list of all suid or sgid programs, first a describing text and then the list of files I should also check all files that are run as root on startup and check security problems (e.g. all daemons and progs run from inetd) suid-man, should be no security problem, someone breaking in could only change the index of man-pages and preformatted man-pages: ./usr/bin/man suid-root, maybe we can change this to suid-cron and also change /var/cron, but the cron daemon must be run as root...: ./usr/bin/crontab suid-root, has to open a secure port, believed to be safe: ./usr/bin/rcp ./usr/bin/rlogin ./usr/bin/rsh suid-root to edit passwd/shadow, I'd say these progs are not really needed, and a sysadmin has to change those fields, so don't make them suid-root for a secure system, maybe change them also for the standard SuSE-distribution: ./usr/bin/chfn ./usr/bin/chsh ./usr/bin/chage ./bin/gpasswd ./bin/newgrp suid-root, I wouldn like to have this prog on a secure server: ./usr/lib/mc/bin/cons.saver sgrp-tty to write on the tty of other users, should be ok: ./usr/bin/wall ./usr/bin/write suid-root, should be ok: ./usr/bin/suidperl suid-root, should be ok: ./usr/bin/screen-3.7.1 suid-uucp and sgid-uucp, those progs have their problems, but breaking in should only give access to /dev/ttyS?, config files from uucp should be kept with owner root.root if possible: ./usr/bin/uux ./usr/bin/uucp ./usr/bin/uustat ./usr/bin/uuname ./usr/bin/cu ./usr/lib/uucp/uucico ./usr/lib/uucp/uuxqt sgid-uucp to access /dev/ttyS?, should be ok: ./usr/bin/minicom progs for local mail are still sgid-mail, this should be changed to a perm 1777 /var/spool/mail directory and without any sgid programs, maybe we should also change to /var/mail, as recommended in FSSTND ?? ./usr/bin/elm ./usr/bin/filter ./usr/bin/procmail ./usr/bin/lockfile suid-root, I don't think we could have them suid-lp, as they at least have to open a secure port, anyway, the authors of plp have tried their best to make these programs ok, they have been checked lots of times... ./usr/bin/lpq ./usr/bin/lprm ./usr/bin/lpr ./usr/bin/lpc suid-news, from c-news, dunno why, I think these progs are only called from progs running as user news, is this correct, who knows more?? ./usr/lib/news/bin/relay/relaynews ./usr/lib/news/bin/input/newsspool inn is started as user news and has inndstart as suid-root, this should be changed, so that inn can only be started as root and changes it permissions to user news (as it has originally been...) ./usr/lib/news/etc/inndstart needs a secure port, should be safe, but could also be without suid-root for a server, then only root can use traceroute/ping to find out about network problems: ./usr/sbin/traceroute ./bin/ping should not be suid-root, this will be changed, anyway, it is currently only 4744, so nobody can exploit it...: ./usr/sbin/sliplogin timedc should probably not be suid-root, should be changed: ./usr/sbin/timedc pppd has security-checks build-in, but I would remove suid-bits on a server: ./usr/sbin/pppd needs to be suid-root, has had lots of problems in the passt, we can just wait for further problems...: ./usr/sbin/sendmail suid-root, but should not be so, or???, from procps-0.99 ./usr/X11R6/bin/xcpustate X11 server can be used to become root, this will be changed in the next official X11 release, we wait for it: ./usr/X11R6/bin/XF86_S3 xterm needs to "chown user.tty /dev/ttyp*", maybe xterm should call a suid-root program to do this or just make "setuid(getuid())" after this, check the source when integrating the next X11 release: ./usr/X11R6/bin/xterm this program should only be run as root, so we don't need it suid-root: ./usr/X11R6/bin/SuperProbe must be suid-root, I don't really trust them, but we have no choice: ./bin/su ./bin/passwd ./bin/login these are believed to be safe, but I would remove the suid-bit on a server machine, if there are no "noauto" entries in /etc/fstab: ./bin/mount ./bin/umount