

under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1), Amendment 21–69, effective September 16, 1991.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. Model 1124 airplanes modified by Alternative Aviation Services. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. Because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

■ The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the supplemental type certification basis for Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. Model 1124 airplanes modified by Alternative Aviation Services.

1. *Protection from Unwanted Effects of High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF).* Each electrical and electronic system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capability of these systems to perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high-intensity radiated fields.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies:

Critical Functions: Functions whose failure would contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 18, 2003.

Ali Bahrami,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2003–CE–01–AD; Amendment 39–13130; AD 2003–09–01]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Model PC–6 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Model PC–6 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect and correct, as necessary, the aileron control bellcrank assemblies at the wing and fuselage locations. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct increased friction in the aileron control bellcrank assemblies, which could result in failure of the aileron flight-control system. Such failure could lead to problems in controlling flight.

DATES: This AD becomes effective on June 17, 2003.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of June 17, 2003.

ADDRESSES: You may get the service information referenced in this AD from Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., Customer Liaison Manager, CH–6371 Stans, Switzerland; telephone: +41 41 619 63 19; facsimile: +41 41 619 6224; or from Pilatus Business Aircraft Ltd., Product Support Department, 11755 Airport Way, Broomfield, Colorado 80021; telephone: (303) 465–9099; facsimile: (303) 465–6040. You may view this information at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2003–CE–01–AD, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Doug Rudolph, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329–4059; facsimile: (816) 329–4090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

What events have caused this AD? The Federal Office for Civil Aviation (FOCA), which is the airworthiness authority for Switzerland, recently notified FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on all Pilatus Model PC–6 airplanes. The FOCA reports one occurrence where the pilot reported increased friction on the ailerons. Inspection revealed unwanted axial movement of the aileron bellcrank assemblies, part numbers 6132.0071.51, 6132.0071.52, and 6232.0118.00. The axial movement is caused by deterioration of the adhesive bond around the bellcrank bearings which could cause the heads of the control cable attachment bolts to catch on the adjacent structure.

Has FAA taken any action to this point? We issued a proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that would apply to certain Pilatus Model PC–6 airplanes. This proposal was published in the **Federal Register** as a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on February 12, 2003 (68 FR 7081). The NPRM proposed to you to inspect and correct, as necessary, the aileron control bellcrank assemblies at the wing and fuselage locations.

What is the potential impact if FAA took no action? Increased friction in the aileron control bellcrank assemblies could result in failure of the aileron flight-control system. Such failure could lead to problems in controlling flight.

Was the public invited to comment? The FAA encouraged interested persons to participate in the making of this amendment. We did not receive any comments on the proposed rule or on our determination of the cost to the public.

FAA's Determination

What is FAA's final determination on this issue? We carefully reviewed all available information related to the subject presented above and determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed except for the changes discussed above and minor editorial questions. We have determined that these changes and minor corrections: