

similar circumstances ordinarily provide significant evidence in determining whether a controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard, in the case of QCSAs such data may not be available. As recognized in the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there is little, if any, public data regarding transactions involving high-profit intangibles. H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 423-25 (1985). The uncontrolled transactions cited by commentators do not share enough characteristics of QCSAs involving the development of high-profit intangibles to establish that parties at arm's length would not take stock options into account in the context of an arrangement similar to a QCSA. Government contractors that are entitled to reimbursement for services on a cost-plus basis under government procurement law assume substantially less entrepreneurial risk than that assumed by service providers that participate in QCSAs, and therefore the economic relationship between the parties to such an arrangement is very different from the economic relationship between participants in a QCSA. The other agreements highlighted by commentators establish arrangements that differ significantly from QCSAs in that they provide for the payment of markups on cost or of non-cost-based service fees to service providers within the arrangement or for the payment of royalties among participants in the arrangement. Such terms, which may have the effect of mitigating the impact of using a cost base to be shared or reimbursed that is less than comprehensive, would not be permitted by the QCSA regulations. Further, the QCSA regulations would not allow the Commissioner to impose such terms in the context of a QCSA.

The regulations relating to QCSAs have as their focus reaching results consistent with what parties at arm's length generally would do if they entered into cost sharing arrangements for the development of high-profit intangibles. These final regulations reflect that at arm's length the parties to an arrangement that is based on the sharing of costs to develop intangibles in order to obtain the benefit of an independent right to exploit such intangibles would ensure through bargaining that the arrangement reflected all relevant costs, including all costs of compensating employees for providing services related to the arrangement. Parties dealing at arm's length in such an arrangement based on the sharing of costs and benefits generally would not distinguish

between stock-based compensation and other forms of compensation.

For example, assume that two parties are negotiating an arrangement similar to a QCSA in order to attempt to develop patentable pharmaceutical products, and that they anticipate that they will benefit equally from their exploitation of such patents in their respective geographic markets. Assume further that one party is considering the commitment of several employees to perform research with respect to the arrangement. That party would not agree to commit employees to an arrangement that is based on the sharing of costs in order to obtain the benefit of independent exploitation rights unless the other party agrees to reimburse its share of the compensation costs of the employees. Treasury and the IRS believe that if a significant element of that compensation consists of stock-based compensation, the party committing employees to the arrangement generally would not agree to do so on terms that ignore the stock-based compensation.

An arrangement between controlled taxpayers for the development of intangible assets in which one taxpayer's share of significant costs exceeds its share of reasonably anticipated benefits from the exploitation of the developed intangibles would not in substance be a QCSA and therefore would be subject to analysis under the other section 482 regulations. For example, as in the transactions cited by commentators, a controlled taxpayer might agree at the outset of an arrangement to bear a disproportionate share of costs in an arrangement in which it receives a service fee or a contingent royalty from the exploitation of the developed intangibles. More generally, controlled taxpayers might agree at the outset of an arrangement to determine the compensation of one party based on a subset of that taxpayer's costs or on a basis that does not take that taxpayer's costs into account at all (e.g., based on an amount determined with reference to a comparable uncontrolled price or transaction). In either case, such an arrangement between controlled taxpayers would not in substance constitute an arrangement to which the rules of § 1.482-7 would apply. Indeed, the limitations contained in § 1.482-7(a)(2) could produce results inconsistent with an arm's length result if applied to such an arrangement because the Commissioner would be precluded from making allocations that could be necessary to ensure that each controlled taxpayer is compensated appropriately. Rather, such an arrangement should be analyzed under

the other section 482 regulations (in particular, sections 1.482-1, 1.482-2(b), and 1.482-4) to determine whether it reaches results consistent with the arm's length standard, and any allocations by the Commissioner should be consistent with such other section 482 regulations.

## 2. Other Comments

Commentators offered various other reasons for not taking stock-based compensation into account in the context of QCSAs. Commentators expressed the view that stock-based compensation should not be taken into account because it does not constitute an economic cost or require a cash outlay, or, to the extent such compensation does constitute a cost, because the cost is borne by shareholders whose share value is diluted when additional shares are issued on exercise. Commentators also noted that the treatment of stock-based compensation for financial reporting purposes should not mandate that stock-based compensation be taken into account in the context of QCSAs.

In response to such views, and as discussed above, Treasury and the IRS continue to believe that requiring stock-based compensation to be taken into account for in the context of QCSAs is appropriate. The final regulations provide that stock-based compensation must be taken into account in the context of QCSAs because such a result is consistent with the arm's length standard. Treasury and the IRS agree that the disposition of financial reporting issues does not mandate a particular result under these regulations.

One commentator suggested that even if stock-based compensation generates a cost to a participant, there is precedent within the regulations relating to QCSAs for excluding certain costs, notably interest and taxes. Treasury and the IRS believe that the technical treatment under the regulations relating to QCSAs of interest, taxes and other expenses not related to the intangible development area does not warrant failing to take into account an element of employee compensation that is clearly related to the intangible development area. Treasury and the IRS believe that in order for the costs incurred by a participant to reasonably reflect its actual economic activity consistent with the legislative intent in this area, those costs must be determined on a comprehensive basis and so must take into account all relevant costs, in particular critical elements such as employee compensation. As noted above, Treasury and the IRS do not believe that there is a basis for