CONTENTS 8 OCTOBER 1993 CRIMINAL LAW 468 (NCI4th). The arguments of the prosecutors in a first-degree murder prosecution were not so grossly improper as to constitute a denial of defendant's due process rights where defendant contended that the prosecutors employed a barrage of impermissible ploys. State v. McHone, 868 (NCI4th). The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by not reinstructing the jury on voluntary intoxication when the jury asked the court to review the instructions on first-degree murder in the deaths of the two victims. State v. McHone, 1355 (NCI4th). The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by not submitting the statutory mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity where no rational juror could have found that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. State v. McHone, 1373 (NCI4th). The evidence in a sentencing hearing for two first-degree murders clearly supported the jury's finding of aggravating circumstances, there is nothing in the record that suggests that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and it could not be held as a matter of law that the sentence of death was disproportionate or excessive. State v. McHone, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 314 (NCI4th). Defense counsel's arguments in a first-degree murder sentencing hearing were not constitutionally deficient where defendant contended that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his knowing consent to his counsel's admission of guilt and sanctioning of the death penalty, but defense counsel's argument, when read in its entirety, neither endorsed nor sanctioned the death penalty. State v. McHone, 371 (NCI4th). The North Carolina death penalty statute is constitutional. State v. McHone, DAMAGES 21 (NCI4th). Plaintiff mother could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when she suffered mental anguish upon being informed that her child was in a car accident caused by defendant's negligence, rushing to the hospital where she observed resuscitation efforts by emergency personnel upon her child, and later learning of the child's death because plaintiff's injury was not reasonably foreseeable by defendant. Gardner v. Gardner, EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES 959 (NCI4th). The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by admitting statements by one of the victims regarding threats made by defendant to kill her where the conversations between the victim and the three witnesses related directly to the victim's fear of defendant and were admissible to show the victim's then existing state of mind at the time she made the statements. State v. McHone, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS 7 (NCI4th). A justiciable controversy existed so as to permit plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action for a determination pursuant to G.S. 136-19 of the price at which the DOT must reconvey to them land which the DOT previously took by eminent domain but no longer needs for highway purposes because litigation over the price appears unavoidable. Ferrell v. Dept. of Transportation, EMINENT DOMAIN 6 (NCI4th). When land previously condemned by the DOT was no longer needed for highway purposes, G.S. 136-19 required the DOT to permit the original owner or his assigns to repurchase the land for the initial award plus interest and the cost of any improvements rather then for the fair market value. Ferrell v. Dept. of Transportation, HOMICIDE 476 (NCI4th). The trial court's instruction regarding transferred intent in a first-degree murder prosecution did not erroneously rely upon an unconstitutional, conclusive presumption. State v. McHone, INTOXICATING LIQUOR 43 (NCI4th). The trial court did not err by dismissing an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiffs alleged that they were the parents of a 21-year-old student who was served alcohol at defendant's place of business by employees who knew that their son was highly intoxicated, that their son was killed when he lost control of his car as he drove home, and that the information that their son had been killed had a devastating emotional impact on plaintiffs. Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, NEGLIGENCE 19 (NCI4th). Plaintiff mother could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when she suffered mental anguish upon being informed that her child was in a car accident caused by defendant's negligence, rushing to the hospital where she observed resuscitation efforts by emergency personnel upon her child, and later learning of the child's death because plaintiff's injury was not reasonably foreseeable by defendant. Gardner v. Gardner, The possibility that defendant's negligence in serving alcohol to plaintiffs' son would combine with the son driving while intoxicated to result in a fatal accident which would cause the son's parents (if he had any) not only to become distraught, but also to suffer severe emotional distress as defined in ZZJohnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, simply was a possibility too remote to permit a finding that it was reasonably foreseeable. Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 57 (NCI4th). Applications for the position of county sheriff sought by a board of county commissioners seeking to fill a vacancy in that office pursuant to G.S. 162-3 are governed by G.S. 153-98 rather than by the Public Records Law, and under that statute the applications are not subject to disclosure to the public. Durham Herald Co. v. County of Durham, STATE 1.2 (NCI3d). Applications for the position of county sheriff sought by a board of county commissioners seeking to fill a vacancy in that office pursuant to G.S. 162-3 are governed by G.S. 153-98 rather than by the Public Records Law, and under that statute the applications are not subject to disclosure to the public. Durham Herald Co. v. County of Durham, 4 (NCI3d). In enacting the statutory scheme set forth G.S. 136-19 which empowers the DOT to acquire title to land for highway construction and provides that, when the DOT later determines that a parcel is not needed for highway purposes, first consideration shall be given to any offer to repurchase by the original owners, the legislature implicity waived the DOT's sovereign immunity to the extent of the rights afforded in G.S. 136-19. Ferrell v. Dept. of Transportation,