

shares of one or more underlying funds which offer their shares "exclusively to separate accounts of the life insurer, or of any affiliated life insurance company, offering either scheduled contracts or flexible contracts, or both; or which also offer their shares to variable annuity separate accounts of the life insurer or of an affiliated life insurance company" (emphasis added). Therefore, Rule 6e-3(T) permits mixed funding with respect to a flexible premium variable life insurance separate account, subject to certain conditions. However, Rule 6e-3(T) does not permit shared funding because the relief granted by Rule 6e-3(T)(b)(15) is not available with respect to a flexible premium variable life insurance separate account that owns shares of an underlying fund that also offers its shares to separate accounts (including variable annuity and flexible premium and scheduled premium variable life insurance separate accounts) of unaffiliated life insurance companies. The relief provided by Rule 6e-3(T) is not relevant to the purchase of shares of the Insurance Trusts by Qualified Plans or by the Manager and its affiliates. However, because the relief granted by Rule 6e-3(T)(b)(15) is available only where shares of the underlying fund are offered exclusively to separate accounts, or to life insurers in connection with the operation of a separate account, additional exemptive relief may be necessary if the shares of the Insurance Trusts are also to be sold to Qualified Plans or to the Manager and its affiliates.

5. None of the relief provided for in Rules 6e-2(b)(15) and 6e-3(T)(b)(15) relates to Qualified Plans, the Manager and its affiliates, or to an underlying fund's ability to sell its shares to such purchasers. It is only because some of the Separate Accounts that may invest in the Insurance Trusts may themselves be investment companies that rely upon Rules 6e-2 and 6e-3(T) and wish to continue to rely upon the relief provided in those Rules, that the Applicants are applying for the requested relief. If and when a material irreconcilable conflict arises in the context of the Application between the Separate Accounts or between Separate Accounts on the one hand and Qualified Plans or the Manager and its affiliates on the other hand, the Participating Insurance Companies, Qualified Plans and the Manager and its affiliates must take whatever steps are necessary to remedy or eliminate the conflict, including eliminating the Insurance Funds as eligible investment options. Applicants have concluded that investment by the Manager and its

affiliates or the inclusion of Qualified Plans as eligible shareholders should not increase the risk of material irreconcilable conflicts among shareholders. However, Applicants further assert that even if a material irreconcilable conflict involving the Qualified Plans arose, the Qualified Plans, unlike the Separate Accounts, can simply redeem their shares and make alternative investments. By contrast, insurance companies cannot simply redeem their separate accounts out of one fund and invest in another. Time consuming, complex transactions must be undertaken to accomplish such redemptions and transfers. Applicants thus argue that allowing the Manager and its affiliates or Qualified Plans to invest directly in the Insurance Trusts should not increase the opportunity for conflicts of interest.

6. Applicants assert that the Treasury Regulations made it possible for shares of an investment company to be held by a Qualified Plan or the investment company's investment manager or its affiliates without adversely affecting the ability of shares in the same investment company to also be held by separate accounts of insurance companies in connection with their variable life insurance contracts. Section 817(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("Code") imposes certain diversification standards on the underlying assets of separate accounts funding variable annuity contracts and variable life contracts. In particular, the Code provides that such contracts shall not be treated as an annuity contract or life insurance contract for any period (and any subsequent period) for which the separate account investments are not, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Treasury Department, adequately diversified. The Treasury Regulations provide that, in order to meet the diversification requirements, all of the beneficial interests in the investment company must be held by the segregated asset accounts of one or more insurance companies. However, the Treasury Regulations also contain certain exceptions to this requirement, one of which allows shares in an investment company to be held by the trustee of a qualified pension or retirement plan without adversely affecting the ability of shares in the same investment company to also be held by the separate accounts of insurance companies in connection with their variable annuity and variable life contracts (Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3)(iii)).

7. Applicants also assert that the Treasury Regulations contain another exception that permits the investment manager of the investment company and

certain companies related to the investment manager to hold shares of the investment company subject to certain conditions (Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3)(ii)).

8. The promulgation of Rules 6e-2(b)(15) and 6e-3(T)(b)(15) preceded the issuance of the Treasury Regulations which made it possible for shares of an investment company to be held by a Qualified Plan or the investment company's investment manager or its affiliates without adversely affecting the ability of shares in the same investment company to also be held by the separate accounts of insurance companies in connection with their variable life insurance contracts. Thus, the sale of shares of the same investment company to separate accounts through which variable life insurance contracts are issued, to Qualified Plans, or to the investment company's investment manager and its affiliates (collectively, "eligible shareholders") could not have been envisioned at the time of the adoption of Rules 6e-2(b)(15) and 6e-3(T)(b)(15), given the then-current tax law.

9. Paragraph (3) of Section 9(a) provides, among other things, that it is unlawful for any company to serve as investment adviser to or principal underwriter for any registered open-end investment company if an affiliated person of that company is subject to a disqualification enumerated in Sections 9(a)(1) or (a)(2). Rule 6e-2(b)(15)(i) and (ii) and Rule 6e-3(T)(b)(15)(i) and (ii) provide exemptions from Section 9(a) under certain circumstances, subject to the limitations discussed above on mixed and shared funding. These exemptions limit the application of the eligibility restrictions to affiliated individuals or companies that directly participate in the management of the underlying management investment company. The relief provided by Rules 6e-2(b)(15)(i) and 6e-3(T)(b)(15)(i) permits a person disqualified under Section 9(a) to serve as an officer, director, or employee of the life insurer, or any of its affiliates, so long as that person does not participate directly in the management or administration of the underlying fund. The relief provided by Rules 6e-2(b)(15)(ii) and 6e-3(T)(b)(15)(ii) permits the life insurer to serve as the underlying fund's investment manager or principal underwriter, provided that none of the insurer's personnel who are ineligible pursuant to Section 9(a) are participating in the management or administration of the Trust. The partial relief granted in Rules 6e-2(b)(15) and 6e-3(T)(b)(15) from the requirements of Section 9 limits, in effect, the amount of