

Instrumentation,” Function 3.e, “HPCS System Flow Rate—Low (Bypass),” request an increase in the Allowable Value from less than or equal to  $\leq 1704$  gpm to  $\leq 2194$  gpm. The operation of High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Flow Rate—Low (Bypass) function is not a precursor to any accident previously evaluated. Thus, the proposed change does not have any effect on the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

The LaSalle County Station Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) are designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containments, to limit the release of radioactive material to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods, flooding and spraying, to cool the reactor core following a LOCA. The HPCS is one of the core spray systems. The evaluation of the proposed change concluded that the HPCS will operate as assumed in accidents previously evaluated. Thus, the radiological consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not affect the control parameters governing unit operation and does not introduce any new equipment, modes of system operation or failure mechanisms. Calculations have been performed which evaluated the performance of the HPCS system without the closure of the minimum flow bypass valve. The calculations determined that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCS pump capacity with the minimum flow bypass valve open will support HPCS System injection flow into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) over the full range of RPV pressures above the requirements for HPCS in the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analyses.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The HPCS System Flow Rate—Low (Bypass) Function is one of the inputs to the logic that controls the opening and closing of the minimum flow bypass valve. The current Allowable Values for this function are greater than or equal to ( $\geq$ ) 1380 gpm and  $\leq 1704$  gpm. The lower Allowable Value limit (*i.e.*, 1380 gpm) ensures that the minimum flow bypass valve opens when pump flow is too low for adequate cooling of the pump while the pump is operating. This limit is not affected by the proposed change.

The upper Allowable Value limit (*i.e.*, 1704 gpm) ensures that the minimum flow bypass valve automatically closes to allow maximum flow to the RPV spray sparger. The proposed change increases the value to  $\leq 2194$  gpm. LaSalle County Station has evaluated the effect of this change and concluded the following:

- The proposed change to increase the upper Allowable Value limit from  $\leq 1704$  gpm to  $\leq 2194$  gpm will provide further assurance that the minimum flow bypass valve remains full open until the HPCS pump flow to the RPV spray sparger is sufficient to prevent overheating of the pump, and
- The upper Allowable Value ensures that the HPCS minimum flow bypass valve closes to allow maximum flow to the RPV spray sparger. The proposed change will delay the initiation of valve closure from  $\leq 1704$  gpm to  $\leq 2194$  gpm. The calculations determined that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCS pump capacity with the minimum flow bypass valve open will support HPCS system injection flow into the RPV over the full range of RPV pressures above the requirements for HPCS in the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis up to the maximum assumed injection flow of 5400 gpm. The margin to the flow requirements of the LOCA analysis varies from approximately 200 gpm at very low RPV pressures to greater than 1000 gpm at higher RPV pressures. Since the HPCS system injection flow requirement to the RPV spray sparger assumed in the LOCA analysis is met with the minimum flow bypass valve open, the LOCA analysis results are not adversely affected by increasing the value of flow when the minimum flow bypass valve starts to close. Although the calculations show that closure of the HPCS minimum flow bypass valve is not necessary to meet the HPCS system injection flow requirements assumed in the LOCA analyses, LaSalle County Station has chosen to retain the upper Allowable Value in the TS to provide additional margin to the assumed injection flow of the analyses.

Thus, increasing the TS upper Allowable Value limit for the HPCS System Flow Rate—Low (Bypass) Function from  $\leq 1704$  gpm to  $\leq 2194$  gpm will not affect the capability of the HPCS system in performing its intended safety function.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the above, Exelon Generation Company concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of “no significant hazards consideration” is justified.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee’s analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.

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*Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-263, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Wright County, Minnesota*

*Date of amendment request:* March 19, 2003.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would delete requirements from the Technical Specifications (TSs) and other elements of the licensing bases related to the post-accident sampling system (PASS) at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. Licensees were generally required to implement PASS upgrades as described in NUREG-0737, “Clarification of TMI [Three Mile Island] Action Plan Requirements,” and Regulatory Guide 1.97, “Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident.” Implementation of these upgrades was an outcome of the lessons learned from the accident that occurred at TMI Unit 2. Requirements related to PASS were imposed by Order for many facilities and were added to or included in the TSs for nuclear power reactors currently licensed to operate. Lessons learned and improvements implemented over the last 20 years have shown that the information obtained from PASS can be readily obtained through other means or is of little use in the assessment and mitigation of accident conditions.

The proposed changes are based on NRC-approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-413, “Elimination of Requirements for a Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).” The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the **Federal Register** on December 27, 2001 (66 FR 66949), on possible amendments concerning TSTF-413. The notice included a model safety evaluation and model no significant hazards consideration determination, using the consolidated line-item improvement process. The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of availability of the models for referencing in license amendment applications in the **Federal Register** on March 20, 2002 (67 FR 13027). The licensee affirmed the applicability of the following no significant hazards consideration determination in its application dated March 19, 2003.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below: