

24 hours as a result of the control room boundary being inoperable. Although this change does provide for an increase in the allowed time for continued plant operation under certain conditions, its acceptability is based on a low probability of any design basis accident occurring during that time period and the added protection provided by the compensatory measures that would be established. The increase in inoperability could be considered to be a decrease in the margin of safety of this system. However, based on the low probability of a concurrent accident requiring system operability during the completion time for this condition and the ability of the compensatory measures to restore the boundary before it is needed if an accident occurs, this potential reduction in safety margin is not considered to be significant.

The proposed changes also provide for limiting the applicability of SR 3.7.12.3, which verifies the operability of the ABVS on a SI signal. The limitation is imposed only when the ABVS is aligned and operating in its safety function configuration. Since the ABVS is already performing its safety function when it is in this condition, verifying the automatic capability to transfer to this configuration is unnecessary. Since this limitation is only during periods where the ABVS is already in its safety function configuration, the margin of safety is actually increased because the ABVS does not have to change configuration as a result of an accident to perform its safety function.

The proposed changes also provide for limiting the required operability of the FHBVS based on a minimum time period ("recently irradiated fuel") that all fuel assemblies in the fuel pool have not been part of a critical core. This change does reduce the current operability requirements for the FHBVS by limiting operability to the period when the system would be required to mitigate the radiological consequences of an accident to acceptable limits. This proposed change creates the potential for increased dose in the control room and at the site boundary due to a FHA outside containment. However, the new analysis demonstrates that the resultant doses are well within the Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183 limits and within the GDC 19 limits. In the case of the offsite dose values, they remain within the RG 1.183 limits, which is considered acceptable. Based on this, the margin of safety is not significantly reduced.

In the new FHA analysis, the offsite and control room doses due to a FHA outside containment have been evaluated using conservative assumptions, such as no credit being taken for the functionality of either FHBVS train's activated charcoal adsorber sections, the control room ventilation system remains in normal mode with no charcoal filtration available, and all airborne activity caused by the FHA is released at a linear rate over two hours. These conservative assumptions ensure the results of the calculation bounds the expected dose. The normal availability of the fuel handling building and control room filtration systems will reduce the potential control room and offsite doses in the event of a FHA, and provides additional margin to the calculated doses.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in any margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.

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Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County, California

Date of amendment requests: May 29, 2003.

Description of amendment requests: The proposed changes to the technical specifications would extend the completion time for restoring an inoperable diesel generator from 7 days to 14 days.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes revise the Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 completion times for Required Actions A.2 and B.4 associated with the diesel generators (DGs). The proposed changes allow an extension of the current TS completion time from 7 days to 14 days for an inoperable DG.

The proposed changes do not affect the design of the DGs, the operational characteristics or function of the DGs, the interfaces between the DGs and other plant systems, or the reliability of the DGs. Required Actions and the associated completion times are not initiating conditions for any accident previously evaluated, and the DGs are not initiators of any previously evaluated accidents. The DGs mitigate the consequences of previously evaluated accidents including loss of offsite power. The consequences of a previously analyzed event will not be significantly affected by the extended DG completion time since the DGs will continue to be capable of performing their accident mitigation function as assumed in the accident analysis. Thus the consequences of accidents previously analyzed are unchanged between the existing TS requirements and the proposed changes. The consequences of an accident are independent of the time the DGs are out of service as long as adequate DG availability is

assured. The proposed changes will not result in a significant decrease in DG availability so that the assumptions regarding DG availability are not impacted.

To fully evaluate the effect of the proposed DG completion time extension, probabilistic risk assessment methods and a deterministic analysis were utilized. The results of the analysis show no significant increase in core damage frequency and large early release frequency.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not involve a change in the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The proposed changes will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be changed. No alteration in the procedures which ensure that the plant remains within analyzed limits is being proposed, and no change is being made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed 14 day DG completion time is based upon both a deterministic evaluation and a risk-informed assessment. The availability of offsite power coupled with the availability of the other DGs in the affected unit, the unit auxiliary feedwater pumps, and all auxiliary saltwater trains (including the cross-tie) and utilization of the Online Risk Management Program while a DG is inoperable, provide adequate compensation for the potential small incremental increase in plant risk of the extended DG completion time. In addition, the increased availability of the DGs during refueling outages provides a reduction in plant risk during shutdown periods.

The risk assessment performed to support this license amendment request concluded that the increase in plant risk is small and consistent with the NRC's Safety Goal Policy Statement, "Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods in Nuclear Activities: Final Policy Statement," **Federal Register**, Volume 60, p. 42622, August 16, 1995 and guidance contained in [* * *] Regulatory Guides (RG) 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," dated July 1998 and RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision making: Technical Specifications," dated August 1998. Together, the deterministic evaluation and the risk-informed assessment provide high assurance of the capability to provide power to the engineered safety feature buses during the proposed 14 day DG completion time.