
Collected and Archived by: China News Digest (cnd-ib@cnd.org)
(Bo Xiong)

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>From: ILC@china.uc.edu (I Love China)
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Subject: Human Rights Report '94
Date: 16 Apr 1994 05:54:42 GMT
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	Human Rights Report of 1994, (Voice of America)
                             
			CHINA


The People's Republic of China (PRC) remains  a  one-party  state
ruled  by  the Chinese Communist Party through a 21-member Polit-
buro and a small circle of officially retired but still  powerful
senior  leaders.   Almost  all top civilian, police, and military
positions at the national and regional levels are held  by  party
members.   Despite official adherence to Marxism-Leninism, in re-
cent years economic decisionmaking has become  less  ideological,
more  decentralized, and increasingly market oriented.  Fundamen-
tal human rights provided for in the Constitution are  frequently
ignored in practice, and challenges to the Communist Party's pol-
itical authority are often dealt with harshly and arbitrarily.

Security forces, comprised of a nationwide network which includes
the People's Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security, the
Ministry of Public Security, the People's Armed Police,  and  the
state judicial, procuratorial, and penal systems, are poorly mon-
itored due to the absence of adequate legal  safeguards  or  ade-
quate  enforcement of existing safeguards for those detained, ac-
cused, or imprisoned.  They are responsible  for  widespread  and
well-documented  human  rights  abuses, including torture, forced
confessions, and arbitrary detentions.

A decade of rapid economic growth, spurred by  market  incentives
and  foreign investment, has reduced party and government control
over the economy and permitted ever larger numbers of Chinese  to
have  more control over their lives and livelihood.  Despite sig-
nificant income disparities between coastal regions and the inte-
rior,  there  is  now  a growing "middle class" in the cities and
rural areas as well as a sharp decline in the number  of  Chinese
at  the  subsistence level.  These economic changes have led to a
de facto end to the role of ideology in the economy  and  an  in-
crease  in  cultural diversity.  An example of this is the media,
which remains tightly controlled with regard to  political  ques-
tions,  although  it  now is free to report on a wider variety of
other issues.

The Government took some positive steps on  human  rights  issues
during 1993.  It released some prominent political prisoners ear-
ly or on medical parole; many had served long  terms  in  prison.
The Government still has not provided a full or public accounting
of the thousands of persons detained during  the  suppression  of
the  1989 democracy movement, when millions of students, workers,
and intellectuals defied the Government and participated in  pub-
lic  demonstrations.  Most of these detainees appear to have been
released,  however,  some  after  serving  periods  of  detention
without  charges  having  been brought and some after having com-
pleted their  prison  sentences.   The  Government  says  it  has
released  the  remaining imprisoned or detained Vatican loyalists
among the Catholic clergy.  Although it continues to restrict the
movements and activities of some elderly priests and bishops, the
Government announced in November that two  priests,  whose  move-
ments  had  been  restricted, were free to return to their homes.
The authorities also allowed a number of prominent political dis-
sidents  to  leave China in 1993.  In November the Government an-
nounced it would give positive consideration to  a  request  from
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit Chi-
na.

Nevertheless, the Government's overall  human  rights  record  in
1993  fell far short of internationally accepted norms as it con-
tinued to repress domestic critics and failed to  control  abuses
by  its  own security forces.  The Government detained, sentenced
to prison, or sent to labor camps, and in a  few  cases  expelled
from  the country, persons who sought to exercise their rights of
freedom of assembly and speech.  The number of persons in Chinese
penal institutions considered political prisoners by internation-
al standards is impossible to estimate accurately.  In 1993  hun-
dreds,  perhaps  thousands, of political prisoners remained under
detention or in prison.  Physical  abuse,  including  torture  by
police  and prison officials persisted, especially in politically
restive regions with minority populations like  Tibet.   Criminal
defendants  continue  to  be  denied legal safeguards such as due
process or adequate defense.  In many localities, government  au-
thorities  continued to harass and occasionally detain Christians
who practiced their religion outside the officially sponsored re-
ligious organizations.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity  of  the  Person,  Including
Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were accounts of extrajudicial killings by government offi-
cials in 1993.  A few cases resulted in severe punishment for the
officials involved and were widely publicized as admonitory exam-
ples.   Local officials beat to death an Anhui farmer in February
after he protested the level of  taxes  and  fees.   Those  found
directly  responsible  for  the beating, including a local public
security official, received long prison terms and, in one case, a
death  sentence.   Other officials were dismissed or disciplined.
Also, in another well-publicized case, the powerful local Commun-
ist  party  secretary  of a village near Tianjin was sentenced in
August to 20 years in prison for obstruction of justice and other
offenses related to a December 1992 beating death.  Those who ac-
tually took part in the beating also received long prison terms.

The official responses to other cases served to cover up  abuses,
however.  Credible reports indicated that a Shaanxi man beaten by
public security officials in March, during a raid on an unauthor-
ized  Protestant  gathering, died as a result of his injuries and
the lack of timely medical care while in police custody.  An  of-
ficial autopsy ascribed the death to an unrelated illness.

Because the Government often restricts access  to  such  informa-
tion, it is impossible to determine the total number of such kil-
lings.  However, according to a credible report issued in 1993 by
a  human  rights  group,  at  least  12 persons died in 1992 as a
result of torture while in police custody.

     b.  Disappearance

There were no reported cases in 1993 in which persons who  disap-
peared  were suspected to have been killed by officials, however,
the Government has still not provided a  comprehensive,  credible
public  accounting of all those missing or detained in connection
with the suppression of the 1989 demonstrations.

     c.   Torture  and  Other  Cruel,   Inhuman,   or   Degrading
Treatment or Punishment

Cases of torture and degrading  treatment  of  detained  and  im-
prisoned  persons  persisted.   Both official Chinese sources and
international human rights groups reported many instances of tor-
ture.   Persons  detained pending trial were particularly at risk
as a result of weaknesses in the legal system, including the  em-
phasis  on  obtaining  confessions as a basis for convictions and
the lack of access to prisoners, even by  family  members,  until
after  formal charges are brought, a step that can be delayed for
months.  Former detainees have credibly reported the use of  cat-
tle  prods and electrodes, prolonged periods of solitary confine-
ment and incommunicado detention, beatings, shackles,  and  other
forms of abuse against detained women and men.

While generally refusing to allow impartial  observers  to  visit
prisoners,  officials stated that internal monitoring and laws to
prevent and punish abuses continue to be strengthened.   Procura-
tor  General Liu Fuzhi said in March that 2,800 procuratorate of-
fices had been set up in jails and detention centers to safeguard
the  welfare of detainees.  In response to a call by the Chairman
of the National People's Congress (NPC), a national-level  procu-
ratorial  conference  held  in Shanghai in early April focused on
measures to improve the Procuratorate's supervision  of  law  en-
forcement  personnel  and  government  officials  who violate the
civil rights of citizens.  In  August  the  Guangdong  provincial
public security bureau issued a regulation forbidding police tor-
ture during interrogations.  In April China told the U.N. Commit-
tee  Against Torture that 339 cases of torture to extract confes-
sions were investigated during 1992, 209 cases were  reported  to
the  Procuratorate  with  a view to prosecution, and 180 prosecu-
tions were brought.  No information on convictions or punishments
was  provided.   While Chinese officials said in December that 23
prison officials had been punished in serious cases of  mistreat-
ment  of prisoners, the number of actual incidents of torture and
ill-treatment by government officials  is  almost  certainly  far
greater than this number.

Conditions of imprisonment for political prisoners  vary  widely.
Some  prisoners,  including  the student leader Wang Dan, who was
released in February, have stated they  were  treated  reasonably
well.  Credible reports indicate others have been abused.  Polit-
ical prisoners are  often  intermingled  with  common  criminals.
Credible  reports  persisted  in  1993 that Liu Gang, a political
prisoner held at a Liaoning labor camp, suffers ill health  as  a
result  of beatings and other mistreatment, and that prison offi-
cials instigated some beatings by cellmates.  Officials  strongly
denied  these  allegations and arranged for an interview with Liu
and his jailers, which was  published  in  August  by  a  Chinese
English-language  journal.   They  declined  repeated requests by
foreign groups to allow access to the  jailed  dissident  by  in-
dependent observers.

There was limited evidence that, at least in  a  few  cases,  de-
tained  dissidents have been incarcerated in psychiatric institu-
tions and treated with drugs.  The lack  of  independent  outside
access  to such persons made it impossible to verify the reports.
Shanghai dissident Wang Miaogen was detained by  public  security
officials  in  May and committed to a mental institution after he
attempted to protest the holding of the East  Asia  games.   Wang
had earlier chopped off four of his fingers in a protest over al-
leged persecution.  Wang Wanxing, detained in 1992 while attempt-
ing  to stage a one-man protest on Tiananmen Square, continued to
be held in a Beijing-area mental hospital.

Conditions in Chinese penal institutions are generally harsh  and
frequently  degrading,  and nutritional and health conditions are
sometimes grim.  Medical care for prisoners has  been  a  problem
area,  despite  official assurances that prisoners have the right
to maintain good health and receive prompt medical  treatment  if
they  become ill.  In 1993 political prisoners who reportedly had
difficulties in obtaining timely and adequate  medical  care  in-
cluded  Wang  Juntao,  Chen  Ziming,  and  Ren  Wanding.  Medical
paroles may be granted to ailing prisoners, and 1989 detainee  Li
Guiren  was  released  in  January  to  obtain medical treatment.
Working conditions for prisoners in many facilities  are  similar
to those in ordinary factories, but some prisoners working in pe-
nal coal mines and at other sites must  endure  dangerous  condi-
tions (see Section 6.c.).

Political prisoner Qi Dafeng continued to serve a 2-year sentence
in  a coal mine in Anhui, where he had been sent under the nonju-
dicial "reeducation through labor" program in late 1992.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

China's Criminal Procedure Law  proscribes  arbitrary  arrest  or
detention,  limits  the  time  a  person  may  be held in custody
without being charged,  and  requires  officials  to  notify  the
detainee's family and work unit of the detention within 24 hours.
These provisions are subject to several important exceptions, in-
cluding  the sweeping provision that notification may be withheld
if it would "hinder the investigation" of a case.   Senior  judi-
cial  officials acknowledged in 1993 that limits on detention are
frequently ignored in practice or circumvented by various  infor-
mal  mechanisms.   In numerous cases, the precise legal status or
location of detainees is unclear.   Public  security  authorities
often detain people for long periods of time under mechanisms not
covered by the Criminal Procedure Law.  These include unpublished
regulations on "taking in for shelter and investigation" and "su-
pervised residence" as well as other methods not requiring procu-
ratorial  approval.   According  to the Chinese media, close to 1
million detentions under "shelter for  investigation"  have  been
carried  out annually in recent years.  No statistics were avail-
able to indicate the usual length of  these  detentions,  but  at
least  some lasted several months.  Links between local officials
and business leaders have resulted in scattered detentions  as  a
means of exerting pressure in economic disputes.  The legality of
detentions may be judicially challenged under the  Administrative
Procedures  Law, but such challenges are rare and there is little
evidence that this is an adequate or timely remedy  for  improper
actions.   There  is no judicially supervised system of bail, but
at the discretion of public security officials some detainees are
released pending further investigation.

Political dissidents are often detained  or  charged  for  having
committed "crimes of counterrevolution" under Articles 90 through
104 of the Criminal  Law.   Counterrevolutionary  offenses  range
from  treason  and  espionage  to spreading counter-revolutionary
propaganda.  These articles have also been used to punish persons
who  organized demonstrations, disrupted traffic, disclosed offi-
cial information to foreigners, or  formed  associations  outside
state  control.   Detention  and  trial  of  dissidents  on other
charges is also possible.  People participating  in  unauthorized
religious  organizations  may  be  charged with criminal offenses
such as receiving funds  from  abroad  without  authorization  or
changing  such  funds  on the black market.  Legal provisions re-
quiring family notification and limiting length of detention  are
often ignored in political cases.  Liao Jia'an, a university stu-
dent in Beijing detained in 1992 for peaceful expression  of  his
political  views,  was  held  for  a  year  before being formally
arrested in mid-1993 for counterrevolutionary crimes.

A well-documented estimate of the total number of those subjected
to  new  or continued arbitrary arrest or detention for political
reasons is not possible due to the Government's tight control  of
information.    Individuals   reported   detained  are  sometimes
released without charge after several days or weeks of interroga-
tion.   There  were several reported lengthier detentions of dis-
sidents, including Sun Lin, Wang Miaogen, and Zhang Xianliang, in
Shanghai  during 1993.  Sun was released in August after 5 months
in detention.  Democracy activists Qin Yongmin,  Yang  Zhou,  and
Zheng  Xuguang  were  detained in November in connection with the
formation of a group called the "Peace Charter."  Yang  Zhou  was
released  from  detention on December 31, but the authorities had
not provided information on the status or location of  the  other
peace  charter  detainees.   Several dozen Tibetans were also re-
ported to have been detained after participation  in  proindepen-
dence  demonstrations or activities (see Section 5).  Gendun Rin-
chen, a Tibetan tour guide who had been detained in May 1993, was
released on January 14, 1994

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

Officials insist that China's judiciary is independent  but  ack-
nowledge  that it is subject to the Communist Party's policy gui-
dance.  In actuality, party and government  leaders  almost  cer-
tainly  predetermine  verdicts  and  sentences  in some sensitive
cases.  According to the Constitution, the court system is  equal
in  authority  to the State Council and the Central Military Com-
mission, the two most  important  government  institutions.   All
three  organs are nominally under the supervision of the National
People's Congress.  The Supreme People's Court stands at the apex
of  the court system, followed in descending order by the higher,
intermediate, and basic people's courts.

Due process rights are provided for in the Constitution  but  are
often  ignored in practice.  Both before and after trial, prison-
ers are subject to severe psychological pressure to confess their
"errors."   Defendants  who  fail to "show the right attitude" by
confessing their crimes are  typically  sentenced  more  harshly.
Despite  official  media  and other reports that indicate coerced
confessions have led to erroneous convictions, a coerced  confes-
sion  is  not  automatically  excluded as evidence.  According to
judicial officials, however,  confessions  without  corroborating
evidence are an insufficient basis for conviction.

Accused persons are given virtually no opportunity to  prepare  a
defense  in  the  pretrial  process, during which the question of
guilt or innocence is essentially decided administratively.   De-
fense  lawyers  may be retained only 7 days before the trial.  In
some cases even this brief period has been shortened under  regu-
lations  issued in 1983 to accelerate the adjudication of certain
serious criminal cases.  Persons appearing before a court are not
presumed  innocent;  despite  official denials, trials are essen-
tially sentencing hearings.  Conviction  rates  average  over  99
percent.   There  is an appeal process, but initial decisions are
rarely overturned, and appeals generally do not provide  meaning-
ful protection against arbitrary or erroneous verdicts.  Like the
initial court verdict, the judgment of the Appeals Court is  sub-
ject to Communist Party "guidance."

Under the Criminal Procedure Law, persons "exempted from prosecu-
tion"  by  procurators  are  deemed  to  have  a criminal record,
despite the lack of a judicial determination of guilt.  Such pro-
visions  can  be applied in "counterrevolutionary crimes" as well
as for ordinary criminal offenses.  In August Shanghai  activists
Sun Lin, Yao Tiansheng, and Han Lifa were "exempted from prosecu-
tion" for counterrevolutionary offenses and released.

Some officials have acknowledged that trials in  China  are  con-
ducted  too  rapidly.   These officials state that China's 70,000
lawyers, most of whom are engaged in commercial law, are insuffi-
cient  to  meet  the country's expanding legal needs and point to
the Government's intention to increase this number  to  at  least
150,000.   Knowledgeable  observers report that defense attorneys
appear in only a small number of criminal trials.  Under  Chinese
law, there is no requirement that the court appoint a defense at-
torney for the defendant unless the defendant is deaf, dumb, or a
minor.   When  attorneys  do  appear,  they  have  little time to
prepare a defense and rarely contest  guilt;  their  function  is
generally confined to requesting clemency.  Defense lawyers, like
other Chinese, generally depend on an official work unit for  em-
ployment,  housing,  and many other aspects of their lives.  They
are therefore often reluctant to be viewed as overzealous in  de-
fending persons accused of political offenses.

The need for adequate, independent legal aid is increasingly  un-
derstood in legal circles and within the Government.  In many ci-
ties, law firms are being organized outside the framework of  es-
tablished  government  legal  offices.   These  firms  are  self-
regulating and do not have their personnel or budgets  determined
directly  by the State.  The Minister of Justice announced in Oc-
tober that China would gradually increase  the  number  of  auto-
nomous law firms from the current total of 410.

The Criminal Procedure Law requires that all trials  be  held  in
public, except those involving state secrets, juveniles, or "per-
sonal secrets."  Details of cases  involving  "counterrevolution-
ary"  charges,  however,  have  frequently been kept secret, even
from defendants' relatives, under this provision.  The  1988  Law
on State Secrets affords a ready basis for denying a public trial
in cases involving "counterrevolution."



Lack of due process is particularly egregious when defendants re-
ceive  the  death  sentence.  Chinese officials refuse to provide
comprehensive statistics on death sentences  or  executions,  but
hundreds of executions are officially reported annually.  The ac-
tual numbers may be much higher.  All death sentences  are  nomi-
nally  reviewed by a higher court.  Reviews are usually completed
within a few days after sentencing and consistently result  in  a
perfunctory confirmation of sentence.  However, no executions for
political offenses are known to have occurred in 1993.

In addition to the formal judicial system, government authorities
can  assign persons accused of "minor" public order and "counter-
revolutionary" offenses to "reeducation through labor"  camps  in
an  extrajudicial process.  In 1990 Chinese officials stated that
869,934 Chinese citizens had been assigned to these  camps  since
1980,  with  about  80,000 assigned each year.  Chinese officials
reported 120,000 prisoners were undergoing  "reeducation  through
labor"  at the end of 1993.  Other estimates of the number of in-
mates are considerably higher.  Terms of  detention  run  from  a
normal  minimum  of  1  year to a maximum of 3 years.  The "labor
reeducation" committee which determines the term of detention may
extend  an  inmate's  sentence  for  an additional year.  Under a
State Council regulation issued in early 1991, those sentenced to
"reeducation  through  labor" may ask the committee to reconsider
their decision.  Since 1990,  "reeducation  through  labor"  sen-
tences may also be judicially challenged under the Administrative
Procedures Law.  While some  persons  have  gained  reduction  or
withdrawal  of their sentence after reconsideration or appeal, in
practice these procedures  are  rarely  used,  and  short  appeal
times, lack of access to lawyers, and other problems weaken their
potential assistance in preventing or reversing  arbitrary  deci-
sions.

The system of "reeducation through labor" sometimes  is  used  by
security  authorities  to deal with political and other offenders
without reference to even the nominal procedures and  protections
the  formal  criminal process offers.  In Shanghai, Fu Shenqi and
Zhang Xianliang were given  3-year  "reeducation  through  labor"
sentences  in  July for "provoking incidents" and "inciting trou-
ble" which disturbed public order.

Government officials deny that China has any political prisoners,
asserting  that  persons are detained not for the political views
they hold, but because they have taken some action which violates
the  Criminal Law.  The number of persons in Chinese penal insti-
tutions considered political prisoners by international standards
is   impossible   to   estimate  accurately.   Hundreds,  perhaps
thousands, of political  prisoners  remained  imprisoned  or  de-
tained.   Estimates  by some foreign researchers of the number of
political prisoners are much higher.  Many  if  not  most  people
held   for  political  offenses  are  charged  as  counterrevolu-
tionaries.  Chinese officials said in December there  were  3,172
persons  serving sentences for counter-revolutionary crimes, down
from a figure of 3,317 given to an American human rights  monitor
in  October.  As part of the October figure, officials also indi-
cated that 560 persons convicted of  counterrevolutionary  crimes
had been paroled.  Those convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes
make up 0.2 percent of the total prisoner population of 1.22 mil-
lion, but they are about 5 percent of total parolees.  As recent-
ly as November 1992, an Australian delegation was told there were
4,000 in prison for counterrevolutionary crimes.  All these esti-
mates almost certainly include a substantial  number  of  persons
convicted of espionage or other internationally recognized crimi-
nal offenses.  At the same time, the figures exclude many politi-
cal  prisoners  detained  but  not charged, persons held in labor
reeducation camps and an undetermined number of persons sentenced
for criminal offenses due solely to their nonviolent political or
religious activities.

Many prominent activists, including Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, and
Liu  Gang  (all  three  held  since 1989), remained imprisoned in
1993.  Some persons detained for political reasons were  released
on parole before the end of their sentences.  Those released ear-
ly included longtime  political  prisoners  Wei  Jingsheng,  Wang
Xizhe,  and  Xu  Wenli, and Tiananmen-related detainees Wang Dan,
Gao Shan, Zhai Weimin, Wu Xuecan, and Guo Haifeng.  Shanghai  ac-
tivist  Fu Shenqi was released in March but reimprisoned on other
charges in June.  Even after release, such persons have a  crimi-
nal  record, and their status in society, ability to be employed,
freedom to travel, and numerous other aspects of their lives  are
often  severely  restricted.   Economic  reform and social change
have somewhat diminished these problems, but some people continue
to  experience  serious  hardships.  For example, the families of
political prisoners sometimes encounter difficulty  in  obtaining
or  keeping  employment and housing.  Zhang Fengying, wife of im-
prisoned activist Ren Wanding, remained in  poor  housing  condi-
tions  in 1993.  Zhang and her teenage daughter were evicted from
their apartment in 1992.  Ren's work  unit  owns  the  apartment.
While the work unit asserted it wanted to reassign the housing to
another worker, the apartment reportedly has remained vacant.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy,  Family,  Home,  or
Correspondence

The authorities extensively monitor  and  regulate  personal  and
family life, particularly in China's cities.  Most persons in ur-
ban areas still depend on their government-linked work  unit  for
housing,  permission  to marry or have a child, approval to apply
for a passport, and other aspects of  ordinary  life.   The  work
unit,  along  with  the  neighborhood watch committee, is charged
with monitoring activities and attitudes.   However,  changes  in
the  economic  structure,  including the growing diversity of em-
ployment opportunities and the increasing market  orientation  of
many  work  units, are undermining the effectiveness of this sys-
tem.  Search warrants are required by law before security  forces
can search premises, but this provision is often ignored.  In ad-
dition, both the Public Security Bureau and procuracy  apparently
can issue search warrants on their own authority.

The  1982  Constitution  states  that  "freedom  and  privacy  of
correspondence  of  citizens  ... are protected by law," but, ac-
cording to a Western expert on Chinese law, legislation for  this
purpose  does  not  exist.  In practice, some telephone conversa-
tions are recorded, and mail is frequently opened  and  censored.
The  Government  often  monitors  and sometimes restricts contact
between foreigners and Chinese citizens, particularly dissidents.

The Government has continued its effort to control citizens'  ac-
cess  to  outside  sources  of  information,  selectively jamming
Chinese language broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and the
British Broadcasting Corporation.  Despite the effort made to jam
VOA, the effectiveness of the jamming varies considerably by  re-
gion, with audible signals reaching most parts of China.  A small
but rapidly growing segment of the population has access  to  sa-
tellite  television  broadcasts.   Authorities issued new regula-
tions on the installation and operation of  satellite  dishes  in
October, requiring permits for operation and banning private own-
ership and operation except under limited circumstances.   Howev-
er, China has not been very successful in implementing past regu-
lations restricting  the  use  of  satellite  dishes.   Satellite
television  dishes are widely available for sale, and a licensing
scheme which nominally controls  purchase  of  the  equipment  is
loosely enforced.



China's population has roughly doubled in the past  40  years  to
nearly  1.2 billion people, over a fifth of all humanity.  In the
1970's and 1980's China adopted a comprehensive  and  highly  in-
trusive family planning policy.  This policy most heavily affects
Han Chinese in urban areas.  For urban couples, obtaining permis-
sion,  usually issued by their work units, to have a second child
is very difficult.  Numerous exceptions are allowed  for  the  70
percent  of  Han  who live in rural areas.  Ethnic minorities are
subject to less stringent population  controls.   Enforcement  of
the  family  planning policy is inconsistent, varying widely from
place to place and year to year.

The population control policy relies  on  education,  propaganda,
and  economic  incentives, as well as more coercive measures, in-
cluding psychological pressure and economic  penalties.   Rewards
for couples who adhere to the policy include monthly stipends and
preferential medical and educational benefits.

Disciplinary measures against those who violate  the  policy  in-
clude  stiff fines, withholding of social services, demotion, and
other administrative punishments, including, in  some  instances,
loss  of  employment.   Unpaid  fines  have sometimes resulted in
confiscation or destruction of personal property. Because  penal-
ties  for excess births may be levied against local officials and
the mothers' work units, many  persons  are  affected,  providing
multiple sources of pressure.

Physical compulsion to submit to abortion or sterilization is not
authorized,  but  Chinese  officials  acknowledge  privately that
there are still instances of forced abortions and  sterilizations
in   remote,   rural   areas.    Officials  maintain  that,  when
discovered, abuses by local officials result in discipline or re-
training.   They admit, however, that stronger punishment is rare
and have not documented any cases where punishment has  occurred.
A  sharp reported drop in fertility rates in 1991-92 sparked con-
cern about a possible upturn in incidents of coercion.  One cause
for  worry  about such increased pressures was a policy change in
early 1991 making local political officials more directly respon-
sible  for  success  in  meeting family quotas.  There was strong
evidence, however, that the magnitude of the  reported  fertility
drop  was  sharply exaggerated, in part because the policy change
intensified strong existing incentives for officials and families
to underreport births.



At least five provincial governments have implemented regulations
with  eugenics  provisions,  beginning with Gansu in 1988.  These
regulations seek to prevent people with severe  mental  handicaps
from  having  children.   National  family planning officials say
they oppose such legislation, but the Government has taken no ac-
tion to overturn these local laws.

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

Freedom of speech and self-expression remain severely restricted,
although  there  has  been an easing of the limits imposed during
the post-Tiananmen crackdown.  Citizens are not permitted to pub-
lish  or  broadcast  criticism of senior leaders or opinions that
contradict basic Communist Party doctrine which  provides  for  a
Socialist  state  under  the party's control, or to make speeches
which contain such criticism or opinions.  The Government  inter-
prets  the Communist Party's "leading role" as circumscribing the
various individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution.  People
who  violate these quidelines are warned and often punished.  Gao
Yu, a former writer of a now banned periodical,  was  charged  in
October  with  "leaking  state secrets abroad" in connection with
articles published in Hong Kong.  Xi Yang, a Hong Kong  reporter,
was  detained  in  September  for "stealing" financial secrets in
connection with articles published in Hong Kong.

Domestic television and radio broadcasting and the  press  remain
under  party and government control and are used to propagate the
currently acceptable ideological line.   A  more  lively  tabloid
sector  continued to expand in 1993, and the circulation of major
propaganda-oriented dailies continued to slip.

Radio talk shows also flourished  and,  although  they  generally
avoided politically sensitive subjects, they provided some oppor-
tunity for Chinese to discuss, and sometimes  question  officials
about, public issues, including corruption.  Under official pres-
sure, the film "Farewell My Concubine," which caused  controversy
because  of its implicit criticism of the cultural revolution and
portrayal of a homosexual relationship, was withdrawn  from  dis-
tribution  in July after showings in Beijing and Shanghai.  After
further editing, it was rereleased in September.

The Government has continued to impose  tight  controls  on  col-
leges,  universities,  and research institutes.  However, Beijing
University and Shanghai's Fudan University stopped  sending  stu-
dents  to  a full year of training and ideological indoctrination
at military camps, a requirement  imposed  in  1989.   The  heavy
ideological control of academic institutions and media censorship
continued to force Chinese journalists and scholars  to  exercise
caution  in  1993.  Many scholars, including some of China's most
prominent, have been deterred from  exercising  free  speech  and
have  declined opportunities to publish or present papers on sub-
jects that they fear could be construed as  sensitive.   On  some
less sensitive but still controversial subjects, such as economic
policy, legal reform and even civil rights issues, the Government
has  tolerated more vigorous public discussion.  Some authors who
were considered politically unacceptable after 1989, such as  le-
gal scholar Yu Haocheng, were able to overcome bans and regain at
least limited ability to get articles published in 1993.

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

While the Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful  assembly
and  association,  these  rights are severely restricted in prac-
tice.  The Constitution provides, for example, that such  activi-
ties  may  not infringe "upon the interests of the State," and in
practice protests against the political system or its leaders are
proscribed.   Demonstrations  involving  expression  of dissident
political views are denied permits and suppressed if  held.   Qin
Yongmin  was  briefly detained several times when he attempted to
leave his  native  Wuhan  for  Beijing  to  protest  against  the
capital's  bid  to  host  the Olympic Games in the year 2000 (see
Section 1.d).  However, some small-scale demonstrations  on  non-
political  grievances  are  tolerated  in  practice.  In February
there were two small demonstrations at the  gate  of  the  Zhong-
nanhai  leadership  compound  in Beijing by women laid off from a
state steel firm.  In August authorities also tolerated generally
peaceful  demonstrations  in  several provinces by Muslims, some-
times numbering in the thousands, who were protesting a book they
found  offensive.   The book was subsequently banned.  Demonstra-
tors protesting the same book in  Qinghai  in  October,  however,
were  met with force when Muslim demonstrators threatened to take
their protest to Beijing.  According to credible  reports,  there
were at least nine deaths.

Public security forces acted with more restraint than in the past
to  demonstrations in Lhasa in May, which began with a small pro-
test on economic grievances but attracted hundreds of  additional
participants,  including many who shouted proindependence slogans
and some who threw rocks.  Several dozen persons were believed to
have  been at least briefly detained in the wake of the protests,
but reports of a handful of deaths or serious injuries  from  the
impact of tear gas projectiles appeared to be erroneous.  Accord-
ing to human rights organizations, smaller  scale  protests  were
reported  to  have occurred frequently in the Tibetan capital and
resulted in swift detention for the participants.  Gendun Rinchen
and  Lobsang  Yonten  were detained in May, apparently because of
alleged proindependence activities, and they  were  held  through
the  remainder of the year before being released in January 1994.
Tibetan political prisoners like Yulo Dawa Tsering, Ngawang  Pul-
chung,  and  Jempel  Tsering  remained imprisoned in 1993.  While
repression continued, there was at the same time  a  continuation
of  limited  dialog  on  Tibet  with representatives of the Dalai
Lama.

The Communist Party organizes and controls most professional  and
other  mass associations.  All organizations are required by 1990
regulations to be officially registered and approved.  Ostensibly
aimed  at  secret  societies  and criminal gangs, the regulations
also deter the formation of unauthorized political or  labor  or-
ganizations.  They have also been used to disband groups, such as
unregistered  house  churches,  deemed  potentially   subversive.
Security  forces  maintain a close watch on groups formed outside
the party establishment.

     c.  Freedom of Religion

Religious freedom in China is subject to restrictions of  varying
severity.  While the Constitution affirms toleration of religious
beliefs, the Government restricts religious practice outside  of-
ficially recognized and government-controlled religious organiza-
tions.  The management and control of religion is  the  responsi-
bility  of  religious affairs bureaus, which are staffed by offi-
cials who rarely are believers in religion.  Communist Party  of-
ficials  state that party membership and religious belief are in-
compatible.  This places a serious limitation on religious  beli-
evers, since party membership is required for almost all high po-
sitions in government- and state-owned businesses.

The Government, after forcefully suppressing all religious obser-
vances  during the 1966-76 cultural revolution, began in the late
1970's to  restore  or  replace  confiscated  churches,  temples,
mosques,  and  monasteries.  The official religious organizations
administer more than a dozen Catholic and Protestant  seminaries,
nine  institutes  to train imams and Islamic scholars, and insti-
tutes to train Buddhist monks.  Students who attend these  insti-
tutes must demonstrate "political reliability," and all graduates
must pass an  examination  on  their  theological  and  political
knowledge  to  qualify  for the clergy.  The Government permitted
Catholic seminarians from several cities  to  go  to  the  United
States in 1993 for additional religious studies.  There have also
been increased contacts between China and the Vatican.

The Government supervises the publication of  religious  material
for  distribution  to  ensure religious and political conformity.
Religious books are not permitted  in  ordinary  bookstores,  and
there  are  persistent  complaints  that the number of Bibles and
amounts of other religious materials allowed to be  printed  fall
far  short of demand.  Religious proselytizing is officially res-
tricted to government-registered and sanctioned  places  of  wor-
ship.   Unauthorized  proselytizing  is  proscribed and sometimes
punished, although some discreet proselytizing  and  distributing
of religious texts outside official channels is tolerated.  Local
authorities have confiscated private property under the guise  of
searching for illegal religious materials.  Officially sanctioned
religious organizations are permitted to  maintain  international
contacts  as  long  as  these  do not entail foreign control, but
proselytizing by foreign groups is forbidden by law  and  regula-
tion.

Buddhists are by far the largest body of religious  believers  in
China.   The  Government  estimates  that  there  are 100 million
Chinese Buddhists, most of whom are from the dominant Han  ethnic
group.   Other  Buddhists belong to Tibetan, Mongolian, and other
ethnic groups.  Han Buddhist leaders generally cooperate with the
Government, and there have been few complaints of government res-
trictions.

In Tibet, however, where Buddhism  and  Tibetan  nationalism  are
closely  intertwined, relations between Buddhists and secular au-
thorities continued to be tense in 1993.  The Government  tightly
controls  Tibetan  Buddhism  and does not tolerate religious man-
ifestations that advocate Tibetan independence.

The Government condemns the Dalai Lama's political activities and
his  leadership of a "government in exile," but recognizes him as
a major religious figure and has tolerated the open veneration of
the  Dalai  Lama  by  Tibetans.   The  Government has spent large
amounts of money on reconstruction of the main sacred sites,  in-
cluding  the Potala Palace and a grand stupa to house the remains
of the 10th Panchen Lama.  Chinese officials have  also  publicly
asked  the  Dalai  Lama  to  assist in the process of finding the
reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama, who died in 1989.

The practice of religion in Tibet is hampered,  however,  by  the
limits  the  Government imposes on religious education and on the
number of monks in the religious community compared to tradition-
al  norms.  Monks at some Tibetan monasteries known for their op-
position to Chinese rule face severe travel restrictions and  in-
tense monitoring.

According to government figures, there are 17 million Muslims  in
China.   In  some areas with large Muslim populations, there con-
tinues to be concern regarding restrictions on  the  building  of
mosques  and the religious education of youths under 18.  Follow-
ing the 1990 unrest in Xinjiang, the authorities  issued  regula-
tions  further  restricting  religious  activities  and teaching.
China permits Muslim citizens to make the hajj to Mecca, and  the
number  of  those  making the hajj has significantly increased in
recent years.  Nongovernment sources indicate  that  about  5,000
Chinese made the hajj in 1992.

The number of Christians has grown rapidly in recent  years,  al-
beit from a small base.  Only those Christian churches affiliated
with either the Catholic Patriotic Association  or  the  (Protes-
tant)  Three-Self  Patriotic Movement, which the Government esta-
blished in the 1950's to eliminate perceived  foreign  domination
of Christian groups, may operate openly.  Active unofficial reli-
gious  movements  pose  an  alternative  to  the  state-regulated
churches.   The  unofficial,  Vatican-affiliated, Catholic Church
claims a membership far larger than the  3.7  million  registered
with the official Catholic church, though actual figures are unk-
nown.  In addition to the 5 million persons  who  are  officially
counted as following Protestantism, a large number of Protestants
worship privately in "house churches"  that  are  independent  of
government control.

Sporadic repression in some areas has reflected official  concern
over  the  Government's  inability to control the rapid growth of
membership in Christian groups.  There continued to  be  credible
reports  in  1993 of efforts by authorities in some areas to rein
in activities of the unapproved  Catholic  and  Protestant  move-
ments,  including  raiding  and  closing a number of unregistered
churches.  In March public security officials disrupted a Protes-
tant  religious  gathering  in  Shaanxi,  beating  many  of those
present.  One man beaten later died, apparently  of  wounds  suf-
fered  in  the incident (see Section 1.a.).  However, authorities
in many areas tolerate the existence of unofficial  Catholic  and
Protestant  churches  as  long as they remain small and discreet.
In some parts of China, official and underground churches seem to
coexist and even cooperate.  The Guangzhou House Church of Pastor
Samuel Lamb (Lin Xiangao) continued to operate  openly,  although
with frequent harassment by authorities.

A number of religious activists remained imprisoned in 1993,  but
others  were  released.  There was some evidence that authorities
have increasingly used short-term detentions,  rather  than  long
prison terms when dealing with unauthorized religious activities.
Some of those  released  from  penal  detention  were  apparently
placed  under  house arrest or other restrictions.  The number of
Catholic clerics in penal detention dropped sharply in  1992  and
1993,  although  the  whereabouts  of  some reported to have been
released could not be confirmed, and others remained  under  some
restrictions.   Catholic Gansu bishop Casimir Wang Milu and Hebei
priest Pei Ronggui were released from long-term imprisonment dur-
ing  the  year.   Ministry  of  Public  Security officials told a
visiting U.S. official in October that  there  were  no  Catholic
clerics  remaining  in  detention.  In November Bishop Peter Chen
Jianzhang and auxiliary bishop Cosmas Shi Enxiang were reportedly
released  from  either  prison  or  house arrest in "old people's
homes."

     d.   Freedom  of  Movement  Within  the   Country,   Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Government uses an identification card system to control  and
restrict  individual residence location within the country.  This
system's effectiveness has eroded during China's shift to a  more
market-oriented  economy.  The need for a supplemental work force
in the areas of fastest  economic  growth  has  led  to  official
tolerance  for  a large itinerant population which is not in com-
pliance with formal requirements to obtain permission  to  change
residence.   However, because this itinerant population lacks of-
ficial status, access to housing, schooling, and the  full  range
of employment opportunities can be restricted.

Some former inmates have been denied permission, under the "stay-
ing  at  prison  employment"  system, to return to their homes, a
provision applicable to those incarcerated in  both  the  "reform
through  labor" and the "reeducation through labor" systems.  For
those assigned to camps far from their residences,  this  consti-
tutes  a form of internal exile.  The number of prisoners subject
to this restriction is unknown.  A Vice Minister of Justice  told
a  British  human  rights  delegation in late 1992 that no former
prisoners were subject to such restrictions.

The  Government  routinely  permits  legal  emigration  and  most
foreign  travel  but  has  placed obstacles in the way of foreign
travel by a few citizens on political or  other  grounds.   Legal
scholar  Yu  Haocheng continued to be unable to obtain permission
to travel abroad.  These obstacles  extend  to  some  dissidents'
family members who have not themselves been active politically or
accused of any wrongdoing by the Government.   Other  dissidents,
including  Hou Xiaotian, Li Honglin, and Qian Liyun, were eventu-
ally able to obtain the passports  and  exit  permits  needed  to
leave the country.

Regulations issued in 1990 require those college  and  university
graduates  who received free postsecondary education to repay the
cost of their education to the State by working for  5  years  or
more  before  being eligible for passports to go abroad to study.
For those who have overseas Chinese relatives  or  have  not  yet
graduated,  the  regulations  provide  a sliding scale of tuition
reimbursement exempting them from the work  requirement.   Imple-
mentation  of  these  regulations has varied from place to place,
and most students wishing to go abroad still  managed  to  obtain
passports.   Persons  subject  to the regulations on study abroad
appear to have had little trouble obtaining  passports  to  visit
relatives  overseas.   Political  attitudes, however, are still a
major criterion  in  selecting  people  for  government-sponsored
study abroad.

The Government has made a concerted effort  to  attract  back  to
China  persons  who  have  studied  overseas.   To reassure them,
Chinese citizens who return from overseas were exempted  in  1992
from  re-exit  formalities,  which  had  involved Public Security
Bureau clearances.  However, official media have stated that, be-
fore returning home, people who have joined foreign organizations
viewed by the Government as hostile to China should quit them and
refrain  from  activities  that  violate Chinese Law.  Procurator
General Liu Fuzhi warned in 1992 that people wanted by the public
security  authorities were not covered by the official assurances
extended to other overseas scholars.

Some dissidents, such as Dai Qing and Liu Xiaobo, reentered China
without incident in 1993.  In August labor activist Han Dongfang,
who had been allowed to leave for medical treatment in the United
States  in  1992,  was expelled shortly after he returned.  Han's
passport was subsequently revoked by Chinese authorities  on  the
grounds  that he had engaged in activities hostile to China while
overseas.  Chinese border officials frustrated Han's several sub-
sequent  attempts to return to China.  Another labor activist, Lu
Jinghua, was refused entry in June when she arrived at the  Beij-
ing  airport.   Lu  had  fled  China  in 1989 before she could be
arrested.  A handful of prominent dissidents  overseas  continued
to have difficulty extending or renewing passports.

The Government accepts the repatriation of citizens who have  en-
tered  other countries or territories illegally.  In 1993, in ad-
dition to the routine return of Chinese illegal immigrants  found
in  Hong  Kong, China accepted the return of several large groups
of illegal immigrants from  other  countries,  including  Mexico,
Honduras,  and the Marshall Islands.  Citizens illegally smuggled
to other countries are often detained  for  a  short  time  after
their  return  to  China to determine their identity and any past
criminal record or involvement in  smuggling  activities.   As  a
deterrent  and to recover repatriation costs, authorities in some
areas levy a fine of about $1,000 equivalent on returnees.

China does not have legislation in place that would allow  it  to
grant  refugee  status  and, with the exception of Vietnamese re-
fugees of Chinese ancestry, has generally repatriated persons  of
other  nationalities  seeking  to be recognized as refugees.  The
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public  Security,  and  Civil  Af-
fairs, in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), are writing legislation  that  would  allow
China  to  honor its obligation as a party since 1982 to the 1967
protocol relative to the status of refugees.

Although the Government denies having tightened its policy on ac-
cepting  Vietnamese  refugees,  in recent years very few such re-
fugees have actually been resettled in China.  According  to  the
UNHCR,  from  1989  to  1992 China granted admission and provided
resettlement to about 130 Vietnamese refugees who came  to  China
to  reunite  with  their families and gave temporary refuge to 35
Vietnamese who subsequently settled in  third  countries.   There
were  credible  reports  that  larger  numbers of Vietnamese have
remained  in  China  without  official  harassment.   China   has
cooperated  with  Hong  Kong to reduce the flow of Vietnamese re-
fugees into the  colony.   China  has  not  participated  in  the
Comprehensive  Plan  of  Action  negotiated  at the International
Conference on Indochinese Refugees  in  1989  but  generally  has
abided by its principles.

Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right  of  Citizens
to Change Their Government

Citizens lack the means to change their  government  legally  and
can  not  freely  choose  or  change  the laws and officials that
govern  them.   Citizens  vote  directly  only  for  county-level
people's  congress delegates.  People's congress delegates at the
provincial  level   are   selected   by   county-level   people's
congresses,  and  in  turn  provincial-level  people's congresses
select delegates to the National People's Congress.  According to
the  1982  Constitution,  the National People's Congress (NPC) is
the highest organ of state power.  It elects  the  President  and
Vice  President, decides on the choice of the Premier, and elects
the Chairman of the Central Military  Commission.   The  election
and  agenda of the NPC are under the tight control of the Commun-
ist Party.

In some elections, voters are offered more candidates than  posi-
tions,  allowing  a  modest degree of choice among officially ap-
proved candidates.  There were credible reports in 1993 that  the
candidates most favored by authorities were defeated in a handful
of county-level elections and in at least two elections of gover-
nors by provincial people's congresses.

As is the case with the NPC, the election and agenda of  people's
congresses at other levels also remain under tight control by the
Communist Party, the paramount source of political  authority  in
China.   The  Constitution  was amended in 1993 to ratify the ex-
istence of small "democratic" parties,  but  these  play  only  a
minor consultative role at most, and all pledge allegiance to the
Communist Party.  Thus, the Communist Party retains  an  explicit
monopoly  on political decision-making.  The requirement that as-
sociations register and be approved makes it  difficult  for  in-
dependent  interest groups to form and affect the system.  Within
the Communist Party, a  closed  inner  circle  of  a  few  senior
leaders  reserves  the  right  to set ultimate policy directions.
Some hold key positions within the standing committee of the Pol-
itburo,  the  Central Military Commission, or other organs, while
others who are nominally retired  wield  great  influence  on  at
least selected issues.

Reversing previous moves to separate the party and government ap-
paratus,  at  the  National  People's  Congress  in April General
Secretary Jiang Zemin and several other senior party members were
named to hold concurrent government positions.

Section 4   Governmental  Attitude  Regarding  International  and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations            of
Human Rights

There are no independent Chinese organizations that publicly mon-
itor or comment on human rights conditions in China.  The Govern-
ment has made it clear it will not tolerate the existence of such
groups.  Authorities in Shanghai took no action on a March appli-
cation by several persons to register a  proposed  "human  rights
association."   Public criticism of the Government's human rights
record can be interpreted as "counterrevolutionary" activity  and
punished accordingly.

Limited academic study and discussion of concepts of human rights
have  been  promoted since 1991.  Research institutes in Shanghai
and Beijing, including the Chinese Academy  of  Social  Sciences,
have organized symposia on human rights, established human rights
research centers, and visited other nations to study human rights
practices  in  these  countries.   Such activities appear to have
originated in a  desire  to  improve  China's  image  abroad  and
strengthen  the  Government's  ability to respond to criticism of
its human rights record.  Whatever the motivation,  this  process
of  study  and  dialog  has exposed more Chinese to international
standards and concepts of human rights.  Three official White Pa-
pers  on  human  rights subjects were published in 1991 and 1992.
While the  reports  stridently  defended  Chinese  practices  and
glossed  over fundamental problems, they sparked a limited debate
among academic experts on human rights  problems  in  China  that
continued in 1993.

Despite the Government's professed adherence to  the  United  Na-
tions  Charter, which mandates respect for and promotion of human
rights, Chinese officials accept only  in  theory  the  principle
that human rights are universal.  They argue that each nation has
its own concept of  human  rights,  grounded  in  its  political,
economic,  and  social  system and its historical, religious, and
cultural background.  China was active in  international  forums,
including  the  World  Conference on Human Rights in June and the
annual U.N. Commission on Human Rights meeting  in  February,  in
support  of  this view and to deflect attempts to discuss China's
human rights record.  China remains reluctant to accept criticism
of  its  human rights situation by other nations or international
organizations.  Its officials often criticized reports by  inter-
national  human rights monitoring groups, as well as past Depart-
ment of State reports on human rights practices in China.  By and
large,  Chinese  officials  continue  to insist that criticism of
China's  human  rights  practices  constitutes  interference   in
China's internal affairs.  Nevertheless, in 1993 Chinese authori-
ties expanded their dialog  with  foreign  governments  on  human
rights issues in talks with a number of visiting delegations from
the United States and other  countries  and  also  during  visits
abroad by Chinese leaders.

Chinese authorities have refused most requests by  foreign  human
rights delegations to meet with political prisoners but did allow
U.S. human rights officials to visit Yulo Dawa Tsering in Drapchi
prison in Lhasa in October.  Representatives of some internation-
al human rights groups visited China in 1993 but did so in an in-
dividual  capacity  and did not engage in an official dialog with
the Government.  A private American human rights monitor,  howev-
er,  did meet with midranking government officials on several oc-
casions to discuss specific human rights cases.

Finally, while China has continued to engage in  a  human  rights
dialog  with foreign critics, it has consistently taken the posi-
tion that human rights practices should be assessed  not  on  the
basis  of universal principles but rather in the context of local
economic, political, and  cultural  conditions.   The  Government
also  maintains that human rights issues are internal matters and
that external intervention on human rights issues constitutes in-
terference with its sovereignty.

Section  5   Discrimination  Based  on   Race,   Sex,   Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status

While laws exist to protect minorities  and  women,  in  practice
discrimination based on ethnicity, sex, and religion has persist-
ed.  Minorities, however, do benefit from an official  policy  of
"privileged  treatment"  in  marriage  policy,  family  planning,
university admission, and employment, as well as from  dispropor-
tionate infrastructure investment in some minority areas.

     Women

The 1982 Constitution states that "women in the People's Republic
of  China enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life" and
promises, among other things, equal pay for equal work.  In fact,
most  women  employed in industry work in lower skilled and lower
paid jobs.  Women hold relatively few  positions  of  significant
influence  within  the party or government structure.  Persistent
problems have remained with regard to the status  of  women,  who
have  often  been  the  unintended victims of reforms designed to
streamline enterprises and give  workers  greater  job  mobility.
Many  employers prefer to hire men to avoid the expense of mater-
nity leave and child care.

Reports by women of  discrimination,  sexual  harassment,  unfair
dismissal,  demotion,  and wage cuts have continued.  In 1992 the
NPC enacted legislation on the protection of the rights  and  in-
terests  of  women  designed  to assist in curbing these types of
sex-related discrimination.  While the gap in the education  lev-
els of men and women is narrowing, men continue to constitute the
majority of the educated class, particularly the highly educated.

The Government continued in 1993 to  condemn  strongly  and  take
steps  to  prevent and punish the abduction and sale of women for
wives and prostitutes, abuse of female children, violence against
women, and female infanticide.  It has severely punished a number
of people accused of such crimes.  No nationwide statistics  were
available  on  the  extent of physical violence against women.  A
May study on family violence reported that in Shanghai from 29 to
33  percent  of  domestic disputes from 1991-92 involved physical
violence.  In another 1993 study on the social status  of  women,
21.2  percent of urban wives and 31.4 percent of rural wives said
there was frequent or occasional violence during family quarrels.
The  abduction  of  women remains a serious problem in some areas
where local officials have resisted efforts of  central  authori-
ties  to  stop  it.   Many discriminatory practices are rooted in
traditional rural attitudes which highly value boys  as  prospec-
tive  earners  and  as  future caretakers for elderly parents.  A
number of provinces have sought to reduce  the  perceived  higher
economic value of boys in providing old age support by establish-
ing or improving pensions and retirement homes.

In many areas, the ready availability of sonograms has facilitat-
ed  selective abortion of female fetuses, contributing to a grow-
ing gap in the ratio of reported male  and  female  births.   In-
sistence  that  local units meet population goals exacerbates the
problem, since traditional-minded parents often  wish  to  ensure
they  have one or more sons without incurring official penalties.
The Government has condemned sex-selective abortion and stated it
is tightening access to sonogram results.



     Children

China does not condone violence against  children,  and  physical
abuse  can be grounds for criminal prosecution.  In January 1992,
China passed a national law on the protection of juveniles.   Ac-
cording  to  Chinese media, China's infant mortality rate has de-
clined to 45 per 1,000 live  births,  severe  malnutrition  among
children under 5 years of age has been "virtually eliminated," 95
percent of children  have  received  immunizations,  and  primary
school  enrollment  is  at  97  percent.   In January an English-
language magazine reported on the problem of child abuse,  noting
that  physical  punishment was widespread, citing four cases from
1992 where children died from abuse.  According to one study from
Zhejiang  province, 60 percent of 200 children surveyed said they
would be beaten if they did not do well in school.  In  addition,
Chinese  officials  indicated  in  October  that there were about
200,000 homeless children in China out of a total of 300  million
children under age 18.

     National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The 55 designated ethnic minorities constitute just over  8  per-
cent of China's total population.  Most minority groups reside in
areas they have traditionally inhabited, with standards of living
often  well  below  the national average.  Government development
policies have helped raise minority living standards but have  at
the  same  time disrupted traditional living patterns.  The Dalai
Lama continued to state his concern in 1993 that the Government's
plan  to  develop  Tibet's economy would lead to a massive influx
into Tibet of Han Chinese.  Tens of thousands of non-Tibetan  en-
trepreneurs without residence permits have come to Lhasa, capital
of Tibet, to engage in business.

In some instances, the Government has  tried  to  adopt  policies
responsive  to minority sensitivities but in doing so has encoun-
tered the dilemma of how to  respect  minority  cultures  without
damaging minority educational and economic opportunities.  In Ti-
bet and Xinjiang, for example, there are two-track school systems
using  standard  Chinese  and  minority  languages.  Students may
choose which system to attend.  One acknowledged side  effect  of
this  policy  to  protect and maintain minority cultures has been
reinforcement of a segregated society.  Under this separate  edu-
cation  system,  those  graduating from minority schools are at a
disadvantage in competing for jobs,  which  require  good  spoken
Chinese,  in  government and business.  These graduates must take
remedial language instruction before attending  universities  and
colleges.

The Communist Party has an avowed  policy  of  boosting  minority
representation in the Government and the party, and a few members
of minorities occupy local  and  national  leadership  positions.
However, ethnic minorities are effectively shut out of most posi-
tions of real political and decisionmaking power.   Some  minori-
ties resent Han officials holding key positions in minority auto-
nomous regions.  Ethnic minorities in Tibet,  Xinjiang,  Qinghai,
and  elsewhere  have  demonstrated against Han Chinese authority,
but central authorities have made it clear  that  they  will  not
tolerate opposition to Beijing's rule in minority regions.

     People with Disabilities

There is no legislation to ensure that buildings, even new  ones,
are  accessible to those with handicaps.  A State Council commit-
tee was established in October to coordinate  policy  toward  the
disabled  under China's 1990 law on the handicapped.  The results
of the eighth 5-year plan for handicapped people, which ended  in
1992,  were  discussed  in  October; schools for the disabled in-
creased from 400 in 1988 to 1,000 in 1992, and special  education
increased  six-fold.   But  according  to  the  Disabled Person's
Federation, only 6 percent of disabled  school-age  children  are
receiving  primary  education.   There  are 40,000 welfare enter-
prises nationwide providing work for the  handicapped,  and  1.26
million  have  benefited  from  rehabilitation projects.  Concern
that the disabled will lose jobs as enterprises emphasize produc-
tivity  has  led  to the creation of a pilot project in which all
state enterprises will be required to hire a  certain  number  of
disabled  workers.  The handicapped still suffer from social iso-
lation, especially in rural areas, and some handicapped  children
are  given to orphanages.  At the end of December, the Government
announced plans to adopt a new law on eugenics, but specifics  of
the law were not available at year's end.

Section 6  Worker Rights

     a.  The Right of Association

China's 1982 Constitution provides for "freedom of  association,"
but  the  guarantee  is  heavily diluted by references to the in-
terest of the State and the leadership of the  Chinese  Communist
Party.  The country's sole officially recognized workers' organi-
zation, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU),  osten-
sibly  independent, is in fact controlled by the Communist Party.
Independent trade unions are  illegal.   Though  union  officials
recognize  that  workers'  interests may not always coincide with
those of the Communist Party, the Union Law passed by the Nation-
al  People's  Congress  in  March 1992 states that the union is a
party organ and its primary purpose is to  mobilize  workers  for
national  development.  The 1993 revised Trade Union Law requires
that the establishment of unions at any level be submitted  to  a
higher level trade union organization for approval.  The ACFTU is
the highest such organization, and it has not approved the estab-
lishment  of any independent unions.  While the foreign press has
reported that some  exist,  because  of  severe  repression  they
operate only deep within the shadows.  The vast majority of work-
ers have no contact with any union other than the  ACFTU.   There
are  no  provisions allowing for individual workers or unofficial
worker organizations to affiliate with international bodies.

The ACFTU's primary attention remains focused on its  traditional
constituency, state sector workers.  The Trade Union Law mandates
that workers may decide whether to join the union in their enter-
prise.   By  official  estimate, 10 percent of workers in collec-
tively and state-owned enterprises have chosen for their own rea-
sons  not  to  join.  There have been no reports of repercussions
for workers who have not joined ACFTU unions.  Diversification of
enterprise  types  over  the last decade of reform has vastly in-
creased the number of workers outside this traditional sphere  of
the  ACFTU.   In  fact, over half of China's nonagricultural work
force is now largely nonunion and outside  the  state  industrial
structure--in  collectives,  village  and  township  enterprises,
private and individual enterprises, and  foreign-invested  enter-
prises.   In township and village enterprises, one of the fastest
growing sectors of the economy, only one-tenth of  1  percent  of
workers are unionized.  Unemployed workers are not considered un-
ion members.

Workers in companies with foreign investors  are  guaranteed  the
right  to  form unions, which then must affiliate with the ACFTU.
According to Ministry of Labor national statistics, 30 percent of
foreign-invested companies now have unions.  Other official esti-
mates show that about 10,000 trade unions with a total of 500,000
members have been established in the nearly 20,000 foreign-funded
companies in Guangdong province.  However, a 1993 embassy  survey
of  foreign-invested  ventures in Beijing indicated the unioniza-
tion rate diminished from 60 percent in 1991  to  40  percent  in
1993.

The right to strike, which had been included in China's 1975  and
1978  constitutions,  was  not retained in the 1982 Constitution.
In general, the union law passed in 1992 assigned unions the role
of  mediators  or  go-betweens  with  management in cases of work
stoppages or slowdowns.  Nonetheless, well-documented work  stop-
pages  occurred in several locations in China during 1993.  There
were two highly visible strikes in Guangdong's Zhuhai City, name-
ly  a  3-day  strike over wages at a joint-venture camera factory
and a work stoppage at a joint-venture electrical components fac-
tory.  Ministry of Labor officials broke with their past practice
of denying the existence of strikes in China  by  giving  details
about  recent  strikes  in  Tianjin  and  Xian.   Strikes  in  11
foreign-invested enterprises in Tianjin were widely  reported  in
the Chinese press.  One particularly high profile case involved a
foreign-owned footwear factory at which 1,200 workers struck over
poor  working  conditions  and alleged mistreatment of several of
the workers by the management.  The 11 enterprises were  held  up
as  examples of disregard for local regulations by foreigners and
indications of the need to establish unions  in  foreign-invested
enterprises.   Strikes  were uniformly resolved in favor of work-
ers, and enterprises were required to bring facilities up to  re-
gulatory standards.  Ministry of Labor officials have not provid-
ed any statistics on how many strikes occurred in 1993,  but  one
Hong Kong newspaper reported that in the first half of 1993 there
were 190 strikes and protests across China involving about 50,000
workers.   It  is  not possible to determine the validity of this
estimate.

Credible reports by foreign human rights  organizations  indicate
that  the  Government  has attempted to stamp out all clandestine
union activity and that  independent  unions  and  worker  groups
feature  prominently  in  lists of illegal organizations.  In May
four men were detained and later formally arrested for the  crime
of  organizing  a counterrevolutionary organization, the Shanghai
Autonomous Workers Federation.  Two of these men were released in
early  September.   As noted in Section 2.d., labor activists Han
Dongfang and Lu Jinghua have been refused reentry to China.   The
International  Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) alleges
that in May and June of 1992 the  Public  Security  Bureau  (PSB)
secretly  arrested  activists of the clandestine China Free Trade
Union Preparatory Committee and appeared to have dismantled  this
organization.   On  May  15  another clandestine union group, the
Free Trade  Union  of  China,  issued  a  manifesto.   Preemptive
arrests  took place just before the June 4 Tiananmen anniversary.
These included seven members of the clandestine  Liberal  Workers
Union  detained  by the PSB to prevent them from circulating com-
memorative leaflets.  Accurate figures on the  number  of  Worker
Autonomous  Federation  detainees still being held after the 1989
Tiananmen Square demonstrations are not available.  The ICFTU al-
leges that hundreds of workers are still being held.

In response to an ICFTU complaint,  the  Governing  Body  of  the
International  Labor  Organization  (ILO) in March requested that
the Government modify "many provisions" of the  Trade  Union  Act
that are contrary to the principle of freedom of association, ex-
pressed concern at the severity of sanctions  pronounced  by  the
courts  against members or leaders of Workers' Autonomous Federa-
tions, and asked that detained workers be released.

     b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Under a 1988 law and current regulations,  collective  bargaining
is permitted only by workers in private enterprises (which employ
less than 3 percent of workers).  There have been no  reports  of
collective bargaining actually taking place.  Most private enter-
prises are small  and  nonunionized.   Thus  far,  without  legal
status as a collective bargaining body, the ACFTU's role has been
limited to consultations with management over wages  and  regula-
tions affecting labor and working conditions and efforts to serve
as a conduit for communicating workers' complaints to the manage-
ment  of  enterprises  or municipal labor bureaus.  The ACFTU has
shown itself concerned with protecting workers' living  standards
in areas such as unemployment insurance.

Before wage reform, workers' salaries were set according to a un-
iform  national  scale  based on seniority and skills.  Following
wage reforms, a total wage bill for each collectively and  state-
owned  enterprise  is  set  by the Ministry of Labor according to
four criteria:  1) As a percentage of profits, 2) as  a  contract
amount  with  the  local labor bureau, 3) for money losing enter-
prises,  according  to  a  state-set  amount,  and   4)   as   an
enterprise-set amount subject to ministry review.  Individual en-
terprises determine how to divide the total among the workers,  a
decision  usually  made by the enterprise manager in consultation
with the enterprise party chief  and  the  union  representative.
Worker  congresses  have  mandated  authority to review plans for
wage reform, though these bodies serve primarily as rubber  stamp
organizations.   Wages  are  generally equal for the same type of
work within enterprises.  Incentives are provided  for  increased
productivity.

The old permanent employment system is giving way to a more flex-
ible  contract-based  system.  However, the percentage of workers
laboring under contract is still low,  approximately  40  percent
nationwide  in  state enterprises.  Under the Labor Contract Sys-
tem, individual workers may negotiate with management  over  con-
tract  terms.  In practice, only the very few workers with highly
technical skills are able to negotiate effectively on salary  and
fringe benefits issues.

Worker congresses, held periodically in most Chinese enterprises,
theoretically  have  the authority to remove incompetent managers
and approve major decisions  affecting  the  enterprise,  notably
wage  and bonus distribution systems.  However, worker congresses
generally take place once a year and serve essentially to rubber-
stamp  agreements worked out among factory managers, party secre-
taries, and union representatives.  In smaller enterprises it  is
not unusual to find these three posts held by the same person.

A dispute settlement procedure has been  in  effect  since  1987.
The  procedure  provides for two levels of arbitration committees
and a final appeal to the courts.  Of the  50,000  cases  brought
for  arbitration  in  1992,  most  were  resolved at the first or
second level, with less than 5 percent reaching the  courts.  Ac-
cording  to  Labor Ministry officials, most arbitration cases are
filed by contract workers or their employers, an indication, they
assert,  that  the  new contract system provides a clearer set of
ground rules which both sides can attempt to enforce.

Laws governing working conditions  in  China's  special  economic
zones  (SEZ's)  are not significantly different from those in the
rest of the country.  However, wages in the  SEZ's  are  signifi-
cantly  higher  than in other Chinese enterprises.  Unskilled la-
borers can expect much higher pay in  southern  China  generally,
but highly skilled workers are the main beneficiaries of the wage
discrepancy.

The 1982 Trade Union Law prohibits antiunion  discrimination  and
specifies  that  union  representatives may not be transferred or
terminated by enterprise management during their term of  office.
Unionized foreign businesses generally report pragmatic relations
with ACFTU representatives.  The ACFTU's stated goal is to estab-
lish  unions  in  all  foreign-funded  enterprises  within 2 to 3
years.

     c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Chinese  penal  policy  emphasizes  "reform   first,   production
second,"  but  compulsory labor is an integral part of the system
both to rehabilitate prisoners and to help  support  the  facili-
ties.   Almost all persons the courts sentence to prison, includ-
ing political prisoners, are required to work, usually for little
or  no compensation.  China also maintains a network of "reeduca-
tion through labor" camps (see  Section  l.e.),  the  inmates  of
which  generally  must work.  Reports from human rights organiza-
tions and released prisoners demonstrate that at least some  per-
sons in pretrial detention are also required to work.  The number
of workers in prison for nonviolent labor-related activity is not
known.   (See  Section  1.e.)   According  to prison authorities,
prisoners in labor reform institutions work a full 8-hour day and
must  also  engage  in  both  ideological  and basic literacy and
skills training.  Justice officials have  stated  that  in  labor
reeducation facilities there is a much heavier emphasis on educa-
tion than on labor.  Most reports conclude that  work  conditions
in  the  penal system's light manufacturing factories are similar
to those in ordinary factories, but conditions on  farms  and  in
mines  can  be harsh.  As is the case nationwide, safety is often
neglected, putting prisoners at risk, but there were no available
figures for casualties in prison industry.

Some penal facilities contract with regular industries for  pris-
oners  to perform light manufacturing and assembly work.  In 1992
Chinese newspapers reported that Chinese prison labor is used for
many  types  of  production  (examples in parentheses), including
heavy industry  (coal,  steel),  light  manufacturing  (clothing,
shoes,  small  machine tools), and agriculture (grain, tea, sugar
cane).  In 1991 the Chinese Government published a reiteration of
its  regulations barring the export of prison-made goods.  On Au-
gust 7, 1992, the U.S. and Chinese Governments signed a  memoran-
dum of understanding (MOU) prohibiting trade in prison labor pro-
ducts.  The U.S. Customs Service has issued detention orders bar-
ring  a  number  of  products  reportedly  made by prisoners from
entering the United States and detained several shipments of such
goods in 1993.  Under the MOU the Chinese have provided requested
investigation reports on 31 suspected facilities.   Five  facili-
ties investigated by the Chinese were found to have had prisoners
engaged in some aspect of export  production  at  some  point  in
time,  though not necessarily to the United States; of these, two
with export activities at the time of the investigation reported-
ly received unspecified administrative sanctions.  U.S. officials
have conducted on-site visits of three suspected  facilities  and
another facility visit has already been scheduled.  The detention
orders on two of the visited facilities were lifted, one  in  De-
cember  1993  and  one  in January 1994.  The other case is still
under study.

     d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children

Regulations promulgated in 1987 prohibit the employment of school
age  minors who have not completed the compulsory 9 years of edu-
cation.  Press reports indicate  that  dropout  rates  for  lower
secondary  schools  (ages  12-15  years) in several southern pro-
vinces exceed 9 percent (the national average  is  2.2  percent).
This suggests the booming economy in that region is enticing more
children to leave their studies to find jobs.  In poorer, isolat-
ed  areas,  child  labor  in agriculture is widespread.  Most in-
dependent observers agree with Chinese officials that China's ur-
ban child labor problem is relatively minor.  No specific Chinese
industry is identifiable as a significant violator of child labor
regulations.  In 1991 the State Council issued regulations impos-
ing severe fines, withdrawal of business licenses,  or  jail  for
employers who hire laborers under 16 years of age.

     e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

China does not have a labor code.  A draft has  been  circulating
since  mid-1992.   Due  to the complexity of incorporating myriad
existing regulations into the proposed unified code,  it  remains
unclear if it will be made law.  Labor regulations continue to be
promulgated at both the national and provincial level,  but  they
are not uniformly enforced.

There is no minimum wage in China.  However, the Ministry of  La-
bor is currently drafting minimum wage regulations.  Anticipating
the issuance of the regulations, some local governments, particu-
larly  those  in more highly developed east coast areas, have al-
ready drafted regulations on minimum wages.  On the  higher  end,
in  Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, the minimum monthly wage has been
set at $62 (350 yuan at the official exchange  rate).   Generally
the levels have been set to provide for a decent standard of liv-
ing for a worker and his family.  Minimum wage figures do not in-
clude  free  or  heavily subsidized benefits which employing work
units commonly provide in kind, such as  housing,  medical  care,
and  education.   Factories  or ministries are required to pay 70
percent of final monthly wages to workers laid off because  of  a
factory  closing  or  reduction  in  force,  but  there have been
numerous reports of violations of this policy.

The national standard workweek, excluding overtime, is  48  hours
with a mandatory 24-hour rest period.  In the past, 3 to 12 work-
ing hours per week were generally spent  in  political  study  or
"education" on current social issues.  In recent years, many fac-
tories have abandoned political study either for regular work  or
for an additional half day off each week.  Starting in 1991, fac-
tories (including joint ventures) were allowed to  adopt  shorter
workweeks.   Despite  laws  mandating  a  standard 8-hour workday
throughout the country, there continue to be reports  of  workers
in the SEZ's regularly working 12 hours daily.

Occupational health and safety are constant themes of posters and
campaigns.   Every  work  unit must designate a health and safety
officer and the International Labor Organization has  established
a  training  program  for  these  officials.  Moreover, while the
right to strike is not provided for in the 1982 Constitution, the
Trade  Union  Law  explicitly  recognizes  the right of unions to
"suggest that staff and workers withdraw from  sites  of  danger"
and  to  participate in accident investigations.  Labor officials
reported that such  withdrawals  did  occur  sometimes  in  1993.
Nonetheless,  pressures  for  increased output, lack of financial
resources to maintain equipment, lack of concern  by  management,
and  a traditionally poor understanding of safety issues by work-
ers have contributed to a  continuing  high  rate  of  accidents.
State  prosecutors deal annually with thousands of negligence and
accident cases.  In November 1992, the Standing Committee of  the
National  People's  Congress passed a law on mining safety, which
established standards and  provided  for  enforcement,  including
fines  and  imprisonment.  Labor officials were unable to provide
statistics verifying the effects of the  law,  but  they  claimed
that  despite substantially increased across-the-board production
in mining output, mine accidents were down in the first  half  of
1993.

More than 15,000 workers died in industrial accidents in 1992, 63
percent  of  them  miners.  Because of the lack of legislation to
bring together diverse and often unpublished regulations in other
health  and safety areas, compliance with existing regulations is
haphazard.  Official Chinese press reports in July announced  the
issuance  of a State Council circular stressing safety in produc-
tion following "sharp increases in job  accidents  in  the  first
half  of  this  year."   Officials blame the increases on lax en-
forcement of safety regulations in the rapidly  expanding  rural,
foreign-funded, and private industry sectors.

As fires and explosions in southern China amply  demonstrated  in
1993,  enforcement of China's safety regulations, particularly in
the booming light industry sector, continued to be lax.  In  late
November,  81  workers  died in a blaze in a Shenzhen toy factory
because safety precautions were not taken and warnings  from  the
local labor ministry office had allegedly gone unheeded.
















