From @UGA.CC.UGA.EDU:owner-china-nt@UGA.CC.UGA.EDU Thu Jul 7 04:13:10 1994 Date: Thu, 7 Jul 1994 00:08:51 EDT Reply-To: Bo Peng Sender: China-Net From: Bo Peng Subject: Chinese Community Forum (#9437) Comments: To: china-nt@uga.cc.uga.edu To: Multiple recipients of list CHINA-NT ==+==+==+== C h i n e s e C o m m u n i t y F o r u m ==+==+==+=== Wednesday, July 6, 1994 (No. 9437) +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Chinese Community Forum (CCF) is an e-journal published on China-Net. CCF is dedicated to the discussion on the issues related to the Chinese community. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the Editorial Board of CCF. Contributions to the discussions and suggestions of new topics are very much appreciated. +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= # of Table of Contents Author | Lines ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== -*- Interests: Personal, National, and Global -*- 1. Speak Up, You Damnforeigners!.................................EBCCF 37 2. Corrupt China in a Democratic Way?.........................Min Yang 72 3. National Interests -- An Extension of the Personal Ones........................Ming Cheng 43 4. The Breakup of China: A Critique of Gerald Segal's Article Published on the Foreign Affairs.................Dave Sheng 346 ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== -- From the Editor -- Perhaps it is most appropriate to begin this FTE by quoting Ming Cheng's remark on the concept of "interest" in his article carried in this issue: "the word 'interest' is so colorful in western terminology that there is even no unique correspondence in Chinese." Collectivism is a four-letter word in America -- count it yourself if you do not believe it. As contrary as in many other aspects, in China (at least traditionally speaking), individualism is the evil devil behind most bad things for the family as well as the country -- after all, "nation family" is the literal translation for the Chinese version of "country." In light of this interesting contrast, it should prove to be for the interests of all to put together a collection of thoughts on various types of interests by some Chinese living in America. Or would it? In a witty tone, Min Yang argued how "bad" personal interests could be manipulated into something good for the society in large in the end: a better China through corruption. Following a thread appeared in a previous issue of CCF, Ming Cheng pondered on the touchy concept of "national interests"; he remains optimistic that personal interests and national interests should, as well as could, be brought to work together in harmony. Through an in-depth point-by-point critique, Dave Sheng brought to our attention an article by Gerald Segal suggesting that China should be divided into pieces pitted against each other for the interests of other East Asian countries as well as of the whole world. It should be for the interests of those who feel blood rushing up the head on the thought of a divided China, as well as of those who find it quite comforting, to read both the original article and the critique. In the same spirit, for the interests of CCF, we extended a call for the readers who are not of Chinese origin to voice your opinions and suggestions and to participate in the making of CCF. Actually, we believe it is for the interests of both communities. Let's exchange our good stuff, instead of saving them in the bank -- the last time we checked, the interest there is infinitesimal. ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 1. Speak Up, You Damnforeigners!.................................EBCCF 37 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- *BEEP BEEP* The title is only a joke. Had this been a serious remark, this call would be paradoxical, as would the very existence of Chinese in America (CIA). We now resume our normal broadcasting program. We know you are out there, those of you who are not of Chinese origin while being interested in China-related affairs or in observing the opinions and behavior of Chinese students and scholars (CSS) in America. Yet you have mostly remained tight-mouth spectators, or "readers" in its strict sense, seldom speaking up. This is eerie and ironic, no? Granted, one fundamental reason for CCF's existence is to provide a forum for CSS to exchange their opinions on issues of interest to them. However, of equal importance is the hope that such an open-end journal distributed through computer networks could enhance the cultural exchange and mutual understanding between the CSS community and the mainstream American society. The last thing we at the EB want to see is for CCF to become an exclusive, self-contained club for CSS to embrace themselves or, as is probably more often the case, to fight among themselves. The single most prominent founding principle of CCF is diversity. Only through civilized exchange of different, sometimes even contradictory, perspectives can we learn how to co-exist peacefully, improve, and prosper. Segregation only leads to misunderstanding, distrust, or (God forbid) even hatred. If you are interested enough to subscribe to CCF, then chances are that you have something to say on the topics covered by previous issues, or ideas on interesting topics to be covered. It would be truly a bad joke if Americans needed to be persuaded to speak up for themselves; however, we would like to assure you that your opinions, suggestions, and participation are just as needed, welcome, and appreciated here in this Forum as those from CSS. In fact, we at the EB have been talking about recruiting some non-Chinese Americans to join the Board. That would help diversifying the Board, offer us some language help, and improve the quality of the journal. So, speak up, you d...errr...whoever you're! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Corrupt China in a Democratic Way?.........................Min Yang 72 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Power corrupts -- it's a cliche. Modernization corrupts -- it's also a cliche, because Samuel Huntington said this more than two decades ago and his recent article just repeated his own old saying. Everyone wants power. Every country wants modernization. Even the Flintstones people are modernizing. So everyone, including the Flintstones, have to accept corruption, and can be corrupted. Well, not everyone. It is well known that you can not bribe the emperor, because he is entitled to everything. Or, since the emperor has absolute power, he is already absolutely corrupted and leaves no room for further work on him. You don't care to corrupt the pauper, on the other hand, because he has nothing you want. As Marx so eloquently explained, the proletariat has nothing to lose but chains. You can't corrupt the sellers and buyers in Adam Smith's market, either. Everything there is openly priced for exchange. The most heinous crime you can commit there is cheating: fake money for shoddy goods. Even in that case, it's even and fair. Maybe this is why Huntington gathered the impressionistic evidence that in societies of modern market economies corruption is less evident a problem than in other places. I buy this with genuine dollars. Logically, there is no chance of corruptive deals between the Emperor and the paupers. Either everyone for the King or against the King. The latter case is called revolution: replace the old lion with a new tiger through violence. Communist revolution is fallacy because the pyramid can never stand on the pinnacle when it is revolved. Yet communist revolutions did succeed in Russia and China and many other parts in the world. The paupers led by some smart elites snatched all the wealth and properties in the country and made them "public", i.e. under the sole disposal of the new power elites for "the sake of the public." Of course there is corruption under the Emperor or the Great Helmsman. The officials, i.e. the agents of the Emperor or the Great Leader do not serve their master whole-heartedly but exchange their master's power in their hands with the Old Hundred Surnames (OHS) for their respective personal gains. And that kind of exchanges are more often at the expense of the emperor than of the Old Hundred Surnames. Yet, those corrupted officials do serve the Emperor in another way by making the lives of the OHS miserable but somewhat tolerable so the OHS do not have to kill the Emperor immediately. Zhou Enlai was allegedly so smart in commenting the Back Door phenomena during his reign: If you shut down all the back doors in China, the crowd will burst and pull down the Great Wall. Communist states grabbed all the national wealth through violence. How can the properties in the hands of the State be fairly redistributed to the private hands? Counter-revolution, even a "velvet" one like that took place in Eastern Europe and Russia, cannot do this job in a "fair play" way. (Again, the pyramid can't revolve standing on the pinnacle.) A safer bet is probably to chip it way, i.e. to corrupt it, by the Old Hundred Surnames, in cooperation with the State Cadres. I had no way of bribing Wang Zhen for a job in CITIC, because that State position must be his son's and the Wang Sr. would care for nothing else. Now I might have a chance of bribing Wang Jr. to make a deal with CITIC which might result in personal gains for both him and me (at the expense of the State left by his father, of course). In the future when CITIC is owned completely by Wang Jr. as his private property, I will again have no way of bribing him but to make fair and pure business deals with him. (Can you in America bribe a dealer for a better used car at a cheaper price?) So let's corrupt the Communist China in a democratic way. That is, let the Old Hundred Surnames corrupt the cadres in a joint venture to manage a gradual and peaceful redistribution of the ridiculously large sum of power and wealth in the hands of the State to the private citizens. To accomplish this endeavor, both the OHS and the cadres need to support rather than overthrow the state because the state is needed as both a warehouse and a referee for all the possible deals between the OHS and the officials. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. National Interests -- An Extension of the Personal Ones........................Ming Cheng 43 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Instead of rigorously moving through a set of logical steps, I would like to draw directly on the deep-thinking articles of Newton Liu and Dave Sheng (see CCF#9435) and the famous phrase of Henry John Temple (1784 - 1865):" Nations do not have permanent enemies; nor do they have permanent friends. They have only permanent interests." In another words, national interests, as well as relationship arising therefrom, are extensions of personal interests and relationship. While the word "interest" is so colorful in western terminology that there is even no unique correspondence in Chinese, Chinese seem to emphasize "Guan Xi" more in consistency with the overwhelming concern of the Chinese Buddhist philosophy. "You did that for your own interests" is a typical accusation among Chinese. On the contrary, when the Founding Father of America G. Washington spoke highly on the three US Congressmen who seemed to sacrifice their personal interests for the great America, he emphasized that one would be wrong if thinking that they did it entirely in the interests of America. They were for their reputations and images which were most important in their personal interests. Nevertheless the national interests are no less complicated than any personal ones. "For or not for" is never a question for westerners whose focal points are on "what and when". With such an understanding, we should not have difficulty seeing the parochial nationalism of the Chinese Government, to which "what and when" is a question never allowed to be asked by the citizens. Nor would we be confused in evaluating the various behaviors of the western nations, either on their bright side as Dave Sheng eruditely pointed out, or their dirty actions exposed vividly by Newton Liu. To balance the conflicting personal interests among a society, democracy has been considered as a workable solution, at least in western countries, or more profoundly, an accepted process as Newton Liu mentioned in a previous article. But for the so-called world democracy balancing the national interests of the countries, even from the view of scholars such as Carl Cohen, it is still a remote dream of human being. More sadly, when every decent person in a civilization knows how to behave him/herself no matter what other people does, we are seeing that governments of countries are taking other government's wrongdoing as excuses to suppress their own citizens, or even kill a nation's future, the young students on the streets, with machine guns. I feel that the discussion on the national interests would shed light on our comprehension of nationalism -- a weapon everyone is using. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. The Breakup of China: A Critique of Gerald Segal's Article Published on the Foreign Affairs.................Dave Sheng 346 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. China Should Be Divided for the Sake of East Asia? Let us start with the last sentence in Mr. Gerald Segal's article, titled "China's Changing Shape" on the May/June, 1994 issue of the Foreign Affairs: "Foreigners will have an increasing stake in the conclusion that, if Beijing is to remain in the middle of its kingdom, it will have to be a looser kingdom." This is of course the conclusion of the author's arguments that a China weakened by the competition of regionalism, if not outright disintegration, is of the best interest to the countries in East Asia, and to the world at large. Today's world is in the dynamics of rapid change. We see countries disintegrate, most of which are in the ex-Soviet block. With the economy down the drain, one ethnic group is blaming another for the trouble. Nationalism finds its fertile soil. The brutality of "ethnic cleansing" has shocked the world, which does not know how to stop it. At the same time, integration is happening to the rich countries of Western Europe. Envying the unified and vast market that has given the Unite States such economical advantages over its European competitors, the Europeans are trying not only to forge a common market, but also to coordinate their governments, in the hope of achieving a United (Western) Europe. The North Americans, worrying about their own positions, decided to integrate their economy and market, and signed NAFTA. Integration is by no means an easy process. But it does offer a hope for a world where common economic interests would overcome narrow-minded nationalism, and make this world a more peaceful and prosperous place. So the pattern is simple, isn't it? The economically depressed countries are falling apart, while the economically successful regions are pushing for more integration. The answer is no, according to Mr. Gerald Segal. Specifically not for East Asia, because "part of China's nationalist agenda is to demonstrate its dominance in the region." So China should be divided, with a weak and ineffective political center, with East Asian countries working together to pull away one chunk of China. And that's the best guarantee for the peace and prosperity in East Asia. B. A Historical Perspective China at this conjuncture faces an uncertain future. Two important factors are in the play. The first is the economical reform of the last 15 years which has been redefining the relationship between the provinces and Beijing, as well as that between provinces. The second factor is the change of guard in Beijing, from Deng Xiaoping to a new generation of leaders. These two factors are well-known, as presented in Segal's article. >From a longer-term perspective, China has been in the search of a political arrangement for more than a century. The dangers of break-up and civil wars were never far from us. It's indeed a treacherous road to walk on. The search has been made more difficult because of the fact that China had quite a successful centralized system for more than one thousand years, based on the Confucius philosophy, a system for selecting government officials through essay-writing contests, and a government machine run by scholars selected through the examination system. It worked sometimes, and failed sometimes. When it worked, there was peace in the land, and our ancestors produced a civilization that we can all be proud of. When it failed, there were chaos, wars, bandits, and misery. But, usually after a few decades of such chaos and misery, a new order would be restored, based on the same principles, and another cycle would start. However, when "modernization" was brought to our doorsteps, the picture changed completely. The old system could not cope with the need of modernization, nor with the aggression by foreign powers. Ever since then, China has been in the process of profound transformation. The last time China went through such a fundamental transformation was about 2000 years ago, when China went from a feudal (Feng1Jian4, Zu1Hou2) system to a centralized system, started by Qin2 Shi3 Huang2. China went through hundreds of years of war and bloodshed before a more robust centralized system was developed. In that sense, what we are witnessing today is actually a once-in-a-millennium transformation. That may sound romantic, while the reality is not romantic at all. It is cruel. Transformation at this level is painful. For one thing, we lost consensus about what kind of a political system China should adopt. The argument among us about "democracy" or "new totalitarianism," which pops up every once in a while on various networks, is just one proof of such lack of consensus. When the clashes of these ideas are staged in action, we end up having bloody civil wars, like the one between KMT and the warlords, and the one between CCP and KMT. The political experiment in itself has many pitfalls. Sun Yat-sen's revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. But in its place was not a Republic nor a democracy, but a complete breakdown of government, substituted by warlordism and rivers of blood. An effective national government was established only after decades of bloodshed, by Mao and his comrades. But Mao's system, the so-called "People's Democratic Dictatorship," was riddled with problems too. It was again a centralized system. It was so centralized that no one could stop Mao from implementing his whimsical ideas for economical development. It didn't even have an established routine to handle the inevitable succession process from an older generation of leadership to a younger one. We thus ended up with the Culture Revolution and millions of deaths. C. Today's Context What is remarkable for the last 15 years is that, under Deng Xiaoping, China has managed to make impressive progresses in its modernization efforts, especially in economy, without large scale turmoil (except in the summer of 1989). As pointed out by Segal, part of Deng's strategy was to decentralize decision-making in economics, and to give provinces more freedom in the area of economical development. It worked impressively, judging from the rapid growth. But it also poses a serious challenge to Deng, and especially to his successors: with the provinces having more economical power, what is the relationship between the central government and its provincial "rivals," and with the unbalanced development among provinces, how should the inevitable friction between rich and poor provinces be resolved? One of the inevitable results of modernization is the requirement for a more complicated government, taking much more functions than a government like the Chinese emperors and their ministers managed. Those emperors were presiding over a relatively simple agriculture society, in which the production was determined more by the weather than by anything else. Today's government has to worry about economical and financial policies, education, healthcare, industrial infrastructure, industrial policy, science, technology, energy, environment, .... The coordination between different branches and levels of government is a vital part of a mature political system. Unfortunately, China cannot be counted as mature in this regard. So here again China is traveling in uncharted waters. One example used by Segal is that Guangdong clashed with Hunan because Guangdong wanted access to cheap rice in Hunan. I grew up in Jiangxi province, which is another hinterland province rich with raw materials and north to Guangdong. I also heard about such stories of clashes between Guangdong and Jiangxi ten years ago while I was still in China. That was during a time when the price for minerals and agricultural products were still controlled by the central government. The prices were arbitrarily low, a standard practice since 1949 to support rapid development of industry. Jiangxi province usually bought these materials from the local counties at the low price stipulated by the central government, since it was under Jiangxi's administrative control. The neighboring Guangdong province, which depended on other provinces for raw materials, and which was a few steps earlier in reform than other provinces, tried to bypass Jiangxi provincial government and buy those materials directly from the local counties at a higher price. Jiangxi province, resentful of the freedom granted to Guangdong but not to Jiangxi at that time by the central government, responded by setting up border crossing check-points to stop such flows of goods. Things like the above are probably inevitable, and will add to inter-- provincial tensions. In the above case, the coexistence of both the market prices and administratively controlled prices is the root of the trouble. With the controlled price being phased out, and the price gradually becoming market-oriented, one would expect an ease of tension in this specific case, although I have to admit that my knowledge about more recent situations is limited. The much more troubling part is actually how should the central and provincial governments share the tax revenue. This problem is closely interwined with the taxation system in China, which is anything but mature. When the reform just started, the economy was still in a very backward state, and each province was required to hand in a certain amount of money, depending on the size of its economy, and to some extent its relation with the central leadership. The amount was supposed to be kept as constant. This "fixed quota" system started to work against the central government when the economy took off and inflation ran high. The provincial governments, especially the coastal provinces, are getting more revenue, while the central government sees their revenue falling. A financially strained central government means a deterioration of services financed by the central government, e.g., higher education and scientific research. Eventually, power flows with money. Economic regionalism will eventually lead to political regionalism, or even the break-up of China. The central government tried to install tax reform early this year, although it was not widely reported in the Western media. If successfully implemented, it will give Beijing more money, and let the central government benefit from economic growth. There were reports of local resistance to the planned tax reform, although the details were murky. It has been in place since the beginning of this year (1994), but the degree of success if not clear at this stage. The timing of this problem could not have been worse. It comes at a time when the Beijing leadership is most vulnerable: they are preparing for the change of guard, from Deng Xiaoping to, at least nominally, Jiang Zeming. Ironically, 80 years after the 1911 Revolution, China has not even solved the power succession problem, although so much blood has been shed, and so many grand ideals have been tossed around. This fact in itself should serve as a reminder to us that we are in a special period in Chinese history. It is easier to talk about grand political ideals than actually implementing any. In any case, the change of leadership may accelerate the break-up of China. D. The International Perspective The break-up of China, or in a more scholarly term, "China's changing shape", is an additional dimension to the transformation of China. We are living in a world, which is more and more interdependent. What happens in China will have effects for people in other countries. This is the subject of Gerald Segal's article, written more or less as a suggestion to all the East and South East Asian countries. The underlying assumption of his article is simple: China will be the single dominant threat, to everyone in the East Asian region, because there is a "nationalist agenda," designed to demonstrate China's dominance in the region. After taking the above as a God-given fact that everyone knows, the rest of it is of course some complicated calculation of geopolitics. Wouldn't economical interactions among East Asian countries result in interdependence and thus a desire for peace and cooperation? No, it is not enough, Segal argued, although I do not know the reason is whether due to the special evilness of China or a lack of confidence in Asian's ability to cooperate with each other. So the East Asian countries have to use the strategy of "interdependence AND regionalism". Interdependence of course means the trade between China and East Asian countries would bring about mutual reliance among them, i.e., some kind of integration of interests between China and other Asian countries. Paradoxically, according to Segal, this integration has to be done in a way so as to deepen the separation of different parts of China. In other words, in the grand design, the economical development has to result in both the integration of several countries, including China, and at the same time the disintegration of China. But how about the downside of a fragmented China? Well, "...the outside world is well aware of the risks of regionalism, most notably if economic fragmentation leads to mass migration and the loss of an important trading partner"; but, "The mephitic implications of a China ripped apart are balanced by the risks that many of China's neighbors see if it grows strong and unchecked. China's unsatisfied nationalism is a source of serious concern in East Asia." That's of course an innovative solution to China's nationalism, which incidentally was a direct product of another grand scheme of "dividing China into power spheres," the policy of European and Japanese imperialists a century ago. By the way, all other East Asian countries suffered as much as China did under those imperialist policy. But then, the Chinese nationalism is just so dangerous. It does not only threaten Southeast Asian countries, because of the disputed and uninhabitable islands in South China Sea, but also Russia and Japan, although both are much more powerful than China and will remain so in the foreseeable future. Segal wrote: "Of all countries, Japan recognizes the need to be careful about discussions of Chinese regionalism. Japan exploited warlordism earlier this century to divide and rule much of China. And yet Japan can see obvious advantages in dealing with a China that has distinctive regions competing for foreign investment and trade, and not having to face a unified and more powerful China. If East Asians are to work together to cope with the risks of a stronger China, then Japan will have to play a crucial role as the most powerful non-Chinese state in Asia. Japanese have only recently begun to think through their options, but the advantages of dealing with a looser China are enormous." And "Russia has good reason to be wary of China as a unified great power. Russia grabbed much of the territory along its frontier when China was weak in earlier centuries. Now Russia must fear for its own ability to hold on to these imperial spoils as China's economy grows and its defense spending approaches Russian levels. A fast-growing China will require precisely those minerals and energy resources that are so close by in the Russia Far East. The small Russian population sitting atop these valuable natural resources could be highly vulnerable, especially if Russia itself should fragment." I understand that China's military buildup is disturbing for people in other countries. Part of the recent speedup in military spending is obviously an attempt to please the military, and to give younger leaders a chance to build connections with the military, i.e. out of domestic political consideration. In any case, China's military hardware is so outdated that in terms of technology it is way behind Taiwan, Malaysia or Indonesia. But there is severe limit for China's military buildup. For one thing, if such buildup provokes a corresponding buildup in Japan, China will be playing a losing game. With its technical capabilities, Japan could achieve the status of a military superpower much faster than China could. China has only one source to buy high tech military hardware, i.e., from Russia. In the deal, it is the Russians who can decide what to sell to the Chinese. So much for China's threat to Russia. In the case of a Russian disintegration, well, that would be a messy game, but China will not be the only player, and I doubt China could be a major player. E. What Is A Divided China Anyway? In the case of China's disintegration, the game would probably be equally bloody and messy. A divided China is not necessary easier to manage, and civil war is probably inevitable. Granted, there is so called "culture fault lines" and dialect difference in China. But there is also a unified written language, and a clear identity of being a Chinese, no mater she/he is from the southern Guangdong or the northern Manchuria. Mr. Segal may want to try to tell a person from either Guangdong or Fujian or even Hong Kong that s/he is not a Chinese because s/he speaks such a distinctive dialect. I bet, in most cases, he will get a dirty look. I tried it on my wife, who is a native from Fujian. And her answer was, in literal translation, "Did you take the wrong medicine today?" Segal wrote: "It is more than a curiosity, for example, that provincial leaders in Guangdong have been appearing on television in recent months speaking in Cantonese." Well, if Guangdong is indeed independent, the leaders of Guangdong still have to speak in Mandarin to get their message across to the whole population, because there are three distinct dialect groups in Guangdong: Cantonese, ChaoZhou, and Hakka. The differences among the three are such that they cannot communicate among themselves using different dialects. The same is true for Fujian, or for any of the provinces south of the Yantse River, or for many of the provinces north of it. That is the difficulty of a divided China: where do you draw the line? The dialect difference is not sufficient to supply for a separate identity. The geography is such that there is no barrier to isolate one part from the other, as in Europe. The Yantse River is a piece of cake in the modern warfare. Plus, the coastal provinces will need the raw materials and the market in the hinterland provinces. Independence for parts of China may look like a good solution for some eggheads, while the reality would almost certainly be armed conflicts, with the boundary difficult to define and with the inevitable friction. There were periods in Chinese history when China was divided, but there were no such periods when China was divided and not fighting. Yes, the history books in China teach us the importance of a unified country. And they do that for a reason. With the modern weaponry, and nuclear capabilities, the divided China will certainly be turned into a killing ground that has never been seen before in human history. Mr. Segal may be able to do all his geopolitical calculations in all coolness. But do not be surprised if you find a Chinese cursing you when you tell her/him that a divided China is good for the world. A divided China is not in the interest of East Asia either. The regionalism in China, supported by different countries, would easily start a competition among those countries for more power and influences. It would include not only Japan and Russia, but also the United States, and probably other smaller countries, with each country supporting a different warlord. It would be a stage for the possible conflicts among these powers, and it did happen less that 60 years ago in the Pacific War. East Asia countries would spend their energy fighting over a chunk of China and remain divided, while Europe and North America are each integrating into a large entity. F. A few More Words China is again in a dangerous crossroads. The pains for China's modernization are far from over. Here I would like to quote again from Mr. Segal's article: "By and large when China has disintegrated it was at least initially for internal reasons, with foreigners taking advantage of subsequent weakness. A strong China has usually been able to resist outside pressure. Thus when European and then Japanese imperialism pressed a severely divided China, it crumbled into pieces. Now that those pieces have been put back together, the great historical question is how well cemented is the edifice. Foreign forces no longer operate like imperial powers, but powerful pressures from the international system could yet reshape a China in the midst of momentous internal transition." Let's pray for China. +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++ + Executive Editor: Bo Peng + + Executive Associate Editor: Zhifeng Liu + + Executive Moderator: Weihe Guan + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ + For subscription: mail "SUB CHINA-NT Your-First-Name Your-Last-Name" + + to LISTSERV@UGA (bitnet) or listserv@uga.cc.uga.edu (internet) + + For unsubscription: mail "UNSUB CHINA-NT" to the above e-address + + For back issues of CCF: + + anonymous ftp to: cnd.org[132.249.229.100]: pub/community/CCF + + gopher to cnd.org: 2. English Menu --> 13. Community --> 1. ccf + + For contribution and inquiry: mail to ccf-editor@ifcss.org + +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++