

a pressurizer hatch to be open for up to 6 hours, an increase from the current TS limit of 1-hour. Conforming changes would also be made to the associated Bases.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. Implementation of this amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Removal of the pressurizer enclosure hatch will not cause an increase in the probability of an accident which has been previously evaluated because the pressurizer enclosure hatch is not an accident initiator.

The consequences of an accident which have been previously evaluated will not be significantly increased by removal of the pressurizer enclosure hatch. As discussed in the analysis contained in the technical justification supporting this amendment request, the new containment compression peak pressure will remain well below the acceptance criteria. Additionally, the long term containment peak pressure will not be adversely affected due to the delay time in melting of the ice. The removal of the pressurizer enclosure hatch itself has been previously evaluated in Modes 1 through 4 in accordance with the analytical process described in NUREG-0612 and the NRC's December 22, 1980 letter regarding the control of heavy loads at nuclear plants. The changes proposed in this license amendment request will have no adverse effect on the procedures used for the handling of heavy loads (pressurizer enclosure hatch) at McGuire nor on the generation of internal missiles as evaluated in Section 3.5 of the McGuire Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

No. Implementation of this amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No new accident causal mechanisms are created as a result of the NRC approval of this license amendment request. As discussed above, extending the time that the pressurizer hatch is allowed to be open does not create any new or different accidents from those previously evaluated. Removal of the pressurizer enclosure hatch to perform inspections or maintenance inside the pressurizer cavity has been previously evaluated and determined to be acceptable. The analysis contained in the technical justification for this license amendment request provides results which conclude that the containment compression peak pressure, and the long term containment peak pressure are acceptable with the pressurizer enclosure hatch open. This amendment does not

impact any plant systems that are accident initiators; therefore, no new accident types are being created.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

No. Implementation of this amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their design functions during and following an accident situation. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the containment system. The pressurizer enclosure hatch and its performance have a direct impact on the containment boundary, since peak containment pressure due to an accident could be affected. However, the analysis supporting this amendment request concludes that the containment compression peak pressure and the long term containment peak pressure continue to be acceptable with the increased open time for the hatch. Thus the performance of the fission product barriers will not be significantly impacted by implementation of this amendment and no safety margin will be significantly impacted.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Attorney for licensee:* Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn, Duke Energy Corporation, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006.

*NRC Section Chief:* John A. Nakoski.

*Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1, Pope County, Arkansas*

*Date of amendment request:* June 30, 2003.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise the control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) surveillance requirement (SR) by modifying an existing SR related to the makeup flow rate to show that it is applicable to the VSF-9 train and by adding a new makeup flow rate SR that is applicable to the 2VSF-9 train.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

*Response:* No.

The purpose of the CREVS is to provide airborne radiological protection for operations from the control room for the

design basis loss of coolant accident fission product release and for a fuel handling accident. The proposed change continues to assure that the control room operator will be protected from the dose consequences related to either of these accidents.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

*Response:* No.

The proposed change will establish appropriate outside air makeup flow rates for the 2VSF-9 fan unit. This criterion has been evaluated and determined to continue to provide protection to the control room operator in accordance with General Design Criterion 19. The proposed change is not an accident initiator. No modifications to the system are proposed which would create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

*Response:* No.

The proposed change will establish the allowable makeup airflow into the control room when the 2VSF-9 CREVS train is in operation. Calculations have been performed which demonstrate that the proposed flow criteria provides increased protection for the control room operator.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Attorney for licensee:* Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.

*NRC Section Chief:* Robert A. Gramm.

*Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas*

*Date of amendment request:* June 30, 2003.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would: (1) Eliminate credit for the Boraflex neutron absorbing material used for reactivity control in Region 1 of the spent fuel pool (SFP), (2) credit a combination of soluble boron and several defined fuel loading patterns within the storage racks to maintain SFP reactivity within the effective neutron multiplication factor ( $K_{eff}$ ) limits of 10 CFR 50.68, (3) increase