From @UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU:owner-china-nt@UGA.CC.UGA.EDU Sat Jun 11 23:37:56 1994 Date: Sat, 11 Jun 1994 20:39:28 EDT Reply-To: Bo Peng Sender: China-Net From: Bo Peng Subject: Chinese Community Forum Comments: To: china-nt@uga.cc.uga.edu To: Multiple recipients of list CHINA-NT ==+==+==+== C h i n e s e C o m m u n i t y F o r u m ==+==+==+=== Sunday June 12, 1994 (Issue No. 9432, Weekend Edition) +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Chinese Community Forum (CCF) is an e-journal published on China-Net. CCF is dedicated to the discussion on the issues related to the Chinese community. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the Editorial Board of CCF. Contributions to the discussions and suggestions of new topics are very much appreciated. +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= # of Table of Contents Author | Lines ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== --*-- Corruption and Modernization --*-- 1. Expos'e......................................................EBCCF 47 2. Corruption and Modernization: A Commentary...............Yanmin Gu 80 3. Corruption -- A Surfactant of Transformation?...........Ming Cheng 47 4. Modernization and Corruption..................Samuel P. Huntington 463 ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== -- From the Editor -- It is hardly news to anyone that corruption has become a way of life for many in China -- a way not only for getting ahead but also, at times, for merely going ahead. While the average Joe Li has his hands full just coping with the reality, the causes and possible cures for the problem have been of immence interests for those who care about the Chinese society in large and can afford the luxury of tending such a concern. Is corruption an unavoidable by-product of, or even necessary lubricant for, rapid ecomonic development? Among the limited choices of government models we have (in theory) today in late twentieth century, which one is the most likely cure for this type of social cancer? Specifically, would democracy be of any help on this aspect, in contrast to dictatorship? These are the questions on which the article by S.P.Huntington tries to shed some light. While hardly dealing with China specifically, the essay seeks to answer the questions on the general humanity and sociological level. It is relatively long and scholarly; for those who are interested in the puzzle, however, we believe it is enlightening and thought-provoking. Should you find the length formidable, Yanmin Gu, who kindly provided the essay, offered a relatively compact commentary and introduction. In the second aarticle, Ming Cheng pondered on the questions of the positive effects (within certain limit) and the "Chinese characteristics" of corruption in China. The first item, from the EBCCF, carries an important announcement that we believe is of significant interest to the CSS community in the US. Even if corruption does not bother you, ignoring this announcement probably would. ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 1. Expos'e......................................................EBCCF 47 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The sixth annual Convention for IFCSS will be held in Chapel Hill, NC on July 21 through 25. As usual, delegates will gather on the convention to elect the next President of IFCSS, among other less thorny duties. "What's your point?" Some might shrug. Well, try to imagine how you would feel when the next IFCSS President gets an invitation from the Congress to give a testimony on some important issue related to China, or if the IFCSS HQ were ever to forget to include a certain group in the scope of coverage of its lobbying plan and you happen to be in bad luck that day. If you are *sure* that you would not go "WHAT!? @N$%^U*T#$*^S*!!!" then, by all means, skip this announcement and tend your more immediate concerns. How are the delegates, who determine who goes to the Capitol Hill to testify, selected? Who are the candidates? What do they have in mind for IFCSS? What do they plan to do for the CSS community? Which "side" does each of them take on issues you care about? How many non-delegate CSS's can answer the above questions before it is too late, if ever? How many would like to know the answers beforehand, if it is not too much trouble, like, having someone to tell all about it? Turning to the other side of the gulf, would the cadidates like to spread their messages and ideas as widely as possible, thus appealing to the general CSS public? While CCF cannot offer any help on the first question, which strictly belongs to the domain of internal operation of IFCSS, we at the EBCCF believe that this forum can, and should, serve as a bridge between the candidates and the CSS community in large for this instance. Therefore, we are planning to publish an issue on Wednesday, June 22 exclusively for the purpose of exposing the candidates. The candidates may choose to announce their candidacy, as well as provide whatever type of information they would like the general public to know. For the general CSS public, the issue will provide an unprecedented opportunity to glimpse into the future orientation of IFCSS. The candidates, on the other hand, will have for the first time ever access to a medium through which they can reach the mass and promote their agenda in a direct fashion, instead of being limited to within the relatively small group of the delegates coming to the Convention. We will announce specific rules regarding the submissions of the cadidates in the upcoming issue of CCF on Wednesday. (For potential cadidates: Please do not submit your message until the rules are publicized. We will not accept entries before then.) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Corruption and Modernization: A Commentary...............Yanmin Gu 80 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The transition from childhood to manhood is arguably the most stirring event for every grown-up male. The reaction when one learns that he has reached puberty is a mixture of anxiety and excitement. He knows that from now on he is going to become a member of the mysterious adult world. The first thing he would like to possess may well be the strong masculinity associated with an adult because the characteristics related to masculinity are so self- evident (i.e., strong arms and legs, bigger physique). Other things may be of secondary nature and differ greatly from individual to individual. Some may admire wisdom, intelligence of their role models while others may emulate brave, heroic role models. Because of better nutrition, a child today could grow much faster and stronger than his parental generation. Hence we can now often find a teenager with a super big physique but childish mentality. However, the discovery over time that one has become bigger and bigger physically lends enormous confidence to the adolescent of what one can accomplish being a "man." Analogous to this experience is the transformation of nations from their tradition-bound society to modernity -- a transition full of uncertainty, anxiety, and the excitement of self-discovery. The modernization process carries explicitly or implicitly a goal of becoming a wealthy nation and strong state. As every grown-up knows, the transition is messy and difficult but not without sweet rewards. Because of the "benefits of backwardness", later comers tend to have an accelerated growth, thus, could acquire a "modern shell" with astonishing speed. The contradiction of this development is the difficulty in incorporating modern "software" into the modern "hardware". It is conceivable that the software will take longer time to digest than the hardware. Hence we often see some peculiar behavior of these nations. However, to condemn the deviant behavior often associated with this great transformation is to condemn one's own memory. As Huntington eloquently demonstrated in the following article, the "moral superiority" enjoyed by the critics from the modern world or of modern criteria is not due to "superiority of genetics" but rather has to do with historical timing -- they happen to be the first to reach modernity. Viewed from this universalistic perspective, corruption and crime are inevitable by-products of the large force underlying modernization. Corruption and crime, thus, are as natural to a human society as diseases are to a human body. It is the scale and prevalence that bewilder the moralistic elites of a society undergoing modernization. Indeed, the scale of corruption seems closely related to the velocity or intensity of the social transformation -- the faster, the more intense the modernization, the more rampant the corruption. This again leads to another perplexing question. Given a democratic representative government, would corruption and crime be reduced or eradicated during the process of modernization? The answer seems to be a surprising no. Based on Huntington's observation, democracy fares no better than any other forms of government in coping with corruption and crime during the period of intense modernization. On the contrary, democratic governments did far worse than their counterparts (communism, fascism, or authoritarianism) in reducing corruption and crimes during industrialization. In the later 19th century, the corruption of the Jacksonian government in the U.S. was well-documented. Despite the fact that Jackson was a "heroic" fighter (or should we say notorious killer in today's human rights criterion) of native Indians and the rampant governmental corruption, he is nonetheless reelected to be the President of the U.S. Did democracy serve its purpose? Yes and No. To say yes is because the formal rules of democracy was observed, the government was a democratically elected representative government (excluding the voting rights of women, blacks, and native Indians due to well-known historical reasons). Everything was legitimate and formal. To say no was because the government violated the spirit of democracy by abusing power and violating the "inalienable rights" of Indians. It seems to be a lazy man's excuse that democracy can solve the problems of modernization, i.e., corruption, crime, etc. Based on the 20th century experience, the claims of democracy appear to rest on promise, not performance. Democracy is no meritocracy. The problem with liberal Chinese intellectuals (myself included) is the moralistic overtone on government. Our fundamental assumption about government lies in the belief that government is good or should be good and it should serve the people it represents. We take the "for the people, by the people, of the people" at its face value without regard to its underlying idealistic aspiration. As we may well aware that the dictum "serve the people" under the Chinese Communist Party can hardly hold the water. The assumption underlying democracy is the belief that any government (or branches of government) can not be trusted if it is not checked by some external powers, i.e. press, congress, judicial system, popular election, etc., even at the expense of efficiency. We often tend to ask "what should be" rather than "what it is as it is". Consequently, I would suggest to read Huntington's article based on the later question rather than the former one. It is in this light, Huntington's article will serve its purpose. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Corruption -- A Surfactant of Transformation?............Ming Cheng 47 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Corruption, a matter that has reached the point of crisis in China's reform, has its own character, as all other social phenomena in China do. While the Chinese government is fond of blaming corruption on Western influences - the results of opening the door and "letting in the flies," it is nevertheless too simplistic if we identify the corruption in today's China with those appeared in the modernization processes of other countries, such as during the period of robber baron of The Unite States which Professor Huntington has profoundly analyzed in the following paper. Professor Huntington has scientifically brought to light the objective laws governing the emergence of corruption in the modernization. Though some characters of present tide of corruption of in China have answered to his description, one of most important and distinctive characters in the case of China does not fall into any of the categories enlisted. This character, which has evoked much controversy, could be objectively described as a surfactant of tranformation or modernization. The roots of this character are within the Chinese system and the way in which the system evolves. In fact, when Professor Huntington pointed out "modernization...encourages corruption by the changes it produces on the output side of the political system," he has vaguely hinting on the possible reverse effects of corruption on the modernization. Modernization has been providing unprecedented opportunities, which are risk-free fot the subjects due to the rudimentary state of China's legal system, for conducting corruption by creating new sources of wealth and power. Thus, becoming wealty by corruption may be an attractive alternative for those powerful supporters of old system. The transformation would become much easier when all the powerful people could benefit from it, at least economically. Especially, because of the current double-track system and the cultural traditions of China, it is sometimes very difficult to judge whether certain behavior is corruption just sue to the backwardness of the society as Professor Huntington mentioned. Corruption is also an untold factor attracting venture capitals from outside of China. Without the bilions of dollars of foreign capital pouring in each year recently, China's economy would have been far from the shape it has today. On one hand, as Professor Huntington said, modernization breeds corruption. While it may be too strong a claim that corruption breeds China's modernization, on the other hand, it is perhaps a fair assessment to say that corruption plays the role of surfactant in the transformation. However, as in a chemical process, it will transfer into another phase if the amount of surfactant exceeds certain limit. Corruption in China now is in a critical state. If the Chinese government fails to keept it under control, China's transformation will end up in nowhere but chaos. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Modernization and Corruption..................Samuel P. Huntington 463 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Samuel P. Huntington is the Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute fro Strategic Studies at Harvard University.] Corruption is behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends. Corruption obviously exists in all societies, but it is also obviously more common in some societies than in others and more common at some times in the evolution of a society than at other times. Impressionistic evidence suggests that its extent correlates reasonably well with rapid social and economic modernization. Political life in 18th century America and in 20th century America, it would appear, was less corrupt than in 19th century America. So also political life in 17th century Britain and in late 19th century Britain. Is it merely coincidence that this high point of corruption in English and American public life coincided with the impact of the industrial revolution, the development of new sources of wealth and power, and the appearance of new classes making new demands on government? In both periods political institutions suffered strain and some measure of decay. Corruption is, of course, one measure of the absence of effective political institutionalization. Public officials lack autonomy and coherence, and subordinate their institutional roles to exogenous demands. Corruption may be more prevalent in some cultures than in others but in most cultures it seems to be most prevalent during the most intense phases of modernization. The differences in the level of corruption which may exist between the modernized and politically developed societies of the Atlantic world and those of Latin America, Africa, and Asia in large part reflect their differences in political modernization and political development. When the leaders of military juntas and revolutionary movements condemn the "corruption" in their societies, they are, in effect, condemning the backwardness of their societies. Why does modernization breed corruption? Three connections stand out. First, modernization involves a change in the basic values of the society. In particular it means the gradual acceptance by groups within the society of universalistic and achievement-based norms, the emergence of loyalties and identifications of individuals and groups with the nation-state, and the spread of the assumption that citizens have equal rights against the state and equal obligations to the state. These norms usually, of course, are first accepted by students, military officers, and others who have been exposed to them abroad. Such groups then begin to judge their own society by these new and alien norms. Behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms becomes unacceptable and corrupt when viewed through modern eyes. Corruption in a modernizing society is thus in part not so much the result of the deviance of behavior from accepted norms as it is the standards and criteria of what is right and wrong lead to a condemnation of at least some traditional behavior patterns as corrupt. "What Britons saw as corrupt and Hausa as oppressive," one scholar has noted of northern Nigeria, "Fulani might regard as both necessary and traditional." The calling into question of old standards, moreover, tends to undermine the legitimacy of all standards. The conflict between modern and traditional norms opens opportunities for individuals to act in ways justified by neither. Corruption requires some recognition of the difference between public role and private interest. If the culture of the society does not distinguish between the king's role as a private person and the king's role as king, it is impossible to accuse the king of corruption in the use of public monies. The distinction between the private purse and public expenditures only gradually evolved in Western Europe at the beginning of the modern period. Some notion of this distinction, however, is necessary to reach any conclusion as to whether the actions of the king are proper or corrupt. Similarly, according to traditional codes in many societies, an official had the responsibility and obligation to provide rewards and employment to members of his family. No distinction existed between obligation to the state and obligation to the family. Only when such a distinction becomes accepted by dominant groups within the society does it become possible to define such behavior as nepotism and hence corruption. Indeed, the introduction of achievement standards may stimulate greater family identification and more felt need to protect family interests against the threat posed by alien ways. Corruption is thus a product of the distinction between public welfare and private interest which comes with modernization. Modernization also contributes to corruption by creating new sources of wealth and power, the relation of which to politics is undefined by the dominant traditional norms of the society and on which the modern norms are not yet accepted by the dominant groups within the society. Corruption in this sense is a direct product of the rise of new groups with new resources and the efforts of these groups to make themselves effective within the political sphere. Corruption may be the means of assimilating new groups into the political system by irregular means because the system has been unable to adapt sufficiently fast to provide legitimate and acceptable means for this purpose. In Africa, corruption threw "a bridge between those who hold political power and those who control wealth, enabling the two classes, markedly apart during the initial stages of African nationalist governments, to assimilate each other." The new millionaires buy themselves seats in the Senate or the House of Lords and thereby become participants in the political system rather than alienated opponents of it, which might have been the case if this opportunity to corrupt the system were denied them. So also recently enfranchised masses or recently arrived immigrants use their new power of the ballot to buy themselves jobs and favors from the local political machine. There is thus the corruption of the poor and the corruption of the rich. The one trades political power for money, the other money for political power. But in both cases something public (a vote or an office or decision) is sold for private gain. Modernization, thirdly, encourages corruption by the changes it produces on the output side of the political system. Modernization, particularly among the later modernizing countries, involves the expansion of governmental authority and the multiplication of the activities subjected to governmental regulation. In Northern Nigeria, "oppression and corruption tended to increase among the Hausa with political centralization and the increase of governmental tasks." All laws, as McMullan has pointed out, put some group at a disadvantage, and this group consequently becomes a potential source of corruption. The multiplication of laws thus multiplies the possibilities of corruption. The extent to which this possibility is realized in practice depends in large part upon the extent to which the laws have the general support of the population, the ease with which the law can be broken without detection, and the profit to be made by breaking it. Laws affecting trade, customs, taxes plus those regulating popular and profitable activities such as gambling, prostitution, and liquor, consequently become major incentives to corruption. Hence in a society where corruption is widespread the passage of strict laws against corruption serves only to multiply the opportunities for corruption. The initial adherence to modern values by a group in a transitional country often takes an extreme form. The ideals of honesty, probity, universalism, and merit often become so overriding that individuals and groups come to condemn as corrupt in their own society practices which are accepted as normal and even legitimate in more modern societies. The initial exposure to modernism tends to give rise to unreasonable puritanical standards even as it did among the Puritans themselves. This escalation in values leads to a denial and rejection of the bargaining and compromise essential to politics and promotes the identification of politics with corruption. To the modernizing zealot a politician's promise to build irrigation ditches for farmers in a village if he is elected seems to be just as corrupt as an offer to pay each villager for his vote before the election. Modernizing elites are nationalistic and stress the overriding preeminence of the general welfare of society as a whole. Hence in a country like Brazil, "efforts by private interests to influence public policy are considered, as in Rousseau, inherently 'corrupt'. By the same token government action which is fashioned in deference to particular claims and pressures from society is considered 'demagogy'." In a society like Brazil the modernizing elements condemn as corrupt ambassadorial appointments to reward friends or to appease critics and the establishment of government projects in return for interest group support. In the extreme case the antagonism to corruption may take the form of the intense fanatical puritanism characteristic of most revolutionary and some military regimes in at least their early phases. Paradoxically, this fanatical anticorruption mentality has ultimate effects similar to those of corruption itself. Both challenge the autonomy of politics: one substituting private goals for public ones and the other replacing political values with technical ones. The escalation of standards in a modernizing society and the concomitant devaluation and rejection of politics represent the victory of the values of modernity over the needs of society. Reducing corruption in a society thus often involves both a scaling down of the norms thought appropriate for the behavior of public officials and at the same time changes in the general behavior of such officials in the direction of those norms. The result is a greater congruence between prevalent norms and prevalent behavior at the price of some inconsistency in both. Some behavior comes to be accepted as a normal part of the process of politics, as "honest" rather than "dishonest graft", while other, similar behavior comes to be generally condemned and generally avoided. Both England and the United States went through this process: at one point the former accepted the sale of peerages but not of ambassadorships, while the latter accepted the sale of ambassadorships but not judgeships. "The result in the U.S.A.," as one observer has noted, "is a patchwork: the scope of political patronage has been greatly reduced and the cash bribery of higher public servants largely eliminated. At the same time, large areas of public life have so far remained more or less immune to reform, and practices that in one sphere would be regarded as corrupt are almost taken for granted in another." The development within a society of the ability to make this discrimination is a sign of its movement from modernization to modernity. The functions, as well as the causes, of corruption are similar to those violence. Both are encouraged by modernization; both are symptomatic of the weakness of political institutions; both are characteristic of what we shall subsequently call praetorian societies; both are means by which individuals and groups relate themselves to the political system and, indeed, participate in the system in ways which violate the mores of the system. Hence the society which has a high capacity for corruption also has a high capacity for violence. In some measure, one form of deviant behavior may substitute for the other, but, more often different social forces simultaneously exploit their differing capacities for each. The prevalence of violence, however, does pose a greater threat to the functioning of the system than the prevalence of corruption. In the absence of agreement on public purposes, corruption substitutes agreement on private ends. Both corruption and violence are illegitimate means of making demands upon the system, but corruption is also an illegitimate means of satisfying those demands. Violence is more often a symbolic gesture of protest which goes unrequited and is not designed to be requited. It is a symptom of more extreme alienation. He who corrupts a system's police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who storms the system's police stations. Like machine politics or clientelistic politics in general, corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society. Corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of political system in the same way that reform is. Corruption itself may be a substitute for reform and both corruption and reform may be substitutes for revolution. Corruption serves to reduce group pressures for policy changes, just as reform serves to reduce class pressures for structural changes. In Brazil, for instance, governmental loans to trade association leaders have caused them to give up "their associations' broader claims. Such betrayals have been an important factor in reducing class and trade association pressure upon the government." The degree of corruption which modernization produces in a society is, of course, a function of the nature of the traditional society as well as of the nature of the modernizing process. The presence of several competing value systems or cultures in a traditional society will, in itself, encourage corruption in that society. Given a relatively homogeneous culture, however, the amount of corruption likely to develop during modernization would appear to be inversely related to the degree of social stratification in the traditional society. A highly articulated class or caste structure means a highly developed system of norms regulating behavior between individuals of different status. These norms are enforced both by the individual's socialization into his own group and by the expectations and potential sanctions of other groups. In such a society failure to follow the relevant norms in intergroup relations may lead to intense personal disorganization and unhappiness. Corruption, consequently, should be less extensive in the modernization of feudal societies than it is in the modernization of centralized bureaucratic societies. It should have been less in Japan than in China and it should have been less in Hindu cultures than in Islamic ones. Impressionistic evidence suggests that these may well be the case. For Western societies, one comparative analysis shows that Australia and Great Britain have "fairly high levels of class voting" compared to the United States and Canada. Political corruption, however, appears to have been more extensive in the latter two countries than in the former, with Quebec perhaps being the most corrupt area in any of the four countries. Consequently, "the most class-polarized countries also seem to have less political corruption." Similarly, in the "mulatto" countries (Panama, Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, Dominican Republic, and Haiti) of Latin America, "there appears to be greater social equality and much less rigidity in the social structure" than in the Indian (Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia) or mestizo (Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay) countries. Correspondingly, however, the relative "absence of an entrenched upper class means also the relative absence of a governing class ethic, with its sense of noblesse oblige" and hence "there seems little doubt that it is countries in this socio-racial category in which political graft reaches its most flagrant heights. Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, Batista in Cuba, and Trujullo in the Dominican Republic all came from non-upper-class backgrounds and all became multimillionaires in office. So also, "Brazil and Panama are notorious for more 'democratic,' more widely distributed, graft-taking." The prevalence of corruption in the African states may well be related to the general absence of rigid class divisions. "The rapid mobility from poverty to wealth and from one occupation to another," one observer has noted of Africa, "has prevented the development of class phenomena, that is, of hereditary status or class consciousness." The same mobility, however, multiplies the opportunities for and the attractions of corruption. Similarly, the Philippines and Thailand, both of which have had reasonably fluid and open societies with relatively high degrees of social mobility, have been characterized by frequent reports of widespread political corruption. In most forms corruption involves an exchange of political action for economic wealth. The particular forms that will be prevalent in a society depend upon the ease of access to one as against the other. In a society with multiple opportunities for the accumulation of wealth and few positions of political power, the dominant pattern will be the use of the former to achieve the latter. In the United States, wealth has more commonly been a road to political influence than political office has been a road to wealth. The rules against using public office to obtain private profit are much stricter and more generally obeyed than those against using private wealth to obtain public office. That striking and yet common phenomenon of American politics, the cabinet minister or presidential assistant who feels forced to quit office in order to provide for his family, would be viewed with amazement and incredulity in most parts of the world. In modernizing countries, the reverse situation is usually the case. The opportunities for the accumulation of wealth through private activity are limited by traditional norms, the monopoly of economic roles by ethnic minorities, or the domination of the economy by foreign companies and investors. In such a society, politics becomes the road to wealth, and those enterprising ambitions and talents which cannot find what they want in business may yet do so in politics. It is, in many modernizing countries, easier for an able and ambitious young man to become a cabinet minister by way of politics than to become a millionaire by way of business. Consequently, contrary to American practice, modernizing countries may accept as normal widespread use of public office to obtain private wealth while at the same time taking a stricter view of the use of private wealth to obtain public office. Corruption, like violence, results when the absence of mobility opportunities outside politics, combined with weak and inflexible political institutions, channels energies into politically deviant behavior. The prevalence of foreign business in a country in particular tends to promote corruption both because the foreigners have less scruples in violating the norms of the society and because their control of important avenues to economic wellbeing forces potential native entrepreneurs to attempt to make their fortunes through politics. Taylor's description of the Philippines undoubtedly has widespread application among modernizing countries: "Politics is a major industry for the Filipinos: it is a way of life. Politics is the main route to power, which, in turn, is the main route to wealth ... More money can be made in a shorter time with the aid of political influence than by any other means." The use of political office as a way to wealth implies a subordination of political values and institutions to economic ones. The principal purpose of politics becomes not the achievement of public goals but the promotion of individual interests. In all societies the scale of corruption (i.e. the average value of the private goods and public services involved in a corrupt exchange) increases as one goes up the bureaucratic hierarchy or potential ladder. The incidence of corruption (i.e. the frequency with which a given population group engages in corrupt acts) on a given level in the political or bureaucratic structure, however, may vary significantly from one society to another. In most political systems, the incidence of corruption is high at the lower levels of bureaucratic and political authority. In some societies, the incidence of corruption seems to remain constant or to increase as one goes up the political hierarchy. In terms of frequency as well as scale, national legislators are more corrupt than local officials; high level bureaucrats are more corrupt than low level ones; cabinet ministers are the most corrupt of all; and the president or top leader the most corrupt among them. In such societies the top leader -- the Nkrumah, Sarit, San Martin, Perez Jimenez, Trujillo -- may make off with tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars. In such a system corruption tends to accentuate already existing inequalities. Those who gain access to the most political power also have the more frequent opportunities to gain access to the most wealth. Such a pattern of top-heavy corruption means a very low level of political institutionalization, since the top political institutions in the society which should be most independent of outside influences are in fact most susceptible to such influences. This pattern of corruption is not necessarily incompatible with political stability so long as the avenues of upward mobility through the political machine or the bureaucracy remain open. If, however, the younger generation of politicians sees itself indefinitely excluded from sharing in the gains of the older leaders, or if the colonels in the army see little hope of generals, the system becomes liable to violent overthrow. In such a society both political corruption and political stability depend upon vertical mobility. The expectation of more corruption at the top is reversed in other societies. In these societies the incidence of corrupt behavior increases as one goes down the political or bureaucratic hierarchy. Low-level bureaucratic officials are more likely to be corrupt than high-level ones; state and local officials are more likely to be corrupt than national ones; the top national leadership and the national cabinet are comparatively free from corruption, while the town council and local offices are deeply involved in it. Scale and incidence of corruption are inversely related. This pattern would seem to be generally true for highly modern societies, such as the United States, and also for at least some modernizing societies, such as india. It is also probably the dominant pattern in communist states. The crucial factor in this type of society is the existence of fairly strong national political institutions which socialize rising political leaders into a code of values stressing the public responsibilities of the political leadership. National political institutions are reasonably autonomous and differentiated, while lower-level and local political individuals and organizations are more closely involved with other social forces and groups. This pattern of corruption may directly enhance the stability of the political system. The top leaders of the society remain true to the stated norms of the political culture and accept political power and moral virtue as substitutes for economic gain. Low-level officials, in turn, are compensated for their lack of political standing by their greater opportunity to engage in corruption. Their envy of the power of their leaders is tempered by the solace of their own petty graft. Just as the corruption produced by the expansion of political participation helps to integrate new groups into the political system, so also the corruption produced by the expansion of governmental regulation may help stimulate economic development. Corruption may be one way of surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations which hamper economic expansion. In the United States during the 1870s and 1880s corruption of state legislatures and city councils by railroad, utility, and industrial corporations undoubtedly speeded the growth of the American economy. "Many economic activities would be paralyzed," Weiner observes of India, "were it not for the flexibility which backshish contributes to the complex, rigid, administrative system." In somewhat similar fashion, during the Kubitschek era in Brazil a high rate of economic development apparently corresponded with a high rate of parliamentary corruption, as industrializing entrepreneurs bought protection and assistance from conservative rural legislators. It has even been suggested that one result of governmental efforts to reduce corruption in societies such as Egypt is to produce additional obstacles to economic development. In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy. A society which is relatively uncorrupt -- a traditional society for instance where traditional norms are still powerful -- may find a certain amount of corruption a welcome lubricant easing the path to modernization. A developed traditional society may be improved -- or at least modernized -- by a little corruption; a society in which corruption is already pervasive, however, is unlikely to be improved by more corruption. Corruption naturally tends to weaken or to perpetuate the weakness of the government bureaucracy. In this respect, it is incompatible with political development. At times, however, some forms of corruption can contribute to political development by helping to strengthen political parties. "The corruption of one government," Harrington said, "is the generation of another". Similarly, the corruption of one governmental organ may help the institutionalization of another. In most modernizing countries, the bureaucracy is overdeveloped in comparison with the institutions responsible for aggregating interests and handling the input side of the political system. Insofar as the governmental bureaucracy is corrupted in the interests of the political parties, political development may be helped rather than hindered. Party patronage is only a mild form of corruption, if indeed it deserves to be called that at all. For an official to award a public office in return for a payment to the official is clearly to place private interest over public interest. For an official to award a public office in return for a contribution of work or money to a party organization is to subordinate one public interest to another, more needy, public interest. Historically strong party organizations have been built either by revolution from below or by patronage from above. The 19th century experience of England and the United States is one long lesson in the use of public funds and public office to build party organization. The repetition of this pattern in the modernizing countries of today has contributed directly to the building of some of the most effective political parties and most stable political systems. In the later modernizing countries the sources of private wealth are too few and too small to make a major contribution to party building. Just as government in these countries has to play a more important role in economic development than it did in England and the United States, so also it must play a more important role in political development. In the 1920s and the 1930s, Ataturk used the resources of the Turkish government to foster the development of the Republican Peoples Party. After its creation in 1929 the Mexican Revolutionary Party similarly benefited from governmental corruption and patronage. The formation of the Democratic Republican Party in Korea in the early 1960s was directly helped by the use of governmental monies and governmental personnel. In Israel and India, governmental patronage has been a major source of strength for Mapai and Congress. The corruption in West Africa derived in part from the needs of the political parties. Of course, in the most obvious and blatant case of all, communist parties, once they acquire power, directly subordinate governmental bureaucracies and governmental resources to their own purposes. The rationale for corrupting the bureaucracy on behalf of the parties does not derive simply from a preference for one organization as against another. Corruption is, as we have seen, a product of modernization and particularly of the expansion of political consciousness and political participation. The reduction of corruption in the long run requires the organization and structuring of that participation. Political parties are the principal institution of modern politics which can perform this function. Corruption thrives on disorganization, the absence of stable relationships among groups and of recognized patterns of authority. The development of political organizations which exercise effective authority and which give rise to organized group interests - the "machine," the "organization," the "party" - transcending those of individual and social groups reduces the opportunity for corruption. Corruption varies inversely with political organization, and to the extent that corruption builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence. Corruption is most prevalent in states which lack effective political parties, in societies where the interests of the individual, the family, the clique, or the clan predominate. In a modernizing polity the weaker and less accepted the political parties, the greater the likelihood of corruption. In countries like Thailand and Iran where parties have had a semilegality at best, corruption on behalf of individual and family interests has been widespread. In the Philippines where political parties are notoriously weak, corruption has again been widely prevalent. In Brazil, also, the weakness of political parties has been reflected in a "clientelistic" pattern of politics in which corruption has been a major factor. In contrast, it would seem that the incidence of corruption in those countries where governmental resources have been diverted or "corrupted" for party-building is on the whole less than it is where parties have remained weak. The historical experience of the West also reflects this pattern. The parties which at first are the leeches on the bureaucracy in the end become the bark protecting it from more destructive locusts of clique and family. Partisanship and corruption, as Henry Jones Ford argued, "are really antagonistic principles. Partisanship tend to establish a connection based upon an avowed public obligation, while corruption consults private and individual interests which secrete themselves from view and avoid accountability of any kind. The weakness of party organization is the opportunity of corruption." [Forwarded by: yg12@gaea.ciser.cornell.edu; Source: Political Corruption: A Handbook. Edited by Arnold Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor LeVine. 1990. New Brunswick: Transaction Publisher. pp 377-388.] +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++ + Executive Editor: Bo Peng + + Executive Moderator: Changqing Yang + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ + For subscription: mail "SUB CHINA-NT Your-First-Name Your-Last-Name" + + to LISTSERV@UGA (bitnet) or listserv@uga.cc.uga.edu (internet) + + For unsubscription: mail "UNSUB CHINA-NT" to the above e-address + + For back issues of CCF: + + anonymous ftp to: cnd.org[132.249.229.100]: pub/community/CCF + + gopher to cnd.org: 2. English Menu --> 14. Community --> 1. ccf + + For contribution and inquiry: mail to ccf-editor@ifcss.org + +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++