

reconsider the change or proceed with announcing the availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting to apply for the subject change to TSs are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information. Each amendment application made in response to the notice of availability would be processed and noticed in accordance with applicable rules and NRC procedures.

This notice involves an increase in the allowed completion times to isolate the affected penetration flow path when selected CIVs are inoperable at CE PWRs. The CEOG proposed this change for incorporation into the STS as TSTF-373, Revision 2. This change is based on the staff approved generic analyses contained in the CEOG Document CE NPSD-1168-A, "Joint Applications Report for Containment Isolation Valve AOT Extension," dated January 2001, accessible electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet (ADAMS Accession Number ML010780257) at the NRC Web site <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

Applicability

This proposed change to revise the TS completion times for selected CIVs is applicable to CE PWRs.

To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, the staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed by TSTF-373 using the CLIP to address the plant-specific verifications identified in the model SE. Namely, each licensee should include in its application that it has verified that:

(a) The supporting information in CE NPSD-1168-A is applicable to their plant and the specific penetrations for which the licensee is requesting an extended completion time (*i.e.*, the specific penetrations are consistent with those analyzed per the risk guidelines of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications," and fall within the 14 containment penetration configurations in the report).

(b) They have evaluated and substantiated that external events will not affect the results of the analysis supporting the extended completion times.

(c) Any plant-specific analyses used to support the amendment request have used an acceptable probabilistic risk analyses (PRA) quality as described in RG 1.177.

(d) Plant-specific implementation of this change includes verification of the operability of the remaining CIV(s) in a penetration flow path before entering the extended completion time for corrective maintenance. Plant-specific implementation of this change includes verification that the affected penetration will remain physically intact or be isolated so as to not permit a release to the outside environment.

(e) They have verified that the additive nature of multiple failed CIVs and the possibility of entering multiple allowed outage times (AOTs) have been addressed as part of the analysis.

(f) Applications that propose changes for configurations not addressed by the groups described in CE NPSD-1168-A include a plant-specific analysis to justify the completion time extension. [Note that such proposals will require staff review of the specific penetrations and related justifications for the proposed extension in completion times.]

The CLIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the changes without the requested verifications. Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may, however, require additional review by the NRC staff and may increase the time and resources needed for the review.

Public Notices

This notice requests comments from interested members of the public within 30 days of the date of publication in the **Federal Register**. Following the staff's evaluation of comments received as a result of this notice, the staff may reconsider the proposed change or may proceed with announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent notice (perhaps with some changes to the SE or proposed NSHC determination as a result of public comments). If the staff announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to adopt the change will submit an application in accordance with applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. The staff will in turn issue for each application a notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating license(s), a proposed NSHC determination, and an

opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance of an amendment to operating license(s) will also be issued to announce the revised requirements for each plant that applies for and receives the requested change.

Proposed Safety Evaluation

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Consolidated Line Item Improvement.

Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-373, "Increase CIV Completion Time in Accordance with CE-NPSD-1168".

1.0 Introduction

By application dated [], [Licensee] (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for [facility]. The proposed changes would revise TS 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)," by extending to 7 days the completion time to isolate the affected penetration flow path when selected containment isolation valves (CIVs) are inoperable in either a penetration flow path with two CIVs or in a penetration flow path with one CIV in a closed system.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

The existing Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3, requires that each CIV be operable. The operability of CIVs ensures that the containment is isolated during a design basis accident and is able to perform its function as a barrier to the release of radioactive material. If a CIV is inoperable in one or more penetrations, the current required action is to isolate the penetration or restore the inoperable CIV to operable status within 4 hours for penetrations with 2 CIVs and within 72 hours for penetrations with a single CIV and a closed system. The times specified for performing these actions were considered reasonable, given the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of ensuring containment integrity during plant operation. In the case of a single CIV and a closed system, the specified completion time takes into consideration the ability of the closed system to act as a penetration boundary.

In June 1999, the Combustion Engineering (CE) Owners Group (COG) submitted the joint application report (JAR) CE NPSD-1168 which provided a risk-informed justification for extending the TS allowed outage time (AOT) (also referred to as completion time), for an inoperable CIV from the current 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. The staff used the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-