

limits for AST, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, because the proposed changes continue to result in dose consequences within the applicable regulatory limits, the changes are considered to not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Attorney for licensee:* Mr. David R. Lewis, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037-1128.

*NRC Section Chief:* James W. Clifford.

*FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and 2), Beaver County, Pennsylvania.*

*Date of amendment request:* October 17, 2003.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments revise the action requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3/4 6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves [CIVs]," to more clearly define action requirements for inoperable CIVs. The proposed changes to the action requirements also include: (1) Provisions for allowing the intermittent unisolation of penetration flow paths which have been isolated per action requirements under administrative control; (2) use of check valves as an isolation device; and (3) an increase in the allowed outage time to 72 hours for CIVs associated with closed systems inside containment. The proposed amendments also revise the TS surveillance requirements (SRs) for CIVs by replacing existing SRs with new SRs similar to those in NUREG-1431, Revision 2, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants."

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not involve any changes to plant equipment, system design functions or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. Therefore, the probability of a malfunction of a

structure, system or component to perform its design function will not be increased.

The proposed change modifies existing action requirements for inoperable containment isolation valves. Action requirements and their associated allowed outage times are not initiating conditions for any accident previously evaluated and the accident analyses do not assume that repaired equipment is out of service prior to the analyzed event. In addition, changes that are consistent with the ISTS [improved Standard Technical Specifications] have been previously evaluated and found not to adversely affect the safe operation of Westinghouse plants or the initiation of any accident previously evaluated. Based on the conclusions of the plant specific evaluation associated with the changes and the evaluation performed in developing the ISTS, the proposed revised action requirements do not result in operating conditions that will significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed event. The revised action requirements provide appropriate remedial actions to be taken in response to the degraded condition considering the operability status of the redundant systems of required features, and the capability of remaining features while minimizing the risk associated with continued operation. As a result, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased.

The proposed change also modifies and deletes some surveillance requirements. Surveillances are not initiators to any accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The equipment specified in the Limiting Condition for Operation is still required to be operable and capable of performing the accident mitigation functions assumed in the accident analysis. This equipment will continue to be tested in a manner and at a frequency to give confidence that the equipment can perform its assumed safety function. The proposed changes are generally made to conform to the ISTS and have been evaluated to not be detrimental to plant safety. As a result, the proposed surveillance requirement changes do not significantly affect the consequences of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not involve any changes to plant equipment, system design functions or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The [technical] specification for containment isolation valves provide[s] controls for maintaining the containment pressure boundary. The revised action requirements and revised surveillance requirements are sufficient to ensure the containment isolation valves are capable of performing their accident mitigation functions. No new

accident initiators are introduced by these changes. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The revised action requirements do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The proposed actions for inoperable containment isolation valves minimize the risk of continued operation under the specified conditions, considering the operability status of the redundant containment isolation barriers, a reasonable time for repairs or replacement of the isolation feature, and the low probability of a design basis accident occurring during the repair period.

The revised surveillance requirements do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The proposed surveillance requirements provide the required verifications for ensuring containment isolation valves operability. Containment isolation valve testing will continue to be performed in a manner and at a frequency necessary to give confidence that the equipment can perform its assumed safety function.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Attorney for licensee:* Mary O'Reilly, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street, Akron, OH 44308.

*NRC Section Chief:* Richard J. Laufer. *FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Ottawa County, Ohio.*

*Date of amendment request:* December 17, 2001, as supplemented by letter dated June 4, 2002.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would change Technical Specification (TS) Section 3/4.3.1, "Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation," to delete an action involving either reducing core thermal power and the high neutron flux reactor trip setpoint or monitoring quadrant power tilt when a reactor protection system (RPS) channel is inoperable. Additionally, changes to the content and format of TS Tables 3.3-1 and 4.3-1 are proposed to enhance specification clarity.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided their analysis of