

[Clinton Power Station] CPS TS to be 0.65% of primary containment air weight per day at the design basis LOCA maximum peak containment pressure (*i.e.*, P_a). The limitation on containment leakage rate is designed to ensure that total leakage volume will not exceed the volume assumed in the accident analyses at P_a . The margin of safety for the offsite dose consequences of postulated accidents directly related to the containment leakage rate is maintained by meeting the L_a acceptance criteria during operation. The L_a value is not being modified by this proposed TS change. The IFTS will continue to provide an acceptable barrier to prevent unacceptable containment leakage during a LOCA, and therefore these changes will not create a situation causing the containment leakage rate acceptance criteria to be violated.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Edward J. Cullen, Deputy General Counsel Exelon BSC—Legal, 2301 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101.

NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Docket Nos. 50–317 and 50–318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert County, Maryland

Date of amendments request: March 28, 2003.

Description of amendments request: The amendment would remove the post-accident hydrogen monitoring and control requirements from the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Technical Specifications.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

The proposed change to the Technical Specifications has been evaluated against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92. The proposed amendment revises Technical Specification 3.3.10, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, and Technical Specification Table 3.3.10–1, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation to delete references to the containment hydrogen analyzers. Additionally, the proposed amendment will delete Technical Specification 3.6.7, Hydrogen Recombiners. The proposed change has been determined to not involve a significant hazards consideration, in that

operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments:

1. Would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Components used in the control of hydrogen in the Containment (consisting of hydrogen recombiners, a hydrogen vent, and hydrogen detectors) are not considered accident initiators. Therefore, this change does not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

The purpose of the Hydrogen Control System is to ensure that hydrogen concentration is maintained below 4.0 volume percent so that Containment integrity is not challenged following a design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Individual Plant Examination analyzed the probability of Containment failure under a variety of conditions. This proposed amendment does not alter the conclusions or assumptions of the Individual Plant Examination. The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Containment provides a safety margin against hydrogen burn following a design basis accident, such that the Containment will not fail even without hydrogen control equipment. Therefore, this change does not increase the consequences of accidents previously evaluated.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. Would not create the possibility of a new or different [kind] of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not change the configuration of the plant beyond the Hydrogen Control System. Hydrogen generation following a design basis LOCA has been evaluated. Deletion of the Hydrogen Control System from the plant design basis and Technical Specifications does not alter the generation of hydrogen post-LOCA.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different [kind] of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Would not involve a significant reduction in [a] margin of safety.

The margin of safety in this case is the ability of Containment to withstand a pressure increase caused by the deflagration of hydrogen in the Containment. Industry experience and experimentation has shown that large, dry, well-ventilated Containments such as those at Calvert Cliffs can withstand pressures generated by ignition of hydrogen resulting from a LOCA. The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Containment provides a safety margin against hydrogen burn following a design basis accident, such that the Containment will not fail even without hydrogen control equipment.

Therefore, this change does not significantly reduce [a] margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendments request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1, Pope County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: April 2, 2003.

Description of amendment request:

The proposed amendment would change the spent fuel pool loading restrictions by redefining the regions, inserting Metamic® poison panels in a portion of the spent fuel pool, and increasing the minimum boron concentration.

Basis for no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The three fuel handling accidents described below can be postulated to increase reactivity. However, for these accident conditions, the double contingency principle of ANS [American Nuclear Society] N16.1–1975 is applied. This states that it is unnecessary to assume two unlikely, independent, concurrent events to ensure protection against a criticality accident. Thus, for accident conditions, the presence of soluble boron in the storage pool water can be assumed as a realistic initial condition since its absence would be a second unlikely event.

Three types of drop accidents have been considered: a vertical drop accident, a horizontal drop accident, and an inadvertent drop of an assembly between the outside periphery of the rack and the pool wall:

- A vertical drop directly upon a cell will cause damage to the racks in the active fuel region. The current 1600 ppm soluble boron concentration TS limit will ensure that K_{eff} does not exceed 0.95.

- A fuel assembly dropped on top of the rack horizontally will not deform the rack structure such that criticality assumptions are invalidated. The rack structure is such that an assembly positioned horizontally on top of the rack results in a separation distance from the upper end of the active fuel region of the stored assemblies. This distance is sufficient to preclude interaction between the dropped assembly and the stored fuel.

- An inadvertent drop of an assembly between the outside periphery of the rack and the pool wall is bounded by the worst case fuel misplacement accident condition.

The fuel assembly misplacement accident was considered for all storage configurations. An assembly with high reactivity is assumed