

accidental release due to the effects of an accidental release, fire, or explosion of a nearby buried pipeline. There is at least one known event of an accidental fire on a pipeline causing rupture of a fixture (valve rack) on an adjacent pipeline. This distinction is important, because except for the metering station there are only two aboveground fixtures (valves) along the MB Pipeline from the Transmontaigne Terminal to the Rio Grande, and the metering station is not positioned near to the existing POCC pipeline. Therefore, only a very small portion of the proposed MB Pipeline is susceptible to damage from an accident on the POCC line.

There is insufficient incident data on pipelines in the United States to numerically analyze the cumulative risk of two pipelines occupying the same corridor. However, there remains the presumption that it is possible for a catastrophic event on one pipeline to cause damage to a nearby pipeline. If the MB Pipeline route is utilized, it would result in two pipelines running parallel for approximately 60–70% of the length of the MB Pipeline; alternatively, if the 8⁵/₈ inch OD POCC pipeline alternative is utilized, it would result in two pipelines (the 8⁵/₈ and the 6⁵/₈ POCC lines) running parallel for nearly the entire length of the POCC pipelines. Therefore, there is an unquantifiable (and from an engineering perspective, insignificant) reduction in the risk of “cumulative impacts” from reducing the amount of ROW that PMI product transport will share with POCC LPG transport if the MB Pipeline is used.

Finally, these potential cumulative risks are smaller in magnitude than the overall reduction in risk that would accrue from transporting the same volume of hazardous liquids in pipelines rather than in tanker trucks.

iv. Possible Conflicts Between the MB Pipeline and the Objectives of Federal, Regional, State and Local Use Plans, Policies and Controls for the Area Concerned: The MB Pipeline supports Brownsville's continued development of the Port of Brownsville for industrial uses, and removes hazardous liquids transport from international bridges and populated areas. PMI will be responsible for ensuring that all applicable environmental and construction permits are obtained prior to the implementation of any portion of this project.

IV. Prevention and Mitigation Measures

In order to control risks associated with outside force damage, corrosion and leaks, PMI has undertaken or will

undertake the prevention and mitigation measures listed below. PMI has or will:

- Bury the pipeline a minimum of 3 feet below grade;
- Place and maintain prominent warning markers at all crossings and so that two are always in line-of-sight along the pipeline ROW;
- Require the pipeline operator to participate in all applicable one-call notification systems;
- Conduct regular ROW drive-overs or over flights in order to identify potential pipeline encroachments and unauthorized activities;
- Ensure that a PMI representative is physically present anytime there is construction activity within the pipeline ROW;
- Assign, on a permanent basis, a pipeline operator employee to headquarter in the area;
- Require the pipeline operator to participate in on-going public education initiatives stressing pipeline safety and damage prevention;
- Use factory-applied fusion-bonded epoxy coating on all pipes;
- Use field-applied coating on all welded joints;
- Conduct biennial surveys to determine effectiveness of corrosion control;
- Use a certified impressed current cathodic protection system;
- Use a heavy wall pipe in lieu of cased crossings;
- Use high-resolution internal inspection tools (*i.e.*, pigs) at least as frequently as required by 49 CFR 195;
- X-ray all girth welds completely;
- Use pipe manufactured at an ISO 9000-certified mill;
- Hydro test pipe in place to 125% of its maximum allowable operating pressure for 8 hours;
- Require that material specification, design, and construction meet or exceed all applicable standards and codes established by API, ASME, DOT/OPS, and TRC;
- Perform comprehensive construction and installation inspection;
- Provide continuous 24-hour monitoring of the MB Pipeline from a dispatch and control center;
- Use computers to identify significant operational deviations, and to set off appropriate alarms;
- Remotely monitor pressure at the Rio Grande River and always be capable of remotely blocking valve sites along the MB Pipeline;
- Provide on-going training and performance certification of employees responsible for pipeline operations and maintenance, as required by the Operator Qualification regulation of DOT;

- Install a fiber optic communications cable in the ditch to provide rapid and reliable transmission of signals between the pipeline equipment and the control room;

- Establish block valve spacing of less than 7.5 miles through industrial, commercial, or residential areas, as recommended under ASME/ANSI B31.4 standards for transport of LPG; and

- Install check valves with each block valve set to provide auto blockage of reverse flow prior to LPG transport.

V. Conclusion: Analysis of the Environmental Assessment Submitted by the Sponsor

On the basis of the final environmental assessment, the Department's independent review of that assessment, information developed during the review of the application and draft environmental assessment, comments received by the Department from Federal and State agencies and the public, and measures that PMI has or is prepared to undertake to mitigate or prevent potentially adverse environmental impacts, the Department has concluded that issuance of a Presidential Permit authorizing construction of the proposed MB Pipeline would not have a significant impact on the quality of the human environment within the United States. Accordingly, a Finding of No Significant Impact is adopted and an environmental impact statement will not be prepared.

The Final Environmental Assessment addressing this action is on file and may be reviewed by interested parties at the Department of State, 2200 C Street, NW., Room 3535, Washington, DC 20520 (Attn: Mr. Pedro Erviti, Tel. 202–647–1291).

Dated: May 6, 2003.

Stephen J. Gallogly,

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

Notice With Respect to List of Countries Denying Fair Market Opportunities for Government-Funded Airport Construction Projects

AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.

ACTION: Notice with respect to a list of countries denying fair market opportunities for products and suppliers