Subject: CND-US, Sunday, Nov 10, 1991

From: [email-masked]
Date: Sun, 10 Nov 1991 22:03:56 -0500

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                               (US Regional)

                         Sunday, November 10, 1991

Table of Contents                                               No. of Lines
1.  DOL Publishes Interim Final Rule On F-1 Off-Campus Work.............. 76
2.  CCP Document on 'Soviet Incident' .................................. 160
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1. DOL Publishes Interim Final Rule On F-1 Off-Campus Work............... 76
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>From:	Bo Xiong, <[email-masked]>
Source: NAFSA Central Office, Wednesday, Nov 6 1991

The  Department of Labor  (DOL)  published today an   interim final  rule to
implement  the new labor attestation  requirement  for  employers hiring F-1
students  working off campus.   This  rule  complements the Immigration  and
Naturalization Service's  final rule on the  F-1 program published last week
(See Oct  25's CND-US - ed.).  DOL's interim final   rule,  published in the
Federal Register (pp. 56860  - 56880) and effective  as of October 1,  1991,
includes  a 30-day period  for the  public to submit   comment letters.  The
comment period ends on December  6, 1991.  A summary of  the DOL regulations
follows.

BACKGROUND:  Congress established  the labor attestation  requirement in the
Immigration Act of 1990 as part of  a  series of changes made  to off-campus
employment for F-1 students.   Under a three-year  pilot  program  that went
into effect on October  1, 1991, students are  allowed  to  work  off campus
without having to show that they are in economic need.  To be  eligible, the
1990 Act specifies that students must be in  good academic standing and must
be in school for at least  one academic  year.  Students will be  allowed to
work  part time while school is  in session,  and full time  during vacation
periods.  Under the pilot program,  the 1990  Act also requires employers of
F-1 students to file a labor  attestation  with DOL, stating  that they have
recruited domestic workers for at least 60 days and will pay the student the
prevailing wage or the actual wage (whichever is higher) for the position.

FILING: The 1990 Act  specifies that employers  must submit Form ETA 9034 to
DOL and provide a copy  to the student's  educational institution before the
student  can begin work.  Employers  must  file  an attestation with  DOL no
later than  60 days after   the  employers'  60 day  recruitment period has
ended.  The  Labor Department will  review Form ETA 9034  to ensure  that is
complete and signed by the  employer, and to  determine whether the employer
has been previously disqualified from employing F-1 students.

An employer that wishes to  hire a  student  for an occupation  that was not
specified in the original attestation must submit a  new attestation to DOL.
Both DOL's and  INS's  F-1   regulations  note that   school  officials  may
authorize students  for off-campus work   upon   receiving  a copy   of  the
attestation from the employer.

RECRUITMENT: To meet the 60-day recruitment requirement, the DOL regulations
will require employers to use  a dual recruitment  source.  DOL will require
employers to file a job order with the local  office of the State Employment
Service Agency (SESA) and post the  job vacancy at  the place of employment.
Employers may  hire F-1 students as  needed for period of 90  days following
the last day of recruitment, provided an attestation has been filed with DOL
and the DSO.

WAGES:   The   regulations  will  require   employers to   certify  in their
attestations that they are   paying F-1 students whichever is   greater: the
actual wage  provided to workers  in similar  jobs  at the work site, or the
prevailing wage for the occupation in the area of employment.

DOCUMENTATION:  Employers    will not  be  required   to   submit supporting
documentation with the attestation. The regulations in  essence however will
force employers to maintain detailed documentation (similar to complex labor
certification  procedures) in  order  to  comply   with  a DOL   request for
information.

VALIDITY PERIOD:  Attestations  will be  valid for three  years, or  through
September 30, 1994 (the date  when the  pilot program is currently scheduled
to end).   During that time,   employers  may hire as  many  F-1 students as
needed for positions specified in  the attestation, provided that  they meet
the Department's wage and recruitment requirements (see above).

PENALTIES:  An employer  who  "violates" any portion  of   the   law will be
permanently disqualified from the F-1 pilot program.

SUMMARY OF  DSO RESPONSIBILITIES: The DOL  regulations will require  DSOs to
meet  many requirements which include:  1.   Prior to authorizing off-campus
employment, the DSO must assure that he  or she  has received an attestation
from the employer, that  the  prospective employer has not been disqualified
from  participation in the F-1 student  program,  and  that the  student has
completed one academic  year of  study and    is maintaining good   academic
standing; 2. DSOs will not authorize students to work more than 20 hours per
week  during the academic  year; and 3.  DSOs   will notify   the Employment
Training Administration  (ETA) when the   employer   has  not  provided  the
educational institution with  an accepted copy of  the attestation within 90
days of the DSOs receipt of the original attestation from the employer.

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2.  CCP Document on 'Soviet Incident' .................................. 160
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Source: Democratic China (Japan), Issue No. 28, Nov. 1991
        Translated by Guangfan Xu, Narrated by Ling Chenguang,
        Recorded by Yang Zhong-mei

Note by the editor of Democratic China (Japan):

CCP DOCUMENT ON 'SOVIET INCIDENT' was based on  Mr.  Ling Chenguang's recol-
lection after  he  came to Japan recently. Mr. Ling  Chenguang is a cadre at
department  level (si  ju  ji).   He told the magazine that  on the document
reading meeting, note-taking and further-spreading were prohibited.  CCP was
clearly interested  in its  interpretation to  be heard and  also  fear  the
consequence.

The inconsistence indicated how terrified CCP was.  After the failure of the
coup  was  confirmed,  CCP  was  stupid  enough to ban naming the coup as 'a
coup', it insisted on all should call it as 'an incident'. The infamous army
lord  Wang  Zhen was so happy with the first news of the coup, he instructed
Gao Di, the director of People' Daily to prepare lengthy  articles  to  bomb
Gorbachev  and  Yeltsin. To his dismay, 'the fortune of eight member commit-
tee' was so short. That's maybe why he at the meeting shouted 'No Mercy'  to
Chinese people's struggle against the suppression by CCP.

At the document reading meeting, Teng Teng, a hardliner in education circle,
lamented  their  heads  might  have hang on the telephone mast if Soviet In-
cident occurred in China. 'Therefor, he added, 'our effort to  oppose  bour-
geois liberalization must be resolute and unshakable'.

However, people used fireworks and laugh to celebrate the  death  of  Soviet
Communist  Party.  According to Mr. Ling, everybody laughed when documenting
reading reached the paragraph that said the reason why the coup  failed  WAS
the members of 'eight member committee' were too young. Audience laughed and
said openly ' Soviet Communist Party was lack of old proletarian revolution-
ary,  like Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun. Why don't say directly. Don't be
so shy.'

When the reading reached to the part that  soviet  army  refused  to  arrest
Yeltsin,  the  audience  commented  in unison 'Conscience if Soviet army was
really high, why our army dosen't learn from the big brother'.

It is interesting to note the CCP had portraited the coup as a incident  led
by Yeltsin or Gorbachev to overthrow the USSR Communist party.

                    ***** document start *****

Recent 'Soviet Incident' had attracted the world's attention. No  doubt,  it
was  a major event in the contemporary history.  In the morning hour of Aug.
19. Eight persons headed by former Vice President of USSR  Yanev  (spelling)
formed  Soviet  National  Committee for State of Emergency and took over the
control of USSR. The occurrence of Soviet Incident was in fact an effort  by
some  comrades in Soviet Communist Party, government and military to reverse
the ever-increasing chaotic political and economic  situation  in  USSR,  to
overcome the crisis of disintegration of Soviet federation, and to insist on
socialist road in Lenin's home country. however, the effort  failed  achieve
its expectations. This is a heavy and deploring historic lessons.

A. The reasons of failure

The reasons why Soviet Incident failed can be summarized in 6 aspects:

1. Although the members of the Committee for State of Emergency led by Yanev
held important positions in the Party, Government and Military, most of them
being in their 50's or  60's,  they  were  lack  of  sufficient  experience.
Although  a few of them were over 60, the committee lacked a leader with in-
telligent, decisive and resolute capability controlling the whole situation.
There  were  lack of self-confidence and solidarity among the members of the
committee. For instance, Prime Minister Pakov didn't come forward the second
day  under  excuse  of illness.This exposed the weakness of the committee to
the opposition force.

2. When preparing to take over the control and  set  Gorbachev  under  house
arrest,  the committee neglected the anti-communist opposition leader, Boris
Yeltsin. The committee didn't arrest decisively and  secretly  Yeltsin  when
arresting Gorbachev. If it happened, there would have been no head among the
dragons, hence the center of opposition force might not have formed.

Due the fact that Yeltsin was free and only a statement criticizing  Yeltsin
was issued, Yeltsin overcame the panic, stayed calm and formed the organized
opposition force leading to the shift of climate, and the  committee  doomed
to lose the control.

3. Although statement to the Soviet people made by the committee saying  'It
bears  the  responsibility  of  the motherland, and is determined to use the
most resolute measures to bring the country and society out of  the  crisis,
the concrete implementation of measures was very irresolute.

When the Soviet Incident occurred on Aug. 19, the committee had only control
over  State Television and a few newspapers. It didn't have control over ra-
dio stations. The communication was not cut off, airport unclose,  and  many
important  departments were not under the committee's control. For instance,
because communication was not cut off, Yeltsin and Co. opposition force  was
able  to  communicate  with the outside world. The measure was not resolute,
not to say striking.

4. There was not enough troop mobilization. The daily political and ideolog-
ical education in the Soviet army was not sufficient.  When the incident oc-
curred, Defense minister Yazov, Interior Minister Pukav,  the  KGB  chairman
mobilized  only  8  divisions  of troops. Such force had no affect of deter-
rence. When KGB ordered the army to arrest Yeltsin, the military leader dare
to  refuse  and saying Yeltsin was legitimately elected president of Russian
Federation and to arrest him is illegal. This indicated that Soviet  Commun-
ist Party's daily political education in Soviet army was problematic.

5. The Committee for  State of Emergency  didn't realized the seriousness of
the incident and essence of the  shaping struggle.  The  committee wanted to
take  over the  control by legitimate measures and  they   wanted to  form a
climate to oust Gorbachev.  Once the 8-member-committee prepared to open the
Supreme Soviet session on the Aug. 26. and to  force  Gorbachev step down on
the Supreme Soviet session.  This,  of course,  busted Gorbachev's attitude.
When 4 members' delegation  of the Committee for  State of Emergency went to
visit the then arrested Gorbachev,   Gorbachev didn't receive them. He   was
instead allowed to meet  with the delegation  of Russian Federation. In  the
end,  the KGB chairman handcuffed  himself,   volunteered to  be hostage and
accompanied Gorbachev  to  return Moscow. The  actions  guided by legitimate
ideology could only lead to passivity and failure.

6. There is no doubt that Western nations supported the Yeltsin's opposition
force.   After  the  Soviet  incident  happened,  Yeltsin  was  in fact pan-
ic-struck, terrified, and run out of ideas.  When Yeltsin talked to  British
Premier Major, he seamed to be very pessimist, saying he could only hold out
a few days, he was soon finished. He asked the Western nations to  help  him
hold  out.   However,  when  Yeltsin talked with US President Bush, his mood
changed rapidly, and acted actively. The reason was that Bush  told  Yeltsin
on  the  telephone that according to US intelligence, the Soviet Army didn't
seem to be mobilized, and there was no sign that the army  would  side  with
the  committee  for  state  of emergency, and furthermore, Bush told Yeltsin
that Gorbachev was not 'ill', his attitude was very tough. The committee had
either  legitimacy  nor was able to control over the situation.  The support
by Western nations led by US was of the main reasons that  resulted  in  the
exploding expansion of Yeltsin's force.

B. Impacts on China

The failed Soviet Incident induced a series of  chock-waves.   Lenin's  home
country has change the color. #We$ cannot rule out that anti-communist force
led by Yeltsin, and encouraged and supported by Western nations might try to
make  trouble  among  Sino-Soviet boarders and create conflict between China
and USSR relation.  Secondly, the reactionary force both at home and  abroad
had  tried  to  various means and forms to intensify penetration to China in
form of peaceful evolution in order to subvert socialist China. We could im-
age  that  Western hostile force led by US will put pressure on our country.
Some organizations both at home and abroad might try to use the situation.

C. Our precautions

1. Party organizations at various levels must pay attention to various  kind
of  problems  that  might happen. Towards Soviet Incident, officials at each
unit should make positive guiding in political studies and party  democratic
life,  and  enhance  dialogue  with the masses, know the true thought of the
masses, and timingly resolve various problems.

2. We should insist on reform and opening up #to outside world$.  To let the
Chinese socialist cause develop and consolidate, we must insist on policy of
reform and opening up.

3. Strike corruption, heal the organism of the Party, and  improve  relation
between the party and the masses.

4.In order to keep a stable environment for economic construction,  we  must
deal  resolutely with all kind of factors that might cause turmoil. (No Mer-
cy| interrupted by CCP leader).

5. We must enhance political and ideological work in the army to ensure that
the Party has absolute control over the army.

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