Date: Wed, 9 Mar 1994 09:02:11 -0500 From: ccf-editor@ifcss.org Subject: Chinese Community Forum (#9411) Comments: To: china-nt@uga.cc.uga.edu To: Multiple recipients of list CHINA-NT ==+==+==+== C h i n e s e C o m m u n i t y F o r u m ==+==+==+=== Wednesday, March 9, 1994 (Issue No. 9411) +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Chinese Community Forum (CCF) is a journal published on China-Net. CCF is dedicated to the discussion on the issues related to the Chinese community. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the Editorial Board of CCF. Contributions to the discussions and suggestions of new topics are very much appreciated. +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= # of Table of Contents Author | Lines ============================================================================ 1. IFCSS, MFN and CSS a. Why Should IFCSS Lobby for Attaching Human Rights Conditions on China's MFN Trade Status?...............Heping Shi 90 b. Questions on the Unofficial Survey..................Dongning Mao 43 c. On IFCSS's MFN Testimony..............................Jing Zhang 79 2. Trade and Politics a. The China-MFN Controversy: The Case For Maintaining China's MFN Status (Part 2).............Grayson R. Robertson III 199 b. Asia's Giants Learn To Waltz --Japan Boosts Investment in China in Search of Its Huge Market.................R. Neff, L. Curry and B. Einhorn 93 3. Question Corner a. Death Penalty and Prison Labor.............................Ty Hu 26 b. IFCSS and the People's Congress.......................Daniel Qiu 22 ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== From The Editor ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recently, Mr. Shi Heping, the Vice-President of the IFCSS testified in the US Congress for conditional-MFN to China. This has provoked a new round of fierce debate on this "old topic". Many are outraged by the testimony without prior consultation with the community that IFCSS is supposed to represent. Many are also pondering with the question: What is the proper way for the community to voice its concerns and opinions on important issues like this one. While Mr. Shi did say that he was testifying on behalf of his organization, the default assumption for many people is that he was testifying as a representative of the CSS community as a whole, since the Charter of IFCSS does claim that IFCSS is the organization of all CSS in the US. It is probably also true that it is upon this assumption that the US Congress asked IFCSS rather than other organizations to testify. An unofficial survey conducted by a student from Purdue University showed that, among the 256 people participated the survey, 77% of the CSS disagree or strongly disagree with the view expressed by the VP. Another survey initiated by the IFCSS New Comers Working Committee and endorsed by the Survey and Information Committee of the IFCSS Council is expected to generate more data from the responses of a larger group of CSS. We present our readers some comments forwarded from our readers, as well as the explanation by Mr. Shi Heping on his testimony. Much more in-depth discussions are needed. We are definitely interested in your thoughts. Again, we want to say that all the views expressed here are solely those of the authors. The Editorial Board of CCF does not claim its position on this issue. To continue our previous discussion on "Trade and Politics", we carry the second part of the article on China's MFN by G. R. Robertson, III from American University. An article from Business Week on trade and politics between China, Japan and the US is also included in this issue. Also, a reader provides his answer to some questions raised last week on the prison labor problem. Questions regarding to the relationship between IFCSS and CSS, and the expectation on the coming People's Congress have also been raised in the Question Corner. ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 1. IFCSS, MFN and CSS 1a. Why Should IFCSS Lobby for Attaching Human Rights Conditions on China's MFN Trade Status?...............Heping Shi 90 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Writer's Note: The following discussion is meant to exchange thoughts with IFCSS Council members on a personal basis. It should not be regarded as an official memo from the HQ. At the 1st Congress of IFCSS, a resolution was passed to establish an "Economic Sanction Committee," whose responsibility was to lobby the U.S. government to impose economic sanctions against China for human rights violations. However, since none of the committee's chairmen lived in the Washington DC area, the committee was unable to do much and was suspended after the second term. Since then all the related work has been carried out by the HQ. In 1989 and 1990, there was a genuine fear on the part of the Chinese government that it would lose MFN status. This fear was reflected in the hiring of Hill & Knolton, a PR firm to which the Chinese government paid two million dollars for MFN-related lobbying in 1990. However, as time went by, particularly after repeated vetoes of MFN bills by George Bush were sustained in the Congress, the Chinese government seemed to worry less and less. Only after Clinton came to the office was the issue reexamined. IFCSS's position on MFN has changed over the years. In the beginning, with fresh memories of June 4th Massacre, it asked for immediate revocation, but that position was changed to conditional renewal before the end of the first term. During the second and the third terms, IFCSS put forward strong conditions such as release of all political and religious prisoners, only to be further watered down during the 4th term. The conditions in President Clinton's executive order issued last June generally reflect our demands, which had by then become very flexible. For instance, instead of asking for the release of ALL political prisoners, we asked for release of political and religious prisoners. The rationale was to apply pressure but not to corner the Chinese government. Several months remain before President Clinton makes his decision. IFCSS can submit a final request in early May to take into account what will take place between now and that time. My impression is that the Chinese government will offer the White House something to show the public. What we should do meanwhile is to generate the greatest pressure possible so that the greatest concession can be extracted from the Chinese government. Since day one of IFCSS's campaign, concern was expressed that it would lead to the revocation of China's MFN status, which has never happened. Why? On one hand, neither IFCSS nor the U.S. government wants it; on the other hand, money is definitely stronger than moral persuasion. The business circle boasts a lobbying force which is many times more effective than that of IFCSS. Will things be different this year? A careful reading of Winston Lord's testimony last Thursday will reveal what the administration is preparing for. If the threat is not real then, are we wasting our time? My personal view is "No." By using MFN as a leverage, we have achieved appreciable results. Every year from February to June, the Chinese government would do something positive. When Bush was in the White House, it might have done so to help Bush fend off congressional as well as public criticisms and beat back the demand for attaching human rights conditions to China's MFN status. With a democrat in the White House, the Chinese government became less certain about the results, so it still made and will continue to make concessions. Some have argued that MFN is not the right tool. I beg to disagree. In the past years we have been using this tool to promote human rights at NO cost to China's economy. Besides, IFCSS is an organization operating in the U.S. rather than China. How can it work for human rights progress in China? One of the most effective and available means is to generate international pressure. Since MFN is an issue that attracts broad attention, it serves as an ideal tool. I have never seen anything else that is as effective as MFN in highlighting human rights abuse in China. It is true that the Chinese government has made progress over the years, but the progress was not made of its own accord. It was because individuals and organizations, including IFCSS, have worked for it. We all support the current economic reform, but remember that the market economy was not invented by Deng Xiaoping. Many intellectuals, some of whom are still in prison today, had pushed for it long before the government incorporated it into its policy. Every time I read letters from family members of those who are in prison, I feel a sense of urgency. We have helped some to gain their freedom, but shall we leave many others to serve out their full terms? I agree that MFN is not the only tool to use and I believe it is the responsibility of the IFCSS Council to come up with some alternatives. I may be wrong. But has the current IFCSS Council passed any resolution related to human rights? Personally, I am willing to give up attaching human rights conditions to China's MFN status if I am convinced of the damage done to China's political and economic progress or if I am given a better tool. Of course, this personal attitude shall not prevent me from carrying out any Council resolutions in my official capacity. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1b. Questions on the Unofficial Survey..................Dongning Mao 43 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the call for survey, the following one does not make sense to me: > >D) Do you think Mr. Shi represented you regarding China's MFN renewal? > ( ) Strongly agree; > ( ) Agree; > ( ) Disagree; > ( ) Strongly disagree. > The proper question should be "Do you think IFCSS represents you ?" If we do not think IFCSS can represents us, then of course, any action taken by IFCSS is irrelevant with us. However, if we believe IFCSS is a valid representative of CSS's, then we should have carefully selected the presidency in the first place. You can not have an elected representative who represents every body's point of view on every issue. Once you choose someone as IFCSS president, you should be prepared for whatever he could do under your name as long as he/she is still in that position. BTW, could the surveying people include the following one? I like to see most people's reactions on it: MMVIII> If your father, or your mother, or your sister, or your brother, or your son, or your daughter has been in prison and tortured just only because they spoke out for better China, you will like to see ( ) Using MFN to give CG more pressure to get them out. ( ) Leaving them in jail because of the interest of billion of Chinese. Honestly, I will choose the first one. For people who prefer to the second one, I would have two more questions for you: 1) Dose the life of billion of Chinese really relies on the Uncle Sam's dollar? (We, the overseas patriots, do, of course, but I do not include) 2) For decades, millions of chinese became sacrifices of the slogan of 'in the interest of all chinese people'. Do we want to see more? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1c. On IFCSS's MFN Testimony..............................Jing Zhang 79 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- On Shi Heping's MFN testimony, I share the popular rage. It's not just a matter of pro/con, but the way he said it, --- by FWDing some wives' letters. Apparently, it is not possible that he, as the spokesman of IFCSS on this issue, does not know that the topics deserves a thorough analysis. --- Don't get me wrong. I am not a *cool* "political-economist" (not even an "academic" in terms of mind-set :-), and I am with those wives full-heartedly. What I am having problem here with is solely the manner IFCSS presented its stand. Ironically enough, the only thing our IFCSS vice president could do *testifying* about this issue was to show some letters of a few of the 1.2-billion-people whose lives are going to be affected. But even more ironically, while this man stood on the Congress floor *vigorously* and *honorably* as the VP of IFCSS, he was able to tell the IFCSS Council-Net *afterwards* that he is the sole person "responsible" for his action, because his "preparation" took place after his boss "Lin Changsheng left for Taiwan". So this is IFCSS!! No one is accountable! They could represent us, their constituents, so arbitrarily, and they believe they can fool us with even the stupidest excuses, --- as soon as they realize necessary. I wonder what they would have had to say, had they been asked why/how could they, with full awareness of the tremendous controversy, not even let us know that there was this testimony before hand, --- let alone a public debate. Honestly, I wouldn't be surprised if I heard them say that they didn't have time, --- as if we don't know that this kind of things are *scheduled*, --- unlike our IFCSS president's sudden show-up on the other side of this planet in Beijing. --- Or maybe, am I just really stupid to still wonder about this, for they could have been dating, drinking (like I did last night), or busy giving birth something ??? IFCSS is really getting bad. Everything, internal & external. Internally, as we have all seen --- in the financial inspection. Council resolution doesn't matter; you just can't do it because I have an opinion about your inspection team. Budget doesn't matter. To cover my ass, I can call in the *professional* CPA any time I want. It doesn't matter that what I can spend on financial management (i.e., the salary paid to the treasurer) had been *specified* in the *budget* which theoretically I can do nothing about but obey. And what is the so called "professional" CPA ? It is a joke, --- isn't it a joke if I tell you that, in order to best safe-guard you from me, I will have to choose a CPA who guarantees your security if I "emit all the financial documents" over someone else who does it without this condition (plus charging a cheaper price) ???! Externally, it is not any better, at least as far as MFN is concerned. I have the responsibility to "work on the improvement of HR" (quote Shi Heping's "rationale" No.1, --- on Council_Net, --- note that I quote), and therefore I have the right to deprive those shoe-towel-makers' back home of their shoe-towel-rights. What you shoe-towel-makers think is not my business; I IFCSS am smart enough to know that you've got to lose your shoe-towel-rights, because, according to my smartness and *idiomology*, it means that you have more HUMAN RIGHT. And you CSS, who are confused about shoe-towel-rights and HUMAN RIGHT, no matter how much you love me --- your "IFCSS baby", don't even think about arguing with me. I lied about you last year, and so I did again this year, because this "has been" my "consistent position" (quote Shi Heping's "rationale" No.2). Talking about the "IFCSS baby", she/he has reached a point that discipline must be exercised. And talking about discipline, it is my opinion that we CSS must admit that we have not been doing our job as DADS & MOMS. For too long, we have not had the courage to show our "tough-love". For too long, we have been tolerating our *handicapped* grass-root election. We have virtually no election ! We'd better have some courage soon, for the bad "baby" is turning out a bad guy/gal quickly if not corrected. Popular election alone can not ensure the health of democracy. There has to be mechanism between elections, and that is a piece of effective media for free-speech. From such a point of view, I think the worst thing ever happened in the Chinese Community since 89 was the close-down of China-Net, --- in exchange for the "Chinese Community Forum" (CCF). I Hope that the owners of China-Net/CCF will soon realize what a mistake they have made, especially considering that it is really unnecessary to close-down China-Net in order to take advantage of its readership/authorship, --- like many other e-magazines that are distributed on China-Net do. China-Net was never omnipotent; it was able, however, to maintain light --- publicity, as proven. I think we ought to go back to the old days. ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 2. Trade and Politics 2a. The China-MFN Controversy: The Case For Maintaining China's MFN Status (Part 2).............Grayson R. Robertson III 199 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Continued from Last Issue) _The Economic and Political Costs of MFN Withdrawal_ The withdrawal of MFN status would have negative implications for American economic interests both here and within China. The most obvious cost would be to severely disrupt of the US-PRC trade relationship. The United States has become China's third-largest trading partner. American consumers purchased $15 billion worth of Chinese-made products in 1990, a 27 percent increase over the previous year.(7) Withdrawing MFN treatment would cut off this burgeoning trade relationship by returning tariff rates for Chinese products to Smoot-Hawley levels. Absent this trade relationship, which has been the engine that has pulled our overall relations forward, 8 the United States will have lost one avenue through which it can effect democratic reform within China.(8) A disproportionate share of the damage to China's export operations would fall on South China's market-oriented economy. South China's economy, in recent years, has become a laboratory for economic experimentation in the benefits of the free market. Guangdong Province in South China earmarks 40 percent of its industrial output for export with over half this production destined for US markets.(9) Many industrial sectors in the South-Chinese economy are mainly composed of joint-ventures with American- and Hong Kong-based firms or are controlled by the province in which they reside, creating the opportunity to compete in the global market without central state interference thereby encouraging economic reform.(10) Damage to the South-Chinese economy resulting from lost trade and foreign direct investment from the United States would not bring Beijing to its knees; rather, it would most likely strengthen the hardliners' resolve to reject Western economic ideas and push the entire Chinese economy back towards central control. Any hindrance to the activities of the powerhouse South China economy would only represent a backward step in the positive economic development of China. Ending China's MFN status would have negative economic effects for the United States as well. China's retaliatory withdrawal of US MFN status would eliminate a major US export market.(11) Not only would this bar American businesses from competing in the dynamic South-Chinese economy, it would also come at a time when American exports to China are expected to rise as the Chinese economy continues to boom. US investments in China would suffer the same fate. Over 1,000 American companies have a cumulative $4 billion worth of joint-venture projects in progress and approximately 500 American firms have overseas Chinese offices currently pursuing liaison and trading activities with Chinese firms.(12) MFN withdrawal would severely damage American companies committed to long-term warm Sino-American commercial relations and would result in a significant impairment in the United States' ability to influence Chinese commercial practice by example. _Comprehensive Engagement as a Policy Alternative_ Since Tiananmen Square, advocates of MFN withdrawal have argued that MFN revocation is capable of forcing the Chinese government to enact democratic and other reforms. However, an alternative policy of comprehensive engagement will better serve the interests of the United States government. Comprehensive engagement calls for the targeting of objectionable behaviors with specific, narrowly focused sanctions as opposed to a wholesale penalty such as MFN revocation. The United States can comprehensively engage the Chinese in several political and economic areas such as human rights violations, weapons proliferation, and trade where violations of international norms are prevalent. The US Department of State has recently held extensive negotiations with the Chinese on human rights issues, something the Chinese government has consistently refused to do in the past. How did this occur? By withdrawing its support for half of the non-basic human needs development loans made by the World Bank to China since Tiananmen, the United States created for itself the specific leverage it needed to get the Chinese government to respond.(13) Furthermore, the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Trade and Development Agency (TDA) have suspended investment and development projects in China.(14) The Chinese government has responded to these sanctions by exchanging human rights negotiation teams and publishing a White Paper on human rights issues. In a similar fashion, progress has been made with the Chinese in the area of weapons proliferation. The Chinese have suggested that they are willing to discuss developing common approaches to the concept of weapons proliferation and are presently engaged with the United States in a dialogue on weapons proliferation in South Asia.(15) China has endorsed all of the key objectives of the Middle East arms control initiative in July 1991 and has also agreed to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, something that the Chinese government has earnestly avoided since the treaty's inception.(16) Each of these achievements has been accomplished by specific sanctions and penalties imposed by the United States government. Critics of China's trade practices argue that Chinese trade improprieties are another reason why China's MFN status should be revoked. One concern in this area is the lack of market access granted American firms by China coupled with the ballooning US-PRC trade deficit. In May 1992 a fourth round of negotiations prompted by International Trade Administration investigations into Chinese trade barriers were initiated. Chinese officials reacted constructively, and progress is being made in these negotiations. (17) However, if an agreement cannot be reached, the imposition of tariffs against several billion dollars' worth of Chinese products annually exported to US markets could result.(18) A second trade issue of concern to the United States government has been China's virtual ignorance of US intellectual property rights. In April 1991 the US Trade Representative identified China as a priority foreign country under the Special 301 provision of the 1988 Trade Act.(19) The resulting investigation culminated in an agreement in January 1992 to improve Chinese protection of US patents and copyrights.(20) In matters of trade between the United States and China, specific measures articulated by United States trade law are far more effective in forcing the Chinese to address trade abuses than mutually damaging disruptions in US-PRC trade that would be brought on by MFN withdrawal. The loss of MFN status would also damage trade negotiations for two additional reasons. First, MFN has provided the avenue by which we have been able to consult and negotiate with the Chinese. Second, MFN withdrawal would eliminate any reason to negotiate in the first place; issues of market access and intellectual property rights would virtually become invalid in the wake of restricted US-PRC trade. Conditional MFN renewal the Clinton Administration's current policy course will also discourage the Chinese from seriously considering trade reforms because its conditions have been denounced by China as being too stringent. The manipulation of China's MFN status will not force the Chinese to behave commercially in ways the United States would like; rather, it would damage China's market reforms and will slow China's commercial reentry into the modern world. _Conclusion_ To retain the ability to exert specific measures of influence over Chinese actions requires the preservation of Sino-American commercial and diplomatic contacts created by MFN status. MFN revocation would remove our ability to engage the Chinese government on these issues with threats of sanctions or whatever other pressure is deemed appropriate. The placement of conditions on MFN renewal, as some have advocated, would hold our "single most powerful instrument for promoting reform hostage to Chinese government hardliners whose actions would most certainly violate the precepts for MFN renewal.(21) Outright cancellation of MFN treatment would inflict harm on those within China struggling for reform and would assist the hardline faction in reasserting control over progressive economic and social sectors of Chinese civilization. Furthermore, MFN revocation would be perceived by the Chinese government as an attempt to single out China with regards to the aforementioned issues. Certainly, China would not react favorably to this form of treatment: To exert any outside pressure or to take any sanctions against China should not be the approach in handling the relations between our two countries. Such methods came to nothing in the past and will never work at present. (22) The removal of most-favored-nation trading status to China would accomplish none of the social or economic goals the United States government has directed toward China. Issues regarding human rights, weapons proliferation, market access, and intellectual property rights are being effectively addressed with specific negotiations or sanctions. Withdrawal of MFN will not force China, a nation possessing tremendous power and influence in world affairs to acquiesce to US preferences on these issues. Revocation of MFN would, however, concurrently destroy the one viable avenue through which the United States government can engage the Chinese on these issues. The world's largest population must continue to advance, both politically and economically. MFN trading status remains an effective means of guiding China's continuing journey into the modern world. [End] *-Grayson R. Robertson III is a second-year M.A. student in the International Economic Policy program at The American University's School of International Service.* _ENDNOTES_ 7. Ford S. Worthy, Making it in China , _Fortune_ (17 June 1991), 103. 8. Zhu, Op. cit., 28. 9. S. Linn Williams, Renewal of MFN Trading Status for the People's Republic of China", Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Congress (26 June 1991), 47. 10. Ibid. 11. $6.3 billion worth of American goods was exported to China in 1991, a 30 percent increase over the previous year. See The Case for China's MFN Status , _China Business Review_ (July-August 1992), 14. 12. Williams, Op. cit., 33-34. 13. Most other World Bank members have restored their full support for these loans. See George Bush, "United States-China Act of 1991", _Congressional Digest_ (October 1991), 228. 14. Kantner, Op. cit., 553. 15. Eagleburger, Op. cit., 22-23. 16. _China Business Review_ (July-August 1992), 17. 17. Zhu, Op. cit., 28. 18. _China Business Review_, Op. cit., 16. 19. Special 301 requires the President to identify those countries with the most damaging trade barriers and to take appropriate action to regain market access. 20. Kantner, Op. cit., 554 21. Ibid. 22. Eagleburger, Op. cit., 8-9. [Forwarded to S.C.C. by "Howard H. Frederick" from "SWORDS & PLOUGHSHARES: A CHRONICLE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS" vol.2, no.1, Fall, 1993. ISSN 1063-133x. Copyright 1993, The Graduate Student Council of the School of International Service, The American University, Washington, D.C.] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2b. Asia's Giants Learn To Waltz --Japan Boosts Investment in China in Search of Its Huge Market.................R. Neff, L. Curry and B. Einhorn 93 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Near the beginning of his nine-day trip to Japan in late February, Chinese Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji drew 900 members of Japan's business elite to a speech at a posh Tokyo hotel. Speaking without notes for almost an hour, China's economic czar laid out the case for stronger commercial ties between the two countries. Not all of his listeners were convinced: After Zhu proclaimed that China had the best investment climate in the world, many in the audience snickered. Zhu may have the last laugh. For years, many Japanese have been skeptical about doing business with their giant neighbor--even as Western companies caught China fever. Now, however, Japan's ties with China are expanding rapidly. Last year, bilateral trade grew by 31%, to $37.8 billion, and Japan has become China's second-largest trading partner, after Hong Kong. Japanese consumers are buying more low-priced Chinese apparel than ever. And Japanese direct investment has soared. "Interest in China is growing extremely fast," says Kozue Hiraiwa, a China researcher at the Japan External Trade Organization. ACE CARD? The implications will be felt in Washington. With the Clinton Administration pressuring Japan on trade and China on human rights, improved Sino-Japanese relations may give both countries a card to play against the Americans. "If China and Japan get strongly linked together, then the issue of what the U. S. does will be less and less important," says Virginie Maisonneuve, China portfolio manager for Batterymarch Financial Management in Boston. As long as Beijing limited foreign investment primarily to export industries, the Japanese largely ignored China. But now that parts of the huge Chinese market are open to foreigners, the Japanese are paying attention. For instance, on Feb. 28, NEC Corp. said it plans to start producing computers for the Chinese market with a Shanghai partner this year, the first such venture for a Japanese company. In the first half of 1993, Japanese investment contracts grew in number by 153% from the same period in 1992. Their value was 44% higher, or $1.2 billion. To be sure, Japan's direct-investment performance is still dwarfed by that of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the U. S. Japan remains a distant fourth and, despite the recent surge in spending, isn't catching up. Practically none of its investments to date is major league, unlike those by such Western companies as Volkswagen and Chrysler Corp. But the Japanese don't seem worried. "The plate is getting bigger all the time," says Kei Yokobori, a senior deputy general manager at trader Mitsui & Co. "China's demand is unlimited." WESTERN HEADSTART. Some Japanese remain cautious, suggesting that Western rivals are taking a large chance by minimizing the hazards of investing in China's overheated economy. "We can't accept a big risk that goes wrong," says Hironori Itazu, deputy general manager of overseas operations at Hitachi Ltd. Playing it safe, Hitachi recently invested a modest $12 million in a home air-conditioner joint venture in Shanghai. If China's economy stabilizes, Itazu says, Hitachi will be ready to pour in enough money to gain a 30% share of the air-conditioner market. Concerns about economic stability have long driven Japan's carmakers away from China. That gave Western companies a headstart in producing cars and trucks there. However, the Japanese "are catching up rapidly," says Keith C. Donaldson, an analyst at Salomon Brothers Asia Ltd. in Tokyo. Suzuki Motor Corp. gets almost 10% of its revenues from China, and it will manufacture about 170,000 vehicles there within the next year. Last March, Nissan Motor Co. entered a joint venture to assemble pickup trucks in Henan Province. Most Chinese can't afford cars. So Honda Motor Co. has succeeded by targeting the motorcycle market. Last year, Honda exported 300,000 cycles to China. That didn't come close to satisfying demand: Six companies in China churned out another 520,000 Hondas. This year, the total should exceed 750,000. The company hopes its established dealer and service network will eventually serve as a stepping-stone for Honda to sell cars. Despite such moves, Japanese business leaders still are quick to point out the pitfalls of doing business in China. Topping their litany of woes is the unpredictable access to foreign exchange, which cramps their ability to purchase imported key components, pay expatriate salaries, and remit dividends overseas. "China's investment climate has certainly improved, but Zhu hasn't said anything about the foreign-exchange problem," complains Akiko Mase, a deputy general manager at the Japan-China Association on Economy & Trade. Smaller export-oriented companies also complain about high real estate and labor costs in popular areas such as Shanghai. That won't deter Japan's heavy hitters, which value China for its domestic market rather than its potential as an export platform. As trade tensions with the U. S. worsen, more Japanese exporters will be targeting the giant economy in their backyard. [From Business Week, March 14, 1994. Robert Neff in Tokyo, with Lynne Curry in Beijing and Bruce Einhorn in New York] ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 3. Question Corner 3a. Death Penalty and Prison Labor.............................Ty Hu 26 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Editor, One thought that might be related to the debate of "prison labors", that is the "death penalty". Governor of the New York State, Cuomo, strongly opposes the death penalty. One of his argument is that death penalty is not civilized, in another word is inhumane. Yet, he promotes "life sentence" in prison. This life sentence has been widely "appreciated" by the liberals, and named it "three times, you are in." Now, the question are: Is it civilized to put a human being behind bars for life? Or, what is the essence of human life? Would it be freedom? Thus, restriction of freedom for life is uncivilized, and is a harsher punishment than put to sleep. Come back to the prison labor, is it simply more humane to keep a person, a criminal, in prison doing nothing and bored the head off, or give this person a chance to work so s/he may realize his/her value and regain self-esteem? Many argument on this issue and human rights are centered at the ideology. Idealists are a precious bunch who keep the society moving forward. At the same time, however, they should also realize that the world can't be perfect overnight. Nnn...Who says ideology propaganda only exists in the "communist" countries? Thank you. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3b. IFCSS and People's Congress..........................Daniel Qiu 22 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. IFCSS and CSS Community Does IFCSS represent the CSS community? Or does the HQ of IFCSS really represent the members of IFCSS? If so, does that mean that IFCSS should represent the majority of CSS on EVERY ISSUE? How to achieve that? Does CSS community need such a representation organization at all? 2. The Coming Session of People's Congress of China The Eighth People's Congress of China will reconvene in two days. IFCSS has requested that overseas community should have their own representative seats in the People's Congress. Is this a legitimate request? Would it be possible? If so, what and how the overseas Chinese community should do to accomplish this? How to make sure that these representatives are properly elected and really represent the majority view of the Chinese Community abroad? There are many other issues important to China to be deliberated in this session of People's Congress. What do you think this People's Congress can achieve and should achieve? +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++ + Executive Editor: Changqing Yang Executive Moderator: Huang Tang + + Editor-in-Chief: Yungui Ding + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ + For subscription: mail "SUB CHINA-NT Your-First-Name Your-Last-Name" + + to LISTSERV@UGA (bitnet) or listserv@uga.cc.uga.edu (internet) + + For back issues of CCF: + + anonymous ftp to cnd.org[132.249.229.100]:pub/community/CCF + + For contribution and inquiry: mail to ccf-editor@ifcss.org + +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++