

detriment of the Asset Manager's clients.

26. The Applicants represent that major clients of the Affiliated Broker-Dealer include investment management firms that are competitors of the Asset Manager. Similarly, the Asset Manager deals on a regular basis with broker-dealers that compete with the Affiliated Broker-Dealer. If special consideration were shown to an affiliate, such conduct would likely have an adverse effect on the relationships of the Affiliated Broker-Dealer and of the Asset Manager with firms that compete with such affiliate. Therefore, a goal of the Applicants' business separation policies is to avoid any possible perception of improper flows of information between the Affiliated Broker-Dealer and the Asset Manager, in order to prevent any adverse impact on client and business relationships.

#### *Underwriting Compensation*

27. The Applicants represent that the underwriters are compensated through the "spread," or difference, between the price at which the underwriters purchase the securities from the issuer and the price at which the securities are sold to the public. The spread is divided into three components.

28. The first component includes the management fee, which generally represents an agreed upon percentage of the overall spread and is allocated among the lead manager and co-managers. Where there is more than one managing underwriter, the way the management fee will be allocated among the managers is generally agreed upon between the managers and the issuer prior to soliciting indications of interest. Thus, the allocation of the management fee is not reflective of the amount of securities that a particular manager sells in an offering.

29. The second component is the underwriting fee, which represents compensation to the underwriters (including the non-managers, if any) for the risks they assume in connection with the offering and for the use of their capital. This component of the spread is also used to cover the expenses of the underwriting that are not otherwise reimbursed by the issuer of the securities.

30. The first and second components of the "spread" are received without regard to how the underwritten securities are allocated for sales purposes or to whom the securities are sold. The third component of the spread is the selling concession, which generally constitutes 60 percent or more of the spread. The selling concession compensates the underwriters for their

actual selling efforts. The allocation of selling concessions among the underwriters generally follows the allocation of the securities for sales purposes. However, a buyer of the underwritten securities may designate other broker-dealers (who may be other underwriters, as well as broker-dealers outside the syndicate) to receive the selling concessions arising from the securities they purchase.

31. Securities are allocated for sales purposes into two categories. The first and larger category is the "institutional pot," which is the pot of securities from which sales are made to institutional investors. Selling concessions for securities sold from the institutional pot are generally designated by the purchaser to go to particular underwriters or other broker-dealers. If securities are sold from the institutional pot, the selling syndicate managers sometimes receive a portion of the selling concessions, referred to as a "fixed designation,"<sup>14</sup> attributable to securities sold in this category, without regard to who sold the securities or to whom they were sold. For securities covered by this proposed exemption, however, the Affiliated Broker-Dealer may not receive, either directly or indirectly, any compensation that is attributable to the fixed designation generated by purchases of securities by the Asset Manager on behalf of its Client Plans.

32. The second category of allocated securities is "retail," which are the securities retained by the underwriters for sale to their retail customers. The underwriters receive the selling concessions from their respective retail retention allocations. Securities may be shifted between the two categories based upon whether either category is oversold or undersold during the course of the offering.

33. The Applicants assert that the Affiliated Broker-Dealer's inability to receive any selling concessions, or any compensation attributable to the fixed designations generated by purchases of securities by the Asset Manager's Client Plans, removes the primary economic incentive for the Asset Manager to make purchases that are not in the interests of its Client Plans from offerings for which the Affiliated Broker-Dealer is an underwriter. The reason is that the Affiliated Broker-Dealer will not receive any additional fees as a result of such purchases by the Asset Manager.

<sup>14</sup> A fixed designation is sometimes referred to as an "auto pot split."

#### *Rule 144A Securities*

34. The Applicants represent that a number of the offerings of Rule 144A Securities in which the Affiliated Broker-Dealer participates represent good investment opportunities for the Asset Manager's Client Plans. Particularly with respect to foreign securities, a Rule 144A offering may provide the least expensive and most accessible means for obtaining these securities. However, PTE 75-1, part III, does not cover Rule 144A Securities. Therefore, absent an exemption, the Asset Manager is foreclosed from purchasing such securities for its Client Plans in offerings in which the Affiliated Broker-Dealer participates.

35. The Applicants state that Rule 144A acts as a "safe harbor" exemption from the registration provisions of the 1933 Act for sales of certain types of securities to QIBs. QIBs include several types of institutional entities, such as employee benefit plans and commingled trust funds holding assets of such plans, which own and invest on a discretionary basis at least \$100 million in securities of unaffiliated issuers.

36. Any securities may be sold pursuant to Rule 144A except for those of the same class or similar to a class that is publicly traded in the United States, or certain types of investment company securities. This limitation is designed to prevent side-by-side public and private markets developing for the same class of securities as is the reason that Rule 144A transactions are generally limited to debt securities.

37. Buyers of Rule 144A Securities must be able to obtain, upon request, basic information concerning the business of the issuer and the issuer's financial statements, much of the same information as would be furnished if the offering were registered. This condition does not apply, however, to an issuer filing reports with the SEC under the 1934 Act, for which reports are publicly available. The condition also does not apply to a "foreign private issuer" for whom reports are furnished to the SEC under Rule 12g3-2(b) of the 1934 Act (17 CFR 240.12g3-2(b)), or to issuers who are foreign governments or political subdivisions thereof and are eligible to use Schedule B under the 1933 Act (which describes the information and documents required to be contained in a registration statement filed by such issuers).

38. Sales under Rule 144A, like sales in a registered offering, remain subject to the protections of the anti-fraud rules of federal and state securities laws. These rules include section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5) thereunder