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Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert County, Maryland

Date of amendments request: May 12, 2003.

Description of amendments request: The proposed amendment would extend several Required Action Completion times for inoperable diesel generators (DGs) identified in Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed Technical Specification changes do not affect the design, operational characteristics, function or reliability of the DGs. The DGs are not accident initiators, and extending the DG Required Action Completion Times will not impact the frequency of any previously evaluated accidents. The design basis accidents will remain the same postulated events described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. In addition, extending the DG Required Action Completion Times will not impact the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The consequences of previously evaluated accidents will remain the same during the proposed extended Required Action Completion Times as during the current Required Action Completion Times. The ability of the remaining DGs to mitigate the consequences of an accident will not be affected since no additional failures are postulated while equipment is inoperable within the Technical Specification Required Action Completion Times. Therefore, the proposed changes will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The duration of a Technical Specification Required Action Completion Time is determined considering that there is a minimal possibility that an accident will occur while a component is removed from

service. A risk informed assessment was performed that concluded that the plant risk is acceptable and consistent with the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 1.177.

The additional proposed changes to renumber action requirements and the correction of a misspelled word will not result in any technical changes to the current requirements. Therefore, these additional proposed changes will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Would not create the possibility of a new or different [kind] of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not impact any system or component in a manner that could cause an accident. The proposed changes will not alter the plant configuration or require any unusual operator actions. The proposed changes will not alter the way any structure, system, or component functions, and will not significantly alter the manner in which the plant is operated. There will be no adverse effect on plant operation or accident mitigation equipment. The response of the plant and the operator following an accident will not be significantly different. In addition, the proposed changes do not introduce any new failure modes. Therefore, the proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margin of safety provided by the DGs is to provide emergency back-up power supply to systems required to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. The engineered safety features systems on either of the two trains for each unit provide for the minimum safety functions necessary to shutdown the units and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. Each of the two trains can be powered from one of the offsite power sources or its associated DG. In addition, the OC DG (Station Blackout DG) is available to provide power to any of the trains. This design provides adequate defense in-depth to ensure that diverse power sources are available to accomplish the required safety functions. Thus, with a safety-related DG out-of-service, there is sufficient means to accomplish the safety functions and prevent the release of radioactive material in the event of an accident.

The proposed change does not affect any of the assumptions or inputs to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and does not reduce the decrease in severe accident risk achieved with the issuance of the Station Blackout Rule, 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating Current Power."

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve [a] significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendments request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Grundy County, Illinois

Date of amendment request: February 26, 2003.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would allow the licensee to revise the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to include a description of a load drop analysis performed for handling reactor cavity shield blocks weighing greater than 110 tons with the Dresden, Units 2 and 3, reactor building crane.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change will allow use of a load drop analysis performed for handling the reactor cavity shield blocks weighing greater than 110 tons with the reactor building crane during power operation. The load drop analysis demonstrates that dropping a reactor cavity shield block within the designated safe load path from the heights assumed in the analysis will not affect the capability of safety-related equipment to perform its function.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change will allow use of a load drop analysis performed for handling the reactor cavity shield blocks weighing greater than 110 tons with the reactor building crane during power operation. The load drop analysis demonstrates that dropping a reactor cavity shield block within the designated safe load path from the heights assumed in the analysis will not affect the capability of safety-related equipment to perform its function. Therefore, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change will allow use of a load drop analysis performed for handling the reactor cavity shield blocks weighing