

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

(f) Unless otherwise provided by this AD, the actions shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-53A295, Revision 02, excluding Appendix and Evaluation Form, dated January 6, 2003. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

Effective Date

(g) This amendment becomes effective on June 5, 2003.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 23, 2003.

Ali Bahrami,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2002-CE-18-AD; Amendment 39-13138; AD 2003-09-09]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Cessna Aircraft Company Models 441 and F406 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-09-13, which currently requires a one-time inspection of the fuel boost pump wiring inside and outside the boost pump reservoir and repair or replacement of the wiring as necessary on certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Model 441 airplanes. AD 2002-09-13 resulted from several reports of chafing and/or arcing of the fuel boost pump wiring inside and outside the fuel pump reservoir. This AD retains the actions required in AD 2002-09-13,

makes the one-time inspection repetitive, requires the inspection and possible replacement of the wire harness, lead wires and fuel boost pump on Model F406 airplanes, and requires eventual installation of an improved design wire harness and fuel boost pump as terminating action for the repetitive inspections. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect, correct, and prevent chafing and/or arcing fuel boost pump wiring, which could result in arcing within the wing fuel storage system. Such a condition could lead to ignition of explosive vapor within the fuel storage system.

DATES: This AD becomes effective on June 24, 2003.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of June 24, 2003.

ADDRESSES: You may get the service information referenced in this AD from Cessna Aircraft Company, Product Support, P.O. Box 7706, Wichita, Kansas 67277; telephone: (316) 517-5800; facsimile: (316) 942-9006. You may view this information at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2002-CE-18-AD, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Adamson, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone: 316-946-4145; facsimile: 316-946-4107.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

What events have caused this AD? Reports of chafing and/or arcing of the fuel boost pump wiring inside the fuel pump reservoir that supplies fuel to each engine on Cessna Model 441 airplanes caused us to issue AD 2002-09-13, Amendment 39-12746 (67 FR 31117, May 9, 2002). AD 2002-09-13 requires you to: (1) do a one-time inspection of the electrical wiring going to the fuel boost pump reservoir and the boost pump wiring inside the reservoir for chafing or damage, and (2) repair or replace the wiring as necessary.

These actions are required in accordance with Cessna Conquest Service Bulletin No.: CQB02-1R1, Revision 1, dated April 22, 2002.

What has happened since AD 2002-09-13 to initiate this action? Further analysis of this situation reveals that:

- The actions required by AD 2002-09-13 should also apply to Model F406 airplanes;
- The inspection should be repetitive; and
- Improved design wire harnesses and fuel boost pumps should eventually be installed as terminating action for the repetitive inspections.

Has FAA taken any action to this point? We issued a proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that would apply to certain Cessna Models 441 and F406 airplanes. This proposal was published in the **Federal Register** as a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on October 21, 2002 (67 FR 64568). The NPRM proposed to supersede AD 2002-09-13 with a new AD that would require repetitive inspections of the Models 441 and F406 airplanes fuel boost pump wiring inside and outside the boost pump reservoir for chafing or damage and replacement of the wiring and fuel boost pump, as necessary, and require eventual installation of an improved design wire harness and fuel boost pump as terminating action for the repetitive inspections.

How will this action relate to the FAA's aging commuter-class aircraft policy? The FAA's aging commuter aircraft policy briefly states that when a modification exists that could eliminate or reduce the number of required critical inspections, the modification should be incorporated. This policy is based on the FAA's determination that reliance on critical repetitive inspections on airplanes utilized in commuter service carries an unnecessary safety risk when a design change exists that could eliminate or, in certain instances, reduce the number of those critical inspections. In determining what inspections are critical, the FAA considers (1) the safety consequences of the airplane if the known problem is not detected by the inspection; (2) the reliability of the inspection.

What is the potential impact if FAA took no action? This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in arcing within the wing fuel storage system. Such a condition could lead to ignition of explosive vapor within the fuel storage system.

Was the public invited to comment? The FAA encouraged interested persons to participate in the making of this amendment. The following presents the comments received on the proposal and FAA's response to each comment: