

specimen surveillance schedule from the Technical Specifications.

With the exception of Oyster Creek, the USARs of each of the listed facilities contain a withdrawal schedule for the reactor pressure vessel material specimens. For those facilities which are not scheduled to remove a material specimen as part of the ISP (*i.e.*, Clinton, Quad Cities, and Limerick), the proposed amendment would remove these plant-specific schedules from the facility USARs and substitute a description of the facility's participation in the ISP. For those facilities which are scheduled to remove a capsule as part of the ISP (*i.e.*, Dresden, LaSalle, and Peach Bottom), the proposed amendment would revise the material specimen withdrawal schedule in accordance with the ISP. Finally, for Oyster Creek, which is not scheduled to remove any further material specimens, the proposed amendment would revise the USAR to state that Oyster Creek will participate in the ISP.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change adopts an integrated surveillance program (ISP) for reactor material specimen surveillances. The ISP ensures that the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) will continue to meet all applicable fracture toughness requirements. No physical changes to the facilities will result from the proposed change. The initial conditions and methodologies used in accident analyses remain unchanged. The proposed change does not revise or alter the design assumptions for systems or components used to mitigate the consequences of accidents. Thus, accident analyses results are not affected by this proposed change.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change adopts an ISP for reactor material specimen surveillances. The ISP ensures that the RPV will continue to meet all applicable fracture toughness requirements. No physical changes to the facilities will result from the proposed change.

The proposed change does not affect the design or operation of any system, structure, or component (SSC) in the plant. The safety functions of the related SSCs are not changed in any manner, nor is the reliability of any SSC reduced. The change does not affect the

manner by which the facility is operated and does not change any facility, structure, system, or component.

No new or different type of equipment will be installed by this proposed change.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change has no impact on the margin of safety of any Technical Specification. There is no impact on safety limits or limiting safety system settings. The change does not affect any plant safety parameters or setpoints. No physical or operational changes to the facility will result from the proposed changes. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Edward J. Cullen, Deputy General Counsel Exelon BSC—Legal, 2301 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101.

NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.

Entergy Operations Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana

Date of amendment request: August 19, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated December 19, 2002.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TSs) by: (1) Modifying the wording of the current Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 4.0.1 and 4.0.3 to be consistent with NUREG-1431, Revision 2, Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) wording for SR 3.0.1 and SR 3.0.3; and (2) modifying the ISTS wording, adopted in item 1 above, to allow a delay period of 24 hours or up to the surveillance frequency interval, whichever is greater, and to require a risk analysis to be performed for any surveillance greater than 24 hours consistent with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-358 for missed surveillances.

The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the **Federal Register** on June 14, 2001 (66 FR 32400), on possible amendments concerning missed surveillances, including a model safety evaluation and model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination, using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). The NRC staff

subsequently issued a notice of availability of the models for referencing in license amendment applications in the **Federal Register** on September 28, 2001 (66 FR 49714). Entergy Operations Inc. reviewed the following proposed NSHC determination published in the **Federal Register** as part of the CLIIP for TSTF-358, and concluded in its application of August 19, 2002, that the proposed NSHC determination applied to Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Adoption of TSTF-358, Revision 6—Missed Surveillances

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change relaxes the time allowed to perform a missed surveillance. The time between surveillances is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The equipment being tested is still required to be operable and capable of performing the accident mitigation functions assumed in the accident analysis. As a result, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected. Any reduction in confidence that a standby system might fail to perform its safety function due to a missed surveillance is small and would not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an increase in consequences beyond those estimated by existing analyses. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by the missed surveillance will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. A missed surveillance will not, in and of itself, introduce new failure modes or effects and any increased chance that a standby system might fail to perform its safety function due to a missed surveillance would not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident beyond those previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by the missed surveillance will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.