

significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. Because of continuing disruptions in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested that petitions for leave to intervene and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and because of continuing disruptions in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for a hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of factors specified in 10 CFR

2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, <http://www.nrc.gov/>

reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Ogle County, Illinois.

Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, Braidwood Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois.

Date of amendment request: June 11, 2003.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would add a license condition to increase the completion time (CT) from 72 hours to 144 hours required to restore a unit specific essential service water (SX) train to operable status. The proposed change would be a one time change applicable to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and both units at Byron Station.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes have been evaluated using the risk informed processes described in RG 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," dated July 1998 and RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications," dated August 1998. The risk associated with the proposed change was found to be acceptable.

The previously analyzed accidents are initiated by the failure of plant structures, systems, or components. The SX system is not considered an initiator for any of these previously analyzed events. The proposed change does not have a detrimental impact on the integrity of any plant structure, system, or component that initiated an analyzed event. No active or passive failure mechanisms that could lead to an accident are affected. The proposed change will not alter the operation of, or otherwise increase the failure probability of any plant equipment that initiates an analyzed accident. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

The unit-specific SX system consists of two separate, electrically independent, 100% capacity, safety related, cooling water trains. Each train consists of a 100% capacity pump, piping, valving, and instrumentation. The pumps and valves are remote and manually

aligned, except in the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The pumps are automatically started upon receipt of a safety injection signal or an undervoltage on the engineered safety features (ESF) bus, and all essential valves are aligned to their post accident positions. The SX system is also the backup water supply to the auxiliary feedwater system and fire protection system.

The design basis of the SX system is for one SX train, in conjunction with the component cooling water (CC) system and a 100% capacity containment cooling system, to remove core decay heat following a design basis LOCA as discussed in the UFSAR, Section 6.2, "Containment Systems." This prevents the containment sump fluid from increasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following a LOCA and provides for a gradual reduction in the temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the reactor coolant system by the emergency core cooling system pumps. The SX system is designed to perform its function with a single failure or any active component, assuming the loss of offsite power. The proposed one-time increase in the CT of the operating unit's SX pump is consistent with the philosophy of the current Technical Specification LCO which allows one train of SX to be inoperable for 72 hours. This change only extends the 72 hour perspective; therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not involve the use or installation of new equipment and the currently installed equipment will not be operated in a new or different manner. No new or different system interactions are created and no new processes are introduced. The proposed changes will not introduce any new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators not already considered in the design and licensing bases. Based on this evaluation, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change does not alter any existing setpoints at which protective actions are initiated and no new setpoints or protective actions are introduced. The design and operations of the SX system remains unchanged. The risk associated with the proposed increase in the time an SX pump is allowed to be inoperable was evaluated using the risk informed processes described in RG 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," dated July 1998 and RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications," dated August 1998. The risk was shown to be acceptable. Based on this evaluation, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.