

consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

[Addition of TS Bases Control Program and Changes to SR 4.0.1] The proposed changes to adopt the ITS [Improved Standard Technical Specifications] wording for Specification 4.0.1 and formally adopt a [TS] Bases Control Program are administrative in nature and do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, configuration of the facility or the manner in which it is operated. The proposed changes do not alter or prevent the ability or structures, systems, or components to perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the acceptance limits assumed in the Seabrook Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Future changes to the TS Bases will continue to be administratively controlled pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The TS Bases is a licensee-controlled document that contains bases information for the [TS]. Future changes to the information contained in the TS Bases will be reviewed and approved in accordance with the FPLE Seabrook Regulatory Compliance Manual and TS Section 6.7.6j (TS Bases Control Program) of the Seabrook Station [TS]. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated.

[CLIP Change]

The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. A missed surveillance will not, in and of itself, introduce new failure modes or effects and any increased chance that a standby system might fail to perform its safety function due to a missed surveillance would not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident beyond those previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by the missed surveillance will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

[Addition of TS Bases Control Program and Changes to SR 4.0.1]

The proposed changes do not alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated. There are no changes to the source term or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences in the Seabrook Station UFSAR. The proposed changes have no adverse impact on component or system interactions. The proposed changes will not adversely degrade the ability of systems, structures and components important to safety to perform their safety function nor change the response of any system, structure or component important to safety as

described in the UFSAR. The proposed changes are administrative in nature and do not change the level of programmatic and procedural details of assuring operation of the facility in a safe manner. Since there are no changes to the design assumptions, conditions, configuration of the facility, or the manner in which the plant is operated and surveilled, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

[CLIP Change]

The extended time allowed to perform a missed surveillance does not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety. As supported by the historical data, the likely outcome of any surveillance is verification that the LCO is met. Failure to perform a surveillance within the prescribed frequency does not cause equipment to become inoperable. The only effect of the additional time allowed to perform a missed surveillance on the margin of safety is the extension of the time until inoperable equipment is discovered to be inoperable by the missed surveillance. However, given the rare occurrence of inoperable equipment, and the rare occurrence of a missed surveillance, a missed surveillance on inoperable equipment would be very unlikely. This must be balanced against the real risk of manipulating the plant equipment or condition to perform the missed surveillance. In addition, parallel trains and alternate equipment are typically available to perform the safety function of the equipment not tested. Thus, there is confidence that the equipment can perform its assumed safety function.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

[Addition of TS Bases Control Program and Changes to SR 4.0.1]

There is no adverse impact on equipment design or operation and there are no changes being made to the [TS] required safety limits or safety system settings that would adversely affect plant safety. The proposed changes are administrative in nature and do not reduce the level of programmatic or procedural controls associated with the activities presently performed via the aforementioned surveillance requirements.

Future changes to the TS Bases information will be reviewed and approved in accordance with Seabrook Station [TS], Section 6.7, and as outlined in [FPLE Seabrook's] Regulatory Compliance programs. Specifically, changes to the Seabrook Station [TS] Bases require an evaluation pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 and review and approval by the Station Operation Review Committee (SORC) prior to implementation.

Therefore, formal adoption of a TS-required TS Bases Control Program and adoption of ITS wording for Specification

4.0.1 do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety provided in the existing specifications.

Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves NSHC.

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*Indiana Michigan Power Company,  
Docket No. 50-316, Donald C. Cook  
Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Berrien County,  
Michigan*

*Date of amendment request:*  
November 15, 2002.

*Description of amendment request:*  
The proposed amendment would revise the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, operating license and Technical Specifications to increase the licensed power level to 3468 Mega Watts Thermal (MWt), or 1.66 percent greater than the current level of 3411 MWt.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:*  
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

*Response:* No.

Probability of Occurrence of an Accident Previously Evaluated—In support of this Measurement Uncertainty Recapture (MUR) power uprate, a comprehensive evaluation was performed for nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) and balance of plant systems and components and analyses that could be affected by this change. A power calorimetric uncertainty calculation was performed, and the effect of increasing plant power by 1.66 percent on the plant's design and licensing basis was evaluated. The result of these evaluations is that all plant components will continue to be capable of performing their design function at an uprated core power of 3468 MWt. In addition, an evaluation of the accident analyses demonstrates that applicable analysis acceptance criteria continue to be met. No accident initiators are affected by this uprate and no challenges to any plant safety barriers are created by this change.

Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated—This change does not affect the release paths, the frequency of release, or the source term for release for any accidents previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Structures, systems, and components (SSC) required to mitigate transients remain capable of performing their design functions, and thus were found acceptable. The reduced uncertainty in the feedwater flow input to the power