

(e) The propulsive thrust obtained from the operating engine after failure of the critical engine during a go-around used to show compliance with the one-engine-inoperative climb requirements of § 25.121(d) may not be greater than the lesser of:

(i) The actual propulsive thrust resulting from the initial setting of power or thrust controls with the ATTCs functioning; or

(ii) 111 percent of the propulsive thrust resulting from the initial setting of power or thrust controls with the ATTCs failing to reset thrust or power and without any action by the crew to reset thrust or power.

### 3. Thrust Setting.

(a) The initial go-around thrust setting on each engine at the beginning of the go-around phase may not be less than any of the following:

(1) That required to permit normal operation of all safety-related systems and equipment dependent upon engine thrust or power lever position; or

(2) That shown to be free of hazardous engine response characteristics when thrust or power is advanced from the initial go-around position to the maximum approved power setting.

(b) For approval of an ATTCs for go-around, the thrust setting procedure must be the same for go-arounds initiated with all engines operating as for go-arounds initiated with one engine inoperative.

### 4. Powerplant Controls.

(a) In addition to the requirements of § 25.1141, no single failure or malfunction, or probable combination thereof, of the ATTCs, including associated systems, may cause the failure of any powerplant function necessary for safety.

(b) The ATTCs must be designed to accomplish the following:

(1) Following any single engine failure during go around: Apply thrust or power on the operating engine(s) to achieve the maximum approved go-around thrust without exceeding engine operating limits;

(2) Permit manual decrease or increase in thrust or power up to the maximum go-around thrust approved for the airplane under existing conditions through the use of the power lever. For airplanes equipped with limiters that automatically prevent engine operating limits from being exceeded under existing ambient conditions, other means may be used to increase the thrust in the event of an ATTCs failure. Any such means must be located on or forward of the power levers; be easily identified and operated under all operating conditions by a single action of either pilot with the

hand that is normally used to actuate the power levers, and meet the requirements of § 25.777 (a), (b), and (c);

(3) Provide a means to verify to the flightcrew before beginning an approach for landing that the ATTCs is in a condition to operate (unless it can be demonstrated that an ATTCs failure combined with an engine failure during an entire flight is extremely improbable); and

(4) Provide a means for the flightcrew to deactivate the automatic function. This means must be designed to prevent inadvertent deactivation.

5. In addition to the requirements of § 25.1305, the following requirements pertaining to powerplant instruments must be met:

(a) A means must be provided to indicate when the ATTCs is in the armed or ready condition; and

(b) If the inherent flight characteristics of the airplane do not provide adequate warning that an engine has failed, a warning system that is independent of the ATTCs must be provided to give the pilot a clear warning of any engine failure during go-around.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 15, 2003.

**Kyle Olsen,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*  
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## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2001-NM-187-AD; Amendment 39-13293; AD 2003-18-02]

**RIN 2120-AA64**

#### **Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330 and A340 Series Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A330 and A340 series airplanes, that requires, among other actions, a detailed inspection of the rudder travel limitation unit for proper adjustment, measurement of the desynchronization of rudder servo-controls, installation of rigging placards for rudder servo-controls, and follow-on and corrective actions if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent desynchronization of the rudder servo-controls, which

could result in high load factors on the rudder servo-controls, and consequent reduced structural integrity of the attachment fittings for the rudder servo-controls. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.

**DATES:** Effective October 10, 2003.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of October 10, 2003.

**ADDRESSES:** The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Airbus Industrie, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France. This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2125; fax (425) 227-1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Airbus Model A330 and A340 series airplanes was published in the **Federal Register** on May 29, 2003 (68 FR 31991). That action proposed to require, among other actions, a detailed inspection of the rudder travel limitation unit for proper adjustment, measurement of the desynchronization of rudder servo-controls, installation of rigging placards for rudder servo-controls, and follow-on and corrective actions if necessary.

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to the comments received.

#### **Request To Extend Compliance Time**

Two commenters request that the compliance time of the proposed AD be extended from 16 months to 18 months. One of the commenters is the operator of the nine U.S.-registered Airbus Model A330 airplanes affected by the proposed AD. Extension of the compliance time to 18 months would match the Airbus C-check interval. The second commenter supports the comments of the first commenter and offers no additional comment.

The FAA does not agree with the commenters' request to extend the