

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION****Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. 2002–CE–43–AD; Amendment 39–13051; AD 2003–04–03]

RIN 2120–AA64

**Airworthiness Directives; SOCATA—Groupe AEROSPATIALE Models TB 9, TB 10, TB 20, TB 21, and TB 200 Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all SOCATA—Groupe AEROSPATIALE (Socata) Models TB 9, TB 10, TB 20, TB 21, and TB 200 airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the aileron control gimbal joint for correct alignment and correct operation, and replace any misaligned or defective gimbal joint. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for France. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the aileron control gimbal joint. Such failure could lead to loss of control of the airplane.

**DATES:** This AD becomes effective on April 7, 2003.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of April 7, 2003.

**ADDRESSES:** You may get the service information referenced in this AD from SOCATA Groupe AEROSPATIALE, Customer Support, Aerodrome Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes, BP 930—F65009 Tarbes Cedex, France; telephone: 011 33 5 62 41 73 00; facsimile: 011 33 5 62 41 76 54; or the Product Support Manager, SOCATA—Groupe AEROSPATIALE, North Perry Airport, 7501 Pembroke Road, Pembroke Pines, Florida 33023; telephone: (954) 893–1400; facsimile:

(954) 964–4141. You may view this information at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2002–CE–43–AD, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW, suite 700, Washington, DC.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Karl Schletzbaum, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329–4146; facsimile: (816) 329–4090.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**Discussion**

*What events have caused this AD?* The Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is the airworthiness authority for France, recently notified FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on all Socata Models TB 9, TB 10, TB 20, TB 21, and TB 200 airplanes. The DGAC reported an incident involving a Model TB 9 airplane. During flight, the pilot experienced loss of aileron control. Loss of aileron control resulted because the gimbal joint became disconnected from the aileron.

The gimbal joint became disconnected from the aileron because the safety pin broke. The cause of the safety pin breaking is being investigated by the manufacturer. The result of the investigation may result in a future design change.

*What is the potential impact if FAA took no action?* This condition, if not corrected, could result in failure of the aileron control gimbal joint. Such failure could lead to loss of control of the airplane.

*Has FAA taken any action to this point?* We issued a proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that would apply to all Socata Models TB 9, TB 10, TB 20, TB 21, and TB 200 airplanes. This proposal was published in the **Federal Register** as a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on November 15, 2002 (67 FR 69154).

The NPRM proposed to require you to repetitively inspect the aileron control gimbal joint for correct alignment and correct operation, and replace any misaligned or defective gimbal joint.

*Was the public invited to comment?*

The FAA encouraged interested persons to participate in the making of this amendment. We did not receive any comments on the proposed rule or on our determination of the cost to the public.

**FAA's Determination**

*What is FAA's final determination on this issue?* After careful review of all available information related to the subject presented above, we have determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed except for minor editorial corrections. We have determined that these minor corrections:

- Provide the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and
- Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM.

*Is there a modification I can incorporate instead of repetitively inspecting the aileron control gimbal joint?* The FAA has determined that long-term continued operational safety would be better assured by design changes that remove the source of the problem rather than by repetitive inspections or other special procedures. With this in mind, FAA will continue to work with Socata in collecting information and in performing fatigue analysis to determine whether a future design change may be necessary.

**Cost Impact**

*How many airplanes does this AD impact?* We estimate that this AD affects 346 airplanes in the U.S. registry.

*What is the cost impact of this AD on owners/operators of the affected airplanes?* We estimate the following costs to accomplish the initial inspection:

Labor cost	Parts cost	Total cost per airplane	Total Cost on U.S. operators
2 workhours × \$60 per hour = \$120 .....	No parts required for inspection .....	\$120	\$120 × 346 = \$41,520

The FAA has no method of determining the number of repetitive inspections each owner/operator will incur over the life of each of the affected airplanes so the cost impact is based on the initial inspection.

We estimate the following costs to accomplish any necessary replacements that will be required based on the results of the inspection. We have no way of determining the number of airplanes that may need such replacement: