

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the above, Exelon Generation Company concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.

*Attorney for licensee:* Mr. Edward J. Cullen, Deputy General Counsel, Exelon BSC—Legal, 2301 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101.

*NRC Section Chief:* Anthony J. Mendiola.

*FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–334 and 50–412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS–1 and 2), Beaver County, Pennsylvania*

*Date of amendment request:* March 11, 2003.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment revises the BVPS–1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs) to apply the Westinghouse best-estimate large break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) methodology to BVPS–1 and 2. The request is contingent upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval of the licensee's amendment request for conversion of the BVPS–1 and 2 containments from sub-atmospheric to atmospheric which had previously been requested by letter dated June 5, 2002, and which is currently under NRC staff review.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The NRC staff's review is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. No physical changes are required as a result of implementing best-estimate loss of cooling accident (LOCA) methodology and associated technical specification changes. The plant conditions assumed in the analysis are bounded by the design conditions for all equipment in the plant. Therefore, there will be no increase in the probability of

a loss of cooling accident. The consequences of a LOCA are not being increased, since it is shown that the emergency core cooling system is designed so that its calculated cooling performance conforms to the criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.46, Paragraph b. No other accident is potentially affected by this change.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

No. There are no physical changes being made to the plants. No new modes of plant operation are being introduced. The parameters assumed in the analysis are within the design limits of the existing plant equipment. All plant systems will perform as designed during the response to a potential accident.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

No. It has been shown that the methodology used in the analysis would more realistically describe the expected behavior of plant systems during a postulated loss of coolant accident. Uncertainties have been accounted for as required by 10 CFR 50.46. A sufficient number of loss of coolant accidents with different break sizes, different locations and other variations in properties are analyzed to provide assurance that the most severe postulated loss of coolant accidents are calculated. It has been shown by analysis that there is a high level of probability that all criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.46, Paragraph b are met.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Attorney for licensee:* Mary O'Reilly, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street, Akron, OH 44308.

*NRC Section Chief:* Richard J. Laufer.

*Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket No. 50–316, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Berrien County, Michigan*

*Date of amendment request:* March 27, 2003.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would amend Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3–4 and the P–11 setpoint in the Engineered Safety Features Interlock Table as follows:

1. Revise the low pressurizer pressure safety injection (SI) trip setpoint from its current value of greater than or equal to 1900 pounds per square inch gauge (psig), to greater than or equal to 1815 psig.

2. Revise the low pressurizer pressure SI allowable value from greater than or equal to 1890 psig, to greater than or equal to 1805 psig.

3. Revise the P–11 setpoint from its current value of greater than or equal to 2010 psig, to greater than or equal to 1915 psig.

4. Make format changes to the affected TS pages that improve appearance but do not affect any requirements.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

*Response:* No.  
[Indiana Michigan Power Company] (I&M) proposes changing the low pressurizer pressure SI trip setpoint, the low pressurizer pressure SI allowable value, the P–11 setpoint, and the format of the associated pages. Neither the change to the low pressurizer pressure SI trip setpoint value and the SI allowable value nor the change to the P–11 setpoint value alter any safety-related components or the means of accomplishing a safety-related function. The change in the values is supported by analyses that demonstrate that applicable acceptance criteria are met when SI is initiated at 1700 psig for a (loss-of-coolant accident) LOCA, a main steam system depressurization event, and a feedwater line break. Because the acceptance criteria are met, there is no significant increase in the consequences of an accident. The format changes are intended to improve readability and appearance, and do not alter any requirements. Thus, neither the probability of an accident nor the consequences of an accident are significantly increased.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

*Response:* No.