

different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. A missed surveillance will not, in and of itself, introduce new failure modes or effects and any increased chance that a standby system might fail to perform its safety function due to a missed surveillance would not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident beyond those previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by the missed surveillance will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

[Additional Changes]

The proposed change involves an addition to clarify the required action when a SR is not met and new TS sections for consistency with the STS. The changes do not involve physical alterations to the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The changes will not impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any existing requirements. Therefore, these changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety

[CLIP Changes]

The extended time allowed to perform a missed surveillance does not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety. As supported by the historical data, the likely outcome of any surveillance is verification that the LCO is met. Failure to perform a surveillance within the prescribed frequency does not cause equipment to become inoperable. The only effect of the additional time allowed to perform a missed surveillance on the margin of safety is the extension of the time until inoperable equipment is discovered to be inoperable by the missed surveillance. However, given the rare occurrence of inoperable equipment, and the rare occurrence of a missed surveillance, a missed surveillance on inoperable equipment would be very unlikely. This must be balanced against the real risk of manipulating the plant equipment or condition to perform the missed surveillance. In addition, parallel trains and alternate equipment are typically available to perform the safety function of the equipment not tested. Thus, there is confidence that the equipment can perform its assumed safety function.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

[Additional Changes]

The proposed change involves an addition to clarify the required action when a SR is not met and new TS sections for consistency with the STS. These additions do not involve technical changes to the existing TSs. The changes will not reduce a margin of safety because they have no impact on any safety analysis assumptions. Also, since these

changes provide clarity and are administrative in nature, no question of safety is involved. Therefore, there will be no reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: J. M. Fulton, Esquire, Assistant General Counsel, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 600 Rocky Hill Road, Plymouth, Massachusetts, 02360-5599.

NRC Section Chief: James W. Clifford.

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Ottawa County, Ohio

Date of amendment request: December 4, 2001.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would change Technical Specification (TS) Section 6.9, "Administrative Controls—Reporting Requirements," to eliminate the requirement to submit startup reports to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Under the current provisions of TS Section 6.9, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station would be required to submit a startup report within 90 days.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensees have provided their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change is administrative in nature. As such, it does not affect any accident initiators and does not affect containment isolation, plant responses to accidents, or radiological effluents. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change is administrative in nature. As such, it does not introduce any new or indifferent accident initiators. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previous evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed change is administrative in nature and does not reduce or adversely affect the capabilities of any plant structures, systems, or components to perform their safety functions. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Mary E. O'Reilly, Attorney, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street, Akron, OH 44308.

NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.

Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin

Date of amendment request: June 20, 2003.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) Technical Specifications (TSs) to allow a one-time extension of the interval between integrated leakage rate tests from 10 years to 15 years.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Proposed Power Level Changes

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

Probability of Occurrence of an Accident Previously Evaluated—

The proposed change to extend the [integrated leakage rate tests] ILRT interval from 10 to 15 years does not affect any accident initiators or precursors. The containment vessel function is purely mitigative. There is no design basis accident that is initiated by a failure of the containment leakage mitigation function. The extension of the ILRT will not create any adverse interactions with other systems that could result in initiation of a design basis accident. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased.

Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated—

The potential consequences of the proposed change have been quantified by analyzing the changes in risk that would result from extending the ILRT interval from