/n/at/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only.--In Sutra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while, according to Ramanuja, the Sutra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jn/at/ri/ and a/n/u, as it is in reality).--The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi. Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jiva, i.e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according to /S/a@nkara's system, this cannot be the final view,--the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of upadhis,--he looks upon the next following Sutra (40) as constituting an adhikara/n/a by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.--Ramanuja, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sutra 40 from the preceding Sutras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases. Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions. Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and the following Sutras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman. According to Ramanuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman[14]; according to Sa@nkara the 'a/ms/a' of the Sutra must be understood to mean 'a/ms/a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.--One Sutra (50) in this adhikara/n/a calls for special notice. According to Sa@nkara the words 'abhasa eva /k/a' mean '(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called pratibimbavada, i.e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called ava/kkh/edavada, i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.--According to Ramanuja the abhasa of the Sutra has to be taken in the sense of hetvabhasa, a fallacious argument, and the Sutra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Vedantins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts[15]. PADA IV. Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the pra/n/as (by which generic name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmen-driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size (a/n/u). Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya pra/n/a, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the pra/n/as discussed above; and that it is minute (a/n/u). Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the pra/n/as are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya pra/n/a. Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the namarupavyakara/n/a) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord. Notes: [Footnote 13: Lokavat, Yatha loke raja/s/asananuvartina/m/ /k/a rajanugrahanigrahak/ri/takhadukhayoges'pi na sa/s/ariraivamatre/n/a sasake rajany api /s/asananuv/ri/ttyauv/ri/ttinimittasukhadukhayor bhokt/ri/vaprasa@nga/h/. Yathaha Drami/d/abhashyakara/h/ yatha loke raja pra/k/uradanda/s/uke ghores'narthasa/m/ka/t/es'pi prade/s/e vartamanoszpi vyajanadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipreta/ms/ /k/a lokan paripipalayishati bhoga/ms/ /k/a gandhadin avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayati tathasau loke/s/varo bhramatsvasamait/h/ya/k/amato doshair na sp/ris/yate rakshati /k/a lokan brahmalokadi/ms/ /k/avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayatiti.] [Footnote 14: Givasya kart/ri/tva/m/ paramapurushayattam ity uktam. Idanim kim aya/m/ giva/h/ parasmad atyantabhinna/h/ uta param eva brahma bhrantam uta brahmaivopadhyava/kkh/innam atha brahma/ms/a iti sa/m/sayyate /s/rutivipraticpatte/h/ sa/m/saya/h/. Nanu tadananyam arambha/n/a/s/abdadibhya/h/ adhika/m/ tu bhedanirdesad ity atraivayam aitho nir/n/ita/h/ Satya/m/ sa eva nanatvaikatva/s/rutivipratipattya skshipya jivasya brahma/ms/atvopapadanena vi/s/eshato nir/n/iyate. Yavad dhi jivasya brahma/m/satva/m/ na nir/n/itam tavaj jivasya brahmanosnanyatva/m/ brahma/n/as tasmad adhikatva/m/ /k/a na pratitish/th/ati. Ki/m/ tavat praptam. Atyanta/m/ bhinna iti. Kuta/h/. J/n/aj/n/nau dvav ityadibhedanirde/s/at. J/n/aj/n/ayor abheda/s/rutayas tv agnina si/nk/ed itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa/k/arikya/h/, Brahma/n/os/ms/o jiva ity api na sadhiya/h/, ekavastvekade/s/ava/k/i hy a/ms/a/s/sabda/h/, jivasya brahmaikade/s/atve tadgata dosha brahma/n/i bhaveyu/h/. Na /k/a brahmakha/nd/o jiva ity a/ms/atvopapatti/h/ kha/nd/ananarhatvad brahma/n/a/h/ praguktadoshaprasa@nga/k/ /k/a, tasmad atyantabhinnasya tada/ms/atva/m/ durupapadam. Yadva bhranta/m/ brahmaiva jiva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibrahmatmabhavopade/s/at, nanatmatvavadinyas tu pratyakshadisiddharthanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopade/s/aparabhi/h/ /s/rutibhi/h/ pratyakshadaya/s/ /k/a avidyantargata/h/ khyapyante.--Athava brahmaivanadyupadhyava/kkh/inna/m/ jiva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tata eva brahmatmabhavopade/s/at. Na /k/ayam upadhir bhrantiparikalpita ita vaktu/m/ sakya/m/ bandhamokshadivyavasthanupapatter. Ity eva/m/ pratptesbhidhiyate. Brahma/ms/a iti. Kuta/h/. Nanavyapade/s/ad anyatha /k/aikatvena vyapade/s/ad ubhayatha hi vyapade/s/o d/ris/yate. Navavyapade/s/as tavat srash/tri/tva/rig/yatva--niyant/ri/tvaniyamyatva--sarvaj/n/atvaj/n/atva-- svadhinatvaparadhinatva--/s/uddhatva/s/uddhatva-- kalya/n/agu/n/akaratvaviparitatva--patitva/s/eshatvadibhir d/ris/yate. Anyatha /k/abhedena vyapade/s/os pi tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibhir d/ris/yate. Api da/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate eke, brahma dasa brahma dasa brahmeme kitava ity atharva/n/ika brahma/n/o da/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate, tata/s/ /k/a sarvajivavyapitvena abhedo vyapadi/s/yata it artha/h/. Evam ubhayavyapade/s/amukhyatvasiddhaye jivosya/m/ brahma/n/os/ms/a ity abhyupagantavya/h/.] [Footnote 15: Nanu bhrantabrahmajivavadeszpy avidyak/ri/topadhibhedad bhogavyavasthadaya upapadyanta ata aha, abhasa eva /k/a. Akha/nd/aikarasapraka/s/amatratvarupasya svarupatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva. Praka/s/aikasvarupasya praka/s/atirodhana/m/ praka/s/ana/s/a eveti prag evopapaditam. Abhasa eveti va pa/th/a/h/, tatha sati hetava abhasa/h/.] THIRD ADHYAYA. PADA I. Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements (bhutasukshma) which serve as an abode to the pra/n/as attached to the soul. Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anu/s/aya) of their former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment. Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon. Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them. PADA II. Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to /S/a@nkara the three first Sutras discuss the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sutra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere 'Maya,' since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Sutra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Maya, yet have a prophetic quality. Sutras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body. The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by Ramanuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sutras with each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sutras 1 and 2 set forth the purvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of some /s/akas declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sutra states the siddhanta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Maya, i.e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'maya,' Ramanuja remarks, 'maya/s/abdo hy a/sk/aryava/k/i janaka/s/ya kule jata devamayeva nirmita ityadishu tatha dar/s/anat.' The three remaining Sutras are exhibited in the /S/ri-bhashya in a different order, the fourth Sutra, according to /S/a@nkara, being the sixth according to Ramanuja. Sutras 4 and 5 (according to Ramanuja's numeration) are explained by Ramanuja very much in the same way as by /S/a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement of the subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves more intimately with the preceding Sutras than is possible on /S/a@nkara's interpretation. In Sutra 6 (su/k/aka/s/ /k/a hi) Ramanuja sees a deduction from the siddhanta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have prophetic significance.' Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart. Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of a swoon. Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/a@nkara, taken up with the question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is merged in the state of deep sleep. Sutra 11 declares that twofold characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes, nirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be destitute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact, Sutra 12 continues, that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially stated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sutra 13 adds--in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected to.--That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sutra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all Vedanta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.--That Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature of the things he illuminates (15).--The B/ri/hadara/n/yaka expressly declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the same is taught in other scriptural passages and in Sm/ri/ti (l7).--At the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the surface of the water are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material like the sun, and there are no real upadhis separate from it as the water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that, as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase, decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes of the upadhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is affected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the upadhis, Scripture declares (21). From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given in the Sri-bhashya differs totally. According to Ramanuja the adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the soul as antaryamin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections) because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil, apahatapapman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious qualities, satyakama, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.) (11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially free from evil--according to the Prajapativakya in the Chandogya--yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies, so the antaryamin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryamin (in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the jiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (dva supar/n/a sayuja sakhaya) (13).--Should it be said that, according to the Chandogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sara; we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent; pradhana) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to 'aka/s/o ha vai namarupayor nirvahita') (14).--But does not the passage 'satya/m/ j/n/anam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage 'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittiriya of their purport, we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover the Taittiriya passage only asserts so much, viz. the praka/s/arupata of Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).--And the passage 'neti neti' will be discussed later on.--The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the sense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti (17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryamin really abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both similes are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21). Sutras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti neti; B/ri/hadar) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sutras 23-26 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are altogether due to the upadhis. The last four Sutras return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts. According to Ramanuja, Sutras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in Sutra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (prakara), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmatra)?--The reply given in Sutra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them again[16]), but merely denies the prak/ri/taitavattva, the previously stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sutra 23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the intuition (sakshatkkara) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/radhana, i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti' is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as praka/s/a, luminousness, j/n/ana, intelligence, &c., so also the quality of being differentiated by the world (prapa/nk/avsish/t/ata) is intuited as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that praka/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vamadeva) in the work of sa/m/radhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious qualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as special arrangements (sa/m/sthanavisesha/h/) of Brahman, as the coils are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both being fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29, 30). Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be truly understood. Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called apurva, but is allotted by the Lord. PADA III. With the third pada of the second adhyaya a new section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different /s/akhas contain many chapters of similar, often nearly identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the same /s/akha exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/akha were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other /s/akhas also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long before the composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one /s/akha may indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/akhas; that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The latter is the special task of the present pada. Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyas, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyas, or one vidya only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those vidyas whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/a/nd/ilyavidya which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the /S/atapathabrahma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bharupatva), while others are peculiar to each separate passage (pra/n/a/s/ariratva and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chandogya Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedantin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on the other hand, the vidya is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts. Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyas being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgithavidyas of the Chandogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgitha being in both identified with pra/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the Chandogya vidya is not the whole udgitha but only the sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad represents the whole udgitha as the object of meditation. Sutra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the O/m/kara and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kara which,' &c.--According to Ramanuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sutra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called pra/n/a-vidyas and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the pra/n/a, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation. Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sutras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidya. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to /S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidya only.--Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called sutratman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation. According to Ramanuja the Sutras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a whose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a. Sutras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sutra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sutras 14-17 continue the discussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.--If priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sutra 14 replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sutra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (atma anandamaya) is applied to it.'--But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in atma pra/n/amaya, &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in atma anandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sutra 16 replies, 'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages (atmaa va idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding clauses about the pra/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in anandamaya atman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage?--To this question asked in the former half of 17 (anvayad iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz. II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.' Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the pra/n/asa/m/vada.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyas.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Ra/n/ayaniya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding Chandogya vidya, because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidya.--Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart. Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brahma/n/a passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance, a brahma/n/a about the mahavrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-ara/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts. Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages. Sutras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken literally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any other place. The /S/ri-bhashya treats the four Sutras as one adhikara/n/a whose two first Sutras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sutra 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death, partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sutra 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir upasampadya svena rupe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti kri/d/an ramamana/h/ sa svara/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kama/k/aro bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's vidyamahatmya.--That the explanation of the /S/ri-bhashya agrees with the text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show; especially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam ubhayatha,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva in the other case. The next Sutra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyas which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyas of Brahman.--The explanation given in the /S/ri-bhashya (in which Sutras 31 and 32 have exchanged places) is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on Brahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and sagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The /S/ri-bhashya reads 'sarvesham,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvasam,' all sagu/n/a-vidyas.) Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.--In the /S/ri-bhashya, where the Sutra follows immediately on Sutra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully performed certain duties. Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in some vidyas--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Ka/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidya only, because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to Ramanuja the Sutra contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidya only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the contrary decides that the passage Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the vidya of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only--According to Ramanuja, Sutras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara. Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidya, since the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with Brahman as destitute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.--According to the /S/ri-bhashya, Sutras 39-41 form one adhikara/n/a whose first Sutra reaches essentially the same conclusion as /S/a@nkara under 39. Sutras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are predicated of Brahman--such as va/s/itva, satyakamatva, &c.--cannot be considered real (paramarthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final release.--To this objection Sutra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with emphasis[17].'--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he who meditates on Brahman as satyakama, &c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in Ch. Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection Sutra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom (i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous of release, may include satyakamatva, &c. in his meditations.) Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions, are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the latter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. passage and a similar Ch. Up. passage, Vayu and Pra/n/a are not to be identified, but to be held apart.--Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but merely subjects of meditations. Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, in the way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists maintain).--According to the /S/ri-bhashya the adhikara/n/a does not refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sutras then have to be translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which belong to it in its embodied state, such as j/n/at/ri/tva and the like), because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The next Sutra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e. the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in the condition of final release).' Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that /s/akha in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all /s/akhas.--Adhik. XXXII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vanara Agni of Ch. Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.--Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidya, /S/a/nd/ilyavidya, &c. remain separate. Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being cumulated.--Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with constituent elements of action, such as the udgitha. PADA IV. Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha, i.e. subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrajins is enjoined by the sacred law, and that for them vidya only is prescribed, not action.--Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part of vidyas are not mere stutis (arthavadas), but themselves enjoin the meditation.--The legends recorded in the Vedanta-texts are not to be used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying--as arthavadas--the injunctions with which they are connected (Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the urdhvaretasa/h/ require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).--Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, &c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidya in the mind (Adhik. VI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII, 28-3l).--The a/s/ramakarma/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who, owing to poverty and so on, are ana/s/rama have claims to vidya (Adhik. IX, 36-39).--An urdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation of the fall of an urdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the fallen urdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamana (Adhik. XIII, 44-46).--B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to balya and pa/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By balya is to be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50). Sutras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Ramanuja, the question when the vidya, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises. Sutra 51 treats of that vidya whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmantara (in which latter case the vidya arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in various passages).'--Sutra 52, 'Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an obstacle, sometimes not).'--/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sutras as two adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyas. Notes: [Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them 'anuvadena,' and finally negative them.] [Footnote 17: Ramanuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a matapit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sastra/m/ pratarakavad aparamarthikau nirasaniyau gu/n/au prama/n/antarapratipannau adare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sara/k/akraparivartanena purvam eva bambhramyamanan mumukshun bhuyo-pi bhramayitum alam.'] [Footnote 18: The /S/ri-bh-ashya as well as several other commentaries reads tadbhavabhavitvat for /S/an@kara's tadbhavabhavitvat.] FOURTH ADHYAYA. PADA I. Adhikara/n/a I (1, 2).--The meditation on the Atman enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be repeated again and again. Adhik. II (3).--The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self. Adhik. III (4).--To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the so-called pratikopasanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano brahmety upasita) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to consider the pratika as constituting his own Self. Adhik. IV (5).--In the pratikopasanas the pratika is to be meditatively viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the pratika.--Ramanuja takes Sutra 5 as simply giving a reason for the decision arrived at under Sutra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new adhikara/n/a. Adhik. V (6).--In meditations connected with constitutives of sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evasau tapati tam udgitham upasita) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance, the udgitha is to be viewed as Aditya, not Aditya as the udgitha. Adhik. VI (7-10).--The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a sitting posture.--/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sutra gives no hint to that effect. Adhik. VII (11).--The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind. Adhik. VIII (12).--The meditations are to be continued until death.--/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to sa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted. Adhik. IX (13).--When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the vidvan is no longer affected by the consequences of either past or future evil deeds. Adhik. X (14).--Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.--The literal translation of the Sutra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the vidvan) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes place).' The last words of the Sutra, 'but on the fall,' are separated by /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sutra and interpreted to mean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvan, who through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of works).'--According to Ramanuja the whole Sutra simply means, 'There is likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is reached), but on the death of the vidvan[19].' Adhik. XI (15).--The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding adhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anarabdhakarya works, i.e. those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend to the arabdhakarya works on which the present existence of the devotee depends. Adhik. XII (16, 17).--From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so, for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of knowledge. Adhik. XIII (18).--The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the upasanas referring to the different members of those works. Adhik. XIV (19).--The arabdhakarya works have to be worked out fully by the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvan becomes united with Brahman.--The 'bhoga' of the Sutra is, according to /S/a@nkara, restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would lead to future embodiments. According to Ramanuja a number of embodied existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the arabdhakarya works are exhausted. PADA II. This and the two remaining padas of the fourth adhyaya describe the fate of the vidvan after death. According to /S/a@nkara we have to distinguish the vidvan who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest Brahman, and the vidvan who knows only the lower Brahman, and have to refer certain Sutras to the former and others to the latter. According to Ramanuja the vidvan is one only. Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).--On the death of the vidvan (i.e. of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to /S/a@nkara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (pra/n/a), the vital air in the individual soul (jiva), the soul in the subtle elements.--According to Ramanuja the combination (sampatti) of the senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not a merging (laya). Adhik. IV (7).--The vidvan (i.e. according to /S/a@nkara, he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvan, i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e. those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle elements, and so on into the na/d/is.--The vidvan also remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet completely destroyed avidya, so that the immortality which Scripture ascribes to him (am/ri/tatva/m/ hi vidvan abhya/s/nute) is only a relative one.--Ramanuja quotes the following text regarding the immortality of the vidvan: 'Yada sarve pramu/k/yante kama yessya h/ri/di sthita/h/ atha martyosm/ri/to bhavaty atra brahma sama/s/nute,' and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvan as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the destruction--mentioned in the preceding pada--of all the effects of good and evil works, while the 'reaching of Brahman' can only refer to the intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee. Adhik. V (8-11) raises; according to /S/a@nkara, the question whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with the highest deity (teja/h/ parasya/m/ devatayam) are completely merged in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on the other hand, as long as the sa/m/sara state lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new bodies for the soul. According to Ramanuja the Sutras 8-11 do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul from the body, 'because Scripture declares sa/m/sara, i.e. embodiedness up to the reaching of Brahman' (tasya tavad eva /k/ira/m/ yavan na vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).--That the soul after having departed from the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from authority[20] (9).--Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the body (10). Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.--According to /S/a@nkara the Sutras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes of him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidya) the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the body of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one with Brahman.--Against this latter implied doctrine Sutra 12 is supposed to formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the pra/n/as from the body of the dying sage is denied (viz. in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, na tasya pra/n/a utkramanti, of him the pra/n/as do not pass out); we reply that in that passage the genitive "tasya" has the sense of the ablative "tasmat," so that the sense of the passage is, "from him, i.e. from the jiva of the dying sage, the pra/n/as do not depart, but remain with it."'--This objection /S/a@nkara supposes to be disposed of in Sutra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure of the pra/n/as in the case of the dying sage,' viz. in the passage B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 11, where Yaj/n/avalkya instructs Artabhaga that, when this man dies, the pra/n/as do not depart from it (asmat; the context showing that asmat means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not 'from him,' viz. the jiva).--The same view is, moreover, confirmed by Sm/ri/ti passages. According to Ramanuja the three Sutras forming /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikara/n/a do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a at all, and, moreover, have to be combined into two Sutras. The topic continuing to be discussed is the utkranti of the vidvan. If, Sutra 12 says, the utkranti of the pra/n/as is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to be contained in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the tasya there is '/s/arirat' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e. the jiva, the pra/n/as do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the reading of some, viz. the Madhyandinas, who, in their text of the passage, do not read 'tasya' but 'tasmat.'--With reference to the instruction given by Yaj/n/avalkya to Artabhaga, it is to be remarked that nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows Brahman.--And, finally, there are Sm/ri/ti passages declaring that the sage also when dying departs from the body. Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to /S/a@nkara, that, on the death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his pra/n/as, elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from it in any way. According to Ramanuja the two Sutras continue the teaching about the pra/n/as, bhutas, &c. of the vidvan in general, and declare that they are finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction (sa/m/yoga), but completely.[21] Adhik. IX (17).--/S/a@nkara here returns to the owner of the apara vidya, while Ramanuja continues the description of the utkranti of his vidvan.--The jiva of the dying man passes into the heart, and thence departs out of the body by means of the na/d/is; the vidvan by means of the na/d/i called sushum/n/a, the avidvan by means of some other na/d/i. Adhik. X (18, 19).--The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of a ray of light which exists at night as well as during day. Adhik. XI (20, 21).--Also that vidvan who dies during the dakshi/n/ayana reaches Brahman. PADA III. Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the vidvan up to Brahman. Adhik. IV (4-6)--By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead the soul on. The remaining part of the pada is by /S/a@nkara divided into two adhikara/n/as. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman to which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the gods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (karya) or qualified (/s/agu/n/a) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sutras 7-11 by Badari, and, finally, accepted by /S/a@nkara in his commentary on Sutra 14. In Sutras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view, according to which the soul of the vidvan goes to the highest Brahman, not to the karyam brahma. But Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part of the adhikara/n/a, is, according to /S/a@nkara, a mere purvapaksha, while Badari's opinion represents the siddhanta.--The latter of the two adhikara/n/as (VI of the whole pada; 15, 16) records the opinion of Badaraya/n/a on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those who worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that those only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a pratika form. According to Ramanuja, Sutras 7-16 form one adhikara/n/a only, in which the views of Badari and of Jaimini represent two purvapakshas, while Badaraya/n/a's opinion is adopted as the siddhanta. The question is whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship the effected Brahman, i.e. Hira/n/yagarbha, or those who worship the highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from Prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye pratyagatmana/m/ prak/ri/tiviyukta/m/ brahmatmakam upasate).--The first view is maintained by Badari in Sutra 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those who worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the latter only;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as such omnipresent Brahman.--The explanation of Sutra 9 is similar to that of /S/a@nkara; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if Hira/n/yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho /s/a manava/h/ sa etan brahma gamayati,' the text would read 'sa etan brahma/n/am gamayati') that Hira/n/yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.--The explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in /S/a@nkara; so also of l2-l4.--The siddhanta view is established in Sutra 13, 'It is the opinion of Badaraya/n/a that it, i.e. the ga/n/a of the guardians, leads to Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is pratika, i.e. those who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the individual Self as dissociated from prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under pratikas. For both views--that of Jaimini as well as that of Badari--are faulty.' The karya view contradicts such passages as 'asma/k/ charirat samutthaya para/m/ jyotir upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the pa/nk/agni-vidya, which declares that ya ittha/m/ vidu/h/, i.e. those who know the pa/nk/agni-vidya, are also led up to Brahman. PADA IV. Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the para vidya, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely manifests itself in its true nature.--The explanation given by Ramanuja is essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvan whose going to Brahman had been described in the preceding pada. Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul stands to Brahman is that of avibhaga, non-separation. This, on /S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.--According to Ramanuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul views itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhuta) from Brahman, or as non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is favoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat tvam asi and the like.[22] Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other places are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapapmatva, satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.--According to Au/d/ulomi the only characteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.--According to Badarayana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul vyavaharapekshaya). Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the apara vidya, and discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former alternative is accepted--According to Ramanuja the adhikara/n/a simply continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the preceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa (it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released soul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive him.' Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied according to their wish and will. Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate several bodies at the same time.--Sutra 12 gives, according to /S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the state of deep sleep (svapyaya = sushupti), or to the fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).--Ramanuja explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti = mata/n/am according to 'van manasi sampadyate,' &c.). Adhik. VII (17-21).--The released jivas participate in all the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of embodied existence. After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the contents of the Brahma-sutras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as well as Ramanuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two modes of interpretation represents--or at any rate more closely approximates to the true meaning of the Sutras. That few of the Sutras are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above; but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases. We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous discrepancies,--of which only the more important ones have been singled out in the conspectus of contents,--the two commentators are at one as to the general drift of the Sutras and the arrangement of topics. As a rule, the adhikara/n/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sutras. This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the meaning of the Sutras on which the bulk of the interpretations of /S/a@nkara as well as of Ramanuja are based. But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, the interpretations of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja diverge more or less widely, and that the Sutras affected thereby are, most of them, especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the Vedanta system. The question then remains which of the two interpretations is entitled to preference. Regarding a small number of Sutras I have already (in the conspectus of contents) given it as my opinion that Ramanuja's explanation appears to be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal meaning of a Sutra, but where /S/a@nkara sees himself reduced to the necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while Ramanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands. To exemplify this remark, I again direct attention to all those Sutras which in clear terms represent the individual soul as something different from the highest soul, and concerning which /S/a@nkara is each time obliged to have recourse to the plea of the Sutra referring, not to what is true in the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked upon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that /S/a@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the Sutras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr. Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires convincing proofs before it can be allowed.--We have had, in the second place, to note a certain number of adhikara/n/as and Sutras concerning whose interpretation /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja disagree altogether; and we have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with the words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by the 13th adhikara/n/a of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jiva, and where Ramanuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to /S/a@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole adhikara/n/a and to the wording of the single Sutras. The adhikara/n/a is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the question what kind of Vedanta is embodied in Badaraya/n/a's work. But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a few detached Sutras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some opinion as to the relation of the Vedanta-sutras as a whole to the chief distinguishing doctrines of /S/a@nkara as well as Ramanuja. Such an attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the conclusion that the Sutras do not teach particular doctrines found in them by certain commentators, will not be without its value. The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the Sutras in any way favour /S/a@nkara's doctrine that we have to distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an exalted form of individual existence. The adhyaya first to be considered in this connexion is the fourth one. According to /S/a@nkara the three latter padas of that adhyaya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who, before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman. According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the three padas, referring throughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the successive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it had tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever without returning into the sa/m/sara. On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat strange that the concluding section of the Sutras should be almost entirely taken up with describing the fate of him who has after all acquired an altogether inferior knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the true sanctuary of Vedantic knowledge, while the fate of the fully initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sutras. It is, I think, not too much to say that no unbiassed student of the Sutras would--before having allowed himself to be influenced by /S/a@nkara's interpretations--imagine for a moment that the solemn words, 'From thence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which the Sutras conclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but merely a stage on the way of that soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual release, a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of existence, but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious sa/m/sara, and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti. And this a priori impression--which, although no doubt significant, could hardly be appealed to as decisive--is confirmed by a detailed consideration of the two sets of Sutras which /S/a@nkara connects with the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sutras are interpreted by /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja has been stated above in the conspectus of contents; the points which render the interpretation given by Ramanuja more probable are as follows. With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to note, in the first place, the circumstance--relevant although not decisive in itself--that Sutra 12 does not contain any indication of a new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be doubted that the text of Sutra 13, 'spash/t/o hy ekesham,' is more appropriately understood, with Ramanuja, as furnishing a reason for the opinion advanced in the preceding Sutra, than--with /S/a@nkara--as embodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case we should expect not 'hi' but 'tu'). And, in the third place, the 'eke,' i.e. 'some,' referred to in Sutra 13 would, on /S/a@nkara's interpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sutra had referred, viz. the followers of the Ka/n/va-/s/akha (the two Vedic passages referred to in 12 and 13 being B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2, 11, according to the Ka/n/va recension); while it is the standing practice of the Sutras to introduce, by means of the designation 'eke,' members of Vedic /s/akhas, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in the preceding Sutras. With this practice Ramanuja's interpretation, on the other hand, fully agrees; for, according to him, the 'eke' are the Madhyandinas, whose reading in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. 'tasmat,' clearly indicates that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the Ka/n/vas denotes the /s/arira, i.e. the jiva. I think it is not saying too much that /S/a@nkara's explanation, according to which the 'eke' would denote the very same Ka/n/vas to whom the preceding Sutra had referred--so that the Ka/n/vas would be distinguished from themselves as it were--is altogether impossible. The result of this closer consideration of the first set of Sutras, alleged by /S/a@nkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of Brahman, entitles us to view with some distrust /S/a@nkara's assertion that another set also--IV, 4, 1-7--has to be detached from the general topic of the fourth adhyaya, and to be understood as depicting the condition of those who have obtained final absolute release. And the Sutras themselves do not tend to weaken this preliminary want of confidence. In the first place their wording also gives no indication whatever of their having to be separated from what precedes as well as what follows. And, in the second place, the last Sutra of the set (7) obliges /S/a@nkara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities which clearly cannot belong to them; so that he finally is obliged to make the extraordinary statement that those qualities belong to them 'vyavaharapekshaya,' while yet the purport of the whole adhikara/n/a is said to be the description of the truly released soul for which no vyavahara exists! Very truly /S/a@nkara's commentator here remarks, 'atra ke/k/in muhyanti akha/n/da/k/inmatrajanan muktasyajnanabhavat kuta aj/n/anika-dharmayoga/h/,' and the way in which thereupon he himself attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters. In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth adhyaya with another passage, which indeed has no direct bearing on the distinction of apara and para vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of /S/a@nkara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the Sutras. The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the opinions of three different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the vidvan repairs on death, or--according to Ramanuja--the worshippers of which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman. Ramanuja treats the views of Badari and Jaimini as two purvapakshas, and the opinion of Badaraya/n/a--which is stated last--as the siddhanta. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, detaching the Sutras in which Badaraya/n/a's view is set forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/n/a (a proceeding which, although not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether illegitimate), maintains that Badari's view, which is expounded first, represents the siddhanta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently, is to be considered a mere purvapaksha. This, of course, is altogether inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras to conclude the discussion of contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. This is so patent that /S/a@nkara feels himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but such as are valid only if /S/a@nkara's system itself is already accepted. The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice but to side with Ramanuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth adhyaya of the Sutras. We need not accept him as our guide in all particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate of one and the same vidvan, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman in /S/a@nkara's sense. If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on the negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding which the entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be consulted. And intimately connected with this investigation--in fact, one with it from a certain point of view--is the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle of illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or I/s/vara. That Ramanuja denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the doctrine of Maya we have seen above; we shall, however, in the subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and interpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras themselves. Placing myself at the point of view of a /S/a@nkara, I am startled at the outset by the second Sutra of the first adhyaya, which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination and so on (i.e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sutra meant to define?--That Brahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sutra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedanta; that Brahman whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact which /S/a@nkara calls the highest.--But, here we must object to ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the world originates. In later Vedantic writings, whose authors were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman and the lower Brahman related to Maya or the world, we meet with definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as sa/k/-/k/id-ananda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the introductory /s/lokas of the Pa/nk/ada/s/i dilating on the sa/m/vid svayam-prabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P.D. I, 7). 'That from which the world proceeds' can by a /S/a@nkara be accepted only as a definition of I/s/vara, of Brahman which by its association with Maya is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and it certainly is as improbable that the Sutras should open with a definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is unlikely that they should conclude with a description of the state of those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the all-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining one in all its various manifestations--a conception which need not by any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the Ramanujas--the definition of Brahman given in the second Sutra becomes altogether unobjectionable. We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in which Badaraya/n/a defines Brahman, viz. that he does not distinguish between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Maya, is confirmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sutras being throughout far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the Sutrakara against the Sa@nkhya doctrine, which maintains that the world has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the non-intelligent pradhana. The most important Sutras relative to this point are to be met with in the first pada of the second adhyaya. Those Sutras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by themselves, but the unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investigation. The sixth Sutra of the pada mentioned replies to the Sa@nkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that 'it is thus seen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence; hair and nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from dung.--Now, an argumentation of this kind is altogether out of place from the point of view of the true /S/a@nkara. According to the latter the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Maya. Maya is the upadana of the material world, and Maya itself is of a non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedantic writers identified with the prak/ri/ti of the Sa@nkhyas. Similarly the illustrative instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal substances do not impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with the doctrine of Maya, according to which the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its subsistence. According to /S/a@nkara the world is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms into which the upadana of the world, i.e. Maya, had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Maya, whose relation to Brahman is not changed thereby.--The illustration, again, given in Sutra 24 of the mode in which Brahman, by means of its inherent power, transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous instruments of action, 'kshiravad dhi,' 'as milk (of its own accord turns into curds),' would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world; and also the analogous instance given in the Sutra next following, 'as Gods and the like (create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will)'--which refers to the real creation of real things--would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous illustrative instances (kshiravad dhi; devadivat), moreover, seems to show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent without having recourse to any extraneous means.[23] That the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sutrakara, further appears from the latter part of the fourth pada of the first adhyaya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is the material cause of the world through Maya only, and that the world is unreal; but the Sutras do not contain a single word to that effect. Sutra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term 'pari/n/amat;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of itself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the Vedanta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/n/avada' was used to denote that very theory to which the followers of /S/a@nkara are most violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not a mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the effect of Brahman undergoing a real change, may that change be conceived to take place in the way taught by Ramanuja or in some other manner.--With regard to the last-quoted Sutra, as well as to those touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of expression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are in reality reconcilable with it; to Sutra 26, for instance, Govindananda remarks that the term 'pari/n/ama' only denotes an effect in general (karyamatra), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as Ramanuja, are satisfied to take 'pari/n/ama' and similar terms in their generally received sense. A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III, 2, 11 ff. It is, according to /S/a@nkara's view, of special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that Brahman is in itself destitute of all qualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (upadhis), the offspring of Maya. I have above (in the conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole section as interpreted by /S/a@nkara on the one hand, and Ramanuja on the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to the purport of the group of Sutras widely diverges from that of /S/a@nkara. The wording of the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators--if indeed either--is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide; regarding the sense of some Sutras /S/a@nkara's explanation seems to deserve preference, in the case of others Ramanuja seems to keep closer to the text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Ramanuja's interpretation of Sutra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sutra is concerned, and more especially with regard to the term 'prak/ri/taitavattvam,' whose proper force is brought out by Ramanuja's explanation only. So much is certain that none of the Sutras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by /S/a@nkara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that the section is one of those--perhaps not few in number--in which both interpreters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing Badaraya/n/a's Sutras to bear testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories. With special reference to the Maya doctrine one important Sutra has yet to be considered, the only one in which the term 'maya' itself occurs, viz. III, 2, 3. According to /S/a@nkara the Sutra signifies that the environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i.e. unsubstantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Ramanuja (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a different explanation of the term 'maya,' but in judging of /S/a@nkara's views we may for the time accept /S/a@nkara's own interpretation. Now, from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams are to be called Maya, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the characteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking soul must not be called Maya. But that the world perceived by waking men is Maya, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming consciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the /S/a@nkara Vedanta; and the Sutra therefore proves either that Badaraya/n/a did not hold the doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term 'maya' in a sense altogether different from that in which /S/a@nkara employs it.--If, on the other hand, we, with Ramanuja, understand the word 'maya' to denote a wonderful thing, the Sutra of course has no bearing whatever on the doctrine of Maya in its later technical sense. We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Do the Sutras indicate anywhere that their author held /S/a@nkara's doctrine, according to which the jiva is in reality identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to avidya, or do they rather favour the view that the souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it? This question is in fact only another aspect of the Maya question, but yet requires a short separate treatment. In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in /S/a@nkara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Ramanuja, that the soul is of minute size. We have further seen that Sutra 18 of the third pada of the second adhyaya, which describes the soul as 'j/n/a,' is more appropriately understood in the sense assigned to it by Ramanuja; and, again, that the Sutras which treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with /S/a@nkara's views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to authorise.--We next have the important Sutra II, 3, 43 in which the soul is distinctly said to be a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and which, as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in with /S/a@nkara's views only if a/ms/a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by 'a/ms/a iva,' while Ramanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands.--We also have already referred to Sutra 50, 'abhasa eva /k/a,' which /S/a@nkara interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavada according to which the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self. But almost every Sutra--and Sutra 50 forms no exception--being so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favourable to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sutra 50, if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sutra 43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? For that 43 contains, as /S/a@nkara and his commentators aver, a statement of the ava/kkh/edavada, can itself be accepted only if we interpret a/ms/a by a/ms/a iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I confess that Ramanuja's interpretation of the Sutra (which however is accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me particularly convincing; and the Sutras unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the term abhasa, which may mean 'reflection,' but may mean hetvabhasa, i.e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this one Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the pratibimbavada which, in its turn, presupposes the mayavada, is the teaching of the Sutras. To the conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of /S/a@nkara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with here and there in the Sutras. In the conspectus of contents we have had occasion to direct attention to the important Sutra II, 1, 22, which distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i.e. additional to, or different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the /s/arira is not the antaryamin, because the Madhyandinas, as well as the Ka/n/vas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam adhiyate), and in 22 the /s/arira and the pradhana are referred to as the two 'others' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word 'itara' (the other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, 16; II, 1, 21) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in contradistinction from the Lord. The /S/a@nkaras indeed maintain that all those passages refer to an unreal distinction due to avidya. But this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands that the Sutras should be thus understood. If we accept the interpretations of the school of /S/a@nkara, it remains altogether unintelligible why the Sutrakara should never hint even at what /S/a@nkara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only, ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its nature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sutrakara was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept /S/a@nkara's mode of interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming; nowhere among the avowed followers of the /S/a@nkara system is there any tendency to treat the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau/d/apada down to the most modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but this one knowledge is without true value. There remains one more important passage concerning the relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedanta. I mean I, 4, 20-22, which three Sutras state the views of A/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi, and Ka/s/akr/ri/tsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed to the highest Self. The siddhanta view is enounced in Sutra 22, 'avasthiter iti Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna/h/' i.e. Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna (accounts for the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or abode.' By this 'permanent abiding' /S/a@nkara understands the Lord's abiding as, i.e. existing as--or in the condition of--the individual soul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enunciation of his own view that the individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avik/ri/ta/h/ parame/s/varo jivo nanya/h/.' Ramanuja on the other hand, likewise accepting Ka/saak/ri/tsna's opinion as the siddhanta view, explains 'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul, as described in the antaryamin-brahma/n/a.--We can hardly maintain that the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by Sa@/n/kara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged in favour of Ramanuja's interpretation that in the five other places where avasthiti (or anavasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent abiding or permanent abode within something. If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding enquiry as to the teaching of the Sutras, I must give it as my opinion that they do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and I/s/vara in /S/a@nkara's sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world; and that they do not, with /S/a@nkara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I do not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results. Upon Ramanuja's mode of interpretation--although I accept it without reserve in some important details--I look on the whole as more useful in providing us with a powerful means of criticising /S/a@nkara's explanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of the text. The author of the Sutras may have held views about the nature of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of /S/a@nkara, and yet not agreeing in all points with those of Ramanuja. If, however, the negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would follow even from them that the system of Badaraya/n/a had greater affinities with that of the Bhagavatas and Ramanuja than with the one of which the /S/a@nkara-bhashya is the classical exponent. It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sutras that only a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling us to form a judgment as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine advocated by Badaraya/n/a. The reason of this is that the greater part of the work is taken up with matters which, according to /S/a@nkara's terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no light upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word. This circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging to /S/a@nkara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower vidya is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are treated with great shortness; and rightly so, for they are unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i.e. final release. When we therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called lower vidya are treated very fully in the Vedanta-sutras, when we observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the investigation of the unity of vidyas (most of which are so-called sagu/n/a, i.e. lower vidyas) is carried in the third adhyaya, or the fact of almost the whole fourth adhyaya being devoted to the ultimate fate of the possessor of the lower vidya; we certainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what /S/a@nkara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed in Badaraya/n/a's opinion part of that knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition. The question as to what kind of system is represented by the Vedanta-sutras may be approached in another way also. While hitherto we have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sutras by means of the different commentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the first place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sutras what doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teaching the Sutras doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads can be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must consider it at the least highly probable that that very same doctrine--of whatever special nature it may be--is hidden in the enigmatical aphorisms of Badaraya/n/a.[24] I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation a safe one. Even if it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads agrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will be paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled unhesitatingly to assume that the Sutras set forth the same doctrine. Whatever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the undeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient times not one but several essentially differing systems, all of which lay claim to the distinction of being the true representatives of the teaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sutras. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Maya is distinctly enunciated in the Upanishads; nevertheless Ramanuja and, for all we know to the contrary, the whole series of more ancient commentators on whom he looked as authorities in the interpretation of the Sutras, denied that the Upanishads teach Maya, and it is hence by no means impossible that Badaraya/n/a should have done the same. The a priori style of reasoning as to the teaching of the Sutras is therefore without much force. But apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the meaning of the Sutras there, of course, remains for us the all-important question as to the true teaching of the Upanishads, a question which a translator of the Sutras and /S/a@nkara cannot afford to pass over in silence, especially after reason has been shown for the conclusion that the Sutras and the /S/a@nkara-bhashya do not agree concerning most important points of Vedantic doctrine. The Sutras as well as the later commentaries claim, in the first place, to be nothing more than systematisations of the Upanishads, and for us a considerable part at least of their value and interest lies in this their nature. Hence the further question presents itself by whom the teaching of the Upanishads has been most adequately systematised, whether by Badaraya/n/a, or /S/a@nkara, or Ramanuja, or some other commentator. This question requires to be kept altogether separate from the enquiry as to which commentator most faithfully renders the contents of the Sutras, and it is by no means impossible that /S/a@nkara, for instance, should in the end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with regard to the teaching of the Upanishads than concerning the meaning of the Sutras. We must remark here at once that, whatever commentator may be found to deserve preference on the whole, it appears fairly certain already at the outset that none of the systems which Indian ingenuity has succeeded in erecting on the basis of the Upanishads can be accepted in its entirety. The reason for this lies in the nature of the Upanishads themselves. To the Hindu commentator and philosopher the Upanishads came down as a body of revealed truth whose teaching had, somehow or other, to be shown to be thoroughly consistent and free from contradictions; a system had to be devised in which a suitable place could be allotted to every one of the multitudinous statements which they make on the various points of Vedantic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in fact to any one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine of /S/ruti, it will certainly appear that all such attempts stand self-condemned. If anything is evident even on a cursory review of the Upanishads--and the impression so created is only strengthened by a more careful investigation--it is that they do not constitute a systematic whole. They themselves, especially the older ones, give the most unmistakable indications on that point. Not only are the doctrines expounded in the different Upanishads ascribed to different teachers, but even the separate sections of one and the same Upanishad are assigned to different authorities. It would be superfluous to quote examples of what a mere look at the Chandogya Upanishad, for instance, suffices to prove. It is of course not impossible that even a multitude of teachers should agree in imparting precisely the same doctrine; but in the case of the Upanishads that is certainly not antecedently probable. For, in the first place, the teachers who are credited with the doctrines of the Upanishads manifestly belonged to different sections of Brahminical society, to different Vedic /s/akhas; nay, some of them the tradition makes out to have been kshattriyas. And, in the second place, the period, whose mental activity is represented in the Upanishads, was a creative one, and as such cannot be judged according to the analogy of later periods of Indian philosophic development. The later philosophic schools as, for instance, the one of which /S/a@nkara is the great representative, were no longer free in their speculations, but strictly bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, which could not be changed or added to, but merely systematised and commented upon. Hence the rigorous uniformity of doctrine characteristic of those schools. But there had been a time when, what later writers received as a sacred legacy, determining and confining the whole course of their speculations, first sprang from the minds of creative thinkers not fettered by the tradition of any school, but freely following the promptings of their own heads and hearts. By the absence of school traditions, I do not indeed mean that the great teachers who appear in the Upanishads were free to make an entirely new start, and to assign to their speculations any direction they chose; for nothing can be more certain than that, at the period as the outcome of whose philosophical activity the Upanishads have to be considered, there were in circulation certain broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every member of Brahminical society. But those ideas were neither very definite nor worked out in detail, and hence allowed themselves to be handled and fashioned in different ways by different individuals. With whom the few leading conceptions traceable in the teaching of all Upanishads first originated, is a point on which those writings themselves do not enlighten us, and which we have no other means for settling; most probably they are to be viewed not as the creation of any individual mind, but as the gradual outcome of speculations carried on by generations of Vedic theologians. In the Upanishads themselves, at any rate, they appear as floating mental possessions which may be seized and moulded into new forms by any one who feels within himself the required inspiration. A certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden being in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be spread everywhere, and often issues from the most unexpected sources. /S/vetaketu receives instruction from his father Uddalaka; the proud Gargya has to become the pupil of Ajata/s/atru, the king of Ka/s/i; Bhujyu Sahyayani receives answers to his questions from a Gandharva possessing a maiden; Satyakama learns what Brahman is from the bull of the herd he is tending, from Agni and from a flamingo; and Upako/s/ala is taught by the sacred fires in his teacher's house. All this is of course legend, not history; but the fact that the philosophic and theological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed in this legendary garb certainly does not strengthen the expectation of finding in them a rigidly systematic doctrine. And a closer investigation of the contents of the Upanishads amply confirms this preliminary impression. If we avail ourselves, for instance, of M. Paul Regnaud's Materiaux pour servir a l'Histoire de la Philosophie de l'Inde, in which the philosophical lucubrations of the different Upanishads are arranged systematically according to topics, we can see with ease how, together with a certain uniformity of general leading conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in details, and very often not unimportant details. A look, for instance, at the collection of passages relative to the origination of the world from the primitive being, suffices to show that the task of demonstrating that whatever the Upanishads teach on that point can be made to fit into a homogeneous system is an altogether hopeless one. The accounts there given of the creation belong, beyond all doubt to different stages of philosophic and theological development or else to different sections of priestly society. None but an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be inclined and sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for instance, the legend of the atman purushavidha, the Self in the shape of a person which is as large as man and woman together, and then splits itself into two halves from which cows, horses, asses, goats, &c. are produced in succession (B/ri/. Up. I, 1, 4), can be reconciled with the account given of the creation in the Chandogya Upanishad, where it is said that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat, 'that which is,' and that feeling a desire of being many it emitted out of itself ether, and then all the other elements in due succession. The former is a primitive cosmogonic myth, which in its details shows striking analogies with the cosmogonic myths of other nations; the latter account is fairly developed Vedanta (although not Vedanta implying the Maya doctrine). We may admit that both accounts show a certain fundamental similarity in so far as they derive the manifold world from one original being; but to go beyond this and to maintain, as /S/a@nkara does, that the atman purushavidha of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka is the so-called Virag of the latter Vedanta--implying thereby that that section consciously aims at describing only the activity of one special form of I/s/vara, and not simply the whole process of creation--is the ingenious shift of an orthodox commentator in difficulties, but nothing more. How all those more or less conflicting texts came to be preserved and handed down to posterity, is not difficult to understand. As mentioned above, each of the great sections of Brahminical priesthood had its own sacred texts, and again in each of those sections there existed more ancient texts which it was impossible to discard when deeper and more advanced speculations began in their turn to be embodied in literary compositions, which in the course of time likewise came to be looked upon as sacred. When the creative period had reached its termination, and the task of collecting and arranging was taken in hand, older and newer pieces were combined into wholes, and thus there arose collections of such heterogeneous character as the Chandogya and B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishads. On later generations, to which the whole body of texts came down as revealed truth, there consequently devolved the inevitable task of establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of the texts; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one, i.e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and honestly, there really is no reason to deny. For a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the different commentators employ in systematizing the contents of the Upanishads there is no room in this place. In order, however, to illustrate what is meant by the 'impossibility,' above alluded to, of combining the various doctrines of the Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a certain number of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some few at least of /S/a@nkara's interpretations, and to render clear the considerations by which he is guided. We begin with a case which has already engaged our attention when discussing the meaning of the Sutras, viz. the question concerning the ultimate fate of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahman. As we have seen, /S/a@nkara teaches that the soul of him who has risen to an insight into the nature of the higher Brahman does not, at the moment of death, pass out of the body, but is directly merged in Brahman by a process from which all departing and moving, in fact all considerations of space, are altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other hand, who has not risen above the knowledge of the lower qualified Brahman departs from the body by means of the artery called sushum/n/a, and following the so-called devayana, the path of the gods, mounts up to the world of Brahman. A review of the chief Upanishad texts on which /S/a@nkara founds this distinction will show how far it is justified. In a considerable number of passages the Upanishads contrast the fate of two classes of men, viz. of those who perform sacrifices and meritorious works only, and of those who in addition possess a certain kind of knowledge. Men of the former kind ascend after death to the moon, where they live for a certain time, and then return to the earth into new forms of embodiment; persons of the latter kind proceed on the path of the gods--on which the sun forms one stage--up to the world of Brahman, from which there is no return. The chief passages to that effect are Ch. Up. V, 10; Kaush. Up. I, 2 ff.; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 ff.; B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 15 ff.; Pra/s/na Up. I, 9 ff.--In other passages only the latter of the two paths is referred to, cp. Ch. Up. IV, 15; VIII 6, 5; Taitt. Up. I, 6; B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9; V, 10; Maitr. Up. VI, 30, to mention only the more important ones. Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows I think, beyond any doubt, that what is meant there by the knowledge which leads through the sun to the world of Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the devotee is capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his knowledge enables him to proceed denotes the highest state which he can ever reach, the state of final release, if we choose to call it by that name.--Ch. Up. V, 10 says, 'Those who know this (viz. the doctrine of the five fires), and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities go to light,' &c.--Ch. Up. IV, 15 is manifestly intended to convey the true knowledge of Brahman; Upako/s/ala's teacher himself represents the instruction given by him as superior to the teaching of the sacred fires.--Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5 quotes the old /s/loka which says that the man moving upwards by the artery penetrating the crown of the head reaches the Immortal.--Kaush. Up. I, 2--which gives the most detailed account of the ascent of the soul--contains no intimation whatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to the Brahman world, being of an inferior nature.--Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 agrees with the Chandogya in saying that 'Those who practise penance and faith in the forest, tranquil, wise, and living on alms, depart free from passion, through the sun, to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is imperishable,' and nothing whatever in the context countenances the assumption that not the highest knowledge and the highest Person are there referred to.--B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8 quotes old /s/lokas clearly referring to the road of the gods ('the small old path'), on which 'sages who know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence higher on as entirely free.--That path was found by Brahman, and on it goes whoever knows Brahman.'--B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 15 is another version of the Pa/nk/agnividya, with the variation, 'Those who know this, and those who in the forest worship faith and the True, go to light,' &c.--Pra/s/na Up. 1, 10 says, 'Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path Aditya, the sun. There is the home of the spirits, the immortal free from danger, the highest. From thence they do not return, for it is the end.'--Maitr. Up. VI, 30 quotes /s/lokas, 'One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing the solar orb: by it, having stepped beyond the world of Brahman, they go to the highest path.' All these passages are as clear as can be desired. The soul of the sage who knows Brahman passes out by the sushum/n/a, and ascends by the path of the gods to the world of Brahman, there to remain for ever in some blissful state. But, according to /S/a@nkara, all these texts are meant to set forth the result of a certain inferior knowledge only, of the knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. Even in a passage apparently so entirely incapable of more than one interpretation as B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 15, the 'True,' which the holy hermits in the forest are said to worship, is not to be the highest Brahman, but only Hira/n/yagarbha!--And why?--Only because the system so demands it, the system which teaches that those who know the highest Brahman become on their death one with it, without having to resort to any other place. The passage on which this latter tenet is chiefly based is B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 6, 7, where, with the fate of him who at his death has desires, and whose soul therefore enters a new body after having departed from the old one, accompanied by all the pra/n/as, there is contrasted the fate of the sage free from all desires. 'But as to the man who does not desire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him (tasya) do not depart--being Brahman he goes to Brahman.' We have seen above (p. lxxx) that this passage is referred to in the important Sutras on whose right interpretation it, in the first place, depends whether or not we must admit the Sutrakara to have acknowledged the distinction of a para and an apara vidya. Here the passage interests us as throwing light on the way in which /S/a@nkara systematises. He looks on the preceding part of the chapter as describing what happens to the souls of all those who do not know the highest Brahman, inclusive of those who know the lower Brahman only. They pass out of the old bodies followed by all pra/n/as and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand, section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not pass out of the body, but becomes one with Brahman then and there. This interpretation of the purport of the entire chapter is not impossibly right, although I am rather inclined to think that the chapter aims at setting forth in its earlier part the future of him who does not know Brahman at all, while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him who does know Brahman (i.e. Brahman pure and simple, the text knowing of no distinction of the so-called lower and higher Brahman). In explaining section 6 /S/a@nkara lays stress upon the clause 'na tasya pra/n/a utkramanti,' 'his vital spirits do not pass out,' taking this to signify that the soul with the vital spirits does not move at all, and thus does not ascend to the world of Brahman; while the purport of the clause may simply be that the soul and vital spirits do not go anywhere else, i.e. do not enter a new body, but are united, somehow or other, with Brahman. On /S/a@nkara's interpretation there immediately arises a new difficulty. In the /s/lokas, quoted under sections 8 and 9, the description of the small old path which leads to the svargaloka and higher on clearly refers--as noticed already above--to the path through the veins, primarily the sushum/n/a, on which, according to so many other passages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path is, according to /S/a@nkara, followed by him only who has not risen above the lower knowledge, and yet the /s/lokas have manifestly to be connected with what is said in the latter half of 6 about the owner of the para vidya. Hence /S/a@nkara sees himself driven to explain the /s/lokas in 8 and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in Professor Max Mueller's version) as follows: 8. 'The subtle old path (i.e. the path of knowledge on which final release is reached; which path is subtle, i.e. difficult to know, and old, i.e. to be known from the eternal Veda) has been obtained and fully reached by me. On it the sages who know Brahman reach final release (svargaloka/s/abda/h/ samnihitaprakara/n/at mokshabhidhayaka/h/). 9. 'On that path they say that there is white or blue or yellow or green or red (i.e. others maintain that the path to final release is, in accordance with the colour of the arteries, either white or blue, &c.; but that is false, for the paths through the arteries lead at the best to the world of Brahman, which itself forms part of the sa/m/sara); that path (i.e. the only path to release, viz. the path of true knowledge) is found by Brahman, i.e. by such Brahma/n/as as through true knowledge have become like Brahman,' &c. A significant instance in truth of the straits to which thorough-going systematisers of the Upanishads see themselves reduced occasionally! But we return to the point which just now chiefly interests us. Whether /S/a@nkara's interpretation of the chapter, and especially of section 6, be right or wrong, so much is certain that we are not entitled to view all those texts which speak of the soul going to the world of Brahman as belonging to the so-called lower knowledge, because a few other passages declare that the sage does not go to Brahman. The text which declares the sage free from desires to become one with Brahman could not, without due discrimination, be used to define and limit the meaning of other passages met with in the same Upanishad even--for as we have remarked above the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka contains pieces manifestly belonging to different stages of development;--much less does it entitle us to put arbitrary constructions on passages forming part of other Upanishads. Historically the disagreement of the various accounts is easy to understand. The older notion was that the soul of the wise man proceeds along the path of the gods to Brahman's abode. A later--and, if we like, more philosophic--conception is that, as Brahman already is a man's Self, there is no need of any motion on man's part to reach Brahman. We may even apply to those two views the terms apara and para--lower and higher--knowledge. But we must not allow any commentator to induce us to believe that what he from his advanced standpoint looks upon as an inferior kind of cognition, was viewed in the same light by the authors of the Upanishads. We turn to another Upanishad text likewise touching upon the point considered in what precedes, viz. the second Brahma/n/a of the third adhyaya of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka. The discussion there first turns upon the grahas and atigrahas, i.e. the senses and organs and their objects, and Yajnavalkya thereupon explains that death, by which everything is overcome, is itself overcome by water; for death is fire. The colloquy then turns to what we must consider an altogether new topic, Artabhaga asking, 'When this man (ayam purusha) dies, do the vital spirits depart from him or not?' and Yajnavalkya answering, 'No, they are gathered up in him; he swells, he is inflated; inflated the dead (body) is lying.'--Now this is for /S/a@nkara an important passage, as we have already seen above (p. lxxxi); for he employs it, in his comment on Ved.-sutra IV, 2, 13, for the purpose of proving that the passage B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 6 really means that the vital spirits do not, at the moment of death, depart from the true sage. Hence the present passage also must refer to him who possesses the highest knowledge; hence the 'ayam purusha' must be 'that man,' i.e. the man who possesses the highest knowledge, and the highest knowledge then must be found in the preceding clause which says that death itself may be conquered by water. But, as Ramanuja also remarks, neither does the context favour the assumption that the highest knowledge is referred to, nor do the words of section 11 contain any indication that what is meant is the merging of the Self of the true Sage in Brahman. With the interpretation given by Ramanuja himself, viz. that the pra/n/as do not depart from the jiva of the dying man, but accompany it into a new body, I can agree as little (although he no doubt rightly explains the 'ayam purusha' by 'man' in general), and am unable to see in the passage anything more than a crude attempt to account for the fact that a dead body appears swollen and inflated.--A little further on (section 13) Artabhaga asks what becomes of this man (ayam purusha) when his speech has entered into the fire, his breath into the air, his eye into the sun, &c. So much here is clear that we have no right to understand by the 'ayam purusha' of section 13 anybody different from the 'ayam purusha' of the two preceding sections; in spite of this /S/a@nkara--according to whose system the organs of the true sage do not enter into the elements, but are directly merged in Brahman--explains the 'ayam purusha' of section 13 to be the 'asa/m/yagdar/s/in,' i.e. the person who has not risen to the cognition of the highest Brahman. And still a further limiting interpretation is required by the system. The asa/m/yagdar/s/in also--who as such has to remain in the sa/m/sara--cannot do without the organs, since his jiva when passing out of the old body into a new one is invested with the subtle body; hence section 13 cannot be taken as saying what it clearly does say, viz. that at death the different organs pass into the different elements, but as merely indicating that the organs are abandoned by the divinities which, during lifetime, presided over them! The whole third adhyaya indeed of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka affords ample proof of the artificial character of /S/a@nkara's attempts to show that the teaching of the Upanishads follows a definite system. The eighth brahma/n/a, for instance, is said to convey the doctrine of the highest non-related Brahman, while the preceding brahma/n/as had treated only of I/s/vara in his various aspects. But, as a matter of fact, brahma/n/a 8, after having, in section 8, represented Brahman as destitute of all qualities, proceeds, in the next section, to describe that very same Brahman as the ruler of the world, 'By the command of that Imperishable sun and moon stand apart,' &c.; a clear indication that the author of the Upanishad does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman in--/S/a@nkara's sense.--The preceding brahma/n/a (7) treats of the antaryamin, i.e. Brahman viewed as the internal ruler of everything. This, according to /S/a@nkara, is the lower form of Brahman called I/s/vara; but we observe that the antaryamin as well as the so-called highest Brahman described in section 8 is, at the termination of the two sections, characterised by means of the very same terms (7, 23: Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, &c.; and 8, 11: That Brahman is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, &c.).--Nothing can be clearer than that all these sections aim at describing one and the same being, and know nothing of the distinctions made by the developed Vedanta, however valid the latter may be from a purely philosophic point of view. We may refer to one more similar instance from the Chandogya Upanishad. We there meet in III, 14 with one of the most famous vidyas describing the nature of Brahman, called after its reputed author the Sa/nd/ilya-vidya. This small vidya is decidedly one of the finest and most characteristic texts; it would be difficult to point out another passage setting forth with greater force and eloquence and in an equally short compass the central doctrine of the Upanishads. Yet this text, which, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest conception of Brahman's nature that Sa/nd/ilya's thought was able to reach, is by /S/a@nkara and his school again declared to form part of the lower vidya only, because it represents Brahman as possessing qualities. It is, according to their terminology, not j/n/ana, i.e. knowledge, but the injunction of a mere upasana, a devout meditation on Brahman in so far as possessing certain definite attributes such as having light for its form, having true thoughts, and so on. The Ramanujas, on the other hand, quote this text with preference as clearly describing the nature of their highest, i.e. their one Brahman. We again allow that /S/a@nkara is free to deny that any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies absolute truth; but we also again remark that there is no reason whatever for supposing that Sa/nd/ilya, or whoever may have been the author of that vidya, looked upon it as anything else but a statement of the highest truth accessible to man. We return to the question as to the true philosophy of the Upanishads, apart from the systems of the commentators.--From what precedes it will appear with sufficient distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy a philosophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all contradictions and allowing room for all the different statements made in all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of the Upanishads cannot even be spoken of. The various lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the human soul of which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to be systematised simply because they were never meant to form a system. /S/a/nd/ilya's views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details agree with those of Yaj/n/avalkya, and Uddalaka differed from both. In this there is nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests altogether with those who maintain that a large number of detached philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed to different authors, doubtless belonging to different periods, and not seldom manifestly contradicting each other, admit of being combined into a perfectly consistent whole. The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we take the terms 'philosophy' and 'philosophical system,' not in the strict sense in which /S/a@nkara and other commentators are not afraid of taking them, but as implying merely an agreement in certain fundamental features. In this latter sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of a philosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that precision in details is not to be aimed at. And here we finally see ourselves driven back altogether on the texts themselves, and have to acknowledge that the help we receive from commentators, to whatever school they may belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be asserted that the texts on the whole oppose very serious difficulties to a right understanding, however obscure the details often are. Concerning the latter we occasionally depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by the scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the texts are concerned, we are quite able to judge by ourselves, and are even specially qualified to do so by having no particular system to advocate. The point we will first touch upon is the same from which we started when examining the doctrine of the Sutras, viz. the question whether the Upanishads acknowledge a higher and lower knowledge in /S/a@nkara's sense, i.e. a knowledge of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we find not to be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently opposed to avidya, by which latter term we have to understand ignorance as to Brahman, absence of philosophic knowledge; and, again, in several places we find the knowledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with its supplementary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge of the Self; to which latter distinction the Mu/nd/aka Up. (I, 4) applies the terms apara and para vidya. But a formal recognition of the essential difference of Brahman being viewed, on the one hand, as possessing distinctive attributes, and, on the other hand, as devoid of all such attributes is not to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed sometimes described as sagu/n/a and sometimes as nirgu/n/a (to use later terms); but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinction of two different kinds of knowledge leading to altogether different results. The knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed; hence the circumstance (already exemplified above) that in the same vidyas it is spoken of as sagu/n/a as well as nirgu/n/a. When the mind of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from which all this world originates, and in which it rests, he naturally applies to it distinctive attributes pointing at its relation to the world; Brahman, then, is called the Self and life of all, the inward ruler, the omniscient Lord, and so on. When, on the other hand, the author follows out the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an outward manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from sensible experience can rightly be applied to it, that nothing more may be predicated of it but that it is neither this nor that. But these are only two aspects of the cognition of one and the same entity. Closely connected with the question as to the double nature of the Brahman of the Upanishads is the question as to their teaching Maya.--From Colebrooke downwards the majority of European writers have inclined towards the opinion that the doctrine of Maya, i.e. of the unreal illusory character of the sensible world, does not constitute a feature of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was introduced into the system at some later period, whether by Badaraya/n/a or /S/a@nkara or somebody else. The opposite view, viz. that the doctrine of Maya forms an integral element of the teaching of the Upanishads, is implied in them everywhere, and enunciated more or less distinctly in more than one place, has in recent times been advocated with much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his Philosophy of the Upanishads. In his Materiaux, &c. M. Paul Regnaud remarks that 'the doctrine of Maya, although implied in the teaching of the Upanishads, could hardly become clear and explicit before the system had reached a stage of development necessitating a choice between admitting two co-existent eternal principles (which became the basis of the Sa@nkhya philosophy), and accepting the predominance of the intellectual principle, which in the end necessarily led to the negation of the opposite principle.'--To the two alternatives here referred to as possible we, however, have to add a third one, viz. that form of the Vedanta of which the theory of the Bhagavatas or Ramanujas is the most eminent type, and according to which Brahman carries within its own nature an element from which the material universe originates; an element which indeed is not an independent entity like the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas, but which at the same time is not an unreal Maya but quite as real as any other part of Brahman's nature. That a doctrine of this character actually developed itself on the basis of the Upanishads, is a circumstance which we clearly must not lose sight of, when attempting to determine what the Upanishads themselves are teaching concerning the character of the world. In enquiring whether the Upanishads maintain the Maya doctrine or not, we must proceed with the same caution as regards other parts of the system, i.e. we must refrain from using unhesitatingly, and without careful consideration of the merits of each individual case, the teaching--direct or inferred--of any one passage to the end of determining the drift of the teaching of other passages. We may admit that some passages, notably of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, contain at any rate the germ of the later developed Maya doctrine[25], and thus render it quite intelligible that a system like /S/a@nkara's should evolve itself, among others, out of the Upanishads; but that affords no valid reason for interpreting Maya into other texts which give a very satisfactory sense without that doctrine, or are even clearly repugnant to it. This remark applies in the very first place to all the accounts of the creation of the physical universe. There, if anywhere, the illusional character of the world should have been hinted at, at least, had that theory been held by the authors of those accounts; but not a word to that effect is met with anywhere. The most important of those accounts--the one given in the sixth chapter of the Chandogya Upanishad--forms no exception. There is absolutely no reason to assume that the 'sending forth' of the elements from the primitive Sat, which is there described at length, was by the writer of that passage meant to represent a vivarta rather than a pari/n/ama that the process of the origination of the physical universe has to be conceived as anything else but a real manifestation of real powers hidden in the primeval Self. The introductory words, addressed to /S/vetaketu by Uddalaka, which are generally appealed to as intimating the unreal character of the evolution about to be described, do not, if viewed impartially, intimate any such thing[26]. For what is capable of being proved, and manifestly meant to be proved, by the illustrative instances of the lump of clay and the nugget of gold, through which there are known all things made of clay and gold? Merely that this whole world has Brahman for its causal substance, just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen pot, and gold of every golden ornament, but not that the process through which any causal substance becomes an effect is an unreal one. We--including Uddalaka--may surely say that all earthen pots are in reality nothing but earth--the earthen pot being merely a special modification (vikara) of clay which has a name of its own--without thereby committing ourselves to the doctrine that the change of form, which a lump of clay undergoes when being fashioned into a pot, is not real but a mere baseless illusion. In the same light we have to view numerous other passages which set forth the successive emanations proceeding from the first principle. When, for instance, we meet in the Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10, in the serial enumeration of the forms of existence intervening between the gross material world and the highest Self (the Person), with the 'avyak/ri/ta,' the Undeveloped, immediately below the purusha; and when again the Mu/nd/aka Up. II, 1, 2, speaks of the 'high Imperishable' higher than which is the heavenly Person; there is no reason whatever to see in that 'Undeveloped' and that 'high Imperishable' anything but that real element in Brahman from which, as in the Ramanuja system, the material universe springs by a process of real development. We must of course render it quite clear to ourselves in what sense the terms 'real' and 'unreal' have to be understood. The Upanishads no doubt teach emphatically that the material world does not owe its existence to any principle independent from the Lord like the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas; the world is nothing but a manifestation of the Lord's wonderful power, and hence is unsubstantial, if we take the term 'substance' in its strict sense. And, again, everything material is immeasurably inferior in nature to the highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated, and which it now hides from the individual soul. But neither unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned constitutes unreality in the sense in which the Maya of /S/a@nkara is unreal. According to the latter the whole world is nothing but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as the snake, for which a piece of rope is mistaken by the belated traveller, and disappearing just as the imagined snake does as soon as the light of true knowledge has risen. But this is certainly not the impression left on the mind by a comprehensive review of the Upanishads which dwells on their general scope, and does not confine itself to the undue urging of what may be implied in some detached passages. The Upanishads do not call upon us to look upon the whole world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge; the great error which they admonish us to relinquish is rather that things have a separate individual existence, and are not tied together by the bond of being all of them effects of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do not say that true knowledge sublates this false world, as /S/a@nkara says, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the world--the inferior murta rupa of Brahman, to use an expression of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka--and to become one with Brahman in its highest form. 'We are to see everything in Brahman, and Brahman in everything;' the natural meaning of this is, 'we are to look upon this whole world as a true manifestation of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.' The mayavadin has indeed appropriated the above saying also, and interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory; but he is able to do so only by perverting its manifest sense. For him it would be appropriate to say, not that everything we see is in Brahman, but rather that everything we see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread over it and hiding it from us. Stress has been laid[27] upon certain passages of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka which seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms, indicative of duality or plurality of existence, by means of an added 'iva,' i.e. 'as it were' (yatranyad iva syat; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati; atma dhyayativa lelayativa). Those passages no doubt readily lend themselves to Maya interpretations, and it is by no means impossible that in their author's mind there was something like an undeveloped Maya doctrine. I must, however, remark that they, on the other hand, also admit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of the unreality of the world. If Yaj/n/avalkya refers to the latter as that 'where there is something else as it were, where there is duality as it were,' he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion, according to which the individual forms of existence of the world are opposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all things being one in so far as they spring from--and are parts of--Brahman. This would in no way involve duality or plurality being unreal in /S/a@nkara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is only one universal substance. And with regard to the clause 'the Self thinks as it were' it has to be noted that according to the commentators the 'as it were' is meant to indicate that truly not the Self is thinking, but the upadhis, i.e. especially the manas with which the Self is connected. But whether these upadhis are the mere offspring of Maya, as /S/a@nkara thinks, or real forms of existence, as Ramanuja teaches, is an altogether different question. I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations, and am ready to admit that not impossibly those iva's indicate that the thought of the writer who employed them was darkly labouring with a conception akin to--although much less explicit than--the Maya of /S/a@nkara. But what I object to is, that conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all, doubtful import should be employed for introducing the Maya doctrine into other passages which do not even hint at it, and are fully intelligible without it.[28] The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads we have to touch upon is the relation of the jivas, the individual souls to the highest Self. The special views regarding that point held by /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja, as have been stated before. Confronting their theories with the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit without hesitation, that /S/a@nkara's doctrine faithfully represents the prevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important point at least, viz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage--whatever its original relation to Brahman may be--is in the end completely merged and indistinguishably lost in the universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly alluded to before, has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain texts of the Upanishads describe the soul's going upwards, on the path of the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells for unnumbered years, i.e. for ever. Those texts, as a type of which we may take, the passage Kaushit. Up. I--the fundamental text of the Ramanujas concerning the soul's fate after death--belong to an earlier stage of philosophic development; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a continued individual existence. But mixed with texts of this class there are others in which the final absolute identification of the individual Self with the universal Self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. 'He who knows Brahman and becomes Brahman;' 'he who knows Brahman becomes all this;' 'as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, thus a wise man goes to the divine person.' And if we look to the whole, to the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the doctrine embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the Upanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently and clearly stated theory of the individual souls being merged in Brahman in the state of deep dreamless sleep. It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching of the Upanishads concerning the original relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, although there can be no doubt that it has to be viewed as proceeding from the latter, and somehow forming a part of it. Negatively we are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to which the soul is merely brahma bhrantam or brahma mayopadhikam, is in no way countenanced by the majority of the passages bearing on the question. If the emission of the elements, described in the Chandogya and referred to above, is a real process--of which we saw no reason to doubt--the jiva atman with which the highest Self enters into the emitted elements is equally real, a true part or emanation of Brahman itself. After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief elements of Vedantic doctrine according to the Upanishads, we may briefly consider /S/a@nkara's system and mode of interpretation--with whose details we had frequent opportunities of finding fault--as a whole. It has been said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the Upanishads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are quite ready to admit that /S/a@nkara's system is most probably the best which can be devised. While unable to allow that the Upanishads recognise a lower and higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the distinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge that the adoption of that distinction furnishes the interpreter with an instrument of extraordinary power for reducing to an orderly whole the heterogeneous material presented by the old theosophic treatises. This becomes very manifest as soon as we compare /S/a@nkara's system with that of Ramanuja. The latter recognises only one Brahman which is, as we should say, a personal God, and he therefore lays stress on all those passages of the Upanishads which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a personal God, such as omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages, on the other hand, whose decided tendency it is to represent Brahman as transcending all qualities, as one undifferenced mass of impersonal intelligence, Ramanuja is unable to accept frankly and fairly, and has to misinterpret them more or less to make them fall in with his system. The same remark holds good with regard to those texts which represent the individual soul as finally identifying itself with Brahman; Ramanuja cannot allow a complete identification but merely an assimilation carried as far as possible. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, by skilfully ringing the changes on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to find room for whatever the Upanishads have to say. Where the text speaks of Brahman as transcending all attributes, the highest doctrine is set forth. Where Brahman is called the All-knowing ruler of the world, the author means to propound the lower knowledge of the Lord only. And where the legends about the primary being and its way of creating the world become somewhat crude and gross, Hira/n/yagarbha and Viraj are summoned forth and charged with the responsibility. Of Viraj Mr. Gough remarks (p. 55) that in him a place is provided by the poets of the Upanishads for the purusha of the ancient /ri/shis, the divine being out of whom the visible and tangible world proceeded. This is quite true if only we substitute for the 'poets of the Upanishads' the framers of the orthodox Vedanta system--for the Upanishads give no indication whatever that by their purusha they understand not the simple old purusha but the Viraj occupying a definite position in a highly elaborate system;--but the mere phrase, 'providing a place' intimates with sufficient clearness the nature of the work in which systematisers of the Vedantic doctrine are engaged. /S/a@nkara's method thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to different stages of historical development, to recognise clearly existing differences which other systematisers are intent on obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of other Vedantic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction made by /S/a@nkara between Brahman and I/s/vara is known to the Upanishads; but we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made between those texts which represent Brahman as nirgu/n/a, and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, /S/a@nkara is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind. The Brahman of the old Upanishads, from which the souls spring to enjoy individual consciousness in their waking state, and into which they sink back temporarily in the state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in death, is certainly not represented adequately by the strictly personal I/s/vara of Ramanuja, who rules the world in wisdom and mercy. The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes of their highest being, and hence /S/a@nkara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypostatised personal I/s/vara[29] a lower place than to his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads in his theory of the ultimate fate of the soul, we have already remarked above. And although the Maya doctrine cannot, in my opinion, be said to form part of the teaching of the Upanishads, it cannot yet be asserted to contradict it openly, because the very point which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the mode in which the physical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls originate, is left by the Upanishads very much in the dark. The later growth of the Maya doctrine on the basis of the Upanishads is therefore quite intelligible, and I fully agree with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it that there has been no addition to the system from without but only a development from within, no graft but only growth. The lines of thought which finally led to the elaboration of the full-blown Maya theory may be traced with considerable certainty. In the first place, deepening speculation on Brahman tended to the notion of advaita being taken in a more and more strict sense, as implying not only the exclusion of any second principle external to Brahman, but also the absence of any elements of duality or plurality in the nature of the one universal being itself; a tendency agreeing with the spirit of a certain set of texts from the Upanishads. And as the fact of the appearance of a manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to thoroughly consistent speculation was to deny at any rate its reality, and to call it a mere illusion due to an unreal principle, with which Brahman is indeed associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's nature just on account of its own unreality. And, in the second place, a more thorough following out of the conception that the union with Brahman is to be reached through true knowledge only, not unnaturally led to the conclusion that what separates us in our unenlightened state from Brahman is such as to allow itself to be completely sublated by an act of knowledge; is, in other words, nothing else but an erroneous notion, an illusion.--A further circumstance which may not impossibly have co-operated to further the development of the theory of the world's unreality will be referred to later on.[30] We have above been obliged to leave it an open question what kind of Vedanta is represented by the Vedanta-sutras, although reason was shown for the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more closely related to the system of Ramanuja than to that of /S/a@nkara. If so, the philosophy of /S/a@nkara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sutras of Badaraya/n/a. This would indeed be a somewhat unexpected conclusion--for, judging a priori, we should be more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true doctrine of the Upanishads through Badaraya/n/a to /S/a@nkara--but a priori considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence to the contrary. There are, moreover, other facts in the history of Indian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate the possibility of Badaraya/n/a's Sutras already setting forth a doctrine that lays greater stress on the personal character of the highest being than is in agreement with the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads. That the pure doctrine of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent at a rather early period amalgamations with beliefs which most probably had sprung up in altogether different--priestly or non-priestly--communities is a well-known circumstance; it suffices for our purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early literary monuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned is observable, viz. the Bhagavadgita. The doctrine of the Bhagavadgita represents a fusion of the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a personal highest being--K/ri/sh/n/a or Vish/n/u--which in many respects approximates very closely to the system of the Bhagavatas; the attempts of a certain set of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth pure Vedanta, i.e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be set aside. But this same Bhagavadgita is quoted in Badaraya/n/a's Sutras (at least according to the unanimous explanations of the most eminent scholiasts of different schools) as inferior to /S/ruti only in authority. The Sutras, moreover, refer in different places to certain Vedantic portions of the Mahabharata, especially the twelfth book, several of which represent forms of Vedanta distinctly differing from /S/a@nkara's teaching, and closely related to the system of the Bhagavatas. Facts of this nature--from entering into the details of which we are prevented by want of space--tend to mitigate the prima facie strangeness of the assumption that the Vedanta-sutras, which occupy an intermediate position between the Upanishads and /S/a@nkara, should yet diverge in their teaching from both. The Vedanta of Gau/d/apada and /S/a@nkara would in that case mark a strictly orthodox reaction against all combinations of non-Vedic elements of belief and doctrine with the teaching of the Upanishads. But although this form of doctrine has ever since /S/a@nkara's time been the one most generally accepted by Brahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sympathy with the wants of the human heart, which, after all, are not so very different in India from what they are elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India, are those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who think it sweet 'to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite.'[31] The only forms of Vedantic philosophy which are--and can at any time have been--really popular, are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads has somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and the devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part of man, justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity. The only religious books of widespread influence are such as the Ramayan of Tulsidas, which lay no stress on the distinction between an absolute Brahman inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory principle of Maya, but love to dwell on the delights of devotion to one all-wise and merciful ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper. * * * * * The present translation of the Vedanta-sutras does not aim at rendering that sense which their author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly follows /S/a@nkara's interpretation. The question as to how far the latter agrees with the views held by Badaraya/n/a has been discussed above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a translation of /S/a@nkara's commentary with an independent version of the Sutras which it explains. Similar considerations have determined the method followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads referred to in the Sutras and discussed at length by /S/a@nkara. There also the views of the commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of the comment would appear devoid of meaning. Hence, while of course following on the whole the critical translation published by Professor Max Mueller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render intelligible /S/a@nkara's explanations and reasonings. I hope to find space in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for making some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating the Upanishads. I regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting fuller notes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most of them, on the /t/ikas composed by Anandagiri and Govindananda (the former of which is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati. My best thanks are due to Pa/nd/its Rama Mi/s/ra /S/astrin and Ga@ngadhara /S/astrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my obligations to Pa/nd/it Ke/s/ava /S/astrin, of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more than one passage more definite or correct. Notes: [Footnote 19: Nanu vidusho z pi setikartavyatakopasananirv/ri/ttaye v/ri/shyannadiphalanish/t/any eva katha/m/ tesha/m/ virodhad vina/s/a u/k/yate. Tatraha pate tv iti. /S/arirapate tu tesha/m/ vina/s/a/h/ /s/arirapatad urdhv/m/ tu vidyanugu/n/ad/ri/sh/t/aphalani suk/ri/tani na/s/yantity artha/h/.] [Footnote 20: Upalabhyate hi devayanena pantha ga/kkh/ato vidushas tam pratibruuyat satyam bruyad iti /k/andramasa sa/m/vadava/k/anena /s/arirasadbhava/h/, ata/h/ sukshma/s/ariram anuvartate.] [Footnote 21: When the jiva has passed out of the body and ascends to the world of Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it reaches the river Vijara. There it divests itself of the subtle body, and the latter is merged in Brahman.]. [Footnote 22: Kim aya/m/ para/m/, yotir upasampanna/h/ saivabandhavinirmukta/h/ pratyagatma svatmana/m/ paramatmana/h/ p/rit/hagbhutam anubhavati uta tatpraharataya tadavibhaktam iti visnye so, /s/nate sarvan kaman saha brahma/n/a vipas/k/ita pasya/h/ pasyate rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartaram isa/m/ purusha/m/ brahmayoni/m/ tada vidvin pu/n/yapape vidhuya nirangana/h/ parama/m/ samyam upaiti ida/m/ jnanam upasritya mama sadharinyam agata/h/ sarve, punopajayante pralayena vyathanti /k/etyadysruysm/nt/ibhyo muktasta pare/n/a sahityasamyasadharmyavagamat p/ri/thagbhutam anubhavatiu prapte u/k/yate. Avibhageneti. Parasmad brahmana/h/ svatmanam avibhagenanubhavati mukta/h/. Kuta/h/. D/ri/shtatvat. Para/m/ brahmopasampadya niv/ri/ttavidyanrodhanasya yathatathyena svatamano d/ri/sh/ta/tvat. Svatmana/h/ ssvarupa/m/ hi tat tvam asy ayam atma brahma aitadatmyam ida/m/ sarva/m/ sarva/m/ khalv ida/m/ brahnetyadisamanadhikara/n/yanirdesai/h/ ya atmani tishtan atmano ntaro yam atma na veda yastatma sarira/m/ ya atmanam antaro yamayati atmantaryamy am/ri/tah anta/h/ pravishta/h/ sasta ananam ityadibhis /k/a paramatmatmaka/m/ ta/kk/haritataya tatprakatabhutam iti pratipaditam avashitei iti kasak/ri/stnety atrato vibhagenaha/m/ brahmasmity cvanubhavati.] [Footnote 23: /S/a@nkara's favourite illustrative instance of the magician producing illusive sights is--significantly enough--not known to the Sutras.] [Footnote 24: Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.] [Footnote 25: It is well known that, with the exception of the /S/vitasvatara and Maitrayaniya, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits the word 'maya.' The term indeed occurs in one place in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka; but that passage is a quotation from the /Ri/k Sa/m/bita in which maya means 'creative power.' Cp. P. Regnaud, La Maya, in the Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, tome xii, No. 3, 1885.] [Footnote 26: As is demonstrated very satisfactorily by Ramanuja.] [Footnote 27: Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads pp. 213 ff.] [Footnote 28: I cannot discuss in this place the Maya passages of the Svetasvatara and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true immixed doctrine of the Upanishads.] [Footnote 29: The I/s/vara who allots to the individual souls their new forms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or demerit cannot be called anything else but a personal God. That this personal conscious being is at the same time identified with the totality of the individual souls in the unconscious state of deep dreamless sleep, is one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going systematisers of Vedantic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid altogether.] [Footnote 30: That section of the introduction in which the point referred to in the text is touched upon will I hope form part of the second volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point concerning which further information had been promised above on page v.] [Footnote 31: Cosi tra questa Immensita s'annega il pensier mio, E il naufrago m' e dolce in qnesto mare. LEOPARDI. ] VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH /S/A@NKARA BHASHYA. /S/A@NKARA'S INTRODUCTION FIRST ADHYAYA. FIRST PADA. REVERENCE TO THE AUGUST VASUDEVA! It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject[32] whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the Non-Ego[33]) and the 'Ego,' and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose[34] upon the subject--whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego--the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and _vice versa_ to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural[35] procedure--which which has its cause in wrong knowledge--not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal[36], to make use of expressions such as 'That am I,' 'That is mine.[37]'--But what have we to understand by the term 'superimposition?'--The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing.[38] Some indeed define the term 'superimposition' as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing.[39] Others, again, define superimposition as the error founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is superimposed.[40] Others[41], again, define it as the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the following: 'Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' 'The moon although one only appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only on such other objects as are placed before him (i.e. in contact with his sense-organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the Ego[42], and the interior Self is well known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation.[43] Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i.e. in contact with our sense-organs; for non-discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour. Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable. This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience (avidya), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimination of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition[44]. The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the presupposition on which there base all the practical distinctions--those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda--between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final release[45].--But how can the means of right knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scriptural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience[46]?--Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, perception and the other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e. the body[47]) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed[48]. Nor can, in the absence of all that[49], the Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also--who possess a higher intelligence--run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well known that the procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non-Self); we therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men also--although distinguished by superior intelligence--proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same way as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non-Self lasts. With reference again to that kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another world; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Vedanta-texts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Brahma/n/a and Kshattriya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory existence. For such knowledge is useless and even contradictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, 'A Brahma/n/a is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, outward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we have already explained. (The superimposition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he thinks 'I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.' Attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self, which, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ, and vice versa the interior Self, which is the witness of everything, is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses, and so on. In this way there goes on this natural beginning--and endless superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the results of their actions), and is observed by every one. With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self the study of the Vedanta-texts is begun. That all the Vedanta-texts have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called /S/ariraka-mima/m/sa.[50] Of this Vedanta-mima/m/sa about to be explained by us the first Sutra is as follows. 1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman. The word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution; not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon; for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing Brahman) is not of that nature[51]. Nor has the word 'then' the sense of auspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning could not be properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word 'then' rather acts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and heard merely, while it denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows moreover from the circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate consecution.[52] If, then, the word 'then' intimates immediate consecution it must be explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends; just as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject of the Purva Mima/m/sa) specially depends on the antecedent reading of the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for those who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for those desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to the enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means of the Purva Mima/m/sa). To this question we reply in the negative, because for a man who has read the Vedanta-parts of the Veda it is possible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word 'then' to indicate order of succession; a purport which it serves in other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off of pieces from the heart and other parts of the sacrificial animal.[53] (For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the agent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), because there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the enquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and subordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act) on the part of the person qualified[54]; and because the result as well as the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that again depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss, and does not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not yet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to be accomplished (in the future); for they depend on the activity of man. In the Brahma-mima/m/sa, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i.e. Brahman, is something already accomplished (existent),--for it is eternal,--and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ moreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious duty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on him their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the fundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without laying on him the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their immediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information regarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something should be stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is proposed.--Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent conditions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means[55], and the desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman and come to know it; but not otherwise. The word 'then' therefore intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition of the above-mentioned (spiritual) means. The word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which are means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance. Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 6, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious duty'), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who knows Brahman attains the highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned means. By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be given in the next Sutra (I, 1, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance, the brahminical caste. In the Sutra the genitive case ('of Brahman;' the literal translation of the Sutra being 'then therefore the desire of knowledge of Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally supplementary (/s/esha[56]); for the desire of knowledge demands an object of desire and no other such object is stated.--But why should not the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the general relation may base itself on the more particular one.--This assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an altogether needless procedure.--Not needless; for if we explain the words of the Sutra to mean 'the desire of knowledge connected with Brahman' we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.--This reason also, we reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those objects need therefore not be mentioned, especially in the Sutra. Analogously the sentence 'there the king is going' implicitly means that the king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation (according to which the Sutra represents Brahman as the direct object of knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance, the passage, 'That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to know that. That is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). With passages of this kind the Sutra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires having reference to results[57]. Knowledge thus constitutes the means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained. For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man, since it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of the entire Sa/m/sara. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be entertained. But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry. We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of the word 'Brahman,' from the root b/ri/h, 'to be great,' we at once understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman[58]. Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the existence of the Self were not known, every one would think 'I am not.' And this Self (of whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it! Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature. Unlearned people and the Lokayatikas are of opinion that the mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain that the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the Veda), maintain that there is a transmigrating being different from the body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of action); others teach that that being is enjoying only, not acting; others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an all-knowing, all-powerful Lord[59]. Others, finally, (i.e. the Vedantins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i.e. of the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the product of Nescience). Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and scriptural texts misunderstood[60]. If therefore a man would embrace some one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this reason the first Sutra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with the help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim the highest beatitude. So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The question now arises what the characteristics of that Brahman are, and the reverend author of the Sutras therefore propounds the following aphorism. 2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i.e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed). The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares the order of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the passage, Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered, through origination, on the state of existence. The words 'of this' denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by perception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words 'from which' denote the cause. The full sense of the Sutra therefore is: That omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of this world--which world is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and causes[61], and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived by the mind,--that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination, subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in the Sutra. As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yaska[62] are possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it might--were they referred to in the Sutra--be suspected that what is meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into Brahman. The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated qualities; not either from a non-intelligent pradhana[63], or from atoms, or from non-being, or from a being subject to transmigration[64]; nor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously, without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects) special places, times, and causes have invariably to be employed. (Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world[65], think that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating beings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without recourse being had to Scripture at all).--But, it might be said, you yourself in the Sutra under discussion have merely brought forward the same argument!--By no means, we reply. The Sutras (i.e. literally 'the strings') have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedanta-passages. In reality the Vedanta-passages referred to by the Sutras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedanta-texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right knowledge. While, however, the Vedanta-passages primarily declare the cause of the origin, &c., of the world, inference also, being an instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the Vedanta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascertained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation; for the passages, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5 ('the Self is to be heard, to be considered'), and Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man, &c., having been informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhara, in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge'), declare that human understanding assists Scripture[66]. Scriptural text, &c.[67], are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in the Purva Mima/m/sa), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and intuition[68], &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of knowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished depends, moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture with sentences such as the following: 'At the atiratra he takes the sho/d/asin cup,' and 'at the atiratra he does not take the sho/d/asin cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen,' and, 'he makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional procedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All option depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, 'it is a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself.--But, it might be said, as Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a discussion of the Vedanta-texts is purposeless.--This we deny; for as Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the Sutra under discussion is not meant to propound inference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedanta-text.--Which, then, is the Vedanta-text which the Sutra points at as having to be considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?--It is the passage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father Varu/n/a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6: 'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom. That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the Sutrakara continues as follows: 3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of Scripture. Brahman is the source, i.e. the cause of the great body of Scripture, consisting of the /Ri/g-veda and other branches, which is supported by various disciplines (such as grammar, nyaya, pura/n/a, &c.); which lamp-like illuminates all things; which is itself all-knowing as it were. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is generally understood that the man from whom some special body of doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for instance, grammar from Pa/n/ini possesses a more extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive though it be; what idea, then, shall we have to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the /Ri/g-veda, &c., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of manifold branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and conditions of gods, animals, and men! See what Scripture says about him, 'The /Ri/g-veda, &c., have been breathed forth from that great Being' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 10). Or else we may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture consisting of the /Ri/g-veda, &c., as described above, is the source or cause, i.e. the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of Brahman. So that the sense would be: through Scripture only as a means of knowledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c., of the world. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the preceding Sutra 'from which these beings are born,' &c.--But as the preceding Sutra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is the source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sutra?--The words of the preceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the scriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the origin, &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining an inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the Sutra under discussion has been propounded. But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing Brahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action (according to the Purva Mima/m/sa Sutra I, 2, 1, 'As the purport of Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not action are purportless'), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not action are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the action, form supplements to the passages enjoining actions, or serve the purpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which give sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as 'he howled, &c.,' which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. I, 2, 7, 'Because they stand in syntactical connection with the injunctions, therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions'). In the same way mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, 'For strength thee (I cut;' which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the dar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action. And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the Vedanta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin actions; notifying the agents, divinities, and results connected with those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmaka/nd/a of the Veda), we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above viz.) that the Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and similar actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta) texts. The result of all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman. To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows: 4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scripture), because it is connected (with the Vedanta-texts) as their purport. The word 'but' is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the prima facie view as urged above). That all-knowing, all-powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the Vedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for instance, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside; this Self is Brahman perceiving everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19); 'That immortal Brahman is before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning the direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can we conclude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious duty); for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13, 'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing, be the object of perception and the other means of knowledge; for the fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without the aid of the scriptural passage 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7). Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not connected with something either to be striven after or shunned; for from the mere comprehension of Brahman's Self, which is not something either to be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain, and thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying certain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the knowledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the conception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman being looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of devotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far as they are connected with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn on that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge of the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so that it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right knowledge of Brahman. Here others raise the following objection:--Although the Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it intimates Brahman only as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other objects not known from the practice of common life is merely supplementary to certain injunctions[69]. Why so? Because the Veda has the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following declaration, 'The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of actions' (Bhashya on Jaimini Sutra I, 1, 1); 'Injunction means passages impelling to action' (Bh. on Jaim. Su. I, 1, 2); 'Of this (viz. active religious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction' (part of Jaim. Su. I, 1, 5); 'The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with (the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose purport is action' (Jaim. Su. I, 1, 25); 'As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purportless' (Jaim. Su. I, 2, 1). Therefore the Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man with regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others; other passages (i.e. all those passages which are not directly injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions and prohibitions. Hence the Vedanta-texts also as likewise belonging to the Veda can have a meaning in the same way only. And if their aim is injunction, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of immortality.--But--somebody might object--it has been declared that there is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the object of enquiry in the karma-ka/nd/a (that part of the Veda which treats of active religious duty) being something to be accomplished, viz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of actions[70].--We reply that it must not be such because the Vedanta-texts give information about Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions of actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind, 'Verily the Self is to be seen' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man worship him as Self' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Let a man worship the Self only as his true state' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 15); 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire to know what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the Vedanta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they perform that task by teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent and free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss. From the devout meditation on this Brahman there results as its fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned in the ordinary way, is discerned by means of the /s/astra. If, on the other hand, the Vedanta-texts were considered to have no reference to injunctions of actions, but to contain statements about mere (accomplished) things, just as if one were saying 'the earth comprises seven dvipas,' 'that king is marching on,' they would be purportless, because then they could not possibly be connected with something to be shunned or endeavoured after.--Perhaps it will here be objected that sometimes a mere statement about existent things has a purpose, as, for instance, the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and that so likewise the Vedanta-passages making statements about the non-transmigrating Self, have a purport of their own (without reference to any action), viz. in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of the Self being liable to transmigration.--We reply that this might be so if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the fear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true nature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being subject to transmigration. But this is not the case; for we observe that even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities attaching to the transmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from the passage, /Bri/. Up. II, 4, 5, 'The Self is to be heard, to be considered, to be reflected upon,' that consideration and reflection have to follow the mere hearing. From all this it results that the sastra can be admitted as a means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with injunctions. To all this, we, the Vedantins, make the following reply:--The preceding reasoning is not valid, on account of the different nature of the fruits of actions on the one side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other side. The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind, which are known from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti, and are comprised under the name 'religious duty' (dharma), is carried on in the Jaimini Sutra, which begins with the words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty;' the opposite of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c., which is defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to the end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which make themselves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all animate beings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure of all embodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From those differences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of the merit acquired by actions in accordance with religious duty; therefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those qualified to perform acts of religious duty. Those latter differences are moreover known to be affected by the desire of certain results (which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain religious acts), worldly possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture that those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of the sun; Ch. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings, works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the southern path. And that there also (viz. in the moon which is finally reached by those who have passed along the southern path) there are degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from the passage 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed.' Analogously it is understood that the different degrees of pleasure which are enjoyed by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the inmates of hell and to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different degrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, there is inferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious demerit as defined in the prohibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This difference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its antecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of degree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as ignorance and the like, is well known--from /S/ruti, Sm/ri/ti, and reasoning--to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature (sa/m/sara). The following text, for instance, 'As long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1), refers to the sa/m/sara-state as described above. From the following passage, on the other hand, 'When he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,' which denies the touch of pain or pleasure, we learn that the unembodied state called 'final release' (moksha) is declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined by Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not be denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said that the very circumstance of its being an unembodied state is the effect of merit, we reply that that cannot be, since Scripture declares that state to be naturally and originally an unembodied one. 'The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve' (Ka. Up. II, 22); 'He is without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That person is not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 15)[71]. All which passages establish the fact that so-called release differs from all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially disembodied state. Among eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal, although changing' (pari/n/aminitya), viz. those, the idea of whose identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo changes; such, for instance, are earth and the other elements in the opinion of those who maintain the eternity of the world, or the three gu/n/as in the opinion of the Sa@nkhyas. But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e. eternal without undergoing any changes (ku/ta/sthanitya), omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold time do not apply, is called release; a definition agreeing with scriptural passages, such as the following: 'Different from merit and demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and future' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It[72] (i.e. moksha) is, therefore, the same as Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged. If Brahman were represented as supplementary to certain actions, and release were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it would be non-eternal, and would have to be considered merely as something holding a pre-eminent position among the described non-eternal fruits of actions with their various degrees. But that release is something eternal is acknowledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching concerning Brahman can therefore not be merely supplementary to actions. There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which declare release to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and which thus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening between the two; for instance, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman fears nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4); 'That Brahman knew its Self only, saying, I am Brahman. From it all this sprang' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity?' (Is. Up. 7.) We must likewise quote the passage,--B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10, ('Seeing this the /Ri/shi Vamadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the sun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between one's seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal Self; for that passage is analogous to the following one, 'standing he sings,' from which we understand that no action due to the same agent intervenes between the standing and the singing. Other scriptural passages show that the removal of the obstacles which lie in the way of release is the only fruit of the knowledge of Brahman; so, for instance, 'You indeed are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore' (Pr. Up. VI, 8); 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'To him after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sutra, supported by arguments, of (Gautama) Akarya, 'Final release results from the successive removal of wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain, the removal of each later member of the series depending on the removal of the preceding member' (Nyay. Su. I, i, 2); and wrong knowledge itself is removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with the Self of Brahman. Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman a mere (fanciful) combination[73], as is made use of, for instance, in the following passage, 'For the mind is endless, and the Vi/s/vedevas are endless, and he thereby gains the endless world' (B/ri/. Up. III, 1, 9)[74]; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription (superimposition)[75], as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1; 19, 1), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the mind, Aditya and so on; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical) with some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the absorber; breath is indeed the absorber[76]' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1; 3); nor is it a mere (ceremonial) purification of (the Self constituting a subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c., Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the sacrificial butter[77]. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self and Brahman were understood in the way of combination and the like, violence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose object, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of Brahman and the Self being really identical; so, for instance, in the following passages, 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19). And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby; so, for instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it be possible, in that case, satisfactorily to explain the passages which speak of the individual Self becoming Brahman: such as 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the Self cannot be of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The knowledge of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of man, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on the object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions. Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by representing it as the object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly declared in two passages, viz. 'It is different from the known and again above (i.e. different from) the unknown' (Ken. Up. I, 3); and 'How should he know him by whom he knows all this?' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13.) In the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of the act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, Ken. Up. I, 5, whose first half declares it not to be an object (of speech, mind, and so on), 'That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which speech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the sastra can impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that the aim of the sastra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience. The sastra's purport is not to represent Brahman definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagatman, the inward Self) is never an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known, knowers, acts of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by Nescience. Accordingly the sastra says, 'By whom it is not thought by him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; unknown by those who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (Ken. Up. II, 3); and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception, nor know the knower of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2). As thereby (i.e. by the knowledge derived from the sastra) the imagination of the transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and Release is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self, it cannot be charged with the imperfection of non-eternality. Those, on the other hand, who consider Release to be something to be effected properly maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech, or body. So, likewise, those who consider it to be a mere modification. Non-eternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two opinions; for we observe in common life that things which are modifications, such as sour milk and the like, and things which are effects, such as jars, &c., are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said that there is a dependance on action in consequence of (Brahman or Release) being something which is to be obtained[78]; for as Brahman constitutes a person's Self it is not something to be attained by that person. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's Self still it would not be something to be obtained; for as it is omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be maintained that Release is something to be ceremonially purified, and as such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sa/m/skara) results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added; nor, again, does the latter alternative apply, since Release is of the nature of Brahman, which is eternally pure.--But, it might be said, Release might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes manifest on the Self being purified by some action; just as the quality of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by means of the action of rubbing.--This objection is invalid, we reply, because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot exist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were modified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and texts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called,' would thus be stultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to assume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (dehin, the individual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial thread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self merely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of perception that bathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the body, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions only that something is purified which is joined to the body. If a person thinks 'I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the 'I' constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied Self). Analogously that I which predicates of itself, that it is purified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity (aha/m/kart/ri/), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results. Thus the mantras also declare, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); and 'When he is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him the Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. III, 1, 4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any accretion and eternally pure, 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one; free from qualities' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil' (I/s/. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore Release is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show any other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is impossible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to any action, excepting knowledge. But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind. By no means, we reply; since the two are of different nature. An action is that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing things and dependent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for instance, the following passages, 'To whichever divinity the offering is made on that one let him meditate when about to say vasha/t/' (Ait. Brahm. III, 8, 1); and 'Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.' Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be performed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their objects existing things; knowledge can therefore not be either made or not made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not either on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it thus widely differs from meditation and the like. The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded on Ch. Up. V, 7, 1; 8, 1, 'The fire is man, O Gautama; the fire is woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic statement, merely an action and dependent on man; that conception of fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is neither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real thing which is an object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and not an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the objects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can neither be endeavoured after nor avoided.--But what then, it will be asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the appearance of injunctions; such as, 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard about?'--They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external things, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to eschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it; such texts as the one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him who is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn from texts such as the following: 'This everything, all is that Self' (B/ri/, Up. II, 4, 6); 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the knower?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19). That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit; for just that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus /S/ruti says, 'If a man understands the Self, saying, "I am he," what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the body?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 12.) And similarly Sm/ri/ti declares, 'Having understood this the understanding man has done with all work, O Bharata' (Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions. We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supplementary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul (purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman, different in nature from the four classes of substances[79], which forms a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; for the passage, 'That Self is to be described by No, no!' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied. The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of self-consciousness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i.e. of the object of self-consciousness, viz. the jivatman). For neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely witnesses it; which is permanent in all (transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be represented as the mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul. But the soul is imperishable[80], as there is no cause why it should perish; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any modification; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And from passages, such as 'Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in the Upanishads, I ask thee' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26), it appears that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold assertion. With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with the purport of the /S/astra (who alone were stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the /S/astra which consists of injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other passage quoted ('as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purportless') we remark that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless[81]. If, on the other hand, the Veda--in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity--does give information about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).--But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are instrumental to action, the information given about such things is merely subservient to action.--This, we reply, does not matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, the things themselves about which information is given are already intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain actions. Their final end (prayojana) indeed may be subserviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given about them, intimated in themselves.--Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose[82]? We reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a purpose is established which renders the passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such passages as 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' which teach abstinence from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach abstinence from action, are devoid of purport--a consequence which is of course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word 'not' stands with the action expressed by the verb 'is to be killed'--which action is naturally established[83]--be used as a reason for assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established elsewhere[84], different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not' is to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is connected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse prompting to the murder of a Brahma/n/a, &c., just as a fire is extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel). Hence we are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special cases, such as the so-called Prajapati-vow, &c.[85] Hence the charge of want of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose of man. The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless (as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvipas) has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a rope.'--But how about the objection raised above that the information about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory world?--We reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who imagines the body, and so on, to constitute the Self, is subject to fear and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And, again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure derived from them vanishes. Thus /S/ruti also declares, 'When he is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). If it should be objected that the condition of being free from the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account of its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The objection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that as the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is likewise not established; for (if we should try to get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of making embodiedness dependent on merit and demerit, and again merit and demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain (of embodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance; for kings may become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by giving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to imagine anything, analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two (which is not based on any assumption). This explains also in how far the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar acts[86]. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the exclusive primary object of the idea and word 'lion,' and we are likewise acquainted with persons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine qualities, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name 'lion' are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well established, the transfer of the conception and name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception and designation of a man; such is likewise the case of the conception and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c., which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not-Self, is figurative (rather than simply false)? considering that even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do. As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. The same is declared in the /S/ruti passages concerning him who knows Brahman: 'And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 7); and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it were.' Sm/ri/ti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are enumerated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions. With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It follows that the /S/astra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta-texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is room for beginning the new /S/astra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the Vedanta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new /S/astra would either not be begun at all, since the /S/astra concerned with injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of the Purva Mima/m/sa, 'Then therefore the enquiry into duty;' or if it were begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new portion of the Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man' (Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 1, 1). But as the comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in the previous /S/astra), it is quite appropriate that a new /S/astra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition expressed in the words, 'I am Brahman;' for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i.e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration:--'When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the knowledge, "I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the (imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an end[87]; how should then the effect[88] (of that wrong imagination) exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing subject; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz. (the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self is ascertained.' (Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is finished[89].) So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages, whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now the Sa@nkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and thereupon interpret the Vedanta-passages as referring to the latter. All the Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha). The followers of Ka/n/ada again infer from the very same passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher (Vyasa)--thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means of proof--proceeds to state as prima facie views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedanta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman. The Sa@nkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pradhana consisting of three constituent elements (gu/n/a) is the cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedanta-passages which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the pradhana in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality an attribute of the gu/n/a of Goodness[90], according to the Sm/ri/ti passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gita XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhana) are known as all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with the very highest degree of 'Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which is isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhana, on the other hand, because consisting of the three gu/n/as, comprises also in its pradhana state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The Vedanta-passages therefore in a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedantin) also who assume an all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as consisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so. To these conclusions he (Vyasa) replies in the following Sutra. 5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhana) is not (to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not founded on Scripture. It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas; because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch. Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw), may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or 'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra/n/a.' By 'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense; just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name and form and food.' The argumentation of the Sa@nkhyas that the pradhana may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the gu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the three gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness. Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhana is destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhana all-knowingness. The case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].--Well then (say those Sa@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradhana possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is imparted to an iron ball by fire.--No, we reply; for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of the world. The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sa@nkhya, is Brahman's all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's knowledge to be permanent.--But, it may be objected, on this latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with reference to the act of knowing.--Why not? we reply; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93].'--But, it will again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel.--This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,' &c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman will fit all the better.--What then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world?--Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-/s/astra assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition--as the sun's nature is eternal luminousness--can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa/m/sarin) indeed, which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions. 'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person' (/S/v. Up. VI, 8; III, 19). But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for /S/ruti expressly declares that 'there is no other seer but he; there is no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23). How then can it be said that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?--True, we reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions and terms as 'the hollow (space) of a jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like. The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements, can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pradhana not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the second Adhyaya (II, 1, 4, &c.). Here the Sa@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty stated by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, 'the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),' and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village, necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhana also acts by the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.--But what reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word 'thought' and for taking it in a figurative sense?--The observation, the Sa@nkhya replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, 'That fire thought; that water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). We therefrom conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense[94]. To this argumentation of the Sadkhya the next Sutra replies: 6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of the world). Your assertion that the term 'Being' denotes the non-intelligent pradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On account of the term 'Self.' For the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2, which begins 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of fire, water, and earth ('it thought,' &c.; 'it sent forth fire,' &c.), goes on--denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the term--'divinities'--as follows, 'That divinity thought: Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self (jiva. atman) and evolve names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent pradhana is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume that the same pradhana--as once constituting the subject-matter of the chapter--is referred to by the term 'that divinity.' But in that case the divinity would not speak of the jiva as 'Self.' For by the term 'Jiva' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self of the non-intelligent pradhana? By 'Self' we understand (a being's) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Jiva cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the Jiva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, 'That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O /S/vetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c.). Here the clause 'It is the Self' designates the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word 'Self,' and the concluding clause, 'that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' declares the intelligent /S/vetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its primary sense--while the employment of the word 'Self' furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat--the thought attributed to them must be explained in a figurative sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of the word 'Self,' not to be understood in a figurative sense.[95] Here the Sa@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The word 'Self,' he says, may be applied to the pradhana, although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects all purposes of another;' as, for instance, a king applies the word 'Self' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions, 'Bhadrasena is my (other) Self.' For the pradhana, which effects the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one word 'Self' may refer to non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses,' are made use of, and as the one word 'light' (jyotis) denotes a certain sacrifice (the jyotish/t/oma) as well as a flame. How then does it follow from the word 'Self' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense? To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies: 7. (The pradhana cannot be designated by the term 'Self') because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat). The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the term 'Self' because in the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2 ff., where the subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, 'That is the Self,' and where the subsequent clause, 'That art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' declares the intelligent /S/vetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage subsequent to the two quoted (viz. 'a man who has a teacher obtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the non-intelligent pradhana were denoted by the term 'Sat' and did comprehend--by means of the phrase 'That art thou'--persons desirous of final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be 'Thou art non-intelligent;' so that Scripture would virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right knowledge. But to assume that the faultless /s/astra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason. And if the /s/astra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he would--comparable to the blind man who had caught hold of the ox's tail[96]--cling to the view of that being the Self, and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him; hence he would be debarred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the /s/astra teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of the heavenly world, so the passage 'that is the Self, that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man grasping the heated axe (Ch. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage 'that art thou' would be of the nature of a fanciful combination only[97], like the knowledge derived from the passage, 'I am the hymn' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word 'Self' is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self' can--in such phrases as 'Bhadrasena is my Self'--be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by perception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that the word 'Self' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word 'jyotis' signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the word 'Self' in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such phrases as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses.' And even if we assume that the word 'Self' primarily signifies both classes of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading under which it stands, or some determinative attributive word. But in the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and /S/vetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity. That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with /S/vetaketu, who possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances determine the object of the word 'Self' here to be something intelligent. The word 'jyotis' does moreover not furnish an appropriate example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of 'light' only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavada assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light. A different explanation of the Sutra is also possible. The preceding Sutra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word 'Self' having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sutra is to be explained as containing an independent reason, proving that the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause is untenable. Hence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by the word 'Self.' This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason. 8. And (the pradhana cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') because there is no statement of its having to be set aside. If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term 'Being' (Sat), and if the passage 'That is the Self, that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' referred to the pradhana; the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhana is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction about the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a friend the (small) star Arundhati at first directs his attention to a big neighbouring star, saying 'that is Arundhati,' although it is really not so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapa/th/aka arrives at a conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is (the Sat). The word 'and' (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that the contradiction of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhana is to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapa/th/aka it is intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely,' &c. Now if the term 'Sat' denoted the pradhana, which is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the latter is not an effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not denoted by the term 'Sat.'--For this the Sutrakara gives a further reason. 9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhana). With reference to the cause denoted by the word 'Sat,' Scripture says, 'When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, "he sleeps" (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apita).' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1.) This passage explains the well-known verb 'to sleep,' with reference to the soul. The word, 'his own,' denotes the Self which had before been denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e. into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i, which means 'to be resolved into.' The individual soul (jiva) is called awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by means of the modifications of the mind--which thus constitute limiting adjuncts of the soul--it apprehends those external objects, and identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external objects[98]. When, modified by the impressions which the external objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind[99].' When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modifications due to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A similar etymology of the word 'h/ri/daya' is given by /s/ruti, 'That Self abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he is in the heart (h/ri/di ayam).' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words a/s/anaya and udanya are similarly etymologised: 'water is carrying away what has been eaten by him;' 'fire carries away what has been drunk by him' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 'Sat,' by means of the etymology of the word 'sleep.' But the intelligent Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhana. If, again, it were said that the pradhana is denoted by the word 'own,' because belonging to the Self (as being the Self's own), there would remain the same absurd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. 'embraced by the intelligent--praj/n/a--Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in the condition of dreamless sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity. Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word 'Sat,' and not the pradhana.--A further reason for the pradhana not being the cause is subjoined. 10. On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta-texts, Brahman is to be considered the cause). If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedanta-texts also, there were set forth different views concerning the nature of the cause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being the cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhana doctrine, and others again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps be possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in with the pradhana theory. But the stated condition is absent since all the Vedanta-texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, 'As from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pra/n/as proceed each towards its place; from the pra/n/as the gods, from the gods the worlds' (Kau. Up. III, 3). And 'from that Self sprang ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). And 'all this springs from the Self' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 1). And 'this pra/n/a is born from the Self' (Pr. Up. III, 3); all which passages declare the Self to be the cause. That the word 'Self' denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown. And that all the Vedanta-texts advocate the same view as to an intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be considered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims of the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a uniform character regarding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman is therefore to be considered the cause of the world, 'on account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta-texts).'--A further reason for this conclusion is advanced. 11. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world). That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the following passage of the mantropanishad of the /S/veta/s/vataras (VI, 9) where the word 'he' refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord, 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore finally settled that the all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent pradhana or anything else. In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate arguments, that the Vedanta-texts exhibited under Sutras I, 1-11, are capable of proving that the all-knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view (I, 10), that all Vedanta-texts whatever maintain an intelligent cause. The question might therefore be asked, 'What reason is there for the subsequent part of the Vedanta-sutras?' (as the chief point is settled already.) To this question we reply as follows: Brahman is apprehended under two forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolutions of name and form (i.e. the multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatever. Compare the following passages: B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15, 'For where there is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the greatest. Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the little. The greatest is immortal; the little is mortal;' Taitt. Up. III, 12, 7, 'The wise one, who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by their names[100]);' /S/v. Up. VI, 19, 'Who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest bridge of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' B/ri/. Up. II, 3, 6, 'Not so, not so;' B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long;' and 'defective is one place, perfect the other.' All these passages, with many others, declare Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either of Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is the object of Nescience, there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion, and the like[101]. The different modes of devotion lead to different results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to success in works; those modes are distinct on account of the distinction of the different qualities and limiting conditions[102]. And although the one highest Self only, i.e. the Lord distinguished by those different qualities constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits (of devotion) are distinct, according as the devotion refers to different qualities. Thus Scripture says, 'According as man worships him, that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). Sm/ri/ti also makes an analogous statement, 'Remembering whatever form of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters, being impressed with it through his constant meditation' (Bha. Gita VIII, 6). Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares that the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals itself[103] in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of various dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Ar. II, 3, 2, 1), 'He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him[104],' &c. Similarly Sm/ri/ti remarks, 'Whatever being there is of power, splendour or might, know it to have sprung from portions of my glory' (Bha. Gita, X, 41); a passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly here (i.e. in the Sutras) also the teacher will show that the golden person in the disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on account of an indicating sign, viz. the circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (Ved. Su. I, 1, 20); the same is to be observed with regard to I, 1, 22 and other Sutras. And, again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the meaning of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instantaneous release; for although that knowledge is conveyed by means of various limiting conditions, yet no special connexion with limiting conditions is intended to be intimated, in consequence of which there arises a doubt whether it (the knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for its object; so, for instance, in the case of Sutra I, 1, 12[105]. From all this it appears that the following part of the /S/astra has a special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedanta-texts teach, on the one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming an object of devotion, and on the other hand, as being free from the connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge. The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different from Brahman, which in I, 1, 10 was based on the uniformity of the meaning of the Vedanta-texts, will be further detailed by the Sutrakara, who, while explaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude all causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman. 12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of the repetition (of the word 'bliss,' as denoting the highest Self). The Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enumerated the Self consisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says, 'Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner Self which consists of bliss.' Here the doubt arises whether the phrase, 'that which consists of bliss,' denotes the highest Brahman of which it had been said previously, that 'It is true Being, Knowledge, without end,' or something different from Brahman, just as the Self consisting of food, &c., is different from it.--The purvapakshin maintains that the Self consisting of bliss is a secondary (not the principal) Self, and something different from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the principal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of bliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be the innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary Self, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text expressly says 'Joy is its head;' and about its being embodied we read, 'Of that former one this one is the embodied Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that former Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self. And of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the transmigrating Soul. To this reasoning we make the following reply:--By the Self consisting of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, 'on account of repetition.' For the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest Self. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause 'That is flavour'--which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and declares it to be of the nature of flavour--we read, 'For only after having perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether (of the heart)? For he alone causes blessedness;' and again, II, 8, 'Now this is an examination of Bliss;' 'He reaches that Self consisting of Bliss;' and again, II, 9, 'He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears nothing;' and in addition, 'He understood that Bliss is Brahman' (III, 6). And in another scriptural passage also (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28), 'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman,' we see the word 'bliss' applied just to Brahman. As, therefore, the word 'bliss' is repeatedly used with reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only denote the secondary Self (the Sa/m/sarin), because it forms a link in a series of secondary Selfs, beginning with the one consisting of food, is of no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the innermost of all. The /S/astra, wishing to convey information about the primary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first refers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is by very obtuse people identified with it; it then proceeds from the body to another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just as the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten brass had been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier comprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self[106], which consists of bliss, is the real Self. Just as when a man, desirous of pointing out the star Arundhati to another man, at first points to several stars which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati, while only the star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhati; so here also the Self consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of its being the innermost (i.e. the last). Nor can any weight be allowed to the objection that the attribution of joy and so on, as head, &c., cannot possibly refer to the real Self; for this attribution is due to the immediately preceding limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of understanding, the so-called vij/n/anakosa), and does not really belong to the real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain of bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and is not ascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is predicated of the transmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Brahman. 13. If (it be objected that the term anandamaya, consisting of bliss, can) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word denoting a modification (or product); (we declare the objection to be) not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed by the affix maya.) Here the purvapakshin raises the objection that the word anandamaya (consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest Self.--Why?--Because the word anandamaya is understood to denote something different from the original word (i.e. the word ananda without the derivative affix maya), viz. a modification; according to the received sense of the affix maya. 'Anandamaya' therefore denotes a modification, just as annamaya (consisting of food) and similar words do. This objection is, however, not valid, because 'maya' is also used in the sense of abundance, i.e. denotes that where there is abundance of what the original word expresses. So, for instance, the phrase 'the sacrifice is annamaya' means 'the sacrifice is abounding in food' (not 'is some modification or product of food'). Thus here Brahman also, as abounding in bliss, is called anandamaya. That Brahman does abound in bliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 8), where, after the bliss of each of the different classes of beings, beginning with man, has been declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the immediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed to be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance. 14. And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i.e. of bliss; therefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.) Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason also that Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, 'For he alone causes bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For he who causes bliss must himself abound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who enriches others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, therefore, maya may be taken to mean 'abundant,' the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self. 15. Moreover (the anandamaya is Brahman because) the same (Brahman) which had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i.e. proclaimed in the Brahma/n/a passage as the anandamaya.) The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the following reason also[107]. On the introductory words 'he who knows Brahman attains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), there follows a mantra proclaiming that Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter, possesses the qualities of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after that it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and then all other moving and non-moving things, and that, entering into the beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all; thereupon, for its better comprehension, the series of the different Selfs ('different from this is the inner Self,' &c.) are enumerated, and then finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed, is again proclaimed in the passage under discussion, 'different from this is the other inner Self, which consists of bliss.' To assume that a mantra and the Brahma/n/a passage belonging to it have the same sense is only proper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which results therefrom); for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome inference that the text drops the topic once started, and turns to an altogether new subject. Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the Self consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self consisting of food, &c.[108] On the same (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded, 'This same knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a; he understood that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self. 16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the other (i.e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the latter assumption). And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self only, not the other, i.e. the one which is other than the Lord, i.e. the transmigrating individual soul. The personal soul cannot be denoted by the term 'the one consisting of bliss.' Why? On account of the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self consisting of bliss, 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He brooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever there is.' Here, the desire arising before the origination of a body, &c., the non-separation of the effects created from the creator, and the creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self different from the highest Self. 17. And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, the anandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul). The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating soul, for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of bliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly represented as different; Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'It (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour can this (soul) perceive bliss.' For he who perceives cannot be that which is perceived.--But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the following /S/ruti- and Smr/ri/ti-passages, 'The Self is to be sought;' 'Nothing higher is known than the attainment of the Self[109]?'--This objection, we reply, is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute truth). Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is never anything but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the truth, identified with the Non-Self, i.e. the body and so on; whereby it becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far as it is identified with the body, and so on, as something not searched for but to be searched for, not heard but to be heard, not seized but to be seized, not perceived but to be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like. Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as 'there is no other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), that there is in reality any seer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it be said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal individual soul; for)[110] the Lord differs from the soul (vij/n/anatman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; or as the free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is determined by its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With reference to this fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual Self, the two last Sutras have been propounded. 18. And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to the anandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i.e. to the pradhana inferred by the Sa@nkhyas.) Since in the passage 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which occurs in the chapter treating of the anandamaya (Taitt. Up. II, 6), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred, i.e. the non-intelligent pradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhyas, cannot be regarded as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the world. Although the opinion that the pradhana is the cause of the world, has already been refuted in the Sutra I, 1, 5, it is here, where a favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the basis of the scriptural passage about the cause of the world feeling desire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all scriptural passages). 19. And, moreover, it (i.e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i.e. the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on that (being fully known). And for the following reason also the term, 'the Self consisting of bliss,' cannot denote either the pradhana or the individual soul. Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge is joined, i.e. identified, with the Self of bliss under discussion, i.e. obtains final release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up. II, 7), 'When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the fearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him.' That means, if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss even a small difference in the form of non-identity, then he finds no release from the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory existence. But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we understand by the Self consisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not either the pradhana or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self. But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made concerning the true meaning of the word 'anandamaya[111].' On what grounds, we ask, can it be maintained that the affix 'maya' after having, in the series of compounds beginning with annamaya and ending with vij/n/anamaya, denoted mere modifications, should all at once, in the word anandamaya, which belongs to the same series, denote abundance, so that anandamaya would refer to Brahman? If it should be said that the assumption is made on account of the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt. Up. II), we reply that therefrom it would follow that also the Selfs consisting of food, breath, &c., denote Brahman (because the governing influence of the mantra extends to them also).--The advocate of the former interpretation will here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use of above, viz. as follows: To assume that the Selfs consisting of food, and so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because after each of them an inner Self is mentioned. After the Self of bliss, on the other hand, no further inner Self is mentioned, and hence it must be considered to be Brahman itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed out by the mantra), and taking up a new topic.--But to this we reply that, although unlike the case of the Selfs consisting of food, &c., no inner Self is mentioned after the Self consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be considered as Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of bliss Scripture declares, 'Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its right arm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its trunk. Brahman is its tail, its support.' Now, here the very same Brahman which, in the mantra, had been introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called the tail, the support; while the five involucra, extending from the involucrum of food up to the involucrum of bliss, are merely introduced for the purpose of setting forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then, can it be maintained that our interpretation implies the needless dropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction of a new topic?--But, it may again be objected, Brahman is called the tail, i.e. a member of the Self consisting of bliss; analogously to those passages in which a tail and other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting of food and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know that Brahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i.e. a subordinate matter) is in reality the chief matter referred to?--From the fact, we reply, of Brahman being the general subject-matter of the chapter.--But, it will again be said, that interpretation also according to which Brahman is cognised as a mere member of the anandamaya does not involve a dropping of the subject-matter, since the anandamaya himself is Brahman.--But, we reply, in that case one and the same Brahman would at first appear as the whole, viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere part, viz. as the tail; which is absurd. And as one of the two alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appropriate to refer to Brahman the clause 'Brahman is the tail' which contains the word 'Brahman,' and not the sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman is not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation of the phrase, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' goes on, 'On this there is also the following /s/loka: He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing.' As this /s/loka, without any reference to the Self of bliss, states the advantage and disadvantage connected with the knowledge of the being and non-being of Brahman only, we conclude that the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' represents Brahman as the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter). About the being or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the other hand, a doubt is not well possible, since the Self of bliss distinguished by joy, satisfaction, &c., is well known to every one.--But if Brahman is the principal matter, how can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self of bliss ('Brahman is the tail, the support')?--Its being called so, we reply, forms no objection; for the word tail here denotes that which is of the nature of a tail, so that we have to understand that the bliss of Brahman is not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or abode, the one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously another scriptural passage declares, 'All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further, if by the Self consisting of bliss we were to understand Brahman we should have to assume that the Brahman meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities (savi/s/esha), because it is said to have joy and the like for its members. But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary passage (II, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object neither of mind nor speech, and so shows that the Brahman meant is the (absolute) Brahman (devoid of qualities), 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears nothing.' Moreover, if we speak of something as 'abounding in bliss[112],' we thereby imply the co-existence of pain; for the word 'abundance' in its ordinary sense implies the existence of a small measure of what is opposed to the thing whereof there is abundance. But the passage so understood would be in conflict with another passage (Ch. Up. VII, 24), 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite;' which declares that in the Infinite, i.e. Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from it. Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in each individual body, the Self consisting of bliss also is a different one in each body. Brahman, on the other hand, does not differ according to bodies; for the mantra at the beginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge, infinite, and another passage says, 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11). Nor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent repetition of the word 'anandamaya;' for merely the radical part of the compound (i.e. the word ananda without the affix maya) is repeated in all the following passages; 'It is a flavour, for only after seizing flavour can any one seize bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss existed not in the ether? For he alone causes blessedness;' 'Now this is an examination of bliss;' 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears nothing;' 'He understood that bliss is Brahman.' If it were a settled matter that Brahman is denoted by the term, 'the Self consisting of bliss,' then we could assume that in the subsequent passages, where merely the word 'bliss' is employed, the term 'consisting of bliss' is meant to be repeated; but that the Self consisting of bliss is not Brahman, we have already proved by means of the reason of joy being its head, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage, viz. 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28), the mere word 'bliss' denotes Brahman, we must conclude that also in such passages as, 'If that bliss existed not in the ether,' the word bliss is used with reference to Brahman, and is not meant to repeat the term 'consisting of bliss.' The repetition of the full compound, 'consisting of bliss,' which occurs in the passage, 'He reaches that Self consisting of bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not refer to Brahman, as it is contained in the enumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the Self of food, &c., all of which are mere effects, and all of which are represented as things to be reached.--But, it may be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is said to have to be reached, were not Brahman--just as the Selfs consisting of food, &c. are not Brahman--then it would not be declared (in the passage immediately following) that he who knows obtains for his reward Brahman.--This objection we invalidate by the remark that the text makes its declaration as to Brahman--which is the tail, the support--being reached by him who knows, by the very means of the declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss; as appears from the passage, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, from which all speech returns,' &c. With reference, again, to the passage, 'He desired: may I be many, may I grow forth,' which is found in proximity to the mention of the Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality connected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which is mentioned in the still nearer passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' and does therefore not intimate that the Self of bliss is Brahman. And, on account of its referring to the passage last quoted ('it desired,' &c.), the later passage also, 'That is flavour,' &c., has not the Self of bliss for its subject.--But, it may be objected, the (neuter word) Brahman cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word as you maintain is done in the passage, 'He desired,' &c.--In reply to this objection we point to the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 1), 'From that Self sprang ether,' where, likewise, the masculine word 'Self' can refer to Brahman only, since the latter is the general topic of the chapter. In the knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a finally ('he knew that bliss is Brahman'), the word 'bliss' is rightly understood to denote Brahman, since we there meet neither with the affix 'maya,' nor with any statement as to joy being its head, and the like. To ascribe to Brahman in itself joy, and so on, as its members, is impossible, unless we have recourse to certain, however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman; and that the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of the qualified (savi/s/esha) Brahman is proved by the passage (quoted above), which declares that Brahman transcends speech and mind. We therefore must conclude that the affix maya, in the word anandamaya, does not denote abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in the words annamaya and the subsequent similar compounds. The Sutras are therefore to be explained as follows. There arises the question whether the passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' is to be understood as intimating that Brahman is a mere member of the Self consisting of bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said that it must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, 'The Self consisting of bliss on account of the repetition.' That means: Brahman, which in the passage 'the Self consisting of bliss,' &c., is spoken of as the tail, the support, is designated as the principal matter (not as something subordinate). On account of the repetition; for in the memorial /s/loka, 'he becomes himself non-existing,' Brahman alone is reiterated. 'If not, on account of the word denoting a modification; not so, on account of abundance.' In this Sutra the word 'modification' is meant to convey the sense of member. The objection that on account of the word 'tail,' which denotes a mere member, Brahman cannot be taken as the principal matter must be refuted. This we do by remarking that there is no difficulty, since a word denoting a member may be introduced into the passage on account of pra/k/urya[113]. Pra/k/urya here means a phraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After the different members, beginning with the head and ending with the tail, of the Selfs, consisting of food, &c. have been enumerated, there are also mentioned the head and the other limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added, 'Brahman is the tail, the support;' the intention being merely to introduce some more terms denoting members, not to convey the meaning of 'member,' (an explanation which is impossible) because the preceding Sutra already has proved Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the principal matter. 'And because he is declared to be the cause of it.' That means: Brahman is declared to be the cause of the entire aggregate of effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting of bliss, in the following passage, 'He created all whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as Brahman is the cause, it cannot at the same time be called the member, in the literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing but one of Brahman's effects. The other Sutras also (which refer to the Self of bliss[114]) are to be considered, as well as they may, as conveying a knowledge of Brahman, which (Brahman) is referred to in the passage about the tail. 20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), on account of his qualities being declared[115]. The following passage is found in Scripture (Ch. Up. I, 6, 6 ff.), 'Now that person bright as gold who is seen within the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold, bright as gold altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus; his name is Ut, for he has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above all evil. So much with reference to the devas.' And further on, with reference to the body, 'Now the person who is seen in the eye,' &c. Here the following doubt presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the object of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye, merely some special individual soul, which, by means of a large measure of knowledge and pious works, has raised itself to a position of eminence; or do they refer to the eternally perfect highest Lord? The purvapakshin takes the former view. An individual soul, he says, is referred to, since Scripture speaks of a definite shape. To the person in the sun special features are ascribed, such as the possession of a beard as bright as gold and so on, and the same features manifestly belong to the person in the eye also, since they are expressly transferred to it in the passage, 'The shape of this person is the same as the shape of that person.' That, on the other hand, no shape can be ascribed to the highest Lord, follows from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3, 15), 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay.' That an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact that a definite abode is mentioned, 'He who is in the sun; he who is in the eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no special abode, but abides in his own glory, no similar statement can be made; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'Where does he rest? In his own glory?' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); and 'like the ether he is omnipresent, eternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied by the fact that the might (of the being in question) is said to be limited; for the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beyond that, and of the wishes of the devas,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in the sun; and the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of the wishes of men,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in the eye. No limit, on the other hand, can be admitted of the might of the highest Lord, as appears from the passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22), 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be confounded;' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all limiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye and the sun cannot be the highest Lord. To this reasoning the Sutra replies, 'The one within, on account of his qualities being declared.' The person referred to in the passages concerning the person within the sun and the person within the eye is not a transmigrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because his qualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest Lord are indicated in the text as follows. At first the name of the person within the sun is mentioned--'his name is Ut'--and then this name is explained on the ground of that person being free from all evil, 'He has risen above all evil.' The same name thus explained is then transferred to the person in the eye, in the clause, 'the name of the one is the name of the other.' Now, entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to the highest Self only; so, for instance (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), 'The Self which is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is the passage, 'He is /Ri/k, he is Saman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman,' which declares the person in the eye to be the Self of the /Ri/k, Saman, and so on; which is possible only if that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is to be considered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text, after having stated in succession /Ri/k and Saman to have earth and fire for their Self with reference to the Devas, and, again, speech and breath with reference to the body, continues, '/Ri/k and Saman are his joints,' with reference to the Devas, and 'the joints of the one are the joints of the other,' with reference to the body. Now this statement also can be made only with regard to that which is the Self of all. Further, the passage, 'Therefore all who sing to the Vina sing him, and from him also they obtain wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic of all worldly songs; which again holds true of the highest Lord only. That absolute command over the objects of worldly desires (as displayed, for instance, in the bestowal of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord is meant, appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad-gita (X, 41), 'Whatever being there is possessing power, glory, or strength, know it to be produced from a portion of my energy[116].' To the objection that the statements about bodily shape contained in the clauses, 'With a beard bright as gold,' &c., cannot refer to the highest Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of Maya, in order to gratify thereby his devout worshippers. Thus Sm/ri/ti also says, 'That thou seest me, O Narada, is the Maya emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with the qualities of all beings.' We have further to note that expressions such as, 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay,' are made use of where instruction is given about the nature of the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities; while passages such as the following one, 'He to whom belong all works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), which represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion, speak of him, who is the cause of everything, as possessing some of the qualities of his effects. Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage under discussion, as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With reference to the objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because an abode is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of devout meditation, a special abode may be assigned to Brahman, although it abides in its own glory only; for as Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be viewed as being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally, about the limitation of Brahman's might, which depends on the distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the body, has likewise reference to devout meditation only. From all this it follows that the being which Scripture states to be within the eye and the sun is the highest Lord. 21. And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the individual souls animating the sun, &c.), on account of the declaration of distinction. There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual souls which animate the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within; whose distinction (from all individual souls) is proclaimed in the following scriptural passage, 'He who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun within; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 9). Here the expression, 'He within the sun whom the sun does not know,' clearly indicates that the Ruler within is distinct from that cognising individual soul whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within we have to identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet of the sameness of purport of all Vedanta-texts. It thus remains a settled conclusion that the passage under discussion conveys instruction about the highest Lord. 22. The aka/s/a, i.e. ether (is Brahman) on account of characteristic marks (of the latter being mentioned). In the Chandogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with, 'What is the origin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings take their rise from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest.'--Here the following doubt arises. Does the word 'ether' denote the highest Brahman or the elemental ether?--Whence the doubt?--Because the word is seen to be used in both senses. Its use in the sense of 'elemental ether' is well established in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech; and, on the other hand, we see that it is sometimes used to denote Brahman, viz. in cases where we ascertain, either from some complementary sentence or from the fact of special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant. So, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'If that bliss existed not in the ether;' and Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'That which is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names are[117] that is Brahman.' Hence the doubt.--Which sense is then to be adopted in our case?--The sense of elemental ether, the purvapakshin replies; because this sense belongs to the word more commonly, and therefore presents itself to the mind more readily. The word 'ether' cannot be taken in both senses equally, because that would involve a (faulty) attribution of several meanings to one and the same word. Hence the term 'ether' applies to Brahman in a secondary (metaphorical) sense only; on account of Brahman being in many of its attributes, such as all pervadingness and the like, similar to ether. The rule is, that when the primary sense of a word is possible, the word must not be taken in a secondary sense. And in the passage under discussion only the primary sense of the word 'ether' is admissible. Should it be objected that, if we refer the passage under discussion to the elemental ether, a complementary passage ('for all these beings take their rise from the ether only, &c.') cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; we reply that the elemental ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air, fire, &c. in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. Up. II, 1), 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, and so on.' The qualities also of being greater and of being a place of rest may be ascribed to the elemental ether, if we consider its relations to all other beings. Therefore we conclude that the word 'ether' here denotes the elemental ether. To this we reply as follows:--The word ether must here be taken to denote Brahman, on account of characteristic marks of the latter being mentioned. For the sentence, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether only,' clearly indicates the highest Brahman, since all Vedanta-texts agree in definitely declaring that all beings spring from the highest Brahman.--But, the opponent may say, we have shown that the elemental ether also may be represented as the cause, viz. of air, fire, and the other elements in due succession.--We admit this. But still there remains the difficulty, that, unless we understand the word to apply to the fundamental cause of all, viz. Brahman, the affirmation contained in the word 'only' and the qualification expressed by the word 'all' (in 'all beings') would be out of place. Moreover, the clause, 'They return into the ether,' again points to Brahman, and so likewise the phrase, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest;' for absolute superiority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the highest Self only; cp. Ch. Up. III, 14, 3, 'Greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds.' The quality of being a place of rest likewise agrees best with the highest Brahman, on account of its being the highest cause. This is confirmed by the following scriptural passage: 'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman, it is the rest of him who gives gifts' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28). Moreover, Jaivali finding fault with the doctrine of /S/alavatya, on account of (his saman) having an end (Ch. Up. I, 8, 8), and wishing to proclaim something that has no end chooses the ether, and then, having identified the ether with the Udgitha, concludes, 'He is the Udgitha greater than great; he is without end.' Now this endlessness is a characteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark that the sense of 'elemental ether' presents itself to the mind more readily, because it is the better established sense of the word aka/s/a, we reply, that, although it may present itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be accepted, because we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the complementary sentences. That the word aka/s/a is also used to denote Brahman has been shown already; cp. such passages as, 'Ether is the revealer of all names and forms.' We see, moreover, that various synonyma of aka/s/a are employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance, /Ri/k Sa/m/h. I, 164, 39, 'In which the Vedas are[118], in the Imperishable one (i.e. Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on which all gods have their seat.' And Taitt. Up. III, 6, 'This is the knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a, founded on the highest ether (vyoman).' And again, 'Om, ka is Brahman, ether (kha) is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 10, 5), and 'the old ether' (B/ri/. Up. V, 1)[119]. And other similar passages. On account of the force of the complementary passage we are justified in deciding that the word 'ether,' although occurring in the beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman. The case is analogous to that of the sentence, 'Agni (lit. the fire) studies a chapter,' where the word agni, although occurring in the beginning, is at once seen to denote a boy[120]. It is therefore settled that the word 'ether' denotes Brahman. 23. For the same reason breath (is Brahman). Concerning the udgitha it is said (Ch. Up. I, 10, 9), 'Prastot/ri/, that deity which belongs to the prastava, &c.,' and, further on (I, 11, 4; 5), 'Which then is that deity? He said: Breath. For all these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise. This is the deity belonging to the prastava.' With reference to this passage doubt and decision are to be considered as analogous to those stated under the preceding Sutra. For while in some passages--as, for instance, 'For indeed, my son, mind is fastened to pra/n/a,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2; and, 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18--the word 'breath' is seen to denote Brahman, its use in the sense of a certain modification of air is better established in common as well as in Vedic language. Hence there arises a doubt whether in the passage under discussion the word pra/n/a denotes Brahman or (ordinary) breath. In favour of which meaning have we then to decide? Here the purvapakshin maintains that the word must be held to denote the fivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar modification of wind (or air); because, as has been remarked already, that sense of the word pra/n/a is the better established one.--But no, an objector will say, just as in the case of the preceding Sutra, so here also Brahman is meant, on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also a complementary passage gives us to understand that all beings spring from and merge into pra/n/a; a process which can take place in connexion with the highest Lord only.--This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is futile, since we see that the beings enter into and proceed from the principal vital air also. For Scripture makes the following statement (Sat. Br. X, 3, 3, 6), 'When man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech merges, into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind; when he awakes then they spring again from breath alone.' What the Veda here states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during sleep, while the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly, the activity of the sense organs is interrupted and again becomes manifest at the time of awaking only. And as the sense organs are the essence of all material beings, the complementary passage which speaks of the merging and emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the principal vital air also. Moreover, subsequently to pra/n/a being mentioned as the divinity of the prastava the sun and food are designated as the divinities of the udgitha and the pratibara. Now as they are not Brahman, the pra/n/a also, by parity of reasoning, cannot be Brahman. To this argumentation the author of the Sutras replies: For the same reason pra/n/a--that means: on account of the presence of characteristic marks--which constituted the reason stated in the preceding Sutra--the word pra/n/a also must be held to denote Brahman. For Scripture says of pra/n/a also, that it is connected with marks characteristic of Brahman. The sentence, 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise,' which declares that the origination and retractation of all beings depend on pra/n/a, clearly shows pra/n/a to be Brahman. In reply to the assertion that the origination and retractation of all beings can be reconciled equally well with the assumption of pra/n/a denoting the chief vital air, because origination and retractation take place in the state of waking and of sleep also, we remark that in those two states only the senses are merged into, and emerge from, the chief vital air, while, according to the scriptural passage, 'For all these beings, &c.,' all beings whatever into which a living Self has entered, together with their senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. And even if the word 'beings' were taken (not in the sense of animated beings, but) in the sense of material elements in general, there would be nothing in the way of interpreting the passage as referring to Brahman.--But, it may be said, that the senses together with their objects do, during sleep, enter into pra/n/a, and again issue from it at the time of waking, we distinctly learn from another scriptural passage, viz. Kau. Up. III, 3, 'When a man being thus asleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names,' &c.--True, we reply, but there also the word pra/n/a denotes (not the vital air) but Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks of Brahman being mentioned. The objection, again, that the word pra/n/a cannot denote Brahman because it occurs in proximity to the words 'food' and 'sun' (which do not refer to Brahman), is altogether baseless; for proximity is of no avail against the force of the complementary passage which intimates that pra/n/a is Brahman. That argument, finally, which rests on the fact that the word pra/n/a commonly denotes the vital air with its five modifications, is to be refuted in the same way as the parallel argument which the purvapakshin brought forward with reference to the word 'ether.' From all this it follows that the pra/n/a, which is the deity of the prastava, is Brahman. Some (commentators)[121] quote under the present Sutra the following passages, 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18), and 'for to pra/n/a mind is fastened' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2). But that is wrong since these two passages offer no opportunity for any discussion, the former on account of the separation of the words, the latter on account of the general topic. When we meet with a phrase such as 'the father of the father' we understand at once that the genitive denotes a father different from the father denoted by the nominative. Analogously we infer from the separation of words contained in the phrase, 'the breath of breath,' that the 'breath of breath' is different from the ordinary breath (denoted by the genitive 'of breath'). For one and the same thing cannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated of--and thus distinguished from--itself. Concerning the second passage we remark that, if the matter constituting the general topic of some chapter is referred to in that chapter under a different name, we yet conclude, from the general topic, that that special matter is meant. For instance, when we meet in the section which treats of the jyotish/t/oma sacrifice with the passage, 'in every spring he is to offer the jyotis sacrifice,' we at once understand that the word denotes the jyotish/t/oma. If we therefore meet with the clause 'to pra/n/a mind is fastened' in a section of which the highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a moment suppose that the word pra/n/a should there denote the ordinary breath which is a mere modification of air. The two passages thus do not offer any matter for discussion, and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for the Sutra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the passage about the pra/n/a, which is the deity of the prastava, allows room for doubt, purvapaksha and final decision. 24. The 'light' (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet (in a passage which is connected with the passage about the light). Scripture says (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines above this heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds that is the same light which is within man.' Here the doubt presents itself whether the word 'light' denotes the light of the sun and the like, or the highest Self. Under the preceding Sutras we had shown that some words which ordinarily have different meanings yet in certain passages denote Brahman, since characteristic marks of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has to be discussed whether, in connexion with the passage quoted, characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned or not. The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes nothing else but the light of the sun and the like, since that is the ordinary well-established meaning of the term. The common use of language, he says, teaches us that the two words 'light' and 'darkness' denote mutually opposite things, darkness being the term for whatever interferes with the function of the sense of sight, as, for instance, the gloom of the night, while sunshine and whatever else favours the action of the eye is called light. The word 'shines' also, which the text exhibits, is known ordinarily to refer to the sun and similar sources of light; while of Brahman, which is devoid of colour, it cannot be said, in the primary sense of the word, that it 'shines.' Further, the word jyotis must here denote light because it is said to be bounded by the sky ('that light which shines above this heaven'). For while it is impossible to consider the sky as being the boundary of Brahman, which is the Self of all and the source of all things movable or immovable, the sky may be looked upon as forming the boundary of light, which is a mere product and as such limited; accordingly the text says, 'the light beyond heaven.'--But light, although a mere product, is perceived everywhere; it would therefore be wrong to declare that it is bounded by the sky!--Well, then, the purvapakshin replies, let us assume that the light meant is the first-born (original) light which has not yet become tripartite[122]. This explanation again cannot be admitted, because the non-tripartite light does not serve any purpose.--But, the purvapakshin resumes, Why should its purpose not be found therein that it is the object of devout meditation?--That cannot be, we reply; for we see that only such things are represented as objects of devotion as have some other independent use of their own; so, for instance, the sun (which dispels darkness and so on). Moreover the scriptural passage, 'Let me make each of these three (fire, water, and earth) tripartite,' does not indicate any difference[123]. And even of the non-tripartite light it is not known that the sky constitutes its boundary.--Well, then (the purvapakshin resumes, dropping the idea of the non-tripartite light), let us assume that the light of which the text speaks is the tripartite (ordinary) light. The objection that light is seen to exist also beneath the sky, viz. in the form of fire and the like, we invalidate by the remark that there is nothing contrary to reason in assigning a special locality to fire, although the latter is observed everywhere; while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which the idea of place does not apply at all, would be most unsuitable. Moreover, the clause 'higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds,' which indicates a multiplicity of abodes, agrees much better with light, which is a mere product (than with Brahman). There is moreover that other clause, also, 'That is the same light which is within man,' in which the highest light is identified with the gastric fire (the fire within man). Now such identifications can be made only where there is a certain similarity of nature; as is seen, for instance, in the passage, 'Of that person Bhu/h/ is the head, for the head is one and that syllable is one' (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 3). But that the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly appears from the passage, 'Of this we have visible and audible proof' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7; 8), which declares that the fire is characterised by the noise it makes, and by heat; and likewise from the following passage, 'Let a man meditate on this as that which is seen and heard.' The same conclusion may be drawn from the passage, 'He who knows this becomes conspicuous and celebrated,' which proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to the devout meditation on Brahman a high reward would have to be allotted. Nor is there mentioned in the entire passage about the light any other characteristic mark of Brahman, while such marks are set forth in the passages (discussed above) which refer to pra/n/a and the ether. Nor, again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding section, 'the Gayatri is everything whatsoever exists,' &c. (III, 12); for that passage makes a statement about the Gayatri metre only. And even if that section did refer to Brahman, still Brahman would not be recognised in the passage at present under discussion; for there (in the section referred to) it is declared in the clause, 'Three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven'--that heaven constitutes the abode; while in our passage the words 'the light above heaven' declare heaven to be a boundary. For all these reasons the word jyotis is here to be taken in its ordinary meaning, viz. light. To this we make the following reply. The word jyotis must be held to denote Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) being mentioned. In a preceding passage Brahman had been spoken of as having four feet (quarters). 'Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person (purusha). One foot of it are all the beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven.' That which in this passage is said to constitute the three-quarter part, immortal and connected with heaven, of Brahman, which altogether comprises four quarters; this very same entity we recognise as again referred to in the passage under discussion, because there also it is said to be connected with heaven. If therefore we should set it aside in our interpretation of the passage and assume the latter to refer to the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of dropping, without need, the topic started and introducing a new subject. Brahman, in fact, continues to form the subject-matter, not only of the passage about the light, but likewise of the subsequent section, the so-called Sa/nd/ilya-vidya (Ch. Up. III, 14). Hence we conclude that in our passage the word 'light' must be held to denote Brahman. The objection (raised above) that from common use the words 'light' and 'to shine' are known to denote effected (physical) light is without force; for as it is known from the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is meant, those two words do not necessarily denote physical light only to the exclusion of Brahman[124], but may also denote Brahman itself, in so far as it is characterised by the physical shining light which is its effect. Analogously another mantra declares, 'that by which the sun shines kindled with heat' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7). Or else we may suppose that the word jyotis here does not denote at all that light on which the function of the eye depends. For we see that in other passages it has altogether different meanings; so, for instance, B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 5, 'With speech only as light man sits,' and Taitt. Sa. I, 6, 3, 3, 'May the mind, the light, accept,' &c. It thus appears that whatever illuminates (in the different senses of the word) something else may be spoken of as 'light.' Hence to Brahman also, whose nature is intelligence, the term 'light' may be applied; for it gives light to the entire world. Similarly, other scriptural passages say, 'Him the shining one, everything shines after; by his light all this is lighted' (Kau. Up. II, 5, 15); and 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as the immortal' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 16). Against the further objection that the omnipresent Brahman cannot be viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that the assignment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to reason because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor does it avail anything to say that it is impossible to assign any place to Brahman because Brahman is out of connexion with all place. For it is possible to make such an assumption, because Brahman is connected with certain limiting adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different kinds of devout meditation on Brahman as specially connected with certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart. For the same reason it is also possible to attribute to Brahman a multiplicity of abodes, as is done in the clause (quoted above) 'higher than all.' The further objection that the light beyond heaven is the mere physical light because it is identified with the gastric fire, which itself is a mere effect and is inferred from perceptible marks such as the heat of the body and a certain sound, is equally devoid of force; for the gastric fire may be viewed as the outward appearance (or symbol) of Brahman, just as Brahman's name is a mere outward symbol. Similarly in the passage, 'Let a man meditate on it (the gastric light) as seen and heard,' the visibility and audibility (here implicitly ascribed to Brahman) must be considered as rendered possible through the gastric fire being the outward appearance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in the objection that Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions an inconsiderable reward only; for there is no reason compelling us to have recourse to Brahman for the purpose of such and such a reward only, and not for the purpose of such and such another reward. Wherever the text represents the highest Brahman--which is free from all connexion with distinguishing attributes--as the universal Self, it is understood that the result of that instruction is one only, viz. final release. Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman is taught to be connected with distinguishing attributes or outward symbols, there, we see, all the various rewards which this world can offer are spoken of; cp. for instance, B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 24, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth.' Although in the passage itself which treats of the light no characteristic mark of Brahman is mentioned, yet, as the Sutra intimates, the mark stated in a preceding passage (viz. the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it,' &c.) has to be taken in connexion with the passage about the light as well. The question how the mere circumstance of Brahman being mentioned in a not distant passage can have the power of divorcing from its natural object and transferring to another object the direct statement about light implied in the word 'light,' may be answered without difficulty. The passage under discussion runs[125], 'which above this heaven, the light.' The relative pronoun with which this clause begins intimates, according to its grammatical force[126], the same Brahman which was mentioned in the previous passage, and which is here recognised (as being the same which was mentioned before) through its connexion with heaven; hence the word jyotis also--which stands in grammatical co-ordination to 'which'--must have Brahman for its object. From all this it follows that the word 'light' here denotes Brahman. 25. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus (i.e. by means of the metre) the direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus it is seen (in other passages also). We now address ourselves to the refutation of the assertion (made in the purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that in the previous passage also Brahman is not referred to, because in the sentence, 'Gayatri is everything whatsoever here exists,' the metre called Gayatri is spoken of.--How (we ask the purvapakshin) can it be maintained that, on account of the metre being spoken of, Brahman is not denoted, while yet the mantra 'such is the greatness of it,' &c., clearly sets forth Brahman with its four quarters?--You are mistaken (the purvapakshin replies). The sentence, 'Gayatri is everything,' starts the discussion of Gayatri. The same Gayatri is thereupon described under the various forms of all beings, earth, body, heart, speech, breath; to which there refers also the verse, 'that Gayatri has four feet and is sixfold.' After that we meet with the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it.' &c. How then, we ask, should this mantra, which evidently is quoted with reference to the Gayatri (metre) as described in the preceding clauses, all at once denote Brahman with its four quarters? Since therefore the metre Gayatri is the subject-matter of the entire chapter, the term 'Brahman' which occurs in a subsequent passage ('the Brahman which has thus been described') must also denote the metre. This is analogous to a previous passage (Ch. Up. III, 11, 3, 'He who thus knows this Brahma-upanishad'), where the word Brahma-upanishad is explained to mean Veda-upanishad. As therefore the preceding passage refers (not to Brahman, but) to the Gayatri metre, Brahman does not constitute the topic of the entire section. This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our position. 'Because thus direction of the mind is declared,' i.e. because the Brahma/n/a passage, 'Gayatri indeed is all this,' intimates that by means of the metre Gayatri the mind is to be directed on Brahman which is connected with that metre. Of the metre Gayatri, which is nothing but a certain special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be said that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to understand the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as the cause of the world, is connected with that product also whose name is Gayatri, is 'all this;' in accordance with that other passage which directly says, 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1). That the effect is in reality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on, under Sutra II, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain effects (of Brahman) is seen to be mentioned in other passages also, so, for instance, Ait. Ar. III, 2, 3, 12, 'For the Bahv/rik/as consider him in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas in the Mahavrata ceremony.' Although, therefore, the previous passage speaks of the metre, Brahman is what is meant, and the same Brahman is again referred to in the passage about the light, whose purport it is to enjoin another form of devout meditation. Another commentator[127] is of opinion that the term Gayatri (does not denote Brahman in so far as viewed under the form of Gayatri, but) directly denotes Brahman, on account of the equality of number; for just as the Gayatri metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so Brahman also has four feet, (i.e. quarters.) Similarly we see that in other passages also the names of metres are used to denote other things which resemble those metres in certain numerical relations; cp. for instance, Ch. Up. IV, 3, 8, where it is said at first, 'Now these five and the other five make ten and that is the K/ri/ta,' and after that 'these are again the Viraj which eats the food.' If we adopt this interpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and the metre is not referred to at all. In any case Brahman is the subject with which the previous passage is concerned. 26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the subject of the previous passage), because (thus only) the declaration as to the beings, &c. being the feet is possible. That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we must assume for that reason also that the text designates the beings and so on as the feet of Gayatri. For the text at first speaks of the beings, the earth, the body, and the heart[128], and then goes on 'that Gayatri has four feet and is sixfold.' For of the mere metre, without any reference to Brahman, it would be impossible to say that the beings and so on are its feet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for the verse, 'Such is the greatness,' &c. For that verse clearly describes Brahman in its own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent the Gayatri as the Self of everything as is done in the words, 'One foot of it are all the beings; three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven.' The purusha-sukta also (/Ri/k Sa/m/h. X, 90) exhibits the verse with sole reference to Brahman. Sm/ri/ti likewise ascribes to Brahman a like nature, 'I stand supporting all this world by a single portion of myself' (Bha. Gita X, 42). Our interpretation moreover enables us to take the passage, 'that Brahman indeed which,' &c. (III, 12, 7), in its primary sense, (i.e. to understand the word Brahman to denote nothing but Brahman.) And, moreover, the passage, 'these are the five men of Brahman' (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former passage about the Gayatri is taken as referring to Brahman (for otherwise the 'Brahman' in 'men of Brahman' would not be connected with the previous topic). Hence Brahman is to be considered as the subject-matter of the previous passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is referred to in the passage about the light where it is recognised (to be the same) from its connexion with heaven, remains unshaken. 27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter) on account of the difference of designation, is not valid because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary (to the recognition). The objection that in the former passage ('three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven'), heaven is designated as the abode, while in the latter passage ('that light which shines above this heaven'), heaven is designated as the boundary, and that, on account of this difference of designation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we do by remarking that in either designation nothing is contrary to the recognition. Just as in ordinary language a falcon, although in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree but also above the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here referred to as being beyond heaven as well. Another (commentator) explains: just as in ordinary language a falcon, although not in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be above the top of the tree but also on the top of the tree, so Brahman also, which is in reality beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two passages) said to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the former passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it remains therefore a settled conclusion that the word 'light' denotes Brahman. 28. Pra/n/a (breath) is Brahman, that being understood from a connected consideration (of the passages referring to pra/n/a). In the Kaushitaki-brahma/n/a-upanishad there is recorded a legend of Indra and Pratardana which begins with the words, 'Pratardana, forsooth, the son of Divodasa came by means of fighting and strength to the beloved abode of Indra' (Kau. Up. III, 1). In this legend we read: 'He said: I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self (praj/n/atman), meditate on me as Life, as Immortality' (III, 2). And later on (III, 3), 'Pra/n/a alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body, makes it rise up.' Then, again (III, 8), 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker.' And in the end (III, 8), 'That breath indeed is the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal.'--Here the doubt presents itself whether the word pra/n/a denotes merely breath, the modification of air, or the Self of some divinity, or the individual soul, or the highest Brahman.--But, it will be said at the outset, the Sutra I, 1, 21 already has shown that the word pra/n/a refers to Brahman, and as here also we meet with characteristic marks of Brahman, viz. the words 'bliss, imperishable, immortal,' what reason is there for again raising the same doubt?--We reply: Because there are observed here characteristic marks of different kinds. For in the legend we meet not only with marks indicating Brahman, but also with marks pointing to other beings Thus Indra's words, 'Know me only' (III, 1) point to the Self of a divinity; the words, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' point to the breath; the words, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' point to the individual soul. There is thus room for doubt. If, now, the purvapakshin maintains that the term pra/n/a here denotes the well-known modification of air, i.e. breath, we, on our side, assert that the word pra/n/a must be understood to denote Brahman.--For what reason?--On account of such being the consecutive meaning of the passages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire section which treats of the pra/n/a, we observe that all the single passages can be construed into a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman. At the beginning of the legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra to choose a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he selects for his boon, in the following words, 'Do you yourself choose that boon for me which you deem most beneficial for a man.' Now, as later on pra/n/a is declared to be what is most beneficial for man, what should pra/n/a denote but the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that Self a man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial for him, as many scriptural passages declare. Compare, for instance, /S/ve. Up. III, 8, 'A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go.' Again, the further passage, 'He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed, not by theft, not by bhru/n/ahatya' (III, 1), has a meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object of knowledge. For, that subsequently to the cognition of Brahman all works and their effects entirely cease, is well known from scriptural passages, such as the following, 'All works perish when he has been beheld who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, pra/n/a can be identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman. For the air which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those characteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding passage (viz. those intimated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,' 'immortal') can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with any being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following passages, 'He does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a bad action. For he makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed;' and, 'He is the guardian of the world, he is the king of the world, he is the Lord of the world' (Kau. Up. III, 8). All this can be properly understood only if the highest Brahman is acknowledged to be the subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word pra/n/a denotes Brahman. 29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the speaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not valid) because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the interior Self. An objection is raised against the assertion that pra/n/a denotes Brahman. The word pra/n/a, it is said, does not denote the highest Brahman, because the speaker designates himself. The speaker, who is a certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal himself to Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the pra/n/a, which this latter passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on, also, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number of attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no way belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvash/tri/; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,' and so on. Indra may be called pra/n/a on account of his strength. Scripture says, 'Strength indeed is pra/n/a,' and Indra is known as the god of strength; and of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self; for the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It thus being a settled matter that some passages convey information about the personal Self of some deity, the other passages also--as, for instance, the one about what is most beneficial for man--must be interpreted as well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence pra/n/a does not denote Brahman. This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are found a multitude of references to the interior Self. For the passage, 'As long as pra/n/a dwells in this body so long surely there is life,' declares that that pra/n/a only which is the intelligent interior Self--and not some particular outward deity--has power to bestow and to take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the pra/n/as as founded on the existence of the pra/n/a, it shows that that pra/n/a is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the sense-organs.[129] Of the same tendency is the passage, 'Pra/n/a, the intelligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up;' and the passage (which occurs in the passus, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is,' &c.), 'For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the pra/n/a. And that pra/n/a indeed is the Self of pra/n/a, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' So also the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as it were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and senses, sums up as follows, 'He is my Self, thus let it be known;' a summing up which is appropriate only if pra/n/a is meant to denote not some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural passage declares 'this Self is Brahman, omniscient'[130] (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19). We therefore arrive at the conclusion that, on account of the multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains information regarding Brahman, not regarding the Self of some deity.--How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring to himself be explained? 30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva. The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of /ri/shi-like intuition[131]--the existence of which is vouched for by Scripture--its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words 'Know me only.' By intuition of the same kind the /ri/shi Vamadeva reached the knowledge expressed in the words, 'I was Manu and Surya;' in accordance with the passage, 'Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that Indra after saying, 'Know me only,' glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of Tvash/tri/'s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge--in which case the sense of the passage would be, 'Because I accomplished such and such deeds, therefore know me'--but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and the like, goes on in the clause next following to exalt knowledge, 'And not one hair of me is harmed there. He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed.'--(But how does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)--Because, we reply, its meaning is as follows: 'Although I do such cruel deeds, yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman. 31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air (being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of (the meaning advocated by us) being accepted (elsewhere); and on account of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the passage under discussion). Although we admit, the purvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the pra/n/a does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity, since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.--For what reason?--Because it mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' mentions a characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On the other hand, we have the passage, 'But pra/n/a alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs (Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 'Then pra/n/a (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those, again, who in the passage quoted above read 'this one (masc.), the body[132]' must give the following explanation, Pra/n/a having laid hold of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other pra/n/as, viz. the sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if the word pra/n/a be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the chief vital air, the pra/n/a and the intelligent Self may be spoken of in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual concomitance, or as being different on account of their (essentially different) individual character; and in these two different ways they are actually spoken of in the two following passages, 'What is pra/n/a that is praj/n/a, what is praj/n/a that is pra/n/a;' and, 'For together do these two live in the body and together do they depart.' If, on the other hand, pra/n/a denoted Brahman, what then could be different from what? For these reasons pra/n/a does not denote Brahman, but either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both. All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would involve the assumption of devout meditation of three different kinds, viz. on the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is inappropriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the pra/n/a really constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause 'Know me only,' followed by 'I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, 'And that pra/n/a indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be similar, and we therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten subjects (subjective powers)[133] cannot rest on anything but Brahman. Moreover, pra/n/a must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning) being accepted,' i.e. because in the case of other passages where characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word pra/n/a is taken in the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the passage to refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage itself there is 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance, the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the passage, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' contains a characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5). Nor does the indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur in the passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' preclude the view of pra/n/a denoting Brahman. For, as the passages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and others, prove, there is in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from Brahman, but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul, agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz. 'let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,') which, by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions, aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the statement about the difference of pra/n/a and praj/n/a (contained in the passage, 'Together they dwell in this body, together they depart') does not agree with that interpretation according to which pra/n/a is Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those two adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may be identified, as is done in the passage 'pra/n/a is praj/n/a.' The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different manner also[134], as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect of pra/n/a, under the aspect of praj/n/a, and in itself. The passages, 'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is pra/n/a,' and 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it alone as uktha,' refer to the pra/n/a aspect. The introductory passage, 'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that praj/n/a,' and the subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by praj/n/a taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the praj/n/a aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following passage, 'These ten objects have reference to praj/n/a, the ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects and the subjects on the pra/n/a.' Thus we see that the one meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so, for instance (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body is pra/n/a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three aspects perfectly agrees with the pra/n/a chapter[135]; as, on the one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of pra/n/a, praj/n/a, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter. Notes: [Footnote 32: The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (/k/u); the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material world.] [Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person.] [Footnote 34: Adhyasa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.] [Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of speech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.] [Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge.] [Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, wealth, &c., belong to my Self.'] [Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form of remembrance' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in Pa/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only.] [Footnote 39: The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.] [Footnote 40: This is the definition of the akhyativadins.] [Footnote 41: Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 42: The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayampraka/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i.e. in so far as it is jiva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bhamati, pp. 22, 23: '/k/idatmaiva svayampraka/s/oszpi buddhyadivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/at katha/mk/id asm upratyayavishayoszha/m/karaspada/m/ jiva iti /k/a jantur iti /k/a ksheuajna iti /k/akhyayate.'] [Footnote 43: Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by itself or by anything else.--It is known or manifest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i.e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: asmatpratyayavishayatveszpy aparokshatvad ekantenavishayatvabbavat tasminn aha@nkaradyadhyasa ity artha/h/. Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id atmano nesh/t/am ity asa@nkyaha pratyagatmeti.] [Footnote 44: Tatraiva/m/ sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara/n/e sati. Bha. Tasminn adhyase uktarityazvidyavmake sati. Go. Yatratmani buddhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa/h/ tena buddhyadi-nasztmana va k/ri/tenasz/s/anayadidoshe/n/a /k/aitanyagu/n/ena /k/atmanatma va vastuto na svalpenapi yujyate. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 45: Whether they belong to the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.] [Footnote 46: It being of course the function of the means of right knowledge to determine Truth and Reality.] [Footnote 47: The Bhamati takes adhish/th/anam in the sense of superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.] [Footnote 48: If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.] [Footnote 49: I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.] [Footnote 50: The Mima/m/sa, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with Brahman. This Mima/m/sa being an enquiry into the meaning of the Vedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta mima/m/sa.] [Footnote 51: Nadhikarartha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyartha/h/, kam ayam atha/s/abdo brahmaj/n/ane/kkh/ya/h/ kim vantar/n/itavi/k/arasya athave/kkh/avi/s/esha/n/aj/n/anasyarambhartha/h/. Nadya/h/ tasya mima/m/sapravartikayas tadapravartyatvad anarabhyatvat tasya/s/ /k/ottaratra pratyadhikara/n/am apratipadanat. Na dvitiyoztha/s/abdenanantaryoktidvara vi/s/ish/t/adhikaryasamarpa/n/e sadhana/k/atush/t/ayasampannana/m/ brahmadhitadvi/k/arayor anarthitvad vi/k/aranarambhan na /k/a vi/k/aravidhiva/s/ad adhikari kalpya/h/ prarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhikari/n/a/s/ /k/a vidhyapekshitopadhitvan na t/ri/tiya/h/ brahmaj/n/anasyanandasakshatkaratvenadhikaryatve z pyapradhanyad atha/s/abdasambandhat tasman narambharthateti. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 52: Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may be comprised under the relation of anantarya.] [Footnote 53: He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the breast.] [Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the offering of the prayajas is to the dar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apur/n/amasa qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place.] [Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering (titiksha), attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and faith (/s/raddha).] [Footnote 56: According to Pa/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.] [Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grama/m/ ga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and result coincide.] [Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the Brahma-mima/m/sa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief attributes.] [Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the Nyaya, the Sa@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.] [Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of the essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in the beginning,' &c.] [Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and Go.; the Bha. proposes another less plausible division.] [Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara/h/ are: origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.] [Footnote 63: The pradhana, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal matter of the world in the /S/a@nkhya-system. It will be fully discussed in later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhana has been left untranslated. Cp. Sa@nkhya Karika 3.] [Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sari/n/am evagamaj jagaddhetum a/k/akshate. Ananada Giri.] [Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.] [Footnote 66: Atmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in the Purva Mima/m/sa.] [Footnote 68: The so-called sakshatkara of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.] [Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial post and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial post.'] [Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/astras were not of a different nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/astras; if they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like.] [Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the third that is independent of either.] [Footnote 72: Ananda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is: p/ri/thagjij/n/asavishayatva/k/ /k/a dharmadyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/ brahma/n/o yuktam ityaha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapa/th/e dharmadyasparse karmaphalavailaksba/n/ya/m/ hetuk/ri/tam.--The above translation follows Govindananda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva karmaphalavilaksha/n/atvad ity artha/h/.] [Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena kena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampadanam. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is identified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence being common to both.] [Footnote 75: Adhyasa/h/ /s/astratoitasmi/m/s taddhi/h/. Sampadi sampadyamanasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti vi/s/esha/h/. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/ sa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vayau pra/n/e /k/a da/s/a/s/agata/m/ jagad dar/s/ayati yatha jivatmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyaya brahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvayaphalayakalpata iti. Bhamati.] [Footnote 77: The butter used in the upa/ms/uyaja is ceremonially purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as kart/ri/--agent--stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman.] [Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from the two preceding hypotheses.] [Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/ karoti), things to be obtained (grama/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be modified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).] [Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things.] [Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.] [Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established?] [Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural motives--not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and the like.] [Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.] [Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean 'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahma/n/a is to be formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression 'a non-Brahma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word 'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the Purva Mima/m/sa; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.] [Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.] [Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.] [Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.] [Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.] [Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.] [Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.] [Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle independent of Sattva.] [Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapatlim nirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad va brahma/n/o sarvaj/n/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti. Prathama/m/ pratyaha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvara viyz/rin/oti anityatve hiti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/n/aneti. Svato nityasyapi j/n/anasya tattadarthava/kkh/innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam pratyayartho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatity aha.--The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the verbal affix in 'janati' indicating the particularity of the act.] [Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapa/th/aka of the Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.] [Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three passages.] [Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.] [Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.] [Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.] [Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.] [Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jivatman is conversant with the names and forms of individual things.] [Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are one.] [Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities--such as the heart and the like--which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.] [Footnote 103: Ananda Giri reads avish/t/asya for avishk/ri/tasya.] [Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, &c. only the satta, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.] [Footnote 105: Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus here also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva siddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sutrak/ri/to api matam ity aha, evam iti, /s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/astre dvairupyam brahma/n/o bhavati; tatra sopadhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara/n/am udaharati adityeti; uktanyaya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasarayati evam iti; sopadhikopade/s/avan nirupadhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityadina, atmaj/n/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam aha pareti; annamayadyupadhidvarokasya katham paravidyavishayatva/m/ tatraha upadhiti; nir/n/ayakramam aha vakyeti, uktartham adhikara/n/a/m/ kvastity asa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.] [Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.] [Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument which is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.] [Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.] [Footnote 109: Yadi labdha na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramatmano vastutobhinnena jivatmana paramatma labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhamati.] [Footnote 110: Yatha paramesvarad bhinno jivatma drash/t/a na bhavaty evam givatmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti, jivasyanirva/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirva/k/ya/h/ syad ity ata aha parame/s/varas tv avidyakalpitad iti. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 111: The explanation of the anandamaya given hitherto is here recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is attributed by Go. An. to the v/ri/ttikara.] [Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must be taken if understood to denote Brahman.] [Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.] [Footnote 114: See I, 1, 15-19. ] [Footnote 115: The preceding adhikara/n/a had shown that the five Selfs (consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates, are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman itself is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara/n/a undertakes to show that the passage about the golden person represents the savi/s/esha Brahman as the object of devout meditation.] [Footnote 116: So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes on poets and singers is Brahman.] [Footnote 117: Or else 'that which is within forms and names.'] [Footnote 118: Viz. as intimating it. Thus An. Gi. and Go. An. against the accent of /rik/a/h/. Saya/n/a explains /rik/a/h/ as genitive.] [Footnote 119: O/m/karasya pratikatvena va/k/akatvena lakshakatvena va brahmatvam uktam, om iti, ka/m/ sukha/m/ tasyarthendriyayogajatva/m/ varayitu/m/ kham iti, tasya bhutaka/s/atva/m/ vyaseddhum pura/n/am ity uktam. An. Gi.] [Footnote 120: The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that is not possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new chapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to be taken into consideration.] [Footnote 121: The v/ri/ttikara, the commentators say.] [Footnote 122: I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth, according to Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was entriely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the latter.] [Footnote 123: So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as non-tripartite light exists at all.] [Footnote 124: Brahma/n/o vyava/kkh/idya teja/h/samarpakatva/m/ vi/s/eshakatvam, tadabhavozvi/s/eshakatvam. An. Gi.] [Footnote 125: If we strictly follow the order of words in the original.] [Footnote 126: Svasamarthyena sarvanamna/h/ sannihitaparamar/s/itvava/s/ena.] [Footnote 127: The v/ri/ttikara according to Go. An. in his /t/ika on the bhashya to the next Sutra.] [Footnote 128: Concerning the difficulty involved in this interpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.] [Footnote 129: The text runs, 'astitve /k/a pra/n/ana/m/ ni/hs/reyasam,' and Go. An. explains 'astitve pra/n/asthitau pra/n/ana/m/ indriya/n/am sthitir ity arthata/h/ /s/rutim aha.' He as well as An. Gi. quotes as the text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athato ni/hs/reyasadanam ity adi.' But if instead of 'astitve /k/a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get the concluding clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's edition.]. [Footnote 130: Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the Kau. Up. is Brahman.] [Footnote 131: I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.] [Footnote 132: Ima/m/ /s/ariram instead of ida/m/ /s/ariram.] [Footnote 133: Pa/nk/a /s/abdadaya/h/ pa/nk/a p/ri/thivyadaya/s/ /k/a da/s/a bhutamatra/h/ pa/nk/a buddhindriya/n/i pa/nk/a buddhaya iti da/s/a praj/n/amatra/h/. Yadva j/n/anendriyartha/h/ pa/nk/a karzmendriyartha/s/ /ka/ pa/nk/eti da/s/a bhutamatra/h/ dvividhanindriya/n/i praj/n/amatra da/s/eti bhava/h/. An. Gi.] [Footnote 134: Viz. by the v/ri/ttikara.] [Footnote 135: Ihapi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogat' of the Sutra.] SECOND PADA. REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF! In the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. Moreover, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present themselves which because containing only obscure indications of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the second and third padas in order to settle those doubtful points. 1. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because there is taught what is known from everywhere. Scripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him therefore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath (the subtle body),' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 14). Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, &c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman. The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says.--Why?--Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'He is without breath, without mind, pure.'--But, it may be objected, the passage, 'All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the object of meditation?--This objection does not apply, the purvapakshin rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being: because Brahman is all this, tajjalan, let a man meditate with a calm mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because, as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion; therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman[136]; but meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon the subsequent passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,' &c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires belong,' &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected that the immediately following passage, 'greater than the earth,' &c., cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if one attribute only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned first; while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, 'That is Brahman' (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul[137], as it is clearly connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on. To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on.--Why?--'On account of there being taught here what is known from everywhere.' What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, ('all this indeed is Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly introducing a new topic.--But, it may be said, it has been shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunction of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating Brahman itself.--True, we reply; but the fact nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal. 2. And because the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman). Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict sense can be expressed[138], there being no speaker, still such phrases as 'desired to be expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be expressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to be received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired to be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i.e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the other explanation also, according to which the passage means 'he whose Self is the ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the same reasons he is called 'he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms 'consisting of mind,' and 'having breath for its body,' which the purvapakshin asserts cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti say of Brahman, 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (/S/ve. Up. IV, 3), and 'its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world' (Bha. Gita III, 13). The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms 'consisting of mind; having breath for its body,' on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of meditation. 3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.). The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman; the present Sutra states that they are not possible in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the embodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, 'He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth,' cannot easily be attributed to the embodied Self. By the term 'embodied' (/s/arira) we have to understand 'residing' in a body. If it be objected that the Lord also resides in the body[139], we reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only; for /s/ruti declares him to be all-pervading; compare, 'He is greater than the earth; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul, on the other hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist. 4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage, 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4), the word 'him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion, viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as something to be obtained; while the words, 'I shall obtain,' represent the meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer. Now, wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the same time. The relation existing between a person meditating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.--And thus for the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul. 5. On account of the difference of words. That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a difference of words. That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self.' There one word, i.e. the locative 'in the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative 'person,' denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different. 6. And on account of Sm/ri/ti. Sm/ri/ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self and the highest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.' But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the preceding Sutras? /S/ruti passages, as well as Sm/ri/ti, expressly deny that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23, 'There is no other seer but he; there is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. Gita XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O Bharata, to be the kshetiaj/n/a in all kshetras.' True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, although in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we have not learned--from the passage, 'That art thou'--that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and the like. 7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and because the case is analogous to that of ether. On account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in the clause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, 'He is smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the purvapaksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the present Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of Ayodhya although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole earth.--But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and to be minute?--He may, we reply, be spoken of thus, 'because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under discussion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar qualities--which apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a modification of the mind--just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred stone called /S/alagram. Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is, moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special forms of contemplation, and are not real. The latter consideration disposes also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would follow that it is affected by all the imperfections which attach to beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on. 8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the two). But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the nature of intelligence and therefore not different from the individual soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure, pain, and so on (as the individual soul). The same result follows from its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different from the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), and similar passages. Hence the highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory existence. This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is the difference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of more than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the assertion, that because Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as, 'That art thou,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded. Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman which is free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel even the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to fruition; how then should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the part of Brahman?--Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.--In that case, we reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in consequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason the Sutrakara says[140] 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of fruition on Brahman's part. 9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is immovable is mentioned (as his food). We read in the Ka/th/avalli (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment?' This passage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and 'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that Upanishad, the subjects of questions[141]. The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from Scripture as well (cp. B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater, according to the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu. Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.' The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being the condime