

other diverse RPS functions provide sufficient protection from an overpressurization transient. Furthermore, there will be no change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents released offsite.

For these reasons, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes revise the applicability for Functions 5 and 10 of TS 3.3.1.1. The RPS is not an initiator of any accident. Rather, the RPS is designed to initiate a reactor scram when one or more monitored parameters exceed their specified limits to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding and the reactor coolant pressure boundary and minimize the energy that must be absorbed following an accident. The proposed changes do not alter the applicability for RPS functions during plant conditions in which an overpressurization transient is assumed to occur. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Margins of safety are established in the design of components, the configuration of components to meet certain performance parameters, and in the establishment of setpoints to initiate alarms and actions. The proposed changes revise the applicability for Functions 5 and 10 of TS 3.3.1.1. The proposed changes do not alter the applicability for RPS functions during plant conditions in which an overpressurization transient is assumed to occur. In addition, the proposed changes do not affect the probability of failure or availability of the affected instrumentation. Furthermore, the proposed changes will reduce the probability of test-induced plant transients and equipment failures. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.

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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket No. 50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2, Beaver County, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: February 4, 2003.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would extend the surveillance interval of the slave relay in the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System instrumentation from 92 days to 12 months. The proposed amendment includes changes to surveillance requirement (SR) 4.3.2.1.1 and the related Bases.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No. The proposed change to the slave relay test interval reduces the potential for spurious actuation of equipment, and therefore does not increase the probability of any accident previously analyzed. The proposed change to the slave relay test interval does not change the response of the unit to any accidents and has an insignificant impact on the reliability of the engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) signals. The ESFAS will remain highly reliable and the proposed change will not result in a significant increase in the risk of plant operation. This is demonstrated by showing that the impact on plant safety as measured by the change in core damage frequency (CDF) is less than $1.0E-06$ per year and the change in large early release frequency (LERF) is less than $1.0E-07$ per year. The change meets the acceptance criteria in Regulatory Guide 1.174. Therefore, since the ESFAS will continue to perform its function with high reliability as originally assumed, and the increase in risk as measured by the change in CDF and LERF is within the acceptance criteria of existing regulatory guidance, there will not be a significant increase in the consequences of any accidents.

The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the unit is operated and maintained. The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not increase the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No. The proposed change does not result in a change in the manner in which the EFSAS provides unit protection. The EFSAS will continue to have the same setpoints after the proposed change is implemented. There are no design changes associated with the proposed change. The change to the slave relay test interval does not change any existing accident scenarios, nor create any new or different accident scenarios.

The change does not involve a physical alteration to the unit (*i.e.*, no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the change does not impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any existing requirements. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current unit operating practice.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No. The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not impacted by this change. Redundant ESFAS trains are maintained, and diversity with regard to the signals that provide engineered safety features actuation is also maintained. All signals credited as primary or secondary, and all operator actions credited in the accident analysis will remain the same. The proposed change will not result in unit operation in a configuration outside the design basis. The calculated impact on risk is insignificant and meets the acceptance criteria contained in Regulatory Guide 1.174. The proposed slave relay test interval change will result in a reduced potential for spurious equipment actuations associated with testing.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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