

consistent with the proposed changes to § 412.4(b) described at section IV.A.3. of this preamble, we are proposing to delete existing § 412.4(b)(2) from the definition of a transfer.

3. Expanding the Postacute Care Transfer Policy to Additional DRGs (§§ 412.4(c) and (d))

Under section 1886(d)(5)(J) of the Act, a “qualified discharge” from one of 10 DRGs selected by the Secretary, to a postacute care provider is treated as a transfer case beginning with discharges on or after October 1, 1998. This section requires the Secretary to define and pay as transfers all cases assigned to one of 10 DRGs selected by the Secretary, if the individuals are discharged to one of the following postacute care settings:

- A hospital or hospital unit that is not a subsection 1886(d) hospital. (Section 1886(d)(1)(B) of the Act identifies the hospitals and hospital units that are excluded from the term “subsection (d) hospital” as psychiatric hospitals and units, rehabilitation hospitals and units, children’s hospitals, long-term care hospitals, and cancer hospitals.)

- A SNF (as defined at section 1819(a) of the Act).

- Home health services provided by a home health agency, if the services relate to the condition or diagnosis for which the individual received inpatient hospital services, and if the home health services are provided within an appropriate period (as determined by the Secretary).

In the July 31, 1998 IPPS final rule (63 FR 40975 through 40976), we specified the appropriate time period during which we would consider a discharge to postacute home health services to constitute a transfer as within 3 days after the date of discharge. Also, in the July 31, 1998 final rule, we did not include in the definition of postacute care transfer cases patients transferred to a swing-bed for skilled nursing care (63 FR 40977).

Section 1886(d)(5)(J) of the Act directed the Secretary to select 10 DRGs based upon a high volume of discharges to postacute care and a disproportionate use of postacute care services. As discussed in the July 31, 1998 final rule, these 10 DRGs were selected in 1998 based on the MedPAR data from FY 1996. Using that information, we identified and selected the first 20 DRGs that had the largest proportion of discharges to postacute care (and at least 14,000 such transfer cases). In order to select 10 DRGs from the 20 DRGs on our list, we considered the volume and percentage of discharges to postacute care that occurred before the mean

length of stay and whether the discharges occurring early in the stay were more likely to receive postacute care. We identified the following DRGs to be subject to the special 10 DRG transfer rule:

- DRG 14 (Intracranial Hemorrhage and Stroke with Infarction (formerly “Specific Cerebrovascular Disorders Except Transient Ischemic Attack”));
- DRG 113 (Amputation for Circulatory System Disorders Except Upper Limb and Toe);
- DRG 209 (Major Joint Limb Reattachment Procedures of Lower Extremity);
- DRG 210 (Hip and Femur Procedures Except Major Joint Procedures Age >17 With CC);
- DRG 211 (Hip and Femur Procedures Except Major Joint Procedures Age >17 Without CC);
- DRG 236 (Fractures of Hip and Pelvis);
- DRG 263 (Skin Graft and/or Debridement for Skin Ulcer or Cellulitis With CC);
- DRG 264 (Skin Graft and/or Debridement for Skin Ulcer or Cellulitis Without CC);
- DRG 429 (Organic Disturbances and Mental Retardation); and
- DRG 483 (Tracheostomy With Mechanical Ventilation 96+ Hours or Principal Diagnosis Except Face, Mouth, and Neck Diagnoses (formerly “Tracheostomy Except for Face, Mouth, and Neck Diagnoses”)).

Similar to the policy for transfers between two acute care hospitals, the transferring hospital in a postacute care transfer for 7 of the 10 DRGs receives twice the per diem rate the first day and the per diem rate for each following day of the stay before the transfer, up to the full DRG payment. However, 3 of the 10 DRGs exhibit a disproportionate share of costs very early in the hospital stay in postacute care transfer situations. For these 3 DRGs, hospitals receive 50 percent of the full DRG payment plus the single per diem (rather than double the per diem) for the first day of the stay and 50 percent of the per diem for the remaining days of the stay, up to the full DRG payment. This is consistent with section 1886(d)(5)(J)(i) of the Act, which recognizes that in some cases “a substantial portion of the costs of care are incurred in the early days of the inpatient stay.”

Section 1886(d)(5)(J)(iv) of the Act authorizes the Secretary to expand the postacute transfer policy beyond 10 DRGs. In the May 9, 2002 IPPS proposed rule, we discussed the possibility of expanding this policy to either all DRGs or a subset of additional DRGs (we identified 13 additional DRGs in that

proposed rule) (67 FR 31455). However, as discussed further in the August 1, 2002 final rule (65 FR 50048), we did not expand the postacute transfer provision to additional DRGs for FY 2003. The commenters on the options in the May 9, 2002 proposed rule raised many issues regarding the impact of expanding this policy that we needed to consider further before proceeding. In particular, due to the limited time between the close of the comment period and the required publication date of August 1, we were unable to completely analyze and respond to all of the points that were raised. We indicated that we would continue to conduct research to assess whether further expansion of this policy may be warranted and, if so, how to design any such refinements.

Many commenters on the May 9, 2002 proposed rule argued that, in a system based on averages, expansion of the postacute care transfer policy negatively influences, and in fact penalizes, hospitals for efficient care. They claimed that this policy indiscriminately penalizes hospitals for efficient treatment and for ensuring that patients receive the right care at the right time in the right place. They believed that the postacute care transfer provision creates an inappropriate incentive for hospitals to keep patients longer.

Commenters also expressed concern that the expansion of the transfer provision violates the fundamental principle of the IPPS. The DRG system is based on payments that will, on average, be adequate. These commenters argued that expansion of the postacute care transfer policy would give the IPPS a per-diem focus and would mean that hospitals would be paid less for shorter than average lengths of stay, although they would not be paid more for the cases that are longer than average (except for outlier cases).

We agree that the transfer policy should not hamper the provision of effective patient care, and any future expansion must consider both the need to reduce payments to reflect cost-shifting due to reductions in length of stay attributable to early transfers to postacute care and the need to ensure that payments, on average, remain adequate to ensure effective patient care. Therefore, we have assessed the extent to which the current postacute transfer policy balances these objectives.

The table below displays the results of our analysis. We first examined whether the 10 DRGs included in the policy continue to exhibit a relatively high percentage of cases transferred to postacute care settings, particularly