From @UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU:owner-china-nt@UGA.CC.UGA.EDU Wed Feb 2 02:06:36 1994 Date: Tue, 1 Feb 1994 23:51:55 -0600 Reply-To: ccf-editor@ifcss.org Sender: China-Net From: ccf-editor@ifcss.org Subject: CCF #9404 Comments: To: china-nt@uga.cc.uga.edu To: Multiple recipients of list CHINA-NT ==+==+==+== C h i n e s e C o m m u n i t y F o r u m ==+==+==+=== Wednesday, February 2, 1994 (Issue No. 9404) +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Chinese Community Forum (CCF) is a journal published on China-Net. CCF is dedicated to the discussion and debate on the issues related to the Chinese community. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the Editorial Board of CCF. Contributions to the discussions and suggestions of new topics are very much appreciated. +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Table of Contents Author | # of Lines ============================================================================ The Theme of This Issue: The Legacy of Mao & Modern China 1. Korean War and Sino-US Relation........................Yang Changqing 155 2. Mao's 100th Anniversary Is Mao Zedong a Hero or a Devil?.........................William Deng 98 3. Letters to the Editor How to Judge Mao ............................................Kan Liao 17 Why Hard to Hate Mao?........................................A Reader 15 4. Response from the Editor Reply to Why Hard to Hate Mao..............................Weihe Guan 16 5. What's Common Among Deng Xiaoping, CCP, and the Current Collective of "Pro-Democracy Camp" (PC)?..........Bo Peng 111 ============================================================================ From the Editor ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The legacy of Mao (Chairman Mao) is rich and long-lasting. The previous discussions on this topic set about further exchange of arguments, which is designated as the theme for this issue. In fact, we expect more comments and reflections to CCF after the A & E's broadcasting of "The Secret Life of Chairman Mao" on 2/28/1994. February 10 will be Spring Festival. To observe this traditional holiday, CCF will run a special issue on Chinese New Year. CCF encourages readers to contribute to the success of this issue from a big variety of perspectives. ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 1. Korean War and Sino-US Relation........................Yang Changqing 155 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- In "Mao and the Korea War", Mr. Li Xiaowen made the claim that Mao's first crime was to involve China into the Korean war. He said that Mao "sacrificed China's national interests, million of lives, only to satisfy his own ego. The involvement of China into Korean war caused twenty years of isolation. The US had good intention toward China before the Korean War." (see Chinese Community Forum, # 9330, Dec. 22, 1993.) These assessment could not hold. In order not to be called "brain washed", I am going to cite some western authors' assessment on the event: In "History of the World" edited by J. M. Roberts of Oxford (Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, 1993), it is said: "The foundation of NATO (in April, 1949) suggested perhaps as well as two Europes, there might also be two worlds. This soon seemed more likely still, when the Cold War re-erupted in east Asia. In 1945 Korea had been divided along the 38th parallel, its industrial north being occupied by the Russians and the agricultural south by the Americans. The problem of reunification was eventually referred to the United Nations. After efforts to obtain elections for the whole country that organization recognized a government set up in the south as the only lawful government of the Republic of Korea. By then, the Soviet zone also had a government claiming sovereignty over the whole country. After Russian and American forces had both withdrawn, North Korea forces invaded the south in June 1950 (with, it now appears, Stalin's foreknowledge and approval). Within two days President Truman sent American forces to fight them, acting in the name of the United Nations. The Security council had voted to resist aggression, and as the Russians were at that moment boycotting it, they could not veto United Nation action. The Americans always provided the bulk of the UN forces in Korea, but other nations soon sent contingents. Within a few months the allied army was operating well north of the 38th parallel. It seemed likely that the North Koreans would be overthrown. When fighting drew near the Manchurian border, though, Chinese communist forces intervened and drove back the UN army. there was now a danger of a much bigger conflict. The question arose of direct action, possibly with nuclear weapons, by the United States against China. China was the second largest communist state in the world, and the largest in terms of population. Behind it stood the USSR; a man could walk from Erfurt to Shanghai without once leaving communist territory." How the decision was made in Beijing? Mr. Li Xiaowen suggested that Mao overruled the opposite opinions for his personal "heroic desire". The following is from "China Builds the Bomb" by John Wilson Lewis, published by Stanford University Press in 1988: "The [Korean] war also tested China's resolve. When the Chinese entered the Korean conflict, North Korea's armies had virtually collapsed and the U. N. troops were closing in on the Sino-Korean border. On October 4, Mao called an urgent meeting of the Central Committee to discuss sending troops to rescue the North Koreans. After hearing 'the list of disadvan- tages' involved in doing so, he said: 'You have reasons for your arguments. But at any rate, once another nation is in crisis, we'd feel bad if we stood idly by.' "Present at the meeting was Peng Dehui, soon to be the commander and political commissar of the 'Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV)', and he saw Mao's comment as combining 'internationalism with patriotism.' As Peng wrestled with pros and cons of joining the war, he concluded that the 'U.S. occupation of Korea, separated from China by only a river, would threaten Northeastern China.' If this happened, he thought, the United States 'could find a pretext at any time to launch a war of aggression against China.' He found this prospect intolerable and argued that 'without going into a test of strength with U.S. imperialism, it would be difficult for us to build socialism. On October 8, 1950, Mao ordered the CPV 'to support the Korean people's war of liberation and to resist the attacks of the U.S. imperialism,' or as the Chinese press later put it, 'to keep the wolf from the door.'" The above told us two things: 1) The Americans saw Korean War not the internal affair of Korean people but part of the Cold War, and, therefor, their involvement of the Korean War was part of their efforts of defending the free world. 2) The communist China only intervened after the war was drown near Yalu River, i.e. the war was approaching the gate of the new born People's Republic. Even if what Mr. Li Xiaowen said about the American goodwill was true, it would be very hard to believe when the American tanks were rolling toward the gate of our country. Was there any American good will? Assuming the story about Luo Long-Ji was true, assuming Luo did pass the message to Mao and Zhou, still, there was no single good will gesture from Washington toward Beijing between Oct. 1, 1949 and Oct. 25, 1950. Beijing had all the reason to believe that Uncle Sam was aimed at the Red China after the Pacific Fleet set up its base in Taiwan soon after the broke out of the Korean War. In fact, the Truman administration started to shape its policy towards the to be-born Red China since the April of 1949, when the PLA crossed the Yangtze River. On August 4, 1949, Truman announced the release of a massive State Department report "United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period of 1944-1949", 409 pages in length with another 645 pages of appended documents in smaller print. In a preface to the report, Dean Acheson (Secretary of State) stressed that the US poured more than $2 billion into support for Chiang Kai-shek after WWII to help destroy communism in China, but it had not been enough. "The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the ...United states... It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not." Truman had said in a handwritten note earlier that a "corrupt" Nationalist government was the cause of China's woes. "We picked a bad horse," he said. Had this trend continued, there could well have been some good wills toward the Red China. However, it did not last. The following is from David McCullough's Truman (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992): "The 'China White Paper' caused a sensation. Affection for China was widespread in the country. Generations of American children had carried nickels and dimes to Sunday School to support missionaries in China. Books by Pearl Buck about Chinese peasant life had won the hearts of millions of readers; Chiang Kai-shek, the Generalissimo, and his smiling, photogenic, Wellesley-educated wife had been America's loyal allies through the war. Now the State Department was declaring officially that China, the largest nation on earth, was lost to communism. Instead of serving as a palliative, as Truman and Acheson intended, the report inflamed the controversy. The New York Times judged it a 'sorry record of well-meaning mistakes.' More outraged critics called it a whitewash, a deliberate distortion, and worse, 'a smooth alibi for the pro-Communists in the State Department who...aided in the Communist conquest of China.' In the Senate, Republican William Knowland of California wondered aloud, and without a shed of evidence, whether Alger Hiss had helped shape China policy. [Hiss was the president of Carnegie Foundation , a former official in both Roosevelt and Truman administrations. He was charged and went to trial for his involvement in underground Communist network. --cq.] The China Lobby raised the cry that Truman and Acheson had 'lost' China, as though China had been America's to lose. A few Democrats, too, joined in the attack, including Representative John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts." Under this circumstances, no one can imagine that the Truman administration would have any good will gesture towards the Red China. In fact, one can not find any evidence from official Washington document about American's good will toward Red China until Richard Nixon came to office. The message from the ex-ambassador to ROC? At most, it was a personal message, not representing the view of the administration. Two more notes. Why Zhou in 1969 revealed the Luo Long-Ji story? In March 1969, an Australian newspaper revealed that low ranking Soviet diplomats secretly talked with the American diplomats, seeking American's possible reaction in case Soviet use nuclear weapons towards China for "Surgical operation". Since Richard Nixon had came to office, he expressed his willingness to adjust American's China policy; Mao and Zhou had started to have "minuet" with Nixon and meet strong opposition from Lin Biao clique. Zhou used his speech on the revision of party charter to signal the will on foreign policy change. It was low profile, yet significant. That was the prelude to the intriguing foreign policy masterpiece in the years followed. Mr. Li Xiaowen claimed that Mao's involvement in Korean War caused China "twenty-years of total isolation". In fact, the total isolation started after CCP openly broke up with Moscow in 1960, seven years after Korean truce. "Twenty years of isolation" should refer to the period from 1960 to 1978, not had too much to do with Korean War. Sino-US relationship, as well as Sino-Soviet relationship after the WWII were very complicated, very intriguing. A lot of historical document need to be thoroughly studied. IN%"cqyang@chemistry.umass.edu" ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 2. Mao's 100th Anniversary Is Mao Zedong a Hero or a Devil?.........................William Deng 98 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- In a previous issue of CCF memorizing Mao' 100 birthday, most articles praised him as a hero. On the coming Jan. 28, we will see on TV a documentary which is said portray Mao as a devil who used many country girls for sex. Is Mao a hero or a devil, or both? A national leader like Mao Zedong should be evaluated on what he had done to his people and country, rather than his private life. While it is undeniable that the credit of unifying China goes to Mao, Most, if not all, suffering and misfortunes of Chinese people are also inflicted by Mao ever since the founding of PRC in 1949. Below I will cite some instances to show how Mao always put his personal interest and ego way above the national interests and push the whole nation and people to disasters again and again. In 1949, before PLA crossed the Yangtze river, Stalin was against PLA's planned advance since a separate China is of Soviet's interests. When PLA attacked and occupied Nanjing, the Soviet embassy left with KMT but the USA embassy stayed and prepared to recognize PRC diplomatically. Indeed, earlier in that year the USA consul in Tianjin (my current advisor was then a consulate in that office) had been doing the same thing since Tianjin was occupied by PLA. And from early 1949, USA forbidden further weaponry shipping to KMT government. The message sent by USA was too obvious to be ignored by Mao. The excuse of the story that Luo, Longji failed to deliver a message for USA to Mao is quite a joke. While media in the western world and Hong Kong leaked the secrets that USA would recognize PRC and provide substantial financial aid to China on condition that China would not ally with Soviet, Mao ordered to attack USA embassy and consuls just one day before USA officially announced the recognition. For his inspiration to become a world leader of communism movement, Mao ignored a basic diplomatic principle "Yun3 Jiao1 Jin4 Gong1" (ally with distant countries to defend against neighbor ones), making USA an enemy while it is inevitable that Soviet would be an enemy just several years later. Then came the Korean War, although almost nobody except Mao in the then CCP leadership supported Mao's idea of sending PLA to Korea, Mao nevertheless decided to go ahead because this is a good chance for Mao to reorganize PLA to his favor and improve his status in the world communist community. The Korean War cost hundreds of thousands of PLA soldiers' life and years of economic development in China and worsen Sino-US relationship. By contrast, according to the Japanese national economic institute, Korean War helped Japanese economy so much that without it the Japanese economy would have been lagged 10 years! One thing leads to another, the Korean War made it politically necessary to stage the "Shan1 fan3" (three against), "Wu3 fan3" etc. campaigns which resulted in death of millions of small landowners and former KMT employees and officials. It also shortened the neo-democratic era and jump to socialist era prematurely, which resulted in dramatic decrease in GNP. During the peace time, the power and status in CCP are related to the ability to handle economic issues. Mao's ineptitude in handling the economy is more and more obvious in late 1950's. For an isolated nation like China to become an industrialized country, it is the natural and only way to follow Soviet's example: exploit farmers to accumulate capital for industrial development. Mao was so stupid that the Great Leap resulted in national famine and tens of millions of people's death. The industrial sector did not expanded but instead shrank, forcing millions of urban workers back to countryside. Stalin's policy was not as brutal but quiet successful in bringing Soviet from an agriculture country to an industrial country. But Mao's crazy economic policy gave China nothing but a death toll bigger than the total casualties in WW II and a destroyed environment. After the devastating Great Leap, Mao became more and more irrelevant in the daily economy handling which was then charged by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and consequently saw his power shrinking. During a peace time, political power only comes from economic performance or military coup. Mao is an idiot on economic issues but a genius in power politics. Mao then resorted to a subtle military coup, the notorious Culture Revolution to regain his power lost in economic wrong-doings. Mao was quiet successful in his goal of achieve superior power and became a real dictator, but during the process he stirred a small scale civil war (Wu3 Dou4) and caused death of millions of people and suffering of almost ALL Chinese people, let alone the devastated economy and culture. In 1969 Mao even kindled a border war against Soviet to divert domestic attention when the Culture revolution ran into troubles, risking tens of millions of Chinese people's life from a potential nuclear attack by Soviet (thanks to USA's intervention which stopped Soviet's plan). Ever since the beginning of Culture Revolution, the industrial production is stagnant, if not shrinking. But Mao prefers a large and ignorant population to birth planning. Therefore his population policy create a surplus which stagnant economy caused by his economic policy cannot absorb.Unemployment problem in countryside is easy to handle since farmers are so separated and difficult to be effectively organized, which is well illustrated by the very fact that tens of millions of peasants starved to death in their own villages without any possibility to reach cities to beg for food during the Great Leap. Unemployment problem in urban area is much more dangerous because most of the unemployed are newly graduates form middle schools and are easy to be effectively organized. Thence, during Culture Revolution, most middle school graduates were sent by Mao to countryside under the pretty name of "re-eduction by peasants" to temporary solve the unemployment problem. Tens of millions of urban youth, not mentioning their families, had suffered the countryside experience, just after these pure and naive students were used by Mao as a major tool to regain power in his Culture Revolution. In 1949, China's per capita GNP is at the same horizon with Taiwan and South Korea, if not Japan. But in 1978 where is China, compared to Taiwan and South Korea? Since 1978 China has been catching up, but nevertheless lagged 30 years! Maybe the only thing Mao did right on the aspect of economy handling is that he did not put Deng Xiaoping to death, like what he had done to Liu Shaoqi and some other leaders. Now, you tell me Mao Zedong is a hero or a devil? "XIAOJIAN@CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU" ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 3. Letters to the Editor (1) How to Judge Mao ............................................Kan Liao 17 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear editor: It is a tough job to judge former Chairman Mao. it is still too early. There are too many people being affected. It is inevitable that too much personal love or hatred will be mixed in. Anyway, I don't expect to see any good sensible article, book, biography or anything in my life time. Being living in that period is good enough for me. However, I can not believe the article about his grandson. Don't be ridiculous. Much ado about nothing. Shakespeare is far much better. About the Chinese Civil War in '46-'49, well, history up to that time is pretty clear. There is a pretty good book about situation then in China under the title "Thunder out of China". We have too many "She Hou Zhu Ge Lian". As for the Korean war, the invasion of Japan to korea and then to China was only 20 years ago at that time, and U.S., I believe, was not a best friend of China. It was the UN army, yeah sure. The Culture Revolution definitely was not a master piece. If you think it was all Mao's fault and the Party' fault, and everyone of us is as innocent as a baby, then will you give all the money you earned now to Mr. Deng xiaoping? "LIAOK@FCRFV1.NCIFCRF.GOV" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Letters to the Editor (2) Why Hard to Hate Mao?........................................A Reader 15 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Editor: I read those articles about Mao with mixed emotions. Chairman Mao (as I am so used to addressing him this way with respect) has such a great impact on me and my generation in our pre-adult years. We grew up with the red flags, flowers, blue sky, and once heartfelt wishes: "Long Live Chairman." Later, like others, I learnt about his mistakes and shortcomings, etc., but my childhood socializations incline me not to associate him with evil image. For whatever it may be, he was a great man. I ask myself quite often why it is hard to hate him, if he deserves our hatred, and why I tend to point to the systematic deficiency while bypassing his own responsibilities. Erikson's psychosocial conflicts theory applies to this generation very well. Because the conflict in the earlier years was not resolved, when we reached at this stage of life, the unresolved conflict bursted out to the forefront, which suppressed what we experienced in the later years. I know all this sounds funny to the younger minds, and I don't know why all this at this time of Mao's 100th anniversary. ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***========== 4. Response from the Editor Reply to Why Hard to Hate Mao. ................................Weihe 16 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Reader: Let me try to give a (partial) answer to your question: why it is hard to hate Mao? We have spent half (if not more) of our life time (so far) to worship Mao. To hate Mao is first of all to completely deny that worship. This is to deny ourselves, to ridicule our own (once) sincere feelings, to hate our own behaviours ... It is the hardest thing for any human beings. Subconsciously, we try to find some reason not to "completely" deny our past. There must be some part of Mao that was once great, that was worth our worship, although there are mistakes later found, etc. I agree with it that it is not that important who Mao is, the important thing is who we were, are and will be. But an important fact on "who we are" is reflected on "how we see Mao", how we face the facts, the truth, the logic, and the hateful part of ourselves. If we don't have the courage to face ourselves, how can we have courage to face the real Mao? "guan@eng.buffalo.edu" ============================================================================= 5. What's Common Among Deng Xiaoping, CCP, and the Current Collective of "Pro-Democracy Camp" (PC)?......................Bo Peng 111 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. They will all die. 2. The fact that they will all die is unimportant. The important thing is WHEN AND HOW they go see Marx/Mao/Adam Smith/Confucian/Almighty/Whomever They Deserve To See. 3. All of them are "insufficient for making, more than enough for breaking." Deng has already done all the preparation for the "breaking" after his death. CCP will be directly carrying out his "plan," though the "plan" may not necessarily be successful -- or so I hope. What I'd like to say here is how the current factions of PC may be of tremendous help to realizing the "plan." The essence of the current Chinese politics is a death watch. Every vulture has been circling closely and holding its breath. That includes many factions of the prodemocracy force, both inside and out of China. The analogy might sound gruesome but there's nothing wrong with it: if you don't seize the opportunity to get power, why do you bother playing politics to begin with? Again, the fact that they'll dine over Deng's dead body is unimportant. What matters is their table manner. It is theoretically conceivable that the dinner proceeds in peace, based on nerve-breaking fear. Unfortunately, such a situation is dynamically unstable--anytime anyone makes a stupid move, it is very likely that the game would instantly transform from a diplomatic banquet to a full-blown vulture dinner. The factions within CCP know each other reasonably well. Unless one of them believe that it can controll others before they react, they would probably choose to play gentlemen -- for the time being, at least. Although it's certainly imaginable that any of them could make a wrong assessment of the power balance. The PC, on the other hand, is most likely to make the first wrong move. A. The PC has never been an insider. Their assessment of the power balance of the political spectrum in China is likely to be incomplete and biased. Yes, some of the prominent figures in PC had connections to top-level politicians before. Some may be excellent political scientists. Some may be veteran political activists. They may think they know Chinese politics inside out. But the fact is they don't. They have hardly actually PLAYED the game, in the ring. The understanding of a roller-coaster could be quite different between a passenger and its designer. Just to add to the disadvantage, the most urgent task facing most of the PC today is sheer survival. I have yet to see much effort directed towards a thorough understanding of the political spectrum in China. Quite understand- able, but just as much unfortunate. Not so understandable but more unfortunateis that much of the limited time and effort and resource has been used for "internal" struggle. I leave it to you to decide how much similarity there is compared to Chiang Kai Shek's policy of wiping out the communists before fighting off the Japanese. B. The PC is the most eager to get into the game, taking this opportunity. As a collective, the PC may not have quite a high stake in the After- Deng game as the incumbents. After all, Li Peng may lose everything, personally, if he loses the game. However, the PC is probably the most enthusiastic player. The PC in China has been suffering from one of the most relentless and cruel types of repression know to human, though the situation has been slowly improving. A few individuals may know better. But, collectively, it's just part of the human nature to seek revenge. It's such a black humor thinking how strongly the CCP has been promoting the spirit of "blood for blood, teeth for teeth." The PC outside of China has been wannabe players for a long time. They all tried in China and failed. So they chose or were forced to move their bases to overseas. The death of Deng could very well be the only chance for them to get in the game for the forseeable future. If I were an archeologist and there were a live dinosaur out there, not much could stop me from going see it. Furthermore, many of them have been suffering from personal hardships staying overseas, especially in the psychological aspect. C. Pardon me for being candid, but many prominent figures in PC are nothing more than activists, as compared to politicians. I'll try to avoid the mine field of judging the 89 Movement as much as possible. Looking back, the Movement is mostly based on enthusiasm, wishful thinking, and emotion, rather than reason and objective analyses. Almost all of the prominent figures in the Movement were granded blinding fame and glamour out of blue. When they first went overseas, part of that fame and glamour went along. But the lump in the throat subsided and tears dried, and the audience suddenly realized that it's time to bring bread home. Some of the speakers grew grumpy and bitter. Some simply tried to do what they had been good at -- political businessman, scholar, activist. Others tried to adjust and find a new position. It's an extremely difficult transition, almost too dramatic to be real. Activists go out of mainstream towards the direction of the principles they promote. Politicians stay in the mainstream and steer it. D. More than 4 years later, the PC still carries many traces of the 89 Movement -- divided, emotional, uncompromising, unsure of what they want, and even more so of how to get it. There are many possibilities as to how the PC could make the wrong move. I'll try to paint the worst, though not necessarily the most probable. Organization ABC has worked hard inside China and managed to get some power base in some local governments and mid-to-low level military, as well as some information channels to the very top. *PUFF* Deng goes, not even having time to pack his toothbrush. ABC starts some demonstration. The slogan begins with "Down with corruption" but quickly escalates to "Off with commie's heads," intended or otherwise. The local government and some military units hint their "support" with reluctance to carrying out the order from the central government to suppress. That makes the minds of some powerful figure at the top snap. Haven't we seen this before? Could it repeat? Only this time, there ain't no Deng XiaoPing around to avoid a full scale, allout war. Massacre of peaceful civilians is morally more despicable than killings in the battle field. But the consequence of a civil war is much worse. "@SAAVIK.STANFORD.EDU" +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++ + Executive Editor: Bai Yan Executive Moderator: Yang Changqing + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ + For subscription: mail "SUB CHINA-NT Your-First-Name Your-Last-Name" + + to LISTSERV@UGA (bitnet) or listserv@uga.cc.uga.edu (internet) + + For back issues of CCF: + + anonymous ftp to cnd.org[132.249.229.100]:pub/community/CCF + + For contribution and inquiry: mail to ccf-editor@ifcss.org + +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++