

the turbine missile design basis from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The turbine missile generation probability will not be significantly increased by elimination of the regulatory commitments in the UFSAR. No plant changes are proposed that would significantly increase the probability of turbine missile generation. Turbine missile generation does not pose a credible threat to safety related components and consequently has no potential to increase radiological consequences.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes involve no physical modification of the plant or different operating configurations.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Turbine missiles do not constitute a credible threat to nuclear safety at STP [South Texas Project]. They are not a consideration in any plant safety analysis. Changing the regulatory commitment with regard to design for turbine missiles has no effect on any margin of safety.

Based upon the analysis provided herein, the proposed amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the request for amendments involves no significant hazards consideration.

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*NRC Section Chief:* Robert A. Gramm.

*Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee*

*Date of amendment request:* January 14, 2003 (TS 02-08).

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise applicability requirements for TS 3.3.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations." This revision will modify the current applicability requirement associated with movement of

"irradiated fuel" by adding a new applicability statement for the containment building equipment door.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change revises the applicability of the containment building penetration function and associated action. This change does not alter the function of the penetrations but does revise when the feature is required to be available for the mitigation of postulated accidents. These penetrations only function to minimize the release of radioactive material for accident mitigation and are not considered to be a source of any postulated accident. The analysis verifies that a fuel handling accident (FHA) occurring at least 100 hours after being critical in a reactor core will not result in dose consequences above the regulatory limits without the containment closure function provided by the CBED [containment building equipment door]. The applicability and action for the CBED will not be changed when movement of recently irradiated fuel is in progress and this function ensures acceptable dose consequences. Therefore, the proposed change will not increase the probability of an accident because the penetration function has not been altered and this function is not a potential source for accidents. Additionally, the proposed change will not significantly increase the consequences of an accident because the analysis has verified that dose consequences will be maintained less than the required regulatory limits.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change only modifies when containment building penetrations need to be available for accident mitigation and does not alter their function, design, or operation. These penetrations only serve to minimize the release of radioactive material in the event of postulated accidents and do not have the potential to create an accident. Since the function of the penetrations is not being changed and they do not have an accident generation potential, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident is not created.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change will not alter the function, design, or operation of the containment building penetrations for postulated accidents that require this feature for the mitigation of the event. The analysis has determined that the CBED availability can be limited to those activities that involve the movement of irradiated fuel that has been in a critical reactor core within the previous 100 hours. Therefore, not requiring the CBED

to be available 100 hours or longer afterwards will not impact plant safety or result in dose consequences above established regulatory limits. The proposed change will not alter any setpoints or other functions that serve to maintain the safety limits. Therefore, the proposed change will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Attorney for licensee:* General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

*NRC Section Chief:* Allen G. Howe.

*Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Docket No. 50-29, Yankee Nuclear Power Station (YNPS) Franklin County, Massachusetts*

*Date of amendment request:* January 14, 2003.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment will revise the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station License and Technical Specifications to delete operational and administrative requirements that would no longer be required once the spent nuclear fuel has been transferred from the spent fuel pool to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. The proposed changes reflect the complete transfer of all spent nuclear fuel from the Spent Fuel Pit to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Design basis accidents related to the Spent Fuel Pit are discussed in the YNPS FSAR. These postulated accidents are predicated on spent nuclear fuel being stored in the Spent Fuel Pit. With the removal of the spent fuel from the Spent Fuel Pit, there are no remaining important to safety systems required to be monitored and there are no remaining credible accidents that require that actions of a Certified Fuel Handler or non-Certified Fuel Handler to prevent occurrence or mitigate the consequences.

The YNPS FSAR provides a discussion of radiological events postulated to occur as a result of decommissioning with the bounding consequence resulting from a materials handling event. The proposed changes do not have an adverse impact on decommissioning activities or any of their postulated consequences.