

precisely define or control the HIRF energy level to which the airplane will be exposed in service; therefore, the FAA hereby defines two acceptable interim methods for complying with the requirement for protection of systems that perform critical functions.

(1) The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to the external HIRF threat environment defined in the following table:

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)	
	Peake	Avg.
10 kHz–100 kHz .....	50	50
100 kHz–500 kHz .....	50	50
500 kHz–2 MHz .....	50	50
2 MHz–30 MHz .....	100	100
30 MHz–70 MHz .....	50	50
70 MHz–100 MHz .....	50	50
100 MHz–200 MHz .....	100	100
200 MHz–400 MHz .....	100	100
400 MHz–700 MHz .....	700	50
700 MHz–1 GHz .....	700	100
1 GHz–2 GHz .....	2000	200
2 GHz–4 GHz .....	3000	200
4 GHz–6 GHz .....	3000	200
6 GHz–8 GHz .....	1000	200
8 GHz–12 GHz .....	3000	300
12 GHz–18 GHz .....	2000	200
18 GHz–40 GHz .....	600	200

The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square (rms) values.

or,

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter peak electrical strength, without the benefit of airplane structural shielding, in the frequency range of 10 KHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for signal attenuation due to installation. Data used for engine certification may be used, when appropriate, for airplane certification.

2. Electronic Engine Control System. The installation of the electronic engine control system must comply with the requirements of § 23.1309(a) through (e) at Amendment 23–46. The intent of this requirement is not to re-evaluate the inherent hardware reliability of the control itself, but rather determine the effects, including environmental effects addressed in § 23.1309(e), on the airplane systems and engine control system when installing the control on the airplane. When appropriate, engine certification data may be used when

showing compliance with this requirement.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on June 9, 2003.

**James E. Jackson,**

*Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 03–17249 Filed 7–8–03; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

**[Docket No. 2003–NM–165–AD; Amendment 39–13225; AD 2003–14–06]**

**RIN 2120–AA64**

#### **Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737–200, –200C, –300, –400, and –500 Series Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737–200, –200C, –300, –400, and –500 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections for cracking of certain lap splices, and corrective action if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct fatigue cracks in the lap joints and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.

**DATES:** Effective July 14, 2003.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of July 14, 2003.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before September 8, 2003.

**ADDRESSES:** Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2003–NM–165–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Comments may be submitted via fax to (425) 227–1232. Comments may also be sent via the Internet using the following address: [9-anm-iarcomment@faa.gov](mailto:9-anm-iarcomment@faa.gov). Comments sent via fax or the Internet must contain “Docket No. 2003–NM–165–AD” in the

subject line and need not be submitted in triplicate. Comments sent via the Internet as attached electronic files must be formatted in Microsoft Word 97 or 2000 or ASCII text.

The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

#### **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**

Duong Tran, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone (425) 917–6452; fax (425) 917–6590.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The FAA recently received a report of a significant number of cracks along the fuselage skin lap joint on a Boeing Model 737–300 series airplane with 35,710 total flight cycles. During scheduled maintenance, fatigue cracks were found on a lap joint of the skin that extends from aft of the flight deck to the wing front spar just above the passenger windows. Some of the cracks linked up to form a 10-inch crack. The premature cracks were attributed to delaminated skin doublers. Improper processing during phosphoric anodize application of the skin panel is the cause of the delaminated skin doublers. This condition, if not corrected, could result in fatigue cracks in the lap joints and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.

The improperly processed panels were installed on certain airplanes during manufacturing and were available to the remaining airplanes as spare parts. Therefore, Model 737–200, –200C, –300, –400, and –500 series airplanes may be subject to the identified unsafe condition.

#### **Related Rulemaking Activity**

We have issued several ADs to require inspections of lap joints; however, those inspections are not required until various times defined in those ADs, which are substantially longer than the compliance time threshold of this AD such that those compliance times do not provide a sufficient level of safety to address the identified unsafe condition.

In addition, on June 26, 2003, we issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, Rules Docket No. 98–NM–11–AD (68 FR 39485, July 2, 2003). That proposed AD would apply to certain Boeing Model 737 series