

proposed amendments for surveillance requirements (SR) 3.8.1.10 and SR 3.8.1.14 share the same electrical configuration alignment to the current monthly 1-hour loaded surveillance.

For SR 3.8.1.13, the DG would still be able to respond to an auto-start signal were one to be received during testing. The unavailability of the DG during the conduct of this SR 3.8.1.13 is minimal (approximately 30 minutes) and is considered insignificant from a risk perspective.

In addition, operating experience and evaluation of the probability of a DG being rendered inoperable concurrent with or due to a significant grid disturbance, support the conclusion that the proposed changes in this LAR do not involve any significant increase in the likelihood of a safety-related bus blackout.

SR changes that are consistent with Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification (STS) change TSTF-283, Revision 3 and NUREG-1432, Revision 2 have been approved by the NRC, and the on-line tests allowed by the TSTF and the NUREG are only to be performed for the purpose of establishing operability [of the DG being tested]. Performance of these SRs during previously restricted modes will require an assessment to assure plant safety is maintained or enhanced.

The deletion of the footnote associated with SR 3.8.4.8 is an editorial change. This footnote was associated with coming out of the ninth refueling outage for Unit 1, which has since passed.

Therefore, the proposed change[s] do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different [kind of] accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change[s] would create no new accidents since no changes are being made to the plant that would introduce any new accident causal mechanisms. Equipment will be operated in the same configuration currently allowed by other DG SRs that allow testing in plant Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. This license amendment request does not impact any plant systems that are accident initiators or adversely impact any accident mitigating systems.

Therefore, the proposed change[s] do not create the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The margin of safety is related to the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their design [safety] functions during and following an accident situation. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the containment system. The proposed changes to the testing requirements for the plant DGs do not affect the operability requirements for the DGs, as verification of such operability will continue

to be performed as required (except during different allowed modes [of operation]). Continued verification of operability supports the capability of the DGs to perform their required function of providing emergency power to plant equipment that supports or constitutes the fission product barriers. Only one DG is to be tested at a time and the remaining DG will be available to safely [shut down] the plant or respond to a DBA, if required. Consequently, the performance of these fission product barriers will not be impacted by implementation of [the] proposed amendment.

In addition, the proposed changes involve no changes to [safety] setpoints or limits established or assumed by the accident analysis. On this and the above basis, no safety margins will be impacted.

Therefore, the proposed change[s] do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on that review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the request for amendments involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Kenneth C. Manne, Senior Attorney, Arizona Public Service Company, P.O. Box 52034, Mail Station 7636, Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034.

NRC Section Chief: Stephen Dembek.

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert County, Maryland

Date of amendments request: May 28, 2003.

Description of amendments request: The proposed amendment would revise the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, cooldown curves (Technical Specification Figure 3.4.3-2) to change the range of temperatures for which a cooldown rate of 100 °F/hr is acceptable.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, the Calvert Cliffs pressure/temperature (P-T) limits for material fracture toughness requirements of the reactor coolant pressure boundary materials were developed using the methods of linear elastic fracture mechanics and the guidance found in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G. The proposed

cooldown rates for the Technical Specification P-T limits were made possible by ASME Code Case N-640 which permits use of K_{IC} for reference stress intensity factor. [Temperatures that enable the low temperature overpressure protection system are not affected].

The proposed change only changes the temperature at which the cooldown transitions from 100°F/hr to 40°F/hr. It does not change the basic cooldown rates or methods of cooling down the Reactor Coolant System. This cooldown transition does not affect the probability of an accident previously evaluated because the cooldown rates have not changed. Additionally, since the cooldown rates are not changed above 300°F, the safety analyses and dose consequences in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report are not affected.

Therefore[,] the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The implementation of the proposed revision has no significant effect on either the configuration of the plant, or the manner in which it is operated.

Therefore, this proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margin of safety is defined by compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, requirements for adequate margin to prevent brittle failure of the reactor coolant pressure boundary materials. As discussed above, use of K_{IC} with continuous cooldown results in a conservative cooldown rate that will maintain plant safety. With the proposed change, the underlying intent of the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, is maintained.

Therefore, this proposed change does not significantly reduce a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendments request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer.

Carolina Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50-261, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Darlington County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: May 28, 2003.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specifications requirements for spent fuel storage pool