

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.2 on page 3/4 2–5 will be revised; (2) Salem Unit No. 2 TS Table 3.3–6 will be revised to indicate that one operable channel of containment air particulate activity reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation is required for operation in Modes 1 through 4; (3) Salem Unit No. 1 TS 3/4.7.6 Action Statements “d.” (for Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) and “e.” (for Modes 5 and 6) will be revised to refer to Action 25 in TS Table 3.3–6; and (4) Salem Unit No. 2 TS 3/4.7.6 Action Statements “d.” (for Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) and “e.” (for Modes 5 and 6) will be revised to refer to Action 28 in TS Table 3.3–6.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

**Response:** No.

The proposed changes to the TSs are administrative or editorial in nature and do not change the intent of any Technical Specification requirement. No changes are being made to any plant systems, structures or components (SSCs).

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

**Response:** No.

The proposed administrative and editorial changes to the TSs do not change the design function or operation of any plant equipment. Additionally, no new modes of plant operation are involved with these changes.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

**Response:** No.

The proposed changes are administrative and editorial corrections to the TSs that do not affect the ability of plant SSCs to perform their design basis accident functions. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

**Attorney for licensee:** Jeffrie J. Keenan, Esquire, Nuclear Business Unit—N21, P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.

**NRC Section Chief:** James W. Clifford.

*Southern California Edison Company, et al., Docket No. 50–206, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, San Diego County, California*

**Date of amendment request:** March 11, 2003.

**Description of amendment request:** The amendment application requests a revision to the Unit 1 defueled Technical Specifications administrative controls section to propose changes in organizational responsibilities. Specifically, the proposed change identifies that the Vice President, Engineering & Technical Services would be responsible for decommissioning activities. Additionally, the Station Manager would be designated as having approval authority for activities within the Station Manager's organization.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. This is a request to revise the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 permanently defueled technical specifications administrative controls. The proposed administrative changes are due to a realignment of the Unit 1 Decommissioning Project into the Engineering & Technical Services organization and the establishment of the Station Manager position within the Nuclear Generation organization. The proposed changes identify the Vice President, Engineering & Technical Services to be responsible for decommissioning activities and provides the Station Manager the opportunity to approve procedures and changes to procedures and changes to the Process Control Program that are under the Station Manager's responsibility. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

No. The proposed changes are administrative. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

No. The proposed changes are administrative. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis. These administrative changes do not affect the design or operation of the facility and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

**Attorney for licensee:** Douglas K. Porter, Esquire, Southern California Edison Company, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue, Rosemead, California 91770.

**NRC Acting Section Chief:** Mark Thaggard.

*Southern California Edison Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, San Diego County, California*

**Date of amendments request:** March 25, 2003.

**Description of amendments request:** The proposed amendments would revise Technical Specification 3.5.2, “ECCS—Operating,” Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.2.5. Specifically, the proposed change would replace the requirement to verify specific surveillance test values for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps with the requirement to verify the developed head for each ECCS pump in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This new requirement is identical to SR 3.5.2.4 in NUREG–1432, “Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants,” Revision 2.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

**Response:** No.

Deleting the specific surveillance test values for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps from Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.2.5 does not affect the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because ECCS pumps are for accident mitigation and do not contribute to initiation of accidents. Periodic surveillance testing of the ECCS pumps in accordance with the Inservice Testing (IST) program provides assurance that the pumps will perform as assumed in the safety analysis. There is no change to the safety analysis.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.