THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST
Translated by
VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS
and Edited by
F. MAX MULLER
Vol. 38
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST
Editor. F. Max Muller
These volumes of the Sacred Books of the East Series include translations of all the most important works of the seven non Christian religions that have exercised a profound influence on the civilizations of the continent of Asia. The Vedic Brahmanic System claims 21 volumes. Buddhism 10, and Jainism 2, 8 volumes comprise Sacred Books of the Parsees, 2 volumes represent Islam, and 6 the two main indigenous systems of China. Translated by twenty leading authorities in the respective fields, the volumes have been edited by the late F. Max Muller. The inception, publication
and the compilation of these books cover 34 years.
[ISBN 81 208 0101 6] 50 Vols.
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1, 15 111!* *UPANISHADS in 2 Vols. F. MaxMuller
2, 14 llll* SACRED LAWS OF THE ÂRYAS in 2 Vols. Georg Bühler
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6 9 THE QUR'ÂN in 2 Vols. E.H. Palmer
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8 THE BHAGAVADGÎTÂ with the Sanatsujâtîya and the Anugîtâ K. T. Telang
10 THE DHAMMAPADA F. Max Muller
SUTTA-NIPÂTA V. Fausboll
11 BUDDHIST SUTTAS T. W. Rhys Davids
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19 THE FO SHO HING TSAN KING Samuel Beal
21 THE SADDHARMA PU/ND/ARÎKA or THE LOTUS OF THE TRUE LAWS H. Kern
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25 MANU Georg Bühler
29, 30 THE G/RI/HYA SÛTRAS in 2 Vols. H. Oldenberg & F. MaxMuller
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33 THE MINOR LAW BOOKS J. Jolly
34, 38 THE VEDÂNTA SÛTRAS in 2 Vols with Sankarâcârya's
Comm. G. Thibaut
35, 36 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA in 2 Vols. T. W. Rhys Davids
42 HYMNS OF THE ATHARVA-VEDA M. Bloomfield
48 THE VEDÂNTA SÛTRAS with Râmânuja's /S/rîbhâshya G. Thibaut
49 BUDDHIST MAHÂYÂNA TEXTS E.B. Cowell, F. Max Muller & J. Takakusu
50 INDEX M. Winternitz
THE
VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS
With the commentary by
SANKÂRACÂRYA
PART II
Translated by
GEORGE THIBAUT
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UNESCO COLLECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE WORKS-Indian Series
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RASHTRAPATI BHAVAN,
NeW DELHI-4
June 10, 1962
I am very glad to know that the Sacred Books
of the East, published years ago by the Clarendon
Press, Oxford, which have been out-of-print for a
number of years, will now be available to all
students of religion and philosophy. The enterprise
of the publishers is commendable and I hope the
books will be widely read.
S. RADHAKRISHINAN
PREFATORY NOTE TO THE NEW EDITION
* * * * *
Since 1948 the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), upon the recommendation
of the General Assembly of the United Nations, has been concerned with facilitating the translation of the works most representative of the culture of certain of its Member States, and, in particular, those of Asia.
One of the major difficulties confronting this programme
is the lack of translators having both the qualifications and
the time to undertake translations of the many outstanding
books meriting publication. To help overcome this difficulty
in part, UNESCO's advisers in this field (a panel of experts
convened every other year by the International Council for
Philosophy and Humanistic Studies), have recommended that
many worthwhile translations published during the l9th century,
and now impossible to find except in a limited number of
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editions, for the use of students and of the general public. The
experts also pointed out that in certain cases, even though
there might be in existence more recent and more accurate
translations endowed with a more modern apparatus of scholarship,
a number of pioneer works of the greatest value and interest to students of Eastern religions also merited republication.
This point of view was warmly endorsed by the Indian
National Academy of Letters (Sahitya Akademi), and the
Indian National Commission for UNESCO.
It is in the spirit of these recommendations that this
work from the famous series "Sacred Books of the East" is
now once again being made available to the general public
as part of the UNESCO Collection of Representative Works.
CONTENTS.
VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY
BY SANKARÂKÂRYA.
ADHYÂYA II.
Pada III
Pada IV
ADHYÂYA III.
Pada I
Pada II
Pada III
Pada IV
ADHYÂYA IV.
Pada I
Pada II
Pada III
Pada IV
INDEXES BY DR. M. WINTERNITZ:--
Index of Quotations to Volumes XXXIV (i) and XXXVIII (ii)
Index of Sanskrit Words to Volumes XXXIV (i) and XXXVIII (ii)
General Index to Volumes XXXIV (i) and XXXVIII (ii)
Corrigenda
Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations
of the Sacred Books of the East
VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS
WITH
SA@NKARA BHÂSHYA.
SECOND ADHYÂYA.
THIRD PÂDA.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
I. Ether[1] (does) not (originate), on account of
the absence of scriptural statement.
[Footnote 1: Here, as generally in the preceding parts of this translation,
âkâsa is rendered by 'ether.' There is no doubt that occasionally
the appropriate--and in some cases the only possible-rendering is
not 'ether' but 'space;' but the former rendering, after all, best
agrees with the general Vedântic view of âkâsa. The Vedântins
do not clearly distinguish between empty space and an exceedingly
line matter filling all space, and thus it happens that in many
cases where we speak of the former they speak of âkâsa, i.e. the
all-pervading substratum of sound; which howsoever attenuated
is yet one of the material elements, and as such belongs to the same
category as air, fire, water, and earth.]
In the Vedânta-texts we meet in different places with
different statements concerning the origination of various
things. Some of those passages declare that ether originated;
some do not. Some record the origination of air;
others do not. Other passages again make analogous
statements concerning the individual soul and the vital
airs.--Similarly we observe that other scriptural texts contradict
one another concerning order of succession and the
like.--Now, as we ourselves have inferred the worthlessness
of other philosophical doctrines from their mutual
contradictions, a suspicion might arise that our doctrine
is equally worthless, owing to its intrinsic contradictions.
Hence a new discussion is begun in order to clear from all
doubt the sense of all those Vedânta-texts which refer to
creation, and thus to remove the suspicion alluded to.
Here we have to consider in the first place the question
whether ether has an origin or not.--The pûrvapakshin
maintains that ether does not originate, since there is no
scriptural statement to that effect. For in the chapter
which treats of the origin (of the world) ether is not
mentioned at all. In the passage 'In the beginning there
was that only which is, one only, without a second' the
/Kh/ândogya at first introduces Brahman as the general
subject-matter, by means of the clause 'that which is,' and
thereupon (in the passages 'It thought,' 'It sent forth fire,'
&c.) records the origin of three elements, viz. fire, water,
and earth; giving the first place to fire which (ordinarily)
occupies the middle place among the five elements. [Footnote: The usual order being ether, air, fire, water, earth.]
Now, as scriptural statement is our (only) authority in the
origination of the knowledge of supersensuous things, and
as there is no scriptural statement declaring the origin of
ether, ether must be considered to have no origin.
2. But there is (a scriptural statement of the
origination of ether).
The conjunction 'but' indicates the adoption of another
alternative.--The origin of ether may not be stated in the
Khândogya; but it is stated in other scriptural passages.
For the text of the Taittirîyakas, after having introduced
Brahman as the general subject-matter,--in the words,'The
true, knowledge, without end is Brahman,'--goes on to say,
'From that Self sprang ether' (Taitt. Up. II, i).--Hence
there arises a conflict of scriptural passages, the creation
sometimes being said to begin with fire, sometimes with
ether.--But may we not appropriately assume the two
scriptural passages to form one syntactical whole?--It
would be well indeed if we could do so, but a unity of the
kind desired cannot be admitted, because the creator who
is mentioned only once--in the passage 'he sent forth fire'
--cannot be connected with two things to be created, as
if the construction were 'He sent forth fire, he sent forth
ether.'--But--an objection may be raised--we see that
sometimes an agent, although^ mentioned once only, is yet
5
connected with two objects; as when we say 'after having
cooked broth he now cooks rice.' We therefore may
combine the two scriptural sentences into one, 'Brahman
having created ether created fire.'--Such a combination of
sentences, we reply, is not admissible here, because the
/Kh/ândogya intimates that fire was created first, while the
Taittrîyaka assigns the same position to ether, and because
it is impossible that both should have been created
first.--The same remarks apply to a further contradiction
involved in the other scriptural passage, 'From that Self
sprang ether,' &c.; for there also the material cause and
the fact of origination, being mentioned only once, cannot
he connected with fire as well as ether, so as to effect a
sentence of the following kind, 'from that there sprang
ether, from that there sprang fire.' Moreover the Taittirîyaka
states separately that 'fire (sprang) from air
[Footnote ref l]."--With
regard to this conflict of statements somebody now maintains
the following view.
3. (The Vedic statement concerning the origination
of ether) has a secondary sense, on account of the
impossibility (of the origination of ether).
The ether does not originate on account of the absence
of scriptural statement.--That other passage which (apparently)
declares the origination of the ether must be
taken as having a secondary (figurative) meaning.--Why?
On account of the impossibility. The origination of
ether cannot be shown to be possible as long as there
exist followers of the opinion of the reverend Ka/n/abhu/g/
(Ka/n/âda). For the latter deny the origination of ether
on the ground that it is impossible to demonstrate the
existence of the required apparatus of causes. Whatever
is originated, they say, is originated from inherent causes,
non-inherent causes, and operative causes. Of a substance
the inherent causes are substances belonging to the same
class and more than one in number. But for ether there
are no such originating substances, belonging to the same
[Footnote 1 While the /Kh/ând, says that fire sprang from the Self.]
6
class and more than one in number, from which, as its
inherent cause, it could originate, and consequently there
also exists no non-inherent cause of ether; for the latter
would have to be looked for in the conjunction of the
primary substances. And as thus there exist no inherent
cause and no non-inherent cause, there is absolutely no
room for an operative cause; for the only function of the
latter is to assist the two other causes. Those elements
moreover which have an origin, as fire and the like, we
may conceive to exist in different conditions at an earlier
and a later time; we may conceive e. g. that fire, previously
to its origination, did not give light or produce
any other effects, while it does do so subsequently to its
origination. Of the ether, on the other hand, no such
difference between an earlier and a later period can be
conceived; for, we ask, would it be possible to maintain
that before its alleged origination there were no large,
minute, and atomic spaces?--That ether is without an
origin further follows from its characteristic qualities, such
as all-pervadingness and so on, which altogether distinguish
it from earth and the other elements.--Hence, as the word
'ether' (âkâsa) is used in a secondary sense in such phrases
as 'make room' (âkâsa), 'there is room,' and as space
although one only is designated as being of different kinds
when we speak of the space of a jar, the space of a house,
&c.--a form of expression met with even in Vedic passages
such as 'he is to place the wild animals in the spaces'
(âkâ/s/eshu)'--we conclude that those Vedic passages also
which speak of its origination must be supposed to have a
secondary meaning.
4. And on account of the word (of the Veda).
The word of the Veda also proclaims the non-originatedness
of ether; for it declares that 'air and ether (antariksha)
are immortal' (B/ri/. Up. II, 3, 3), and what is immortal
cannot have an origin. Another scriptural passage ('omnipresent
and eternal like ether'), by comparing two attributes
of Brahman, viz. omnipresence and eternity with the
other, intimates that those qualities belong to the ether
7
also; in which case no beginning can be attributed to it.
Other passages to be quoted in this connexion are, 'As
this ether is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite;'
and 'Brahman has the ether for its body, the ether is the
Self.' For if the ether had a beginning, it could not be
predicated of Brahman (as is done in the last passage), as
we predicate blueness of a lotus ('the lotus is blue').
Hence we understand that the eternal Brahman is of the
nature as ether.
5. The one (word 'sprang') may be (taken in its
secondary as well as in its primary sense), like the
word 'Brahman.'
This Sûtra contains the reply to a doubt.--If we admit
the opinion maintained hitherto, how can one and the same
word 'sprang' ('from that Self sprang the ether') be used,
in the same chapter, in its primary (real) meaning with
regard to fire and so on, and in a secondary meaning with
regard to ether?--The answer to this objection is that the
one word 'sprang' may, according to the nature of the
things to which it refers, be used in its primary as well as
its secondary sense, just as the word 'Brahman' is used.
For the one word 'Brahman' is, in the passage Taitt. Up.
III, 2-6 ('Try to know Brahman by penance, for penance
is Brahman'), used in a secondary sense with regard to
food, &c., and in its primary sense with regard to bliss;
and the same word Brahman is, in the way of figurative
identification (bhakti), applied to penance, which is merely
the means of knowing Brahman, and again directly to
Brahman as the object of knowledge.--But how--to raise
another question--can we, on the supposition of ether
having no beginning, uphold the validity of the statement
made in the clause 'one only, without a second?' For if
ether is a second entity (co-existing with Brahman from
eternity), it follows that Brahman has a second. And if so,
how can it be said that when Brahman is known everything
is known? (/Kh/. Up. VI, i*).--The word 'one,' the pûrva-pakshin
replies, may be used with reference to (the absence
of) effects. As in ordinary life a person, who on a certain
8
day sees in a potter's house a lump of clay, a staff, a wheel
and so on, and on the following day a number of finished
vessels, might say, 'Yesterday there was only clay,' meaning
thereby only that on the preceding day there were no
things made of clay, not that there were no staff, wheel and
the like; so the passage under discussion also is to be
understood.--The term 'without a second' (does not exclude
the existence from eternity of ether, but) excludes
the existence of any other superintending being (but
Brahman). While there is a superintending potter in addition
to the material cause of the vessels, i. e. the clay, there
is no other superintendent in addition to Brahman, the
material cause of the world. Nor does the existence of
ether as a second entity involve Brahman's being associated
with a second (and therefore not being of a simple nature).
For diversity is founded on difference of characteristic
attributes, and before the origin (of the creation) no difference
of attributes separating Brahman and ether exists;
the two being mixed like water and milk, and having the
common attributes of all-pervadingness, immateriality and
so on. At the time of creation however a certain diversity
of the two determines itself, Brahman putting forth
energy in order to produce the world, while the ether remains
immoveable.--And also from the passages quoted
above--such as 'Brahman has the ether for its body'--it
follows that the two are identical. Thence again it follows
that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is
known.--Moreover every effect, which is produced, is produced
in such a way as not to be separated from ether in
place as well as in time, and ether itself is non-separated in
place and time from Brahman; hence, if there are known
Brahman and its effects, the ether also is known. The
case is similar to that of a few drops of water poured
into a jug full of milk. Those drops are taken when the
milk is taken; the taking of the drops does not constitute
something additional to the taking of the milk. Analogously
the ether, as being non-separate in place and time
from Brahman and its effects, is comprised within Brahman,
and consequently we have to understand the passages
9
about the origin of the ether in a secondary sense.--To
this argumentation we make the following reply.
6. The non-abandonment of the promissory statements
(results only) from the non-difference (of the
entire world from Brahman), according to the words
of the Veda.
In all the Vedânta-texts we meet with promissory
statements of the following nature:-- 'That by which we
hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived,
know what is not known' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 1, 3); 'When
the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known,
then all this is known' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'Sir, what is
that through which if it is known everything else becomes
known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3); 'Outside that which is there is
no knowledge.' These promissory statements are not
abandoned, i.e. not stultified, only if the entire aggregate
of things is non-different from Brahman, the object of
knowledge; for if there were any difference, the affirmation
that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known,
would be contradicted thereby. Non-difference again of
the two is possible only if the whole aggregate of things
originates from the one Brahman. And we understand
from the words of the Veda that that affirmation can be
established only through the theory of the non-difference
of the material cause and its effects. For the affirmation
contained in the clause 'That by which we hear what is
not heard,' &c., is proved by the analogous instances of
clay, &c., which all aim at showing the identity of effect
and cause. In order to establish this, the subsequent
clauses also ('Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,
one only, without a second; it thought; it sent forth
fire,' &c.) at first state that the aggregate of effects belongs
to Brahman, and then declare its identity with Brahman,
viz. from the passage 'In it all that exists has its Self'
(VI, 8, 7), up to the end of the prapâ/th/aka.--If, now, the
ether were not one of the effects of Brahman, it could not
be known by Brahman being known, and that would
involve an abandonment of a (previous) affirmation; an
10
alternative which, as invalidating the authoritativeness of
the Veda, is of course altogether unacceptable.--Similarly
in all the Vedânta-texts certain passages are to be found
which, by means of various instances, make the same
affirmation, so e.g. 'This everything, all is that Self' (B/ri/.
Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is that Immortal before'
(Mu. Up. II, 2, 11).--Hence, like fire and the other substances,
the ether also is a product.--The averment
made by the pûrvapakshin that on account of the absence
of scriptural statements the ether is not a product
is unfounded, since a scriptural passage referring to the
origin of ether has already been pointed out, viz. 'from
that Self sprang ether.'--True,--the pûrvapakshin may
reply,--such a statement has indeed been pointed out, but
it is contradicted by another statement, viz. 'It sent forth
fire,' &c. Should it be alleged that there can be no contradiction,
because all scriptural passages form one whole,
the reply is that all non-contradictory passages form a
whole; in the present case, however, a contradiction has
been shown to exist, because the creator, who is mentioned
only once, cannot be connected with two things created;
because two things cannot both be created first; and
because an option is, in that case, inadmissible. [Footnote 1]--This
reply, we rejoin, is without force. It is indeed true that it
is impossible to explain the passage of the Taittiriyaka in
any modified sense; for it distinctly declares that fire was
produced in the third place, 'From that Self sprang the
ether, from ether air, from air fire.' But, on the other
hand, it is possible to give a different turn to the passage
from the /Kh/ândogya, which may be explained to mean
that 'Brahman, after having created ether and air, created
fire.' For as the purport of this passage is to relate the
origin of fire, it cannot at the same time impugn the
account of the origin of ether given in another passage;
according to the principle that to one and the same sentence
a double purport must not be ascribed. As, on the
[Footnote 1: For we cannot maintain that optionally either the one or the
other was created first.]
other hand, one creator may successively create more than
one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the
two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we
are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on
account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scriptural
passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator
mentioned only once is to be connected with two created
things; for the other (second) created thing is supplied
from another scriptural passage. And, in the same way as
the fact of the whole aggregate of things being produced
from Brahman--which is stated directly in the passage
'Let a man meditate with calm mind on that as beginning,
ending and breathing in it' (/Kh/. Up. III, 14, 1)--does
not impugn the order of creation stated elsewhere to
begin with fire; so also the statement as to fire being produced
from Brahman has no force to impugn the order of
creation which, in another scriptural passage, is said to
begin with ether.
But, it may be objected, the passage 'Let a man
meditate with calm mind,' &c. has the purpose of enjoining
calmness, and does not state anything with regard
to creation; it need not therefore adapt itself to the
order (of creation) established by another passage [Footnote: 1]. On
the other hand, the passage 'It sent forth fire' refers to
the creation, and we must therefore accept the order
exactly as stated there.--This objection we refute by the
remark that it is not legitimate to abandon, from deference
to the circumstance of fire occupying the first place (in the
/Kh/. Up.), the thing, viz. the ether which is known (to
have been created) from another passage; for order of
succession is a mere attribute of things (and therefore
subordinate to the latter). Moreover, in the passage 'It
sent forth fire' we meet with no word directly indicating
the order of succession; but we merely infer the latter
from the sense, and this (merely inferred) order is impugned
by the order established by another direct scriptural state-*
[Footnote 1: Yatpara/h/ /s/abda/h/ /s/abdârtho na /k/âya/m/ /s/abda/h/ s/ri/shâparo*to
na prasiddha/m/ kramam bâdhitum alam iti. Ân. Gi.]
*ment, viz. 'From air there sprang fire.' Now with regard
to the question whether ether or fire were created first,
neither option nor addition are permissible, because the
former is impossible in itself, and the latter non-admitted
by the texts [Footnote: 1]. Hence the two scriptural passages are not
contradictory.--Moreover, in order to justify the promise
made in the /Kh/ândogya in the beginning of the chapter
{'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard'),
we have to count the ether, although 'not heard' (i. e. not
mentioned in the text) among the things produced; how
much more impossible then is it for us not to accept the
statement actually made about the ether in the Taittiriyaka!
--To the assertion, made above by the pûrvapakshin,
that the ether as occupying the same space with
everything is known together with Brahman and its effects,
and that thus the assertion (of everything being known
through Brahman) is not contradicted; and that moreover
the scriptural passage 'one only, without a second' is not
contradicted, because Brahman and the ether may be considered
as non-separate, like milk and water, we make the
following reply. That knowledge of everything through
the knowledge of one thing (of which scripture speaks)
cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed
with water, because we understand from the parallel
instance of a piece of clay being brought forward (/Kh/. Up.
VI, 1, 4) that the knowledge of everything has to be explained
through the relation of the material cause and the
material effect (the knowledge of the cause implying the
knowledge of the effect). Moreover, the knowledge of everything,
if assumed to be analogous to the case of the knowledge
of milk and water, could not be called a perfect
knowledge (samyag-vi/gñ/âna), because the water which is
[Footnote 1: An optional proceeding, i.e. the doctrine that either ether or
fire was the first product is impossible because only actions to be
done, not existing things, fall within the sphere of option; addition,
i.e. the fact of fire and ether together being the first creation is not
admitted by scripture, which teaches a successive creation of the
elements.]
13
apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk (with
which it is mixed) is not grasped by perfect knowledge [Footnote: Ref 1]. Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like
ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, untruth,
and deceit [Footnote: Ref 2]. And we should do violence to the
emphatic assertion made in the passage 'one only, without
a second,' if we explained it according to the analogy of
milk mixed with water.--Nor must we explain the cognition
of everything (through one thing), and the assertion
as to the one without a second, as referring only to a part
of existing things, viz. the avowed effects of Brahman (to
the exclusion of ether), on the ground that such is the case
in the parallel instances of clay and the like. For what is
said about clay and the like is not something altogether
new and independent; but has to be understood in connexion
with the previous passage '/S/vetaketu, as you are
so conceited,' &c. We therefore must conclude that the
'knowledge of everything' has all things whatever for its
objects, and is here introduced with a view to showing that
everything is the effect of Brahman.
The next Sûtra replies to the assertion, made by the
pûrvapakshin, that the passage which speaks of the origin
of ether is to be understood in a secondary sense, on
account of the impossibility (of ether having an origin).
7. But wherever there are effects, there is division;
as in ordinary life.
The conjunction 'but' is meant to exclude the suspicion
of impossibility.--We must not imagine the origin of ether
to be impossible, because wherever we observe effects
(modifications of a substance), such as jars, pots and urns,
or bracelets, armlets and earrings, or needles, arrows and
swords, we also observe division; while, on the other hand,
[Footnote 1: For the water, although mixed with the milk, yet is different from it.]
[Footnote 2: But the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known is to be taken in its full literal meaning.]
14
nothing which is not an effect is seen to be divided [Footnote 1]. Now, we apprehend ether as divided from earth and so on; hence
ether also must be an effect. Thereby (i. e. by the circumstance
of their being divided) place (di/s/), time, mind
(manas) and the atoms also are shown to be effects.
But--an objection may be raised--the Self also is divided
from ether and so on, and hence it follows that it is an
effect like jars and the like.--This objection we refute by
pointing to the scriptural statement that 'ether sprang from
the Self (Taitt. Up. II, 1). For if the Self also were a mere
modification (of something else), it would follow that all
effects such as the ether and so on are without a Self [Footnote 2]; for scripture mentions nothing beyond the Self, and that Self
itself would (on the supposition stated) be a mere effect.
And thus we should be driven to the hypothesis of a general
void (/s/ûnyavâda). Just because it is the Self, it is impossible
for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable
of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any
person's case, adventitious, not established through the so-called
means of right knowledge; it rather is self-established.
The Self does indeed employ perception and the other means
of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously
non-established objects of knowledge; for nobody assumes
such things as ether and so on to be self-established independently
of the means of right knowledge. But the Self,
as being the abode of the energy that acts through the
means of right knowledge, is itself established previously
to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity
is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted,
but not that which is the essential nature (of him
who attempts the refutation); for it is the essential nature
of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i. e.
sublated) by the fire itself.--Let us further consider the
relation expressed in the following clauses: 'I know at the
present moment whatever is present; I knew (at former
moments) the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know
[Footnote 1: Whatever is divided, is an effect, as jars, pots, &c. Whatever is not an effect, is not divided, as the Self.]
[Footnote 2: I.e. without a material cause.]
15
(in the future) the nearer and the remoter future.' Here
the object of knowledge changes according as it is something
past or something future or something present; but
the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is
eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is eternal
presence, it cannot undergo destruction even when the
body is reduced to ashes; nay we cannot even conceive
that it ever should become something different from what
it is.--It thus follows from the essential irrefutability of its
nature that the Self is not an effect. The ether, on the
other hand, falls under the category of effected things.
To the objection, raised above by the pûrvapakshín,
that there is no plurality of homogeneous substances out of
which the ether could originate, we reply that it is not an
absolute law that effects should originate only from things
belonging to the same genus, not from such as belong to
different genera. Threads for instance and the conjunctions
of threads [Footnote: 1] do not belong to the same genus, the
former being admitted to belong to the genus 'substance,'
the latter to the genus 'quality.' Nor again is there a
binding rule that the operative causes such as the shuttle,
the loom and so on should belong to the same genus.--Well
then let the doctrine that the causes must belong to
the same genus extend to the inherent causes only, not to
the other causes [Footnote: 2].--But here also there is no absolute rule.
For we see that one and the same rope is made of things
belonging to different genera, such as threads and cowhair,
and several kinds of cloth are woven of vegetable
thread and wool.--If it were assumed that the postulate of
the inherent causes belonging to the same genus refers
only to the genera of essentiality, substantiality, &c., the
rule would be a superfluous one; for in that sense every
inherent cause belongs to the same genus as every other [Footnote: 3].
[Footnote 1: Threads are the inherent cause of a piece of cloth; the conjunction
of the threads constitutes the non-inherent cause; the
loom, shuttle, &c. are the operative causes. ]
[Footnote 2: So much only was in fact insisted upon by the pûrvapakshín,
II, 3.3.]
[Footnote 3: An inherent cause is always a substance (dravya), and as such]*
16
--Nor again is there an absolute rule that only a plurality
of inherent causes, not one such cause, is able to originate
an effect. For it is admitted that an atom as well as the
mind (manas) originate their first activity; i.e. one atom
by itself, and also the mind by itself, give rise to their
primary actions, without being in conjunction with other
substances.--And, should it be said that there is an absolute
rule as to several causes only having originating power in
the case of the origination of substances only (not in the
case of the origination of actions, &c.), we again deny that,
because it is admitted that there is such a thing as change
(transformation). An absolute rule, such as maintained by
you, would exist if substances did originate other substances,
only when assisted by conjunction (a non-inherent
cause). But, as a matter of fact, one and the same substance,
when passing over into a different state distinguished
by peculiar characteristic marks, is admitted to be
an effect. In some cases more substances than one undergo
the change, as when a young plant springs from seed and
earth; in other cases one substance only changes, as when
milk turns into curds.--In short it is none of the Lord's
laws that only several causes in conjunction should produce
an effect. We therefore decide, on the authority of scripture,
that the entire world has sprung from the one Brahman,
ether being produced first and later on the other
elements in due succession. A statement to that effect
has already been made above (II, 1, 24).
The further assertion made by the pûrvapakshín, that on
the assumption of ether having had an origin it is impossible
to conceive a difference between the former and later
periods (the time before and after the origination of ether)
is likewise unfounded; for we have to understand that that
very specialising difference [Footnote ref 1], from which we ascertain at
present that there is a thing such as ether, different from
earth and the other elements, did not exist before the
[Footnote *] always falls under the notion of essentiality (sattâ), which constitutes the summum genus for substances, qualities, and actions.
[Footnote 1 Viz. the quality of sound.]
17
origination of ether. And just as Brahman's nature does
not participate in the nature of earth and the other elements
characterised by grossness and similar qualities,--according
to such scriptural passages as 'It is not gross, it
is not subtle,'--so also it does not participate in the nature
of ether, as we understand from the passage 'it is without
other' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8). It therefore remains a settled
conclusion that, before ether was produced, Brahman existed
without ether.
The inference, drawn by the pûrvapakshin, that ether
has no beginning, because it differs in nature from those
substances which avowedly have a beginning, such as earth
and so on, is without any value; for, as it is contradicted
by scripture, it must be considered fallacious. We, on our
part, have brought forward arguments showing that ether
is an originated thing; and we may moreover reason as
follows: Ether is non-eternal, because it is the substratum
of a non-eternal quality, viz. sound, just as jars and other
things, which are the substrata of non-eternal qualities,
are themselves non-eternal.--Nor is there any danger of
this latter reasoning being extended to the Self also, for the
philosopher who takes his stand on the Upanishads does
not admit that the Self is the substratum of non-eternal
qualities. Moreover, those who teach ether to have an
origin do not consider it proved that it is all-pervading
and so on.
In reply to the remarks made under II, 3, 4 we point
out that those scriptural passages which speak of the
'immortality of ether' are to be understood in the same
way as the analogous statements about the immortality of
the gods [Footnote: 1], since the origin and destruction of the ether have
been shown to be possible. And if it is said of Brahman
that 'it is omnipresent and eternal like ether,' Brahman is
there compared to ether, whose greatness is well known,
merely in order to indicate its supereminent greatness, not
in order to maintain its being equal to ether. Similarly,
when we say that the sun moves with the speed of an
[Footnote 1: I.e. as referring to a relative immortality only.]
arrow, we merely mean that he moves fast, not that he
moves at the same rate as an arrow. This remark explains
that scriptural passage also in which Brahman is declared
to be infinite like ether. On the other hand, such passages
as 'It is greater than ether' prove that the extent of ether
is less than that of Brahman; passages like 'there is no
image of him' (Sve. Up. IV, 19) show that there is nothing
to compare Brahman to; and passages like 'Everything
else is of evil' (Bri. Up. Ill, 4, 2) show that everything
different from Brahman such as ether, &c. is of evil. All
which serves to refute the assertion that the passage which
declares ether to have originated has to be taken in a
secondary sense, as the word Brahman actually has to be
taken in some passages. Scripture and reasoning in combination
rather show that ether has an origin, and the final
conclusion therefore is that ether is an effect of Brahman.
8. Hereby air (also) is explained.
The present Sûtra extends the reasoning concerning ether
to the air of which the ether is the abode. The different
views about air also are to be arranged in an analogous
manner. The pûrvapakshin maintains that the air is not a
product, because it is not mentioned in that chapter of the
Khândogya which treats of the origination of things.
The opposite opinion is, that the air is mentioned in the
parallel chapter of the Taittiriyaka ('from the ether sprang
the air'). The two scriptural passages being of a conflicting
nature, the pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage
which declares the air to have originated must be taken in
a secondary sense; firstly on account of the impossibility
(of the literal sense being adopted), as shown (in the adhikara/na
treating of the ether); secondly on account of that
passage which denies that it ever sets, 'Vâyu (the air) is the
deity that never sets' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 22); and thirdly on
account of those passages which declare it to be immortal.
The final opinion on the other hand is, that air is a product;
in the first place because this conclusion is conformable
to the general tendency of scripture; and, in the
second place, because it is generally admitted that whatever
19
is divided is an effect. The denial of its ever setting refers
to the lower knowledge (aparâ vidyâ [1]) and is merely a
relative one, Vâyu not setting in the same way as fire,
&c. The statement as to the immortality, &c. of air has
already received its reply (in the adhikara/na treating of
the ether). Here it maybe asked why, ether and air being
equally mentioned and not mentioned in the chapters
treating of the origin of the world, one adhikara/na is not
considered to suffice for both, and why instead of that there
is made a formal extension of the former reasoning to the
latter case, although there is no difference between the two
cases. To this we reply that there is indeed some reason
for the question; that, however, the formal extension is
made for the purpose of removing any doubts which might
possibly be engendered in the minds of slow-witted people
by mere words [2]. For as, in the Sa/mvargavidyâ and other
passages, the glory of Vâyu is referred to as an object of
uorship; and as scripture says that he never sets, &c.,
some men might think that he is eternal.
9. But there is no origin of that which is (i.e. of
Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such
an origin).
Somebody, who has learned from scripture that ether
and air, although not in themselves likely to have originated,
yet actually are things with a beginning, might feel inclined
to suspect that Brahman itself has sprung from something
else. And further somebody, who has learned from scripture
that from ether and the other elements which are themselves
mere effects further effects are produced, might think that
also Brahman, from which ether has sprung, is a mere effect.
In order to remove this doubt the Sutra declares that Brahman,
whose Self is Being, must not be suspected to have
sprung from anything else 'on account of the impossibility.'
Brahman which is mere Being cannot spring from mere
[1] in which Brahman is spoken of as to be meditated upon under
the form of Vayu.
[2] /Sabdânurodhiny eva /sa@nkâ na vastvanurodhinîti. Ân. Gi.
20
being, since the relation of cause and effect cannot exist
without a certain superiority (on the part of the cause).
Nor again can Brahman spring from that which is something
particular, since this would be contrary to experience.
For we observe that particular forms of existence are produced
from what is general, as, for instance, jars and pots
from clay, but not that what is general is produced from
particulars. Nor again can Brahman spring from that which
is not (asat), for that which is not is without a Self [Footnote ref 1], and
moreover scripture expressly rejects that view, in the passage
'How could that which is spring from that which is
not?' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 2, 2). Another passage, moreover,
expressly denies that Brahman has any progenitor, 'He is
the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is
of him neither progenitor nor lord' (/S/ve.* Up. VI, 9).--With
regard to ether and air the possibility of an origin has been
shown; but in Brahman's case there is no such possibility;
hence the cases are not parallel. Nor does the fact of other
effects springing from effects imply that Brahman also must
be an effect; for the non-admission of a fundamental causal
substance would drive us to a retrogressus in infinitum. And
that fundamental causal substance which as a matter of
fact is generally acknowledged to exist, just that is our
Brahman.--Thus there is not any contradiction.
10. Fire (is produced) thence (i.e. from air); for
thus (the text) declares.
In the /Kh/ândogya it is said that fire has for its source
that which is (Brahman), in the Taittirîyaka that it has the
air for its source. There being thus a conflict of scriptural
passages with regard to the origin of fire, the pûrvapakshin
maintains that fire has Brahman for its source.--Why?--Because
the text, after having stated at the outset
that there existed only that which is, teaches that it sent
forth fire; and because the assertion of everything being
known through Brahman is possible only in case of every-*
[Footnote 1 And cannot therefore constitute a cause; for a cause is the
Self of its effects.]
21
***ng; being produced from Brahman; and because the
scriptural statement as to the 'Ta/gg/alân' (Kh. Up. III,
*, 1) specifies no difference[Footnote 1]; and because another scriptural
passage (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) teaches that everything
without exception is born from Brahman. The Taittirîyaka
**** makes a statement about the entire world without any
exception, 'after having brooded he sent forth all whatever
there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). Hence the statement that
*** was produced from air' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) must be
considered to teach the order of succession only 'fire was
produced subsequently to air.'
To this the Sûtra replies that fire was produced thence,
** from air, because the text declares it to be so--'from
** sprang fire.' For if fire had sprung directly from Brahman
and not from air, the scriptural statement that 'fire
sprang from air' would be contradicted thereby. That
that statement should intimate the order of succession
merely, as maintained by the pûrvapakshin, we cannot admit.
*** as in the preceding sentence ('from that Self sprang
ether') the fifth case (âtmana/h/) denotes the Self as that
from which the origination proceeds, and as the same verb
sprang') governs our sentence also, and as in the following
sentences also--such as 'from earth the herbs'--the fifth
*** (p/ri/thivyâ/h/) denotes that from which something proceeds
we understand that in our sentence also the fifth case
(**o/h/) denotes that from which fire proceeds. Moreover,
* we should explain our sentence to mean 'after air fire was
produced,' we should have to supply some preposition
** adverb as 'after,' 'subsequently'), while that construction
which rests on the proper sense of the fifth case-affix is
**dy made at hand and does not require anything to be
applied. The passage therefore intimates that fire springs
from air.--But, it may be said, the other scriptural passage
('sent forth fire') intimates that fire springs from Brahman.
Not so, we reply; for this latter passage remains uncontridicted,
even if we assume that fire sprang from Brahman
**ly through intermediate links (not directly).
[Footnote 1: But implies the whole world to have sprung from Brahman.]
22
Even the supposition that Brahman, after having created
ether and air, assumed the form of air and thus created fire
would not be opposed to fire having sprung from Brahman;
for we may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that
curds come from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow.
There is, moreover, a scriptural passage declaring that Brahman
abides as the Self of its effects, viz. Taitt Up. II, 7,
'That made itself its Self.' And analogously Sm/ri/ti--in
the passage beginning 'Cognition, knowledge, steadiness of
mind' (Bha. Gi. X, 4)--says about the Lord, 'From me
only spring the manifold states of the beings.' For
although cognition and so on are observed to spring
directly from their immediate causes, yet (the assertion
made in the passage quoted holds good), since the entire
aggregate of beings is, directly or indirectly, derived from
the Lord.--Thereby those scriptural passages are accounted
for which speak of the creation (on the whole) without
specifying the order of succession[Footnote ref 1]; for they may be explained
anyhow, while on the other hand the passages
specifying the order of creation cannot be turned in any
other way (i.e. not away from their direct sense). The
general assertion, moreover, of everything springing from
Brahman requires only that all things should ultimately
proceed from that which is, not that they should be its
immediate effects.--Thus there remains no difficulty.
II. Water (is produced from fire).
We have to supply from the preceding Sûtra the words
'thence' and 'for thus the text declares.'--Water is produced
from fire; for the text says, 'it sent forth water'
(/Kh/. Up. VI, 2, 3), and 'from fire (sprang) water' (Taitt.
Up. II, i). These explicit statements allow no room for
doubt[Footnote ref 2]. The Sûtrakâra, however, having explained the
creation of fire, and being about to explain the creation of
[Footnote 1 I.e. it appears from the preceding discussion that those passages
have to be explained in such a way as to agree with those other
passages which state the order of the created beings.]
[Footnote 2 So that the Sutra might possibly be looked upon as no
called for.]
23
earth, propounds this Sutra in order to insert water (and
thus to point out its position in the s/ri/sh/t/ikrama).
12. The earth (is meant by the word 'anna'), on
account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other
passages.
We read, 'Water thought, may I be many, may I grow
forth. It sent forth food (anna)' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 2, 4).--
Here a doubt arises, whether the word 'anna' denotes
things fit to be used as food, such as rice, barley and the
like; or cooked food; or else the earth.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word is to be
understood in the former sense; for, he says, the word
'anna' means 'food' in ordinary language, and is moreover
confirmed in that sense by the complementary passage,
'Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food is then
produced;' for when it rains, rice, barley and the like, but
not earth, are produced in abundance.
To this we reply that by the word 'anna' we have to
understand earth as being produced from water.--Why?--
On account of the subject-matter, on account of the colour,
and on account of other passages.--The subject-matter, in
the first place, is clearly connected with the elements, as we
see from the preceding passages, 'it sent forth fire, it sent
forth water.' It would therefore be improper to pass over
a further element, viz. earth, when its turn has come, and
to assume without reason that rice and the like are meant
by the word 'anna.'--In the second place, we find that in a
complementary passage there is mentioned a colour which
agrees with earth, 'the black colour (of fire) is the colour
of anna.' Eatable things on the other hand, such as cooked
dishes, and rice, barley and the like, are not necessarily
black.--But earth too is not necessarily black; for the soil
of some fields has a whitish colour like milk, and that of
others looks red like glowing coals!--True, but that does
not affect our argument, since what we have to look to is
the predominant colour. Now the predominant colour of
earth is black, not either white or red. The Paurâ/n/ikas also
designate the colour of the earth by the term 'night'
24
(/s/arvarî); now the night is black, and we therefore conclude
that black is the colour of earth also.--In the third
place other scriptural passages also, which refer to the same
subject, declare that 'from water (sprang) earth' (Taitt. Up.
II, i), and that 'what was there as the froth of the water,
that was hardened and became the earth' (B/ri/. Up. I, 2, 2).
On the other hand the text declares that rice and the like
were produced from the earth, 'From earth sprang herbs,
from herbs food' (Taitt. Up. II, i).--As, thus, the general
subject-matter as well as other arguments clearly proves
that the word 'anna' here denotes earth, we can in no way
accept the view that rice and the like are referred to. The
common use of language to which the pûrvapakshin appeals
is of no avail against the arguments favouring our interpretation.
The complementary passage also ('whenever it
rains,' &c.) is to be viewed as pointing out that, owing to
the earthy nature of food (rice, &c.), earth itself mediately
springs from water.--For all these reasons the word 'anna'
denotes this earth.
13. But on account of the indicatory mark supplied
by their reflecting (i.e. by the reflection attributed
to the elements), he (i.e. the Lord is the creative
principle abiding within the elements).
A doubt here arises whether ether and the other elements
do themselves send forth their effects, or if the highest
Lord abiding within certain Selfs produces, after reflection,
certain effects.
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the elements themselves
send forth, because the texts speak of them as acting
independently; compare, for instance, 'from ether sprang air,
from air fire,' &c. The objection that non-intelligent beings
cannot enter on independent activity is invalidated by the
fact that the elements also are spoken of in the sacred texts
as endowed with intelligence, cf. for instance, 'fire thought,'
'water thought' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4).
To this we reply that the highest Lord himself abiding
within certain Selfs sends forth, after reflection, certain
effects.--Why?--On account of the indicatory marks. For
25
texts* such as 'he who dwells in the earth, and within the
earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth
[is*] and who rules the earth within' show that the elements
enter on their activity only if presided over by an intelligent
principle. Texts such as 'He became sat and tyat' (which
occurs in the passage, 'he wished may I be many, may I
grow forth,' Taitt. Up. 11, 6) and 'It made itself its Self' (i. e.
the Self of everything which exists; II, 7) show that he
the highest Lord) is the Self of everything. The thinking
and hearing which the texts attribute to water and fire must
be viewed as due to the fact of the highest Lord having
entered them; for the passage, 'there is no other seer but
[he,'*] denies there being any other seer (thinker), and that
which is (i.e. Brahman), in the character of seer (or thinker),
constitutes the subject-matter of the whole chapter; as we
conclude from the introductory passage, 'It thought, may I
be many, may I grow forth' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 2, 3).
14. The order (in which the elements are retracted
into Brahman) is the reverse of that (i.e. the order
in which they are created); this is proved (by its
agreement with observation).
Having considered the order of the creation of the
elements we now proceed to consider the order of their
retractation.--The question here is whether their retractation
takes place in an indefinite order, or in the order of
the creation, or in the inverse order. That the origin, the
subsistence and the retractation of the elements all depend
on Brahman, scripture declares 'That from whence these
beings are born, that by which when born they live, that
into which they enter at their death.'
The pûrvapakshintains that the retraretractationhe
elements is not bound to any definite order, because scripture
contains no specific information on the point. Or else,
he says, let him who wishes to know the order of the retractation
accept the order of creation, since the latter is
expressly mentioned in the texts.
To this we reply that the order of retractation must be
viewed as the reverse of the order of creation. For we see
29*
In ordinary life that a man who has ascended a stair has, in
descending, to take the steps in the reverse order. Moreover
we observe that things made of clay, such as jars,
dishes, &c., on being destroyed pass back into clay, and that
things which have originated from water, such as snow and
hailstones, again dissolve into water. Hence we rightly
assume that earth which has (according to scripture) sprung
from water passes back into water when the period of its
subsistence comes to an end, and that water which has
sprung from fire passes back into fire. In this way each
particular effect passes back into its immediately antecedent
cause--each cause being of a subtler nature than its
effect--until in the end the last cause is refunded into
Brahman, the ultimate and most subtle of all causes. It
certainly would be irrational to assume that an effect, passing
over its immediate cause, should at once refund itself
into the cause of the cause. Sm/ri/ti also declares that the
order of retractation is the order of origination inverted,
'The earth, the basis of the world, is dissolved into water,
O divine /Ri/shi, the water into fire, the fire into air.' The
order of creation is indeed stated in the sacred texts, but
that statement refers to creation only, and can therefore
not be extended to retractation. We, moreover, cannot
even desire to apply the order in which the elements are
created to their retractation also since it is clearly unsuitable
in the latter case. For, as long as an effect subsists, it
is impossible to assume the dissolution of the cause, since
on the dissolution of the latter the effect also cannot exist.
On the other hand, we may assume a continued existence
of the cause although the effect be destroyed; for that is
actually observed in the case of clay (and the things made
of it).
15. If it be said that between (Brahman and the
elements) the intellect and mind (are mentioned;
and that therefore their origination and retractation
are to be placed) somewhere in the series, on
account of there being inferential signs (whereby the
order of the creation of the elements is broken); we
27
deny that, on account of the non-difference (of the
organs and the elements).
In what precedes we have said that the creation and the
retractation of the elements take place in direct and reverse
order; further that the creation proceeds from the Self,
and that the retractation terminates in the Self.--Now
Sruti as well as Sm/ri/ti enlightens us concerning the existence
of the mind (manas) together with the senses, and of
the intellect (buddhi); compare, for instance, the indicatory
marks contained in the passage, Ka.Up. I,3, 3.4,'Know the
intellect to be the charioteer and the mind the reins; the
senses they call the horses,' &c. And as the whole aggregate
of beings avowedly springs from Brahman, we must
assume that the mind, the intellect and the senses also
originate from it and are again merged in it in due order,
occupying a definite place among the things created and
retracted. Moreover the Âtharva(Mu/nd/aka), in the
chapter treating of the creation, mentions the organs
between the Self and the elements, 'From him is born
breath, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, light,
water and the earth the support of all' (II, i, 3). And
from this there results a break in the previously stated
order of the creation and the retractation of the elements.
This we deny, on account of the non-difference (of the
organs from the elements). If the organs themselves are of
the nature of the elements, their origination and retractation
are the same as those of the elements, and we therefore
have not to look out in their case for a different order.
And that the organs are of the nature of the elements, for
that we have inferential marks, in passages such as the
following, 'for mind, my child, consists of earth, breath of
water, speech of fire' (Kh. Up. VI, 6, 5). That the organs
(although in reality belonging to the elements) are sometimes
mentioned separately from them, is to be understood
in the same way as when the Parivrâgakasdicant
Brâhma/n/as) are spoken of separately from the Brâhma/n/as.
And supposing even that the organs are not of the nature
of the elements, still the order of the origin of the elements
28 VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS
would not be interfered with by the organs; for we might
assume either that the organs are produced first and the
elements last; or else that the elements are produced first
and the organs last. In the Âtharvaupaniupanishaded
above we have merely a serial enumeration of the organs
and the elements, not a statement as to the order of their
origination. Similarly in other places also the series of the
organs is recorded apart from the series of the elements; so,
for instance, in the following passage,'Pra/g/âpatied was
all this in the beginning, he reflected on himself; he sent
forth mind; there was mind only; mind reflected on itself; it
sent forth speech,' &c.--Hence the origination of the organs
does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the
elements.
16. But the designation (as being born and dying)
abides in the (bodies of beings) moving and non-moving; it is secondary (metaphorical) if applied to
the soul, as the existence (of those terms) depends
on the existence of that (i.e. the body).
On account of certain popular modes of expression such
as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' and the like,
and on account of certain ceremonies such as the Gâtakaakarman
some people might fall into the error of thinking
that the individual soul has a beginning, and in the end
undergoes destruction. This error we are going to dispel.
--The individual soul has no beginning and is not subject
to dissolution, since thus only it can be connected with the
results of actions, as the Sâstrahes. If the individual
soul perished after the body, there would be no sense
in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to
the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant
things in another body (another birth). And scripture says,
'This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the
living soul does not die' (Kh. Up. VI, ii, 3).--But it has
been pointed out above that ordinary language speaks of
the birth and the death of the individual soul!--True; but
the terms 'birth' and 'death,' if applied to the soul, have to
29
be taken in a secondary sense.--What then is that thing to
which those words apply in their primary sense, and with
*reference* to which we can speak of a secondary sense?--
They apply, we answer, to whatever moves and whatever
does not move. The words 'birth' and 'death' have reference
to the bodies of moving and non-moving beings; for
such beings are born (produced) and die. To them the
terms 'birth' and'death' apply in their primary sense;
while they are used metaphorically only with reference to
the soul dwelling in them. For their existence (i. e. their
being used) depends on the existence of the body; i.e.
the words 'birth' and 'death' are used where there take
place the manifestation and disappearance of bodies, not
where they are absent. For nobody ever observes a soul
being born or dying, apart from its connexion with a body.
That the words 'birth' and 'death' have reference to the
conjunction with--and separation from--a body merely, is
also shown by the following passage: 'On being born that
person assuming his body, &c.; when he passes out (of the
body) and dies,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 8). The /g/âta-ceremony
also is to be viewed as having reference to the manifestation
of the body only; for the soul is not manifested.--Whether
the individual soul is produced from the highest Self like
ether, &c. or not, will be discussed in the next Sûtra; the
present Sûtra merely states that the gross origination and
dissolution which belong to the body do not affect the
soul.
17. The (living) Self is not (produced) as there is
no scriptural statement, and as it is eternal according
to them (i.e. scriptural passages).
There is a Self called the living one (the individual soul),
which rules the body and the senses, and is connected with
the fruits of actions. With regard to that Self the conflict
of scriptural passages suggests the doubt, whether it is
produced from Brahman like ether and the other elements,
or if, like Brahman itself, it is unproduced. Some scriptural
passages, by comparing it to sparks proceeding from
a fire and so on, intimate that the living soul is produced
30
from Brahman; from others again we learn that the
highest Brahman, without undergoing any modification,
passes, by entering into its effects (the elements), into the
condition of the individual soul. These latter passages do
not thus record an origination of the individual soul.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the individual soul is
produced, because on that view the general promissory
statement is not contradicted. For the general assertion
that 'by one thing being known all this is known' is not
contradicted, only if the entire aggregate of things springs
from Brahman; while it would be contradicted by the
assumption of the individual soul being a thing of a different
kind. Nor can the individual soul be conceived as
mere unmodified highest Self, on account of the difference
of their respective characteristics. For the highest Self is
characterised by freedom from sin and so on, while the
individual soul possesses the opposite attributes. That it
is an effect, follows moreover from its being divided. For
ether and all other things, in so far as divided, are effects,
and we have concluded therefrom that they have an origin.
Hence the soul also, which is distributed through all the
bodies, doing good and evil and experiencing pleasure and
pain, must be considered to originate at the time when
the entire world is produced. We have moreover the following
scriptural passage, 'As small sparks come forth
from fire, thus from that Self all vital airs,' &c. (B/ri/. Up.
II, i, 20). This text teaches first the creation of the
aggregate of objects of fruition, beginning with the vital
airs, and then (in the words, 'all the Selfs') separately
teaches the creation of all the enjoying souls. Again we
have the passage, 'As from a blazing fire sparks, being of
the same nature as fire, fly forth a thousandfold, thus are
various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, my
friend, and return hither also' (Mu. Up. II, i, 1); a passage
descriptive of the origin and the retractation of the souls, as
we infer from the statement about the sameness of nature[Footnote ref 1].
[Footnote 1: That the word bhâvâ/h/ 'beings' here means 'individual souls,' we conclude from their being said to have the same nature as the Imperishable.
31
For the individual souls are of the same nature as Brahman,
because they are endowed with intelligence. Nor can the
fact that in some places (as, for instance, in the accounts of
the creation of the elements) the creation of the soul is
not mentioned, invalidate what is stated about it in other
places; it being a general principle of interpretation that
whatever new, and at the same time non-contradictory,
matter is taught in some scriptural passage has to be combined
with the teaching of all other passages. Hence that
passage also which speaks of the Self entering (into its
effects and thus becoming /g/iva) must be explained as
stating the Self's passing over into an effect (viz. the soul),
analogously to such passages as 'that made itself its Self,'
&c. (Taitt. Up. II, 7).--From all which it follows that the
individual soul is a product.
To all this we reply, that the individual soul is not a
product.--Why?--On account of the absence of scriptural
statement. For in the chapters which treat of the creation,
the production of the soul is, in most cases, not mentioned.
--But, it was admitted above that the circumstance of something
not being stated in some places does not invalidate
the statements made about it elsewhere.--True, that was
admitted; but we now declare that the production of the
soul is not possible.--Why?--'On account of the eternity,
&c., resulting from them' (i.e. the scriptural passages).
The word '&c.' implies non-originatedness and similar
attributes. For we know from scriptural passages that the
soul is eternal, that it has no origin, that it is unchanging,
that what constitutes the soul is the unmodified Brahman,
and that the soul has its Self in Brahman. A being of
such a nature cannot be a product. The scriptural
passages to which we are alluding are the following:--
'The living Self dies not' (Kh. Up. VI, ii, 3); 'This great
unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is
indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'The knowing Self
is not born, it dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); 'The Ancient
is unborn, eternal, everlasting' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); 'Having
sent forth that he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6); 'Let
me now enter those with this living Self and let me then
32
evolve names and forms' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He entered
thither to the very tips of the finger-nails' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7);
'Thou art that' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' (B/ri/.
Up. II, 4,10); 'This Self is Brahman knowing all'(B/ri/.Up.
II, 5, 19).--All these texts declare the eternity of the soul,
and thus militate against the view of its having been produced.--But
it has been argued above that the soul must
be a modification because it is divided, and must have an
origin because it is a modification!--It is not, we reply, in
itself divided; for scripture declares that 'there is one God
hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all
beings' (/S/ve. Up. VI, 11*); it only appears divided owing
to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind and so on, just
as the ether appears divided by its connexion with jars
and the like. Scripture (viz. B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, 'that Self
is indeed Brahman, made up of knowledge, mind, life, sight,
hearing,' &c.) also declares that the one unmodified Brahman
is made up of a plurality of intellects (buddhi), &c. By
Brahman being made up of mind and so on is meant, that its
nature is coloured thereby, while the fact of its being entirely
separate from it is non-apparent. Analogously we say that
a mean, cowardly fellow is made up of womanishness.--The
casual passages which speak of the soul's production
and dissolution must therefore be interpreted on the ground
of the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts; when the
adjunct is produced or dissolved, the soul also is said to be
produced or dissolved. Thus scripture also declares, 'Being
altogether a mass of knowledge, having risen from out of
these elements it again perishes after them. When he has
departed there is no more knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 13). What
is meant there, is only the dissolution of the limiting
adjuncts of the Self, not the dissolution of the Self itself[Footnote ref 1].
The text itself explains this, in reply to Maitreyî*'s ques-*
[Footnote 1 Hence the phrase, 'there is no more knowledge,'--which seems to contradict the term 'a mass of knowledge,'--only means that,
on the limiting adjuncts being dissolved, there is no longer any
knowledge of distinctions.]
33
*tion ('Here, Sir, thou hast landed me in utter bewilderment.
Indeed I do not understand him, that when he has
departed there is no more knowledge'), in the words, 'I say
nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is
imperishable and of an indestructible nature. But it enters
into contact with the sense organs.'--Non-contradiction
moreover of the general assertion (about everything being
known through one) results only from the acknowledgment
that Brahman is the individual soul. The difference of the
attributes of both is also owing to the limiting adjuncts
only. Moreover the words 'Speak on for the sake of final
deliverance' (uttered by /G/anaka with reference to the instruction
he receives from Yâ/gñ/avalkya about the vi/gñ/âna-*maya
âtman) implicitly deny that the Self consisting of
knowledge (i.e. the individual soul) possesses any of the
attiibutes of transitory existence, and thus show it to be
one with the highest Self.--From all this it follows that
the individual soul does not either originate or undergo
destruction.
18. For this very reason (the individual soul is)
intelligent.
Owing to the conflicting views of the philosophical
schools there arises a doubt whether, as the followers
of Ka/n/âda think, the soul is in itself non-intelligent, so
that its intelligence is merely adventitious; or if. as the
Sâ@nkhyas* think, eternal intelligence constitutes its very
nature.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the intelligence of the
Self is adventitious, and is produced by the conjunction of the
Self with the mind (manas), just as, for instance, the quality
of redness is produced in a jar by the conjunction of the jar
with fire. For if the soul were of eternal (essential) intelligence,
it would remain intelligent in the states of deep
sleep, swoon, and possession, while as a matter of fact, men
when waking from sleep and so on declare in reply to
questions addressed to them that they were not conscious
of anything. Men in their ordinary state, on the other hand,
are seen to be (actively) intelligent. Hence, as intelli*gent
*intelligence* is clearly intermittent, we conclude that the Self's
intelligence is adventitious only.
To this reply that the soul is of eternal intelligence,
for that very reason that it is not a product but nothing
else but the unmodified highest Brahman which, owing to
the contact with its limiting adjuncts, appears as individual
soul. That intelligence constitutes the essential nature of
the highest Brahman, we know from scriptural passages
such as 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28, 7); 'Brahman is true, knowledge, infinite' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Having neither inside nor outside, but being
altogether a mass of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 13).
Now, if the individual soul is nothing but that highest
Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul's
essential nature also, just as light and heat constitute the
nature of fire. In the chapter treating of that which consists
of knowledge, there are, moreover, passages (directly
declaring that the individual soul is of the nature of self-
luminous intelligence), 'He not asleep himself looks down
upon the sleeping (senses)' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 11); 'That
person is self-illuminated' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14); 'For there
is no intermission of the knowing of the knower' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 30). That the soul's nature is intelligence, follows
moreover from the passage (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4) where
it is represented as connected with knowledge through all
sense-organs, 'He who knows let me smell this, he is the
Self,' &c. &c.--From the soul's essential nature being
intelligence it does not follow that the senses are useless;
for they serve the purpose of determing the special object
of each sense, such as smell and so on. This is expressly
declared by scripture, 'Smell is for the purpose of perceiving
odour' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4).--The objection that
sleeping persons are not conscious of anything is refuted by scripture, where we read concerning a man lying in
deep sleep, 'And when there he does not see, yet he is
seeing through he does not see. For there is no intermission
of the seeing of the seer, because it cannot perish.
But there is then no second, nothing else different from
him that he could see' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 23). That means:
The absence of actual intelligising is due to the absence of
objects, not to the absence of intelligence; just as the light
pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of
things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature.
--The reasoning of the Vaiyeshikas and others is, as contradicting
scripture, merely fallacious, and we therefore decide
that eternal intelligence is the essential nature of the soul.
19. (On account of the scriptural declarations) of
(the soul's) passing out, going and returning, (the
soul is of atomic size).
We now have to consider of what size the soul is,
whether of atomic size or of a medium size, or of great
(infinite) size.--But, it has been shown above that the soul
is not a product and that eternal intelligence constitutes
its nature, whence it follows that it is identical with the
highest Self. Now the infinity of the highest Self is clearly
stated in scripture; what need then is there of a discussion
of the soul's size?--True, we reply; but certain scriptural
passages which speak of the soul's passing out, going and
returning, establish the primâ facie view that the soul is
of limited size, and moreover in some places scripture
expressly declares it to be of atomic size. The present
discussion is therefore begun for the purpose of clearing up
this doubtful point.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that, on account of its being
said to pass out, go and return, the soul must be held to
be of limited, atomic size. Its passing out is mentioned
(Kau. Up. III, 3), 'And when he passes out of this body
he passes out together with all these;' its going (Kau.
Up. I, 3), 'All who depart from this world go to the
moon;' its returning (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 6), 'From that world
he returns again to this world of action.' From these
statements as to the soul's passing out, going and returning
it follows that it is of limited size. For motion
is impossible in the case of an all-pervading being. And
a limited size being once admitted, we have to conclude
more especially that the size is atomic, since the hypothesis
36
of the soul being of the same size as the body has already
been refuted in our examination of the Ârhata-system.
20. And on account of the two latter (i.e. going
and returning) being connected with their Self (i.e.
the agent), (the soul is of atomic size).
We admit that 'passing out' might possibly be attributed
to the soul even if it does not move, viz. if that
expression be taken to mean the soul's ceasing to be the
ruler of the body, in consequence of the results of its
former actions having become exhausted; just as somebody
when ceasing to be the ruler of a village may be said
to 'go out.' But the two latter activities, viz. going and
returning, are not possible in the ease of something which
does not move; for they are both connected with the own
Self (of the agent), going (and coming back) being activities
abiding in the agent [Footnote ref 1]. Now going and coming are
possible for a being that is not of medium size, only if it
is of atomic size. And as going and coming must be taken
in their literal sense, we conclude that the passing out also
means nothing but the soul's actual moving out of the
body. For the soul cannot go and return without first
having moved out of the body. Moreover certain parts
of the body are mentioned as the points from which the
soul starts in passing out, viz. in the following passage,
'Either from the eye or from the skull or from other
places of the body (the Self passes out)' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 2).
Other passages mention that the embodied soul goes and
comes within the body also; so, for instance, 'He taking
with him those elements of light descends into the heart'
B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 1); 'Having assumed light he again goes to
his place' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 11).--Thereby the atomic size
of the soul is established as well.
21. If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, on
account of scriptural statements about what is not
that (i.e. what is opposed to atomic size); we deny
[Footnote 1: Going is known to be an activity inherent in the agent, from the fact of its producing effects inherent in him, such as his conjunction with--or disjunction from--other things.]
that, on account of the other one (the highest Self)
being the subject-matter (of those passages).
Nevertheless, it may be objected, the soul cannot be of
atomic size, because there are scriptural statements of what
is not that, i.e. because there are scriptural statements of
its size being the opposite of atomic size. So that by
accepting the alternative of atomic size we should place
ourselves in opposition to scriptural passages such as the
following, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of
knowledge, is surrounded by the Prâ/n/as, the ether within
the heart' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22); 'Like the ether he is omnipresent,
eternal;' 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'
(Taitt. Up. II. i).
This objection, the pûrvapakshin replies, is not valid
'on account of the other one forming the subject of discussion.'
For those statements about a size different (from
the atomic one) occur under the heading of the highest
Self which on account of its pre-eminence constitutes the
general object of knowledge in all Vedânta-texts; and
moreover the passage, 'It is spotless, beyond the ether'
(B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 20), specially proves that the highest
Self constitutes the subject-matter (in the passage quoted
above from the B/ri/. Up.). Thus with regard to the other
passages also.--But from the expressions, 'consisting of
knowledge, surrounded by the prâ/n/as,' it appears that
the embodied Self only (not the highest Self) is designated
as connected with greatness.--That designation, the pûrvapakshin
replies, is founded on an intuition, vouched for by
scripture, as in the case of Vâmadeva [Footnote ref 1].--As therefore the statements of a different size refer to the highest Self (prâ/gñ/a), they do not militate against the view of the individual soul being of atomic size.
22. And also on account of direct statement, and
of inference.
The soul is of atomic size for that reason also that
scripture contains a direct statement to that effect, 'By
[Footnote 1: Who 'paramârthad/ri/sh/l/yâ' identifies himself with everything in the universe, (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/bita IV, 26. 1 ff.).
thought is to be known that atomic Self into which
breath has entered fivefold' (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 9). That the
Self spoken of there as atomic is the living Self, i.e. the
individual soul, we see from its connexion with breath.--
Inference also favours the conclusion that the soul is of
atomic size; i.e. we infer that from such passages as 'That
living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part
of the point of a hair divided a hundred times' (/S/ve. Up.
V, 9), and, 'That lower one also is seen small even like the
point of a goad.'--But, an objection may here be raised,
if the soul is assumed to be of atomic size, and therefore
to occupy one point of the body only, the fact of sensation
extending over the whole body would appear contrary to
reason. And yet it is a matter of experience that men
bathing in the Ganges or in a pond experience the sensation
of cold over their whole bodies, and again that in
summer people feel hot all over the body.--To this objection
the following Sûtra replies.
23. There is no contradiction, as in the case of
sandal-ointment.
Just as a drop of sandal-ointment, although in actual
contact with one spot of the body only, yet produces a
refreshing sensation extending over the whole body; so the
soul, although abiding in one point of the body only, may
be the cause of a perception extending over the entire body.
And as the soul is connected with the skin (which is the seat
of feeling), the assumption that the soul's sensations should
extend over the whole body is by no means contrary to
reason. For the connexion of the soul and the skin abides
in the entire skin, and the skin extends over the whole
body.
24. If it be said (that the two cases are not
parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode
(present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in
the case of the soul); we deny that, on account of
the acknowledgment (by scripture, of a special place
of the soul), viz. within the heart.
Here it may be objected that the argumentation relied
upon in the last Sûtra is not admissible, because the two
cases compared are not parallel. If it were a settled
matter that the soul dwells in one point of the body, the
drop of sandal-ointment might be adduced as a parallel
instance. But, as a matter of fact, we know from perception
that the drop of sandal-ointment is in contact with
one spot of the body only, just as we know that it refreshes
the whole body; while in the case of the soul observation
tells us only that it is percipient all over the body, but
not that it abides in one spot.--Should it be said that the
latter point must be settled by inference, we reply that
inference is here of no use, because it is not capable of
removing the doubt whether the perception extending over
the whole body belongs to a soul which extends over the
whole body like the skin and the sense of touch inhering
in it, or to a soul which is all-pervading like ether, or to
a soul which, like a drop of ointment, is minute and abides
in one spot only [Footnote ref 1].
This objection, the pûrvapakshin replies, is unfounded 'on
account of the acknowledgment of a speciality of abode,'
an abiding in one spot of the body being admitted in the
case of the soul no less than in the case of a drop of
ointment. For we read in the Vedânta-texts that the soul
abides within the heart; cp. for instance, the information
given (in Pr. Up. Ill, 6),'The Self is in the heart;' (/Kh/. Up.
VIII, 3, 3), 'That Self abides in the heart;' (B/ri/. Up. IV,
3, 7), 'Who is that Self?--He who is within the heart,
surrounded by the Prâ/n/as, the person of light, consisting
of knowledge.'--As therefore the two cases compared are
not devoid of parallelism, the argumentation resorted to
in Sûtra 23 is unobjectionable.
25. Or on account of (its) quality (viz. intelligence),
as in cases of ordinary experience.
[Footnote 1: We cannot reason as follows, 'The soul is atomic because it produces effects extending (over the vhole body), like a drop of sandal-ointment;' for that reasoning would apply to the sense of touch (the skin) also, which we know not to be of atomic size.]
40
That the soul although atomic produces effects extending
over the whole body, is not contrary to reason, on
account of the pervadingness of intellect which is its
quality. From ordinary experience we know that luminous
things, such as lamps or gems, although occupying only
one spot of a chamber, produce, by means of their light
which fills the chamber, an effect in every part of the
chamber.--This Sûtra has the purpose of removing the
doubts of those who might object that sandal-ointment,
because consisting of parts, may perhaps refresh the entire
body by the diffusion of imperceptible particles; that,
however, the soul as a mere atom does not possess any
parts by means of which it could diffuse itself through the
whole body.--But how can a quality extend beyond that
in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere? We certainly
do not see that the whiteness which is the quality of a
piece of cloth extends beyond that piece of cloth to other
places. Nor must you say that the case of the soul is
analogous to that of the light diffused from a lamp; for
that light itself is admitted to be (not a quality but) a substance.
The flame of a lamp is substantial light with its
particles crowded close to one another; the light diffused
from that flame is substantial light whose particles are thin
and scattered.--The reply to this objection is given in the
next Sûtra.
26. The extending beyond is as in the case of
odour.
Just as odour, although a quality, extends beyond the
odorous substance--as appears from the fact of our perceiving
odour even without actually grasping flowers which
are the seat of odour--so the quality of intelligence also
may extend beyond the soul although the latter be atomic.
It therefore is an undue stretch of inference to maintain
that a quality, such as colour and the like, cannot separate
itself from the substratum in which it inheres, because it
is a quality; for we see that odour although a mere
quality does separate itself from its substratum.--The objection
that odour also separates itself from its substance
only with the substance (i.e. parts of the substance) we do not admit, because that would involve the dwindling away
of the fundamental substance from which the separation of
parts takes place. But that it does not so dwindle away,
we conclude from its remaining in its former condition;
otherwise it would lose the heaviness and other qualities
belonging to it in its former state.--Well, but perhaps the
separation of the particles in which odour resides is not
noticed on account of their minuteness. Nevertheless the
fact may be that minute odorous atoms spreading in all
directions enter the cavity of the nose and there produce
the sensation of smell.--This we cannot admit, because the
atoms are suprasensible, and because in some cases, as, for
instance, from the blossoms of the nâgakesara-tree, a very
strong odour is perceived [Footnote ref 1]. According to the generally prevailing idea, moreover, it is not the odorous substance which is smelled, but ordinary people rather think that they smell
the odour only.--The objection that, because we do not
perceive colour and so on to extend beyond their substratum,
we have no right to assume that odour does
so, we cannot admit, because there is no room for that
conclusion [Footnote ref 2], on account of the (actually existing) perception (of the smell apart from the odorous substance).
Logicians must shape their inferences in such a way as to
make them agree with ordinary observation, not in any
other way. For, to quote another instance, the circumstance
that one of the qualities, viz. taste, is perceived by
the tongue, certainly does not entitle us to draw the general
inference that colour and the other qualities also are perceived
by means of the tongue.
27. And thus (scripture also) declares.
Scripture also, after having signified the soul's abiding
in the heart and its atomic size, declares by means of such
[Footnote 1: Single atoms could not produce any sensations; trasare/n/gs, i.e. combinations of three atoms even could not produce lively sensations.]
[Footnote 2: Viz. that smell cannot exist apart from the odorous substance, because it is a quality like colour.]
42
passages as 'Up to the hairs, up to the tips of the nails'
(Kau. Up. IV, 20; B/ri/. Up. I. 4, 7), that the soul pervades
the entire body by means of intelligence which is its
quality.
28. On account of the separate statement (of soul
and intelligence).
From the passage 'Having by knowledge taken possession
of the body' which represents the soul and intelligence as
separate, viz. as respectively the agent and the instrument
of action, we understand that the soul pervades the body
only by means of intelligence, its quality. Again the passage
'Then (the intelligent person) having through the
intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all
intelligence' (B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 17) shows intelligence to be
different from the agent, i.e. the embodied soul, and so
likewise confirms our view.--The reply to all this is as
follows.
29. But it is designated thus (i.e. as atomic), on
account of its having for its essence the qualities of
that (i.e. the buddhi); as in the case of the intelligent
Self (i.e. Brahman).
The word 'but' is meant to set aside the opinion maintained
hitherto.--The soul is not of atomic size, since
scripture does not declare it to have had an origin. On
the contrary, as scripture speaks of the highest Brahman
entering into the elements and teaches that it is their Self,
the soul is nothing else but the highest Brahman. And if
the soul is the highest Brahman, it must be of the same
extent as Brahman. Now scripture states Brahman to be
all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading.--On
that view all the statements about the all-pervadingness
of the soul made in Sruti and Sm/ri/ti are justified, so, for instance, the passage, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists
of knowledge, is surrounded by the prâ/n/as &c.' (B/ri/. Up. IV,
4, 22). Nor again could the soul, if it were of atomic size,
experience sensations extending over the whole body. If
it be said that that is possible owing to the soul's connexion
43
with the sense of touch (the skin), we deny that assertion.
For from that it would follow that, when we tread on a
thorn, the sensation extends over the whole body, since the
connexion of the thorn and the skin abides in the entire
skin, and the skin extends over the whole body. While
as a matter of fact, when treading on a thorn we experience
a sensation in the sole of the foot only.--Nor again is it
possible that a quality of an atom should diffuse itself beyond
the atom. For qualities occupy the same place with the
substances of which they are qualities, and a quality not
abiding in its substance would no longer be a quality.
Concerning the light emitted from a lamp we have already
shown that it is, not a quality, but rather a different kind
of substance. Hence odour also, being avowedly a quality,
can exist in so far only as it inheres in its substance; otherwise
it would cease to be odour. Thus the reverend Dvai-*pâyana
also says, 'Having perceived odour in water some
unthinking people ascribe it to the latter; but know that it
is in the earth only, and (merely) passes over into air and
water.' If the intelligence of the soul pervades the whole
body, the soul cannot be atomic; for intelligence constitutes
the soul's proper nature, just as heat and light constitute
that of fire. A separation of the two as quality
and that which is qualified does not exist. Now it has
already been shown (II, 2, 34) that the soul is not
of the same size as the body; the only remaining alternative
therefore is that it is all-pervading (infinite). But why
then, our opponent asks, is the soul designated (in some
scriptural passages) as being of atomic size, &c.?--It is
designated as such 'on account of being of the nature of
the essence of that (i.e. the buddhi).'--The Self is here said
to be of the nature of the essence of the mind's (buddhi)
qualities, because those qualities, such as desire, aversion,
pleasure, pain and so on, constitute the essence, i.e. the
principal characteristics of the Self as long as it is implicated
in transmigratory existence. Apart from the qualities
of the mind the mere Self does not exist in the sa/m/sâra
state; for the latter, owing to which the Self appears as an
agent and enjoyer, is altogether due to the circumstance of
44
the qualities of the buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts
being wrongly superimposed upon the Self. That the
non-transmigrating eternally free Self which neither acts nor
enjoys is declared to be of the same size as the buddhi, is
thus due only to its having the qualities of the buddhi for
its essence (viz. as long as it is in fictitious connexion with
the buddhi). Moreover we have the scriptural passage,
'That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth
part of the point of a hair, divided a hundred times, and
yet it is to be infinite' (/S/ve. Up. V, 9), which at first states
the soul to be atomic and then teaches it to be infinite.
Now this is appropriate only in the case of the atomicity of
the soul being metaphorical while its infinity is real; for
both statements cannot be taken in their primary sense at
the same time. And the infinity certainly cannot be understood
in a metaphorical sense, since all the Upanishads aim
at showing that Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.
--The other passage also (/S/ve. Up. V, 8) which treats of
the measure of the soul, 'The lower one, endowed with the
quality of mind and the quality of body, is seen small even
like the point of a goad,' teaches the soul's small size to
depend on its connexion with the qualities of the buddhi,
not upon its own Self. The following passage again, 'That
small (a/n/u) Self is to be known by thought' (Mu. Up. III,
1, 9), does not teach that the soul is of atomic size, since the
subject of the chapter is Brahman in so far as not to be
fathomed by the eye, &c., but to be apprehended by the
serene light of knowledge, and since moreover the soul
cannot be of atomic size in the primary sense of the word.
Hence the statement about a/n/utva (smallness, subtlety) has
to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of
knowing the soul, or else to its limiting adjuncts. Similarly
such passages as 'Having by knowledge taken possession
of the whole body' (Kau. Up. III, 6), which mention a
difference (between the soul and knowledge), must be understood
to mean that the soul takes possession of the whole
body through the buddhi, its limiting adjunct; or else they
must be considered as mere modes of expression, as when
we speak of the body of a stone statue. For we have
45
already shown that the distinction of quality and thing
qualified does not exist in the case of the soul.--The statements
as to the soul abiding in the heart are likewise to
be explained on the ground of the buddhi abiding there.--
That also the soul's passing out and so on depend on
the limiting adjuncts, is shown by the passage, 'What
is it by whose passing out I shall pass out, and by whose
staying I shall stay? He sent forth pra/n/a.' &c. (Pr. Up VI,
3, 4). For where there is no passing out, no going and
returning are known; for what has not left the body cannot
go and return [Footnote ref 1].--As thus the soul (as long as involved in (the sa/m/sâra) has for its essence the qualities of its limiting adjuncts it is spoken of as minute. The case is analogous
to that of Brahman (prâ/gñ/a). Just as in those chapters
whose topic is the meditation on the qualified Brahman, the
highest Self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness
and so on, because it has the qualities of its limiting adjuncts
for its essence (cp. 'Smaller than a grain of rice or barley;'
'He who consists of mind, whose body is prâ/n/a,' &c., /Kh/.
Up. III, 14, 2; 3); so it is also with the individual soul.--
Very well, let us then assume that the transmigratory condition
of the soul is due to the qualities of the buddhi forming
its essence. From this however, it will follow that, as
the conjunction of buddhi and soul--which are different
entities--must necessarily come to an end, the soul when
disjoined from the buddhi will be altogether undefinable and
thence non-existing or rather non-existing in the sa/m/sâra
state [Footnote ref 2].--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
30. The objection (raised above) is not valid, since
(the connexion of the soul with the buddhi) exists as
long as the soul; it being thus observed (in scripture).
We need not fear that the objection formulated above
can be proved.--Why?--'On account of the existence of
the connexion of the soul with the buddhi, as long as the
[Footnote 1: So that the distinction insisted on in Sûtra 20 is not valid]
[Footnote 2: Katham asativa/m/ svarûpena *satâd* ity âsañkhyâha sa/m/sâritva/m/
ved. Ân. Gi.]
46
soul exists.' That means: as long as this Self is in the
sa/m/sâra-state, as long as the sa/m/sâra-state is not brought
to an end by means of perfect knowledge, so long the connexion
of the soul with the buddhi does not cease. And
as long as its connexion with the buddhi, its limiting
adjunct, lasts, so long the individual soul remains individual
soul, implicated in transmigratory existence. In
reality, however, there is no individual soul but in so far
as it is fictitiously hypostatized by the buddhi, its limiting
adjunct. For in attempting to determine the object of the
Vedânta-texts we meet with no other intelligent substance
but the one omniscient Lord whose nature is eternal freedom.
This appears from innumerable texts, such as the
following:--'There is no other seer but he, there is no
other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he,
there is no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23);
'There is nothing that sees, hears, perceives, knows but it'
(B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11); 'Thou art that' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 8, 7);
'I am Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10).--How again is it
known that the soul is connected with the buddhi as long
as it exists?--We reply: because that is seen (viz. in
scripture). For scripture makes the following declaration:
'He who is within the heart, consisting of knowledge, surrounded
by the prâ/n/as, the person of light, he remaining
the same wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as
if moving' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the term 'consisting
of knowledge' means 'consisting of buddhi,' as we infer
from another passage, viz. 'The Self consisting of knowledge,
mind, life, sight, hearing' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5), where
knowledge is enumerated among mind and, so on[Footnote ref 1]. By
'being made up of buddhi' is meant 'having for one's
essence the qualities of buddhi.' Similarly a phrase like
'Devadatta is made up of womanishness,' which may be
made use of in ordinary language, means that in Devadatta
feminine attributes such as softness of voice and the like
prevail. Moreover, the passage, 'He remaining the same
wanders along the two worlds,' declares that the Self, even
[Footnote 1: And therefore has to be understood in the sense of buddhi.]
47
when going to another world, is not separated from the
buddhi, &c. For if we ask whereby it does remain the
same, the answer, based on proximity[Footnote ref 1], is 'by means of
the buddhi.'--Further, such modes of expression, 'as if
thinking,' 'as if moving,' lead us to the same conclusion;
for they mean that the Self does not think and move on its
own account, but thinks as it were and moves as it were,
because the buddhi to which it is joined really moves and
thinks.--Moreover, the connexion of the Self with the
buddhi, its limiting adjunct, depends on wrong knowledge,
and wrong knowledge cannot cease except through perfect
knowledge; hence as long as there does not rise the cognition
of Brahman being the universal Self, so long the
connexion of the soul with the buddhi and its other limiting
adjuncts does not come to an end. Thus scripture
also says, 'I know that great person of sunlike lustre
beyond the darkness. A man who knows him passes over
death; there is no other path to go' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8).
But, an objection is raised, in the states of deep sleep
and retractation (pralaya) no connexion of the Self with
the buddhi can be acknowledged, since scripture declares
that 'then he becomes united with the True, he is gone to
his own' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 8, 1), and as then all modifications
have avowedly passed away. How then can it be said
that the connexion with the buddhi exists as long as the
Self?--To this objection the following Sûtra replies.
/*
31. On account of the appropriateness of the
manifestation of that (connexion) which exists
(potentially); like virile power.
*/
As in ordinary life virile power and so on, existing
potentially only in young children, and being then looked
upon as non-existing, become manifest at the time of
puberty--and do not originate at that time from previous
non-existence, because in that case they might originate in
eunuchs also--; so the connexion of the soul with the
* * * * *
[Footnote 1: I.e. on the proximity of terms clearly indicating the buddhi, viz. vi/gñ/âna-maya/h/ prâ/n/eshu.]
48
buddhi exists potentially merely during deep sleep and
the period of general retractation, and again becomes
manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation.--This
explanation is appropriate, because nothing can be
assumed to spring up unless from something else; otherwise
we should have to suppose that effects spring up
without causes. That the rising from deep sleep is due to
the existence of potential avidyâ, scripture also declares,
'Having become merged in the True they know not that
they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures
are here, whether a lion or a wolf,' &c. (/Kh/. Up. VI, 9, 2;
3).--It is therefore a proved matter that the connexion of
the soul with the buddhi and the other adjuncts lasts as
long as the soul (in its sa/m/sâra-state).
32. Otherwise (if no manas existed) there would
result either constant perception or constant non-perception,
or else a limitation of either of the two
(i.e. of the soul or of the senses).
The internal organ which constitutes the limiting adjunct
of the soul is called in different places by different
names, such as manas (mind), buddhi (intelligence), vi/gñ/âna
(knowledge), /k/itta (thought). This difference of nomenclature
is sometimes made dependent on the difference of
the modifications of the internal organ which is called
manas when it is in the state of doubt, &c., buddhi when it
is in the state of determination and the like.--Now we must
necessarily acknowledge the existence of such an internal
organ; because otherwise there would result either perpetual
perception or perpetual non-perception. There
would result perpetual perception whenever there is a conjunction
of the soul, the senses and the objects of sense--the
three together constituting the instruments of perception;
or else, if on the conjunction of the three causes the effect
did not follow, there would take place perpetual non-perception.
But neither of these two alternatives is actually
observed.--Or else we should have to assume that there
are obstacles in the way of the energy either of the Self or
the sense-organs. But the former is not possible, as the
49
Self is not capable of any modification; nor the latter, as
we cannot assume that the energy of the sense-organ which
is non-obstructed in the preceding and the following moment
should, without any cause, be obstructed (in the
intervening moment). Hence we have to acknowledge
the existence of an internal organ through whose attention
and non-attention perception and non-perception take
place. Thus scripture declares, 'My mind was elsewhere,
I did not see; my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear; for
a man sees with his mind and hears with his mind ' (B/ri/.
Up. I, 5, 3). Scripture moreover shows that desire and
similar states are modifications of the mind, 'Desire, representation, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness,
shame, reflection, fear, all this is mind.' The explanation
given in Sûtra 29 is therefore an appropriate one.
/*
33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of scripture
having a purport (thereby).
*/
In connexion with the doctrine that the soul possesses
for its essence the qualities of the buddhi, another attribute
of the soul is set forth.--The individual soul is an agent,
because thus scripture has a purport. For only on that
assumption scriptural injunctions (such as 'He is to sacrifice,'
'He is to make an oblation into the fire,' 'He is to give,'
&c.) acquire a purport; otherwise they would be purportless.
For they all teach special acts to be done by agents;
which would not be possible if the soul did not possess the
quality of being an agent.--On that supposition a meaning
belongs to the following passage also, 'For it is he who
sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he the person whose
Self is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9).
/*
34. And on account of (the text) teaching its
wandering about.
*/
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the
soul for that reason also, that, in a chapter treating of the
soul, the text declares it to wander about in the state of
sleep, 'The immortal one goes wherever he likes' (B/ri/. Up.
50
IV, 3, 12); and again, 'He moves about, according to his
pleasure, within his own body' (B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 18).
35. On account of its taking.
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the
soul for that reason also that in the same chapter treating
of the soul the text speaks of the soul taking its instruments,
'Having taken, through the intelligence of the
senses, intelligence,' and 'having taken the senses' (B/ri/. Up.
II. 1, 18; 17).
36. (The soul is an agent) also because it is
designated as such with regard to actions; if it were
not such, there would be a change of designation.
The quality of being an agent belongs to the soul for
that reason also that the sacred texts speak of its agency
in sacred and secular actions. 'Understanding performs
the sacrifice, it performs all acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5).--But,
an objection may here be raised, we have seen that the
word 'understanding' applies to the buddhi; how then
can it indicate the circumstance of the soul being an agent?--The
soul only, we reply, is designated there, not the
buddhi. If the soul were not meant to be designated,
there would be a change in the designation, i.e. the passage
would run, 'through understanding it performs,' &c. For
we see that in another passage where the buddhi is meant
the word 'understanding' is exhibited in the instrumental
form, 'Having through the understanding (intelligence) of
these senses taken all understanding' (B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 17).
In the passage under discussion, on the other hand, the
word 'understanding' is given in the case characteristic of
the agent (viz. the nominative), and therefore indicates the
Self which is distinct from the buddhi. Hence your objection
is not valid.--Another objection is raised. If the
soul in so far as distinct from the buddhi were the agent,
it would, because it is independent, bring about exclusively
what is pleasant and useful to itself, not the opposite. We,
however, observe that it does bring about the opposite
also. But such an unrestricted proceeding does not become
51
the independent Self.--To this objection the following
Sûtra replies.
37. The absence of restriction is as in the case of
perception.
Just as this Self, although free with regard to perception,
yet perceives unrestrictedly what is unpleasant as well as
what is pleasant, so we assume that it also brings about
what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant.--The
objection that in the act of perception also the soul is not
free because it depends on the employment of the causes
of perception (i.e. the sense-organs), we invalidate by the
remark that the use of the causes of perception is merely
to present the objects of perception, that however in the
act of perception the soul because endowed with intelligence
does not depend on anything else[Footnote ref 1].--Moreover in
actions also the soul is not absolutely free, as it depends
on differences of place, time, and efficient causes. But an
agent does not cease to be so because he requires assistance.
A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking although
he requires fuel, water, and so on. The presence of a
plurality of cooperating factors is therefore not opposed
to the activity of the soul unrestrictedly extending to
actions productive of pleasant as well as unpleasant
results.
38. On account of the reversal of power.
The soul distinct from 'understanding' has to be viewed
as an agent for the following reason also. If the buddhi
which is denoted by the term 'understanding' were the
agent, there would take place a reversal of power, i.e. the
instrumental power which appertains to the buddhi would
have to be set aside, and to be replaced by the power of an
agent. But if the buddhi has the power of an agent, it
must be admitted that it is also the object of self-conscious-
[Footnote 1: /K/akshurâdînâ/m/ vishayopanâyakatvât tadupalabdhau /k/âtmanas /k/etanatvena svâtantryâd udâhara/n/asiddhir ity âha neti. Ân. Gi.
52
*ness (ahampratyaya)[Footnote ref 1], since we see that everywhere activity is preceded by self-consciousness, '/I/ go, /I/ come, /I/ eat, /I/ drink,' &c. But if the buddhi is endowed with the power of an agent and effects all things, we have to assume for it
another instrument by means of which it effects everything.
For we see that agents although themselves capable of
acting yet become really active only through making use
of instruments.--Hence the whole dispute is about a name
only, and there is no real difference, since in either case that
which is different from the instrument of action is admitted
to be the agent.
39. And on account of the impossibility of meditation
(samâdhi).
Moreover the meditation taught in the Vedânta-texts,
whose aim is the realisation of the Self as represented by
the Upanishads, is possible only if the Self is the agent[Footnote ref 2]. Compare the following passages, 'Verily, the Self is to be
seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked' (B/ri/. Up.
II, 4, 5); 'The Self we must seek out, we must try to
understand' (/Kh/. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Meditate on the Self
as Om' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 6).--Therefrom also it follows that
the Self is an agent.
40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion.
That the embodied Self is an agent, has been proved by
the reasons set forth in Sûtra 33, &c. We now have to
consider whether this agency depends on the fundamental
nature of the Self, or is due to its limiting adjuncts.--If here
it be maintained that for the same reasons which were
employed to prove the Self's being an agent its agency
must be held to be natural, there being no reasons to the
contrary, we reply as follows.
[Footnote 1: And that would virtually identify the buddhi with the /g/iva, the individual soul.]
[Footnote 2: The Self which enjoys the fruit of final release must be the agent in the meditation which is instrumental in bringing about final release.]
The Self's being an agent cannot be founded on its real
nature, because (if it were so) the impossibility of final
release would follow. For if being an agent belongs to
the soul's nature, it can never free itself from it--no more
than fire can divest itself of heat--and as long as man has
not freed himself from activity he cannot obtain his highest
end, since activity is essentially painful.--But, an objection
will be raised, the end of man may be obtained, even as long
as the potentiality of activity remains, viz. by man avoiding
the effects of activity, and this he may accomplish by avoiding
its occasions, just as fire, for instance, although endowed
with the potentiality of burning, does, if fuel is withheld
from it, not produce its natural effect, i.e. burning.--This
objection we invalidate by the remark that the occasions,
because connected (with the soul) by means of the peculiar
connexion called 'potentiality' (power), cannot be avoided
absolutely[Footnote ref 1].--Nor can it be said that release will be
obtained through the means effecting it being employed,
because whatever depends on means to be employed is
non-eternal. Scripture moreover declares that release
results from the instruction about the eternally pure, intelligent,
free Self. Now instruction of this nature would not
be possible, if the agentship of the Self formed part of its
nature. The agentship of the Self is therefore due to the
attributes of its adjuncts being ascribed to it, and does not
form part of its nature. Hence scripture says of the Self, 'As
if thinking, as if moving' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7), and 'He (the
Self) when in union with the body, the senses, and the
mind, is called the enjoyer by wise people' (Ka. Up. I.
3, 4); which passages show that the Self passes into the
special condition of being an enjoyer, &c., only through its
[Footnote 1: Kart/ri/tvasya dharmâdîni nimittâni teshâ/m/ /gñ/ânânivartyatve
muktâv api sambhavât kart/ri/tva/m/ syât /gñ/ânena tanniv/ri/ttau teshâm
a/gñ/ânakâryatvât k/ri/ta/m/ kart/ri/tva/m/ api tathâ syât, /s/akte/s/ /k/a /s/akta-/s/akyasâpekshatayâ
sanimittakriyâlaksha/n/a/s/akyâpekshakatvâd anir-mokshas
tasmân nimittaparihârasya duranush/th/ânatvân na /s/aktivâde
muktir iti. Ân. Gi.
/S/akta/s/akyâ/s/rayâ /s/akti/h/ svasattayâva/s/ya/m/* /s/akyam *âkshipati*. Bhâ.]
54
connexion with the limiting adjuncts. For to the discerning
there is no Self called the living Self and being either
agent or enjoyer, apart from the highest Self; according to
the scriptural passage 'There is no other seer but he,' &c.
(B/ri/. Up. III. 7, 23). Nor must we suppose that, if there
were no intelligent individual Soul, different from the
highest Self and distinct from the aggregate consisting of
buddhi, &c., it would follow that the highest Self is involved
in the sa/m/sâra-state as agent and enjoyer. For the conditions
of being agent and enjoyer are presented by Nescience
merely. Scripture also, after having declared (in the passage,
'For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees the
other,' &c., B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) that the conditions of being
an agent and an enjoyer belong to the state of Nescience only,
excludes them from the state of knowledge, 'But where the
Self only is all this, how should he see another?' And again,
after having declared that the Self, in the states of waking
and of dreaming, suffers weariness owing to the contact with
its limiting adjuncts, like a falcon flying about in the air,
scripture teaches that that fatigue ceases in deep sleep when
the soul is embraced by the intelligent (highest) Self. 'This
indeed is his true form in which his wishes are fulfilled, in
which the Self only is his wish, in which no wish is left,--free
from any sorrow'--up to 'This is his highest goal, this
is his highest success, this is his highest world, this is his
highest bliss' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 21-32).--This the teacher
intimates in the Sûtra, 'and as the carpenter in both ways.'
'And' is here used in the sense of 'but.' It is not to be
supposed that the agentship of the Self belongs to its true
nature, as heat belongs to the nature of fire. But just as in
ordinary life a carpenter as long as working with his axe and
other tools undergoes pain, while on the other hand he enjoys
ease and leisure after having finished his work, laid his tools
aside and returned to his home; so the Self also, as long as
it is joined with duality presented by Nescience and is an
agent in the states of waking and dreaming, undergoes pain;
but as soon as, for the purpose of shaking off its weariness,
it enters into its own highest Self, it frees itself from the
complex of effects and instruments, and enjoys full ease in
55
the state of deep sleep. And in the state of final release
also, the Self, having dispelled the darkness of ignorance
by the light of knowledge, and having reached the state
of absolute isolation and rest, enjoys full ease.--The case
of the carpenter must be considered as being parallel to
the following extent. The carpenter is, in certain kinds
of work, such as cutting wood, &c., an agent with regard to
certain definite tools, such as the axe and so on, but a non-agent
with his mere body; so this Self also is an agent in
all its functions with regard to its instruments, such as the
mind, &c., but is a non-agent by its own Self. On the
other hand, the Self has no parts corresponding to the
hands and other limbs of the carpenter, by means of which
it could take up or put aside its instruments, as the carpenter
takes up and puts aside his tools.
In reply to the reasons brought forward in favour of the
soul's agentship being natural, as, for instance, the reason
based on scripture having a purport, we remark that the
scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts presuppose
an agentship established somehow, but do not themselves
aim at establishing the (direct) agentship of the Self. Now
we have shown that the agentship of the Self does not constitute
part of its real nature because scripture teaches that its
true Self is Brahman; we therefore conclude that the
Vedic injunctions are operative with reference to that agentship
of the soul which is due to Nescience. Such scriptural
passages also as 'The agent, the person whose Self is
understanding' (Pr. Up. IV, 9), must be assumed, because
being of the nature of anuvâdas [Footnote ref l], to refer to an agentship already established elsewhere, and being the product of
Nescience.
The preceding remarks refute also the reasons founded
on 'the wandering about' and the 'taking' (Sûtras 34, 35), as
the statements about them also are mere anuvâdas.--But
an objection may be raised, the passage which teaches that
the soul while its instruments are asleep, 'moves about,
[Footnote 1 I.e. being only incidental remarks about matters established or taught elsewhere.]
56
according to its pleasure, within its own body' (B/r/i. Up. II.
1, 18), clearly implies that the pure Self is an agent. And
in the passage relative to the taking ('(the purusha) having
through the intelligence of the senses absorbed all intelligence'),
the fact of the instruments appearing in the
objective and instrumental cases likewise intimates that
the pure Self is the agent.--To this we reply that even in
the state of dream the instruments of the Self are not
altogether at rest; for scripture states that even then it is
connected with the buddhi, 'Having become a dream,
together with buddhi it passes beyond this world.' Sm/ri/ti
also says, 'When, the senses being at rest, the mind not
being at rest is occupied with the objects, that state know
to be a dream.' And scripture says that desire, &c., are
modifications of the mind (cp. Bri. Up. I, 5, 3). Now these
are observed in dreams; therefore the Self wanders about
in dreams together with the mind only. That wandering
about moreover is founded on the mental impressions
(vâsanâ) only, is not real. Thus scripture also in describing
our doings in dreams qualifies them by an 'as it were:'
'As it were rejoicing together with women, or laughing as
it were, or seeing terrible sights' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 13).
Ordinary people also describe their dreams in the same
manner, 'I ascended as it were the summit of a mountain,'
'I saw a tree as it were.'--And although it is true
that, in the statement about the taking, the instruments are
exhibited in the objective and instrumental cases, still the
agentship of the Self must be considered as connected
with those instruments, since we have shown that the pure
Self cannot be an agent.
In ordinary language also we meet with similar variations
of expression; the two sentences, for instance, 'the warriors
fight' and 'the king fights by means of his warriors,' really
have the same meaning. Moreover, the statement about
the taking means to express only the cessation of activity
on the part of the instruments, not the independent activity
of any one.--The passage referred to above, 'understanding
performs the sacrifice,' establishes the agentship of the
buddhi merely, as the word 'understanding' is known to
57
have that sense, and as the mind is mentioned close by,
and as in the passage, 'Faith is its head,' &c., faith and so
on are declared to be the members of the Self which consists
of understanding, and as faith, &c., are known to be
attributes of the buddhi. Another reason is furnished by
the complementary sentence, 'All gods worship understanding
as the oldest, as Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 5), for
buddhi is known to be the oldest, i.e. the first produced [Footnote ref 1]. Another scriptural passage also avers that that sacrifice is
accomplished by means of speech and buddhi, 'The
sacrifice is what results from speech and mind.' Nor can
it rightly be maintained (cp. Sûtrathat to view the
instruments as agents would lead to an exchange of power
on the part of the buddhi; for all instruments must necessarily
be considered as agents in regard of their special
functions [Footnote ref 2]. But with reference to perception (upalabdhi) those instruments are (not agents, but) mere instruments,
and perception belongs to the Self. Nor can agentship
be ascribed to the Self on account of perception, since
permanent perception constitutes its nature (and hence cannot
be viewed as a mere transitory activity). Nor can the
agentship which has self-consciousness for its antecedent
belong to the perceiving principle (upalabdh/ri/); for
self-consciousness itself is an object of perception (on the part
of the upalabdh/ri/, i. e. the pure, isolated, intelligent Self).
And on this doctrine there is no occasion for assuming a
further instrument, as we maintain the buddhi itself to be
the instrument.
The objection founded on the impossibility of meditation
(Sûtrais already refuted by the fact, pointed out above,
of scripture having a purport, meditation being enjoined by
scripture with reference to such agentship as is already
established by other passages.--The result of all this is
[Footnote 1 According to the /s/ruti: mahad yaksham prathamaga/m/ veda yo ha vai /g/yesh/tham/ /k/a /s/resh/tham/ /k/a veda.]
[Footnote 2 Wood, for instance, is an 'agent' in regard of the function of burning, while it is a mere instrument with reference to the action of cooking.]
58
that the agentship of the Self is due to its limiting adjuncts only.
41. But from the highest (Lord there result sa/m/sâramokshmokshacause scripture teaches that.
We now enter on the discussion whether the agentship, characterising.the individual soul in the state of Nescience and founded on its limiting adjuncts, is independent of the Lord or dependent on him.
The pûrvapakshintains that the soul as far as it is an agent does not depend on the Lord, because the assumption of such a dependence would serve no purpose. For as the individual soul has motives in its own imperfections,
such as passion, aversion, and so on, and is furnished with the whole apparatus of the other constituents
of action [Footnote ref 1], it is able to occupy on its own account the position of an agent; and what then should the Lord
do for it? Nor does ordinary experience show that in
addition to the oxen which are required for such actions
as ploughing and the like the Lord also is to be depended
upon. Moreover (if all activity depended on the Lord) it
would follow that the Lord is cruel because imposing on
his creatures activity which is essentially painful, and at
the same time unjust because allotting to their activities
unequal results.--But it has already been shown (II, i,
34) that the Lord cannot be taxed with cruelty and injustice,
on account of his dependence.--True, that has
been shown, but only on the condition of the dependence
on the Lord being possible. Now such dependence is
possible only if there exist religious merit and demerit on
the part of the creatures, and these again exist if the
soul is an agent; if then the agentship of the soul
again depends on the Lord, whereupon will the Lord's
dependence depend? And (if we should assume the Lord
to determine the souls without reference to their merits and
demerits) it would follow that the souls have to undergo
[Footnote 1 I.e. the constituents of action such as instrument, object, &c.,
exclusive of the agent.]
59
consequences not due to their actions.-- Hence the soul's
activity is independent.
Setting aside this primâefacie by means of the word
'but,' the Sûtrakârafrom the highest.' For the
soul which in the state of Nescience is blinded by the
darkness of ignorance and hence unable to distinguish
itself from the complex of effects and instruments, the
samsâra-state in which it appears as agent and enjoyenjoyer
brought about through the permission of the Lord who
is the highest Self, the superintendent of all actions, the
witness residing in all beings, the cause of all intelligence;
and we must therefore assume that final release also is
effected through knowledge caused by the grace of the
Lord.
Why so?--'Because scripture teaches that.' For although
the soul has its own imperfections, such as passion
and so on, for motives, and is furnished with the whole
apparatus of action, and although ordinary experience does
not show that the Lord is a cause in occupations such as
ploughing and the like, yet we ascertain from scripture
that the Lord is a causal agent in all activity. For scripture
says, 'He makes him whom he wishes to lead up
from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes
him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do
a bad deed' (Kau. Up. Ill, 8); and again, 'He who
dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within' (Sat. Br.
XIV, 6, 7, 30).
But if causal agency thus belongs to the Lord, it follows
that he must be cruel and unjust, and that the soul has
to undergo consequences of what it has not done.--This
objection the following Sûtrates.
42. But with a view to the efforts made (by the
soul) (the Lord makes it act), on account of the
(otherwise resulting) purportlessness of the injunctions
and prohibitions, &c.
The word 'but' removes the objections started.--The
Lord makes the soul act, having regard to the efforts made
by it, whether meritorious or non--meritorious. Hence
60
there is no room for the objections raised. Having regard
to the inequality of the virtuous and vicious actions of the
souls, the Lord, acting as a mere occasional cause, allots
to them corresponding unequal results. An analogous case
is furnished by rain. As rain constitutes the common
occasional cause for shrubs, bushes, corn, and so on, which
belong to different species and spring each from its particular
seed -- for the inequality of their sap, flowers, fruits,
and leaves results neither when rain is absent nor when
the special seeds are absent -- ; so we also must assume
that the Lord arranges favourable or unfavourable circumstances
for the souls with a view to their former efforts. --
But if the activity of the soul is dependent on something
else, this having regard (on the part of the Lord) to
former effort is inappropriate. -- By no means, we reply:
for although the activity of the soul is not independent.*
yet the soul does act. The Lord indeed causes it to act,
but it acts itself. Moreover, the Lord in causing it to act
now has regard to its former efforts, and he caused it to
act in a former existence, having regard to its efforts
previous to that existence; a regressus against which, considering
the eternity of the sa/m/sâraobjections can be
raised. -- But how is it known that the Lord has regard
to the efforts made (in former existences)? -- The Sûtra
replies: from the purportlessness.* &c., of injunctions and
prohibitions. For thus (i.e. if the Lord has regard to
former actions) injunctions such as ' he who is desirous of
the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' and prohibitions such as
a Brâhma/n/a must not be killed,' are not devoid of purport.
On the other alternative they would be without purport,
and the Lord would in fact be enjoined in the place of
injunctions and prohibitions[Footnote ref 1], since the soul would be
absolutely dependent. And then the Lord might requite
with good those who act according to the injunctions, and
with evil men doing what is forbidden; which would
[Footnote 1 I*/s/vara eva vidhinishedhayo/h/ sthânegniyugyetavyadividhinishedhayohalaphalaad isvarisvaretalprtalpratipâditadharmâdharmanirapeksheti. BhâriitiBhâ
61
subvert the authoritativeness of the Veda. Moreover, if
the Lord were absolutely without any regard, it would
follow that also the ordinary efforts of men are without
any purport; and so likewise the special conditions of
place, time, and cause. And also the difficulty mentioned
above [Footnote ref 1] would present itself.--All these latter difficulties the
Sûtrakâra comprises in his '&c.'
43. (The soul is) a part of the Lord, on account of
the declarations of difference, and (because) in a
different way also some record that (Brahman) is of
the nature of slaves, fishers, and so on.
We have shown that the individual soul and the Lord
stand to each other in the relation of what is being acted
upon and what is acting upon. This relation is observed in
ordinary life to exist only between things connected, such
as a master and a servant, or a fire and its sparks. Now
as the soul and the Lord also are acknowledged to stand
in the relation of what is acted upon and what is acting,
a doubt arises whether their connexion is analogous to
that of a master and a servant, or to that of a fire and
its sparks.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that either the matter is
to be considered as undetermined, or that the connexion
is like that of master and seivant, because that connexion
only is well known to be the relation of ruler (Lord) and
subject ruled.
To this the Sûtra replies that the soul must be considered
a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of
the fire. By 'part' we mean 'a part as it were,' since a
being not composed of parts cannot have parts in the
literal sense.--Why, then, do we not view the Lord, who
is not composed of parts, as identical with the soul?--'On
account of the declarations of difference.' For such scriptural
passages as 'That (self) it is which we must search
out, that it is which we must try to understand' (/Kh/. Up.
[Footnote 1: I.e. the objectionable assumption that men have to undergo
consequences not resulting from their own former actions.]
62
VIII, 7); 'He who knows him becomes a muni' (B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 22); 'He who dwelling within the Self pulls the
Self within' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23); which all of them refer
to a difference (between the highest and the individual
Self) would be inappropriate, if there were no difference.--But,
it may be said, these statements of difference would
agree better with a relation similar to that of master
and servant.--Hence the sûtrakâra adds, 'and otherwise
also.' That the soul is a part (of the Lord) we learn not
only from the passages declaring their difference, but there
are other statements also which teach their non-difference.
The members of a certain /s/âkhâ of the Atharva-veda
record in a Brahma-sûkta that 'Brahman are the fishermen,
Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers,' &c.
Here low creatures such as fishermen, and slaves depending
on their masters, and gamblers are called Brahman;
whence it appears that all individual souls which
have entered into aggregates of effects and instruments
(i.e. bodies) depending on name and form are Brahman.
The same view is set forth in other passages such
as 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou
art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy
staff, thou art born with thy face turned everywhere'
(/S/ve. Up. IV, 3), and 'The wise one who, having produced
all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by
their names)' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7). Passages such as 'There
is no other seer but he' and other similar ones establish
the same truth.--Non-differenced intelligence belongs to
the soul and the Lord alike, as heat belongs to the sparks
as well as the fire.--From these two views of difference
and non-difference there results the comprehensive view
of the soul being a part of the Lord.--The following Sûtra
supplies a further reason.
44. And on account of the mantra.
A mantra also intimates the same view. 'Such is the
greatness of it; greater than it is the Person. One foot
of it are all beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in
heaven' (/Kh/. Up. III, 12, 6). Here the word 'beings'
63
denotes all moving and non-moving things, among which
the souls occupy the first place; in accordance with the
use of the word in the following passage, 'Not giving pain to
any being (bhûta) except at the tîrthas' (/Kh/. Up. VIII,
15). Herefrom also we conclude that the individual soul
is a part of the Lord.--And again from the following
reason.
45. Moreover it is so stated in Sm/ri/ti.
In the Î/s/varagitâs (Bhagavad-gitâ) also it is said that the
soul is a part of the Lord, 'an eternal part of me becomes
the individual soul in the world of life' (Bha. Gî. XV, 7).
With regard to the assertion made above, viz. that in ordinary
life the relation of ruler and ruled is known to hold
good in the case of master and servant &c. only, we remark
that, although that may be the case in ordinary life, we
ascertain from scripture that the relation of part and whole
and that of ruler and ruled may go together. Nor is there
anything contradictory in assuming that the Lord who is
provided with superexcellent limiting adjuncts rules the
souls which are connected with inferior adjuncts only.
Here the pûrvapakshin raises another objection. If we
admit that the souls are parts of the Lord, it follows that
the Lord also, whose part the soul is, will be afflicted by the
pain caused to the soul by its experience of the sa/m/sâra-state;
as we see in ordinary life that the entire Devadatta
suffers from the pain affecting his hand or foot or some
other limb. Herefrom it would follow that they who obtain
Brahman obtain a greater pain [Footnote ref 1]: so that the former sa/m/sâra-condition
would be preferable, and complete knowledge
be devoid of purpose.--To this the following Sûtra replies.
46. (As the soul is affected by pleasure and pain)
not so the highest (Lord); as in the case of light and
so on.
We maintain that the highest Lord does not feel the pain
of the sa/m/sâra-state in the same way as the soul does. The
soul being engrossed by Nescience identifies itself as it were
[Footnote 1: Viz. by participating in all pain.]
64
with the body and so on, and imagines itself to be affected
by the experience of pain which is due to Nescience, 'I am
afflicted by the pain due to the body;' the highest Lord, on
the other hand, neither identifies himself with a body, nor
imagines himself to be afflicted by pain. The pain of the
individual soul also is not real, but imaginary only, caused
by the error consisting in the non-discrimination of (the
Self from) the body, senses, and other limiting adjuncts which
are due to name and form, the effects of Nescience. And as
a person feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his
body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter, so
he feels also the pain affecting others, such as sons or friends,
by erroneously identifying himself with them, entering as it
were into them through love, and imagining 'I am the son,
I am the friend.' Wherefrom we infer with certainty that
the feeling of pain is due merely to the error of false imagination.
At the same conclusion we arrive on the ground of
negative instances. Let us consider the case of many men,
each of whom possesses sons, friends, &c., sitting together,
some of them erroneously imagining that they are connected
with their sons, friends, &c., while others do not. If then
somebody calls out 'the son has died,' 'the friend has died,'
grief is produced in the minds of those who are under the
imagination of being connected with sons and friends, but
not in the minds of religious mendicants who have freed
themselves from that imagination. From this it appears
that perfect knowledge is of use even to an ordinary man;
of how much greater use then will it be to him (i.e. the
Lord) whose nature is eternal pure intelligence, who sees
nothing beside the Self for which there are no objects.
Hence it follows that perfect knowledge is not purposeless.
--To illustrate this view the Sûtraoduces a comparison
'like light,' &c. Just as the light of the sun or the moon
which pervades the entire space becomes straight or bent
as it were when the limiting adjuncts with which it is in
contact, such as a finger, for instance, are straight or bent, but
does not really become so; and just as the ether, although
imagined to move as it were when jars are being moved,
does not really move; and as the sun does not tremble,
65
although its image trembles when you shake the cup filled
with water in which the sun's light is reflected; thus the
Lord also is not affected by pain, although pain be felt
by that part of him which is called the individual soul,
is presented by Nescience, and limited by the buddhi and
other adjuncts. That also the soul's undergoing pain is
due to Nescience only, we have already explained. Accordingly
the Vedânta--texts teach that, when the soul's individual
state, due to Nescience, is sublated, it becomes Brahman,
'Thou art that &c.'--Thus there is no occasion to conclude
that the highest Self is affected by the pain of the individual
soul.
47. And the Sm/ri/tis state (that).
Vyâsaothers state in their sm/rismirittis the highest
Self is not afflicted by the pain of the individual soul, 'That
highest Self is said to be eternal, devoid of qualities, nor is
it stained by the fruits of actions any more than a lotus
leaf by water. But that other Self whose essence is action
is connected with bondage and release; again and again
it is joined with the seventeenfold aggregate[Footnote ref 1 ].'--On the ground of the particle 'and' (in the Sûtrahave to supply
'and scripture also records that.' So, for instance, 'One of
them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating'
(Mu. Up. Ill, i, i), and 'The one Self within all things is
never contaminated by the misery of the world, being himself
without' (Ka. Up. II, 5, ii).
Here the pûrvapakshines a new objection.--If there
is only one internal Self of all beings, what room is there
for permissions and prohibitions, worldly as well as Vedic?
You must not reject this objection on the ground of your
having proved that the individual soul is a part of the Lord,
and that thus injunctions and prohibitions may, without any
mutual interference, apply to the soul which is different from
the Lord. For there are other scriptural passages which teach
that the soul is not different from the Lord, and therefore
not a part of him, as, for instance, the following ones:
[Footnote 1 I.e. the subtle body consisting of the ten sense-organs, the five prâ, manasmanas buddhbuddhi
66
Having sent forth that he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. 11, 6);
There is no other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23); 'From
death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity'
(B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'Thou art that' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 8, 7);
'I am Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). Should you say that
just from this concurrence of intimations of difference on the
one hand and non--difference on the other hand it follows
that the soul is a part of the Lord, we reply that such might
be the case if the intention of the texts were to teach difference
as well as non--difference. But the fact is that the texts
aim solely at teaching non--difference, because through the
knowledge of Brahman being the universal Self the highest
end of man is obtained. About difference on the other
hand mere occasional statements (anuvâda made as
about something already established naturally (i.e. apart
from scripture). Moreover, we have already maintained
that Brahman as not composed of parts can have no parts.
Hence it follows that the one highest Self which is within
all beings appears as individual soul, and it therefore remains
to show how injunctions and prohibitions are possible.
48. (The possibility of) injunctions and prohibitions
(results) from the connexion (of the Self) with
bodies; as in the case of light and so on.
Passages such as 'He is to approach his wife at the
proper time,' and 'he is not to approach the wife of his
guru,' are examples of permissions (or injunctions) and
prohibitions; or again passages such as 'He is to kill the
animal devoted to Agnîshomaud 'He is not to hurt any
being.' Corresponding examples from ordinary life are:
'A friend is to be served,' and 'Enemies are to be shunned.'
Permissions and prohibitions of this kind are possible, because
the Self although one only is connected with various
bodies.--Of what kind then is that connexion?--It consists
in the origination in the Self of the erroneous notion that
the Self is the aggregate consisting of the body and so on.
This erroneous notion is seen to prevail in all living beings,
and finds its expression in thoughts such as the following:
'/I/ go,' '/I/ come,' '/I/ am blind,' '/I/ am not blind,' '/I/ am con-*
67
*fused,' '/I/ am not confused.' That erroneous notion cannot
be removed by anything but perfect knowledge, and before
the latter supervenes, it remains spread among all living
beings. And thus, although the Self must be admitted to
be one only, injunctions and prohibitions are possible owing
to the difference effected by its connexion with bodies and
other limiting adjuncts, the products of Nescience.--It then
follows that for him who has obtained perfect knowledge,
injunctions and prohibitions are purportless.--No, we reply,
(they are not purportless for him, but they do not refer to
him), since to him who has obtained the highest aim no
obligation can apply. For obligations are imposed with
reference to things to be avoided* or desired; how then
should he, who sees nothing, either to be wished or avoided,
beyond the universal Self, stand under any obligation?
The Self certainly cannot be enjoined on the Self.--Should
it be said that injunctions and prohibitions apply to all
those who discern that the soul is something different from
the body (and therefore also to him who possesses perfect
knowledge), we reply that (such an assertion is too wide,
since) obligation depends on a man's imagining his Self to
be (actually) connected with the body. It is true that
obligation exists for him only who views the soul as something
different from the body; but fundamentally all obligation
is an erroneous imagination existing in the case of
him only who does not see that his Self is no more connected
with a body than the ether is with jars and the
like. For him, on the other hand, who does not see that
connexion no obligation exists, much less, therefore, for him
who discerns the unity of the Self.--Nor does it result from
the absence of obligation, that he who has arrived at perfect
knowledge can act as he likes; for in all cases it is only the
wrong imagination (as to the Self's connexion with a body)
that impels to action, and that imagination is absent in the
case of him who has reached perfect knowledge.--From all
this it follows that injunctions and prohibitions are based on
the Self s connexion with the body; 'as in the case of
light' . * The case under discussion is analogous to cases
such as the following: Light is one only, and yet we shun
68
a fire which has consumed dead bodies, not any other fire.
The sun* is one only; yet we shun only that part of his
light which shines on unholy places, not that part which
falls on pure ground. Some things consisting of earth, are
desired, e.g. diamonds and beryls; other things likewise
consisting of earth are shunned, e.g. dead bodies. The
urine and dung of cows are considered pure and used as
such; those of other animals are shunned. And many
similar cases.
49. And on account of the non-extension (of the
individual soul), there is no confusion (of the results
of actions).
Well, let it be granted that injunctions and prohibitions,
are valid, because the Self although one is joined with
particular bodies.--From the admission, however, of the
unity of the Self it follows that there must be a confusion
of the fruits of actions, there being only one master
(i.e. one soul to enjoy the fruits of action).--This is not so,
we reply, because there is no extension of the acting and
enjoying Self, i.e. no connexion on its part with all bodies.
For, as we have shown, the individual soul depends on its
adjuncts, and owing to the non-extension of those adjuncts
there is also non-extension of the soul. Hence there is no
confusion of actions or fruits of actions.
50. And (the individual soul is) an appearance
(reflection) only.
And that individual soul is to be considered a mere
appearance of the highest Self, like the reflection of the
sun in the water; it is neither directly that (i.e. the highest
Self), nor a different thing. Hence just as, when one reflected
image of the sun trembles, another reflected image
does not on that account tremble also; so, when one soul
is connected with actions and results of actions, another
soul is not on that account connected likewise. There is
therefore no confusion of actions and results. And as that
'appearance' is the effect of Nescience, it follows that the
sa/m/sârah is based on it (the appearance) is also the
effect of Nescience, so that from the removal of the latter
there results the cognition of the soul being in reality
nothing but Brahman.
For those, on the other hand, who maintain that there
are many Selfs and all of them all-pervading, it follows
that there must be a confusion of actions and results.--In
what way?--According to the opinion of the Sâ@nkhyas
there exist many all-pervading Selfs, whose nature is pure
intelligence, devoid of qualities and of unsurpassable excellence.
For the common purpose of all of them there
exists the pradhâna, through which the souls obtain enjoyment
and release.--According to the followers of Ka/n/âda
there exist many all-pervading Selfs, but they are, like so
many jars or stools, mere substances and unintelligent in
themselves. With those Selfs there co-operate the internal
organs (manas), atomic and also unintelligent. From the
conjunction of these two classes of substances, viz. the
Selfs and the internal organs, there spring the nine special
qualities of the Selfs, viz. desire, &c.[Footnote ref 1] These qualities inhere in the individual Selfs separately, without any
confusion, and that constitutes the sa/m/sâra-state. Final
release, on the other hand, consists in the absolute non-origination
of those nine qualities.
With regard to these opinions we remark that, as far as
the Sâ@nkhyas are concerned, their doctrine that all Selfs
are of the nature of intelligence, and that there is no
difference between them in the point of proximity (to the
pradhâna), &c.[Footnote ref 2], implies that, if one Self is connected with
pleasure and pain, all Selfs will be so connected.--Well but,
the Sâ@nkhya might reply, a difference (in the connexion
of the individual Selfs with pleasure and pain) may result
from the circumstance that the activity of the pradhana
aims at the isolation (emancipation) of the Selfs[Footnote ref 3]. Other-*
[Footnote 1: Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, demerit, and bhâvanâ.]
[Footnote 2: The &c. implies the non-activity (âudasinya) of the Selfs.]
[Footnote 3: And therefore proceeds in a special definite direction capable of effecting in the end the emancipation of some particular Self.]
70
*wise the activity of the pradhâna would serve no other
end but to manifest the pradhâna's power, in consequence
whereof no final release would ever take place.--This argumentation,
we reply, is not sound. For we have no right
to assume a difference which has for its only motive the
accomplishment of an end desirable (to us, viz. the emancipation
of the Selfs), but we must rather bring forward
some proof for that difference. If no such proof can be
brought forward, the desired end, i.e. the emancipation
of the soul, must be supposed not to take place; while
at the same time the absence of any cause of difference
establishes the confusion of actions and their results.--Against
the Kâ/n/âdas we urge that if, on their theory, the
internal organ is connected with one soul, it must in the
same way be connected with all other souls as well, as
there is no difference in the point of proximity, &c.[Footnote ref 1]
Hence, there being no difference of cause and consequently
no difference of effect, it follows that, when one soul is
connected with pleasure and pain, all souls are thus connected.--But
may not the limitation (of actions and their
results) be caused by the unseen principle (ad/ri/sh/t/a)? By
no means, the following Sûtra replies.
51. On account of the unseen principle being non-*limitative.
While there are many souls, all-pervading like ether,
and in equal proximity to all bodies from within as well
as without, the so-called unseen principle (ad/ri/sh/t/a), which
is of the nature of religious merit or demerit, is acquired
through mind, speech, and body (i.e. thoughts, words, and
actions).--Now, according to the Sâ@nkhyas, that principle
inheres not in the Self, but abides in the pradhâna and
cannot, on account of the pradhâna being the same (for
all souls), be the limitative cause of the enjoyment of
pleasure and pain for each individual Self.--And according
to the Kâ/n/âdas also the unseen principle is due to the
non-particular conjunction of the Selfs with the internal
[Footnote 1: The '&c.' implies substantiality and so on.]
71
organs, and as thus there is no limitative reason for any
particular ad/ri/sh/t/a belonging to any particular soul, the
doctrine is open to the same objection.--Well, but there
are at work in every particular Self resolutions, &c., such
as, 'I wish to obtain that result,' 'I wish to avoid that
other result,' 'I am striving for that purpose,' 'I wish to
act in that way,' &c. &c., and these may, we assume,
define the relation of ownership in which particular Selfs
stand to particular ad/ri/sh/t/as.--This objection is negatived
in the following Sûtra.
52. And this is also the case in resolutions, &c.
The objection pointed out before applies also to resolutions,
&c., for they also are made through the non-particular
conjunction of the internal organ and the Self,
in proximity to all Selfs. Hence they also cannot furnish
a reason for limitation.
53. (Should it be said that distinction of pleasure,
pain, &c., results) from (difference of) place; we say
no, on account of the (Self's) being within (all
things).
Here it might be objected that, although all Selfs are
all-pervading, yet their conjunction with the internal organ
which is seated in the body must take place in that part
of each Self which is limited by the body; and that thus
there may result from difference of locality a limitative
distinction of resolutions, &c., of the ad/ri/sh/t/a, and of
pleasure and pain.--This also, we reply, is not possible
'on account of the being within.' For, as being equally
infinite, all Selfs are within all bodies. Thus the Vai/s/eshikas
have no right whatever to assume any part of the
Self to be limited by the body. And if they do assume
such a part of the Self which in reality is without any
parts, that part because merely assumptive will be incapable
of limiting a real effect. Moreover, it is impossible
to limit the body which originates in proximity to all
(omnipresent) Selfs to one particular Self to the exclusion
of all others. Moreover, on the doctrine of limitation due
72
to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two
Selfs enjoying the same pleasure or pain might effect their
fruition by one and the same body, since it may happen
that the unseen principle of two Selfs occupies the same
place. For we may observe, e.g. that after Devadatta's
body has moved away from a certain spot in which Devadatta
had enjoyed a certain amount of pleasure or pain,
and the body of Ya/gñ/adatta has moved into that very same
place, Ya/gñ/adatta enjoys an equal amount of pleasure or
pain; a thing which (on the theory discussed) could not
happen if the unseen principles of the two men did not
occupy the same place. From the doctrine that the unseen
principles occupy fixed places it would, moreover, follow
that no enjoyment of the heavenly world, &c. can take
place; for the ad/ri/sh/t/a is effected in definite places such
as e.g. the body of a Brâhma/n/a, and the enjoyment of the
heavenly world is bound to a definite different place.--It
further[Footnote ref 1] is impossible to maintain that there exist many
all-pervading Selfs [Footnote ref 2], as there are no parallel instances. Mention if you can a plurality of other things occupying
the same place!--You will perhaps bring forward colour
and so on[Footnote ref 3]. But we refuse to accept that instance as
parallel, because colour, &c., although non-different in so
far as they are attributes of one substance, yet differ
through their essential characteristics. On the other hand
there is no difference of characteristics between your
(alleged) many Selfs. If you say that a difference of
characteristics can be established on the ground of the
ultimate special differences (of all substances), we point
out that you implicate yourself in a logical circle as the
assumption of difference of characteristics and the assumption
of ultimate differences presuppose each other.
[Footnote 1: And this is an attack on the basis of the position of the Sâ@nkhyas as well as of the Vai/s/eshikas.]
[Footnote 2: Which being equally omnipresent would all occupy the same space.]
[Footnote 3: Many attributes such as colour, smell, touch, &c. reside in one place as belonging to one material object.]
73
Should you adduce as parallel instances the all-pervadingness
of ether, &c. (the '&c.' implying place and time), we
reply that their all-pervadingness is not proved for him
who holds the doctrine of Brahman and looks upon ether
and so on as mere effects.
All which establishes the conclusion that the only doctrine
not open to any objections is the doctrine of the unity
of the Self.
74
FOURTH PÂDA.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
/*
1. Thus the vital airs.
*/
In the third pâda it has been shown that a conflict of
Vedic passages as to ether, &c., does not exist. The same
is now done in this fourth pâda with regard to the vital
airs. On the one hand the chapters treating of the origin of
things do not record an origin of the vital airs; so e.g.
(/Kh/. Up. VI, 2, 3) 'It sent forth fire,' &c.; and (Taitt. Up.
II, 1) 'From that Self sprang ether,' &c. On the other
hand it is said expressly in some places that the vital airs
were not produced. The following passage, e.g. 'Non-being
indeed was this in the beginning; they say: what
was that non-being? those /ri/shis indeed were the non-being
in the beginning; they say: who are those /ri/shis? the
vital airs indeed are the /ri/shis' (/S/at. Br. VI, 1, 1, 1), states
that the vital airs existed before the origin of things.--In
other passages again we read of the origin of the vital
airs also, so e.g. 'As small sparks come forth from fire,
thus do all vital airs come forth from that Self' (B/ri/. Up.
II, 1, 20); 'From that is born the vital air, mind, and all
organs of sense' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3); 'The seven vital airs
also spring from him' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8); 'He sent forth
the vital air; from the vital air /s/raddhâ, ether, air, light.
water, earth, sense, mind, food' (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Hence
as there is a conflict of scriptural passages, and as no
reason can be made out for deciding in favour of either
alternative, the pûrvapakshin thinks that either no opinion
can be formed, or that the passages relative to the origin
of the vital airs must be taken in a metaphorical sense, since
scripture expressly states the prâ/n/as to have existed before
the creation.
In reply to this the author of the Sûtras says, 'thus the
prâ/n/as.'--What then, it will be asked, is the fitness of the
word 'thus,' as there is no point of comparison with the
matter under discussion? The matter under discussion at
the conclusion of the preceding pâda was the refutation
of those who maintain a plurality of omnipresent Selfs, and
with this no comparison can be instituted because there is
no similarity. For a comparison is possible only where
there is similarity; as when we say, e.g. 'as a lion so is Bala-*varman.'
Possibly it might be said that the comparison is
meant to intimate similarity with the ad/ri/sh/t/a.; the meaning
being that as the ad/ri/sh/t/a is not limited because it is produced
in proximity to all Selfs, so the prâ/n/as also are not
limited with regard to all the different Selfs. But, on that
explanation, the Sûtra would be an idle repetition, as it has
already been explained that that absence of limitation is due
to the non-limitation of bodies.--Nor can the prâ/n/as be compared
with the individual soul, because that would be contrary
to the conclusion about to be established. For it has
been shown that the individual soul is without an origin,
while the intention is to declare that the prâ/n/as have an
origin. Hence it appears that the word 'so' is devoid of
connexion.--Not so, we reply. A connexion may be
established by means of a comparison based on the exemplifying
passages. Under that category fall those passages
which state the origin of the prâ/n/as, as e.g. 'From that
Self come forth all prâ/n/as, all worlds, all gods, all beings'
(B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 20); which passage means that as the worlds
and so on are produced from the highest Brahman so the
prâ/n/as also. Such passages also as (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3)
'From him are born prâ/n/a, mind and all organs of sense,
ether, air, light, water, and the earth the support of all,' are
to be considered as intimating that the origin of the prâ/n/as
is analogous to that of the ether, &c.--Or else, as a connexion
with a somewhat remote object of comparison is
resorted to in such cases as the one treated of in Pû. Mî.
Sû. III, 4, 32 ('and the accident in drinking Soma, in the
same manner')[Footnote ref 1], we may construe our Sûtra in the following
[Footnote 1: The 'tadvat' in the quoted Sûtra refers not to the immediately preceding adhikara/n/a but to Sûtra III, 4, 28.]
76
way: in the same way as ether and so on, which are mentioned
in the beginning of the preceding pada, are understood
to be effects of the highest Brahman, so the prâ/n/as
also are effects of the highest Brahman. And if it be
asked what reason we have for assuming the prâ/n/as to be
so, we reply: the fact of this being stated by scripture.--But
it has been shown above that in some places the
origin of the prâ/n/as is not mentioned.--That is of no
weight, we reply, as it is mentioned in other places. For
the circumstance of a thing not being stated in some
places has no power to invalidate what is stated about it
in other places. Hence, on account of equality of scriptural
statement, it is proper to maintain that the prâ/n/as
also are produced in the same way as ether and so on.
2. On account of the impossibility of a secondary
(origin of the prâ/n/as).
Against the objection that the origin of the prâ/n/as must
be understood in a secondary sense because the text states
that they existed before the origin of the world, the Sûtra-*kâra
declares 'on account of the impossibility of a
secondary origin.' The statement as to the origin of the
prâ/n/as cannot be taken in a secondary sense because
therefrom would result the abandonment of a general
assertion. For after the text has asserted that the knowledge
of everything depends on the knowledge of one
('What is that through which when it is known everything
else becomes known?' Mu. Up. I, 1, 3), it goes on to say,
in order to prove that assertion, that 'From him is born
prâ/n/a,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3). Now the assertion is made
good only if the whole world including the prâ/n/as is an
effect of Brahman, because then there is no effect independent
of the material cause; if on the other hand the
statement as to the origin of the prâ/n/as were taken in a
secondary sense, the assertion would thereby be stultified.
The text, moreover, makes some concluding statements
about the matter asserted, 'The Person is all this, sacrifice,
penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal' (II, 1, 10), and
'Brahman alone is all this; it is the Best.'--That same
77
assertion is to be connected with such passages as the
following, 'When we see, hear, perceive, and know the Self,
then all this is known' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5).--How then
have we to account for the statement that the prâ/n/as
existed before the creation?--That statement, we reply,
does not refer to the fundamental causal substance; for we
ascertain from scriptural passages, such as Mu. Up. II, 1, 2
('That heavenly Person is without breath and without mind,
pure, higher than the high Imperishable'), that the fundamental
causal substance is devoid of all distinctions such
as breath and the like. We must rather view the statement
about the existence of the prâ/n/as before the creation as
having for its object a subordinate causal substance [Footnote 1], and
being made with reference to the effects of the latter only.
For it is known from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti that even in the
universe of evolved things many states of being may stand
to each other in the relation of causal substance and effect.--In
the adhikara/n/a treating of the ether there occurred a
Sûtra (composed of the same syllables) 'gau/n/yasambhavât,'
which as being the pûrvapaksha-sûtra had to be explained
as ' gau/n/i asambhavât,' 'the statement about the origin
of ether must be taken in a secondary sense on account of
the impossibility (of the primary sense).' There the final
conclusion was established by means of the abandonment
of the general assertion. Here on the other hand the Sûtra
is the Siddhânta Sûtra and we have therefore explained
it as meaning 'on account of the impossibility of a secondary
meaning.'--Those who explain the present Sûtra in the
same way as the previous Sûtra overlook the fact of the
general assertion being abandoned (viz. if the passages
referring to the origin of the prâ/n/as were taken in a
secondary sense).
/*
3. On account of that (word which indicates origin)
being enunciated at first (in connexion with the
prâ/n/as).
*/
That the scriptural statement about the origin of the
* * * * *
[Footnote 1: Such as Hita/n/yagarbha.]
78
prâ is to be taken in its literal sense just as the statements
about the ether, &c., appears from that circumstance
also that the one word which (in the passage from the Mu.
Up.) indicates origination, viz. 'is born' (/g/âyate in the
first place connected with the prâ and has afterwards to
be joined with ether, &c., also ('from him is born breath,
mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air,' &c.). Now as it is
a settled matter that the phrase 'is born' must be taken in
its primary sense with reference to ether and so on, it
follows that the origin of the prâ also to which the same
word is applied must be understood as a real origin. For
it would be impossible to decide that a word enunciated
once only in one chapter and one sentence, and connected
with many other words, has in some cases to be taken in its
primary sense, and in others in a secondary sense; for such
a decision would imply want of uniformity.--So likewise in
the passage,'He sent forth prâ from prâ/nprâddha,' &raddha
(Pr. Up. VI, 4), the phrase 'he sent forth' which the text
exhibits in conjunction with the prâ has to be carried
on to /s/raddhâthe other things which have an origin.
--The same reasoning holds good in those cases where the
word expressing origination occurs at the end and has to be
connected with the preceding words; as e.g. in the passage
ending 'all beings come forth from the Self,' where the
word 'come forth ' must be connected with the prâ, &c.,
mentioned in the earlier part of the sentence.
4. Because speech is preceded by that (viz. fire
and the other elements).
Although in the chapter, 'That sent forth fire,' &c., the
origin of the prâ is not mentioned, the origin of the
three elements, fire, water, and earth only being stated,
nevertheless, the fact of the text declaring that speech,
prâ and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth--which in
their turn have Brahman for their causal substance--proves
that they--and, by parity of reasoning, all prâ--have
sprung from Brahman. That speech, prâ and mind
presuppose fire, water, and earth is told in the same chapter,
'For truly, my child, mind consists of earth, breath of water,
79
speech of fire' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 5, 4). If their consisting of
earth and so on is taken literally, it follows at once that
they have sprung from Brahman. And if it be taken in a
metaphorical sense only, yet, as the sentence forms part of
the chapter which treats of the evolution of names and
forms effected by Brahman; and as the introductory phrase
runs, 'That by which we hear what is not heard' (/Kh/. Up.
VI, 1, 3); and as the concluding passage is 'In it all that
exists has its Self' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 8, 7); and as the matter is
moreover known from other scriptural passages; we understand
that also the statement about mind and so on
consisting of earth, &c., is meant to teach that they are
products of Brahman.--It is therefore an established conclusion
that the prâ also are effects of Brahman.
5. (The prâ are) seven, on account of this
being understood (from scriptural passages) and of
the specification (of those seven).
So far we have shown that there is in reality no conflict
of scriptural passages regarding the origin of the prâ.
It will now be shown that there is also no conflict regarding
their number. The chief vital air (mukhya prâ will be
discussed later on. For the present the Sûtrakâra
the number of the other prâ. A doubt arises here
owing to the conflicting nature of the scriptural passages.
In one place seven prâ are mentioned, 'The seven prâ/nprâ
spring from him' (Mu. Up. II, i, 8). In another place
eight prâ are mentioned as being grahagrahasght grahagrahas
there are and eight atigrahas' (B/ri/. Up. III, 2, i). In
another place nine, ' Seven are the prâ of the head, two
the lower ones' (Taitt. Sa/m/h. V, 3, 2, 5). Sometimes ten,
'Nine prâ indeed are in men, the navel is the tenth'
(Taitt. Sa/m/h. V, 3, 2, 3). Sometimes eleven, 'Ten are these
prâ in man, and Âtman is the eleventh' (B/ri/. ri. III,
9, 4). Sometimes twelve, 'All touches have their centre in
the skin,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, ii). Sometimes thirteen,
'The eye and what can be seen,' &c. (Pr. Up. IV, 8).--Thus
the scriptural passages disagree about the number of the
prâ.
80
Here the pûrvapakshintains that the prâ/nprâin
reality seven in number, on account of understanding, i.e.
because they are understood to be so many, from passages
such as 'The seven prâ spring from him,' &c. These
seven prâ are moreover specified in the other passage
quoted above, 'Seven indeed are the prâ of the head.'
--But in the same passage we meet with the following
reiteration, 'Resting in the cave they are placed there seven
and seven,' which intimates that there are prâ in addition
to the seven.--No matter, we reply; that reiteration is
made with reference to the plurality of men, and means
that each man has seven prâ; it does not mean that
there are two sets of seven prâ each of different nature.
--But, another objection will be raised, other scriptural
passages speak of the prâ as eight in number; how then
should they be seven?--True, we reply, the number of eight
also is stated; but on account of the contradictory nature
of the statements we have to decide in favour of either of
the two numbers; hence we decide in favour of the number
seven, in deference to the (simpler) assumption of a low
number, and consider the statements of other numbers to
refer to the difference of modifications (of the fundamental
seven prâ).--To this argumentation the next SûtraSûtra
6. But (there are also, in addition to the seven
prâ mentioned,) the hands and so on. This being
a settled matter, therefore (we must) not (conclude)
thus (viz. that there are seven prâ only).
In addition to the seven prâ scripture mentions other
prâ also, such as the hands, &c., 'The hand is one grahagraha
and that is seized by work as the atigraha; for with the
hands one does work' (B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 8), and similar passages.
And as it is settled that there are more than seven,
the number seven may be explained as being contained
within the greater number. For wherever there is a conflict
between a higher and a lower number, the higher number
has to be accepted because the lower one is contained within
it; while the higher is not contained within the lower. We
therefore must not conclude that, in deference to the lower
81
number, seven prâ have to be assumed, but rather that
there are eleven prâ, in deference to the higher number.
This conclusion is confirmed by one of the passages quoted,
'Ten are these prâ in man, and Åtman is the eleventh.'
By the word Åtman we have to understand the internal
organ, on account of its ruling over the organs. Should it
be objected that scripture also mentions numbers higher
than eleven, viz. twelve and thirteen, we admit that, but
remark that there are no objective effects in addition to the
eleven (well--known) objective effects on account of which
additional organs would have to be assumed. There are five
distinctions of buddhi having for their respective objects
sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, and on their account
there are the five intellectual organs; again there are five
classes of action, viz. speaking, taking, going, evacuation,
and begetting, and on their account there are the five organs
of action; finally there is the manas which has all things
for its objects and extends to the past, the present, and the
future; it is one only but has various functions. On account
of the plurality of its functions we find it designated by
different terms in different places, as manas or buddhi or
aha/m/kârak/itta.ittas scripture also after having enumerated
the various functions such as desire, &c., says at
the end, 'All this is manas only.'--That passage again which
speaks of the prâ of the head as seven means four prâ/nprâ
only, which on account of the plurality of their places may
be counted as seven; viz. the two ears, the two eyes, the
two nostrils, and speech.--Nor can it be maintained that
there are in reality only so many (i.e. seven), the other
prâ being mere functions of the seven; for the functions
of the hands and so on are absolutely different (from the
functions of the seven senses admitted by the pûrvapakshin
--Again, in the passage 'Nine prâ indeed are in man, the
navel is the tenth,' the expression 'ten prâ 'is used to
denote the different openings of the human body, not the
difference of nature of the prâ, as we conclude from the
navel being mentioned as the eleventh. For no prâis
known that bears the name of navel; but the navel as being
one of the special abodes of the chief prâis here enu-*enu
82
*merated as a tenth prâ--In some places so and so many
are counted for the purpose of meditation; in other places
so and so many for the purpose of illustration [Footnote ref 1]. As the statements concerning the number of the prâ are of so
varying a nature we must therefore distinguish in each case
what the object of the statement is. Meanwhile it remains
a settled conclusion that that statement which makes the
prâ to be eleven is authoritative, on account of the
objective effects (being eleven also).
The two Sûtraserring to the number of the prâ/nprâ
may be construed in the following manner also. The
prâ are seven because scripture mentions the going
(gati) of seven only, 'When he thus departs life departs
after him, and when life thus departs all the other prâ [Footnote ref 2]
depart after it' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 2).--But, it may be objected,
this passage says 'all the other prâ;' how then does it
declare the going of seven only?--The Sûtraies, 'on
account of their being specified.' Seven senses only, from
seeing up to feeling, are specified there because so many
only are under discussion; as we see from the enumeration
given in the passage, 'When that person in the eye turns
away then he ceases to know any forms. He has become
one they say. he does not see' &c. The word 'all' refers
here only to what is under discussion, i.e. only to the seven
prâ mentioned before, not to any other. Analogously
when we say 'all the Brâhma/n/as have been fed,' we mean
only those Brâhma/n/as who have been invited and concern
us at the time, not any other.--If it be objected that the
passage quoted mentions understanding (vi/gñ*åna
eighth thing departing, and that we therefore have no right
to speak of the departing of seven only, we reply that
manas and understanding differ not in essential nature but
only in function, and that on this account we are entitled
to speak of seven prâ only.--The answer to this
[Footnote 1: Sapta prâh/ prabhprabhavantîtymâderkgatimti, akvat/auitiau
grahâdityâderûgatiyatisû itayati.gatimitiGi
[Footnote 2: I.e. seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, feeling, and the manas.]
82
pûrvapaksha is as follows.--In addition to the seven
senses, other prâ/n/as also, such as the hands, are known
to exist, as we see from such passages as 'The hands are
one graha,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 8). By their being a graha
(seizer) is meant that they are bonds by which the individual
soul (kshetra/gñ/a) is tied. Now the individual soul is
tied not in one body only, but is equally tied in other bodies
also. Hence it follows that that bond called graha (i.e.
among other things the hands) moves over into other bodies
also. Sm/ri/ti also ('He--the Self--is joined with the aggregate
of eight, comprising breath, &c.[Footnote ref 1], as his mark; his
bondage consists in being bound by it, his release in being
freed from it') shows that the Self is, previous to final
release, not freed from the bonds called grahas. And also
in the enumeration of the senses and their objects given
by the Atharva/n/a Upanishad ('The eye and what can be
seen,' &c., Pr. Up. IV, 8), the organs of action such as the
hands and so on, together with their objects, are specified
as well,'the hands and what can be grasped; the member and
what can be delighted; the anus and what can be evacuated;
the feet and what can be walked.' Moreover the passage,
'These ten vital breaths and átman as the eleventh; when
they depart from this mortal body they make us cry' (B/ri/.
Up. III, 9, 4), shows that eleven prâ/n/as depart from the body.
--Moreover the word 'all' (which occurs in the passage. B/ri/.
Up. IV, 4, 2) must, because connected with the word 'prâ/n/as,'
denote all prâ/n/as, and cannot, on the ground of general subject-matter, be limited to the seven prâ/n/as; for a direct statement
has greater force than the subject-matter. Even in the
analogous sentence, 'all Brâhma/n/as have been fed,' we have,
on the ground of the words, to understand all Brâhma/n/as
living on the earth; but because it is impossible to feed all
Brâhma/n/as in the latter sense, we accept that meaning of
[Footnote 1: The eightfold aggregate of which the Self is freed in final release only comprises the five prâ/n/as (vital airs), the pentad of the five subtle elements, the pentad of the organs of intellect, the pentad of the organs of action, the tetrad of internal organs (manas, &c.), avidyâ, desire (kâma), and karman.]
84
'all,' according to which it denotes all invited Brâhma/n/as.
In our case on the other hand there is no reason whatever
for narrowing the meaning of 'all.'--Hence the word 'all'
includes all prâ/n/as without exception. Nothing on the
other hand prevents the enumeration of seven prâ/n/as being
taken as illustrative only. It is therefore an established
conclusion, resting on the number of the effects as well
as on Vedic statement, that there are eleven prâ/n/as.
7. And (they are) minute.
The author of the Sûtras adds another characteristic
quality of the prâ/n/as. The prâ/n/as under discussion must
be viewed as minute. By their minuteness we have to
understand subtilty and limited size; but not atomic size,
as otherwise they would be incapable of producing effects
which extend over the whole body. They must be subtle;
for if they were big the persons surrounding a dying man
would see them coming out from the body at the moment
of death, as a snake comes out of its hole. They must be
limited; for if they were all-pervading the scriptural
statements as to their passing out of the body, going and
coming, would be contradicted thereby, and it could not
be established that the individual soul is 'the essence of
the qualities of that' (i.e. the manas; cp. II, 3, 29).
Should it be said that they may be all-pervading, but at
the same time appear as functions (v/ri/tti) in the body only,
we rejoin that only a function can constitute an instrument.
Whatever effects perception, may it be a function
or something else, just that is an instrument for us. The
disagreement is therefore about a name only, and the
assumption of the instruments (prâ/n/as) being all-pervading
is thus purposeless.--Hence we decide that the prâ/n/as are
subtle and of limited size.
8. And the best (i.e. the chief vital air).
The Sûtra extends to the chief vital air (mukhya prâ/n/a)
a quality already asserted of the other prâ/n/as, viz. being an
effect of Brahman.--But, an objection may be raised, it has
already been stated of all prâ/n/as without difference that
they are effects of Brahman; e.g. the passage, 'From him
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is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense' (Mu. Up. II.
1, 3), states the origin of prâ/n/a separately from the senses
and the manas; and there are other passages also such
as 'He sent forth prâ/n/a' (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Why then the
formal extension?--We reply: For the purpose of removing
further doubt. For in the Nâsadiya-sûkta whose
subject is Brahman there occurs the following mantra:
'There was neither death nor the Immortal; nor manifestation
of either night or day. By its own law the One
was breathing without wind; there was nothing different
from that or higher than it' (/Ri/. Sa/m/h. X, 129, 2).
Here the words, 'was breathing' which denote the
proper function of breath, intimate that breath existed as
it were before the creation. And therefrom it might be
concluded that prâ/n/a is not produced; an idea which the
Sûtrakâra discards by the formal extension (to prâ/n/a of
the quality of having originated from Brahman).--Moreover
the word 'breathed' does not intimate that prâ/n/a existed
before the creation; for in the first place it is qualified by
the addition 'without wind,' and in the second place
scriptural passages--such as 'He is without breath, without
mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2)--declare expressly that the
causal substance is without any qualifications such as
prâ/n/a and so on. Hence the word 'breathed' has merely
the purpose of setting forth the existence of the cause.--
The term 'the best' (employed in the Sûtra) denotes the
chief vital air, according to the declaration of scripture,
'Breath indeed is the oldest and the best' (/Kh/. Up. V, 1, 1).
The breath is the oldest because it begins its function from
the moment when the child is conceived; the senses of
hearing, &c., on the other hand, begin to act only when
their special seats, viz. the cars, &c., are formed, and they
are thus not 'the oldest.' The designation 'the best'
belongs to the prâ/n/a on account of its superior qualities
and on account of the passage, 'We shall not be able to
live without thee' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 13).
9. (The chief prâ/n/a is) neither air nor function,
on account of its being mentioned separately.
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An inquiry is now started concerning the nature of that
chief prâ/n/a.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that the prâ/n/a
is, according to /S/ruti, nothing but air. For /S/ruti says,
'Breath is air; that air assuming five forms is prâ/n/a,
apâna, vyâna, udâna, samâna.'--Or else the pûrvapaksha
may be formulated according to the view of another
philosophical doctrine, and prâ/n/a may be considered as
the combined function of all organs. For so the followers
of another doctrine (viz. the Sâ@nkhyas) teach, 'The five
airs, prâ/n/a, &c., are the common function of the instruments[Footnote ref 1].'
To this we reply that the prâ/n/a is neither air nor the
function of an organ; for it is mentioned separately.
From air prâ/n/a is distinguished in the following passage,
'Breath indeed is the fourth foot of Brahman. That foot
shines as Agni with its light and warms.' If prâ/n/a were
mere air, it would not be mentioned separately from air.--
Thus it is also mentioned separately from the functions of
the organs; for the texts enumerate speech and the other
organs and mention prâ/n/a separately from them, and the
function and that to which the function belongs (the organ)
are identical. If it were a mere function of an organ, it
would not be mentioned separately from the organs.
Other passages also in which the prâ/n/a is mentioned
separately from air and the organs are here to be considered
so, e.g. 'From him is born breath, mind, and all
organs of sense, ether, air,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3). Nor is
it possible that all the organs together should have one function
(and that that function should be the prâ/n/a); for each
organ has its own special function and the aggregate of
them has no active power of its own.--But--an objection
may be raised--the thing may take place in the manner of
the moving bird-cage. Just as eleven birds shut up in one
cage may, although each makes a separate effort, move the
cage by the combination of their efforts; so the eleven
[Footnote 1: Sâ@nkhya Sû. II, 31; where, however, the reading is 'sâmânya-kara/n/av/ri/tti/h/' explained by the Comm. as sâdhâra/n/î kara/n/asya anta/h/kara/n/atrayasya
v/ri/tti/h/ pari/n/âmabhedâ iti. /S/a@nkara, on the other
hand, understands by kara/n/a the eleven prâ/n/as discussed previously.]
87
prâ/n/as which abide in one body may, although each has
its own special function, by the combination of these
functions, produce one common function called prâ/n/a.--
This objection, we reply, is without force. The birds
indeed may, by means of their separate subordinate efforts,
which all favour the movement of the cage, move the
cage by combination; that is a matter of observation.
But we have no right to assume that the different prâ/n/as
with their subordinate functions such as hearing &c. can,
by combination, produce the function of vital breath; for
there is no means to prove this, and the vital breath is in
kind absolutely different from hearing and so on.--Moreover,
if the vital breath were the mere function of an organ
(or the organs) it could not be glorified as the 'best,' and
speech and so on could not be represented as subordinate
to it. Hence the vital breath is different from air and the
functions (of the organs).--How then have we to understand
the scriptural passage, 'The prâ/n/a is air,' &c.?--
The air, we reply, passing into the adhyâtma-state, dividing
itself fivefold and thus abiding in a specialized condition is
called prâ/n/a. It therefore is neither a different being nor
is it mere air. Hence there is room for those passages as
well which identify it with air as those which do not.--
Well, let this be granted. The prâ/n/a then also must be
considered to be independent in this body like the
individual soul, as scripture declares it to be the 'best'
and the organs such as speech, &c., to be subordinate to it.
For various powers are ascribed to it in scriptural passages.
It is said, for instance, that when speech and the other
(organs) are asleep the prâ/n/a alone is awake; that the
pra/n/a alone is not reached by death; that the pra/n/a is the
absorber, it absorbs speech, &c.; that the pra/n/a guards
the other senses (prâ/n/as) as a mother her sons [Footnote ref 1]. Hence it follows that the pra/n/a is independent in the same way
as the individual soul.--This view is impugned in the next
Sûtra.
[Footnote 1: Cp.Ka.Up.II, 5, 8; B/ri/.Up.I, 5, 21; /Kh/.Up.IV, 3, 3; Pr.Up. II, 13.]
88
10. But (the prâ/n/a is subordinate to the soul) like
the eye, &c., on account of being taught with them
(the eye, &c.), and for other reasons.
The word 'but' sets aside the independence of the prâ/n/a.
As the eye and so on stand, like the subjects of a king, in
mere subordinate relation to the acting and enjoying of the
soul and are not independent, so the chief vital air also,
occupying a position analogous to that of a king's minister,
stands in an entirely subordinate relation to the soul and
is not independent.--Why?--Because it is taught (spoken
of) together with them, i.e. the eye and the other organs,
in such passages as the colloquy of the prâ/n/as, &c. For
to be mentioned together is appropriate only in the case
of things with the same attributes, as e.g. the B/ri/hat-sâman
and the Rathantara-sâman.[Footnote ref 1] The words 'and so
on' (in the Sûtra) indicate other reasons refuting the
independence of the prâ/n/a, such as its being composed of
parts, its being of a non-intelligent nature and the like.--
Well, but if it be admitted that the prâ/n/a stands to the
soul in the relation of an instrument as the eye and so on.
it will follow that we must assume another sense-object
analogous to colour and so on. For the eyes, &c., occupy
their specific subordinate position with regard to the soul
through their functions which consist in the seeing of
colour and so on. Now we can enumerate only eleven
classes of functions, viz. the seeing of colour and so on,
on whose account we assume eleven different prâ/n/as, and
there is no twelfth class of effects on account of which a
twelfth prâ/n/a could be assumed.--To this objection the
following Sûtra replies.
11. And on account of (its) not being an instrument
the objection is not (valid); for thus (scripture)
declares.
The objection urged, viz. that there would result another
sense-object, is not valid; because the prâ/n/a is not an
[Footnote 1: Which go together because they are both sâmans.]
89
instrument. For we do not assume that the prâ/n/a is, like
the eye, an organ because it determines a special sense-object.
Nor is it on that account devoid of an effect;
since scripture declares that the chief vital air has a specific
effect which cannot belong to the other prâ/n/as. For in
the so-called colloquies of the prâ/n/as we read in the beginning,
'The prâ/n/as quarrelled together who was best;'
after that we read, 'He by whose departure the body seems
worse than worst, he is the best of you;' thereupon the
text, after showing how, on the successive departure of
speech and so on, the life of the body, although deprived
of one particular function, went on as before, finally relates
that as soon as the chief prâ/n/a was about to depart all
other prâ/n/as became loosened and the body was about to
perish; which shows that the body and all the senses subsist
by means of the chief prâ/n/a. The same thing is declared
by another passage, 'Then prâ/n/a as the best said to
them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold
support this body and keep it' (Pr. Up. II, 3). Another
passage, viz. 'With prâ/n/a guarding the lower nest' (B/ri/. Up.
IV, 3, 12), shows that the guarding of the body depends on
prâ/n/a. Again, two other passages show that the nourishing
of the body depends on prâ/n/a, 'From whatever limb
prâ/n/a goes away that limb withers' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 19), and
'What we eat and drink with it supports the other vital
breaths.' And another passage declares that the soul's
departing and staying depend on prâ/n/a, 'What is it by
whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying
I shall stay?--The created prâ/n/a' (Pr. Up. VI, 3; 4).
12. It is designated as having five functions like
mind.
The chief vital air has its specific effect for that reason
also that in scripture it is designated as having five
functions, prâ/n/a, apâna, vyâna, udâna, samâna. This distinction
of functions is based on a distinction of effects.
Prâ/n/a is the forward-function whose work is aspiration, &c.;
apâna is the backward-function whose work is inspiration,
&c.; vyâna is that which, abiding in the junction of the two,
90
is the cause of works of strength[Footnote ref 1]; udâna is the ascending
function and is the cause of the passing out (of the soul);
samâna is the function which conveys the juices of the
food equally through all the limbs of the body. Thus the
prâ/n/a has five functions just as the mind (manas) has.
The five functions of the mind are the five well-known
ones caused by the ear, &c., and having sound and so on
for their objects. By the functions of the mind we cannot
here understand those enumerated (in B/ri/. Up. I, 5, 3),
'desire, representation,' &c., because those are more than
five. But on the former explanation also there exists yet
another function of the mind which does not depend on
the ear, &c., but has for its object the past, the future, and
so on; so that on that explanation also the number five
is exceeded.--Well, let us then follow the principle that
the opinions of other (systems) if unobjectionable may be
adopted, and let us assume that the five functions of the
manas are those five which are known from the Yoga/s/âstra,
viz. right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber, and remembrance.
Or else let us assume that the Sûtra quotes
the manas as an analogous instance merely with reference
to the plurality (not the fivefoldness) of its functions.--
In any case the Sûtra must be construed to mean that the
prâ/n/a's subordinate position with regard to the soul follows
from its having five functions like the manas.
13. And it is minute.
And the chief vital air is to be considered as minute like
the other prâ/n/as.--Here also we have to understand by
minuteness that the chief vital air is subtle and of limited
size, not that is of atomic size; for by means of its five
functions it pervades the entire body. It must be viewed
as subtle because when passing out of the body it is not
perceived by a bystander, and as limited because scripture
speaks of its passing out, going and coming.--But, it may
be said, scripture speaks also of its all-pervadingness; so,
[Footnote 1: Viz. the holding in of the breath; cp./Kh/.Up.I, 3, 3-5.]
91
e.g. 'He is equal to a grub, equal to a gnat, equal to an
elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this
Universe' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 22).--To this we reply that the
all-pervadingness of which this text speaks belongs to the
Self of the pra/n/a in its adhidaivata relation, according to
which it appears as Hira/n/yagarbha in his double--universal
and individual--form, not in its adhyâtma relation. Moreover
the statements of equality 'equal to a grub,' &c.,
just declare the limited size of the prâ/n/a which abides
within every living being.--Thus there remains no difficulty.
14. But there is guidance (of the prâ/n/as) by fire,
&c., on account of that being declared by scripture.
Here there arises a discussion whether the prâ/n/as of
which we have been treating are able to produce their
effects by their own power or only in so far as guided by
divinities.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that the prâ/n/as
being endowed with the capacity of producing their effects
act from their own power. If we, moreover, admitted that
the prâ/n/as act only in so far as guided by divinities, it
would follow that those guiding divinities are the enjoyers
(of the fruits of the actions), and the individual soul would
thus cease to be an enjoyer. Hence the prâ/n/as act from
their own power.--To this we reply as follows. 'But there
takes place guidance by fire,' &c.--The word 'but' excludes
the pûrvapaksha. The different classes of organs, speech,
&c., the Sûtra says, enter on their peculiar activities, guided
by the divinities animating fire, and so on. The words,
'on account of that being declared by scripture,' state the
reason. For different passages declare this, cp. Ait. Âr, II,
4, 2, 4, 'Agni having become speech entered the mouth.'
This statement about Agni (fire) becoming speech and
entering the mouth is made on the assumption of Agni
acting as a ruler with his divine Self (not as a mere
element). For if we abstract from the connexion with the
divinity we do not see that there is any special connexion
of fire either with speech or the mouth. The subsequent
passages, 'Vâyu having become breath entered
into the nostrils,' &c, are to be explained in the same way.
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--This conclusion is confirmed by other passages also, such
as 'Speech is indeed the fourth foot of Brahman; that foot
shines with Agni as its light and warms' (/Kh/. Up. IV,
18, 3), which passage declares that speech is made of the
light of Agni. Other passages intimate the same thing by
declaring that speech, &c., pass over into Agni, &c., cp.
B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 12, 'He carried speech across first; when
speech had become freed from death it became Agni.'
Everywhere the enumeration of speech and so on on the
one side and Agni and so on on the other side--wherein is
implied a distinction of the personal and the divine
element--proceeds on the ground of the same relation (viz. of that
which is guided and that which guides). Sm/ri/ti--passagcs
also declare at length that speech, &c., are guided by
Agni and the other divinities, cp. for instance,' Brâhma/n/as
knowing the truth call speech the personal element, that
which is spoken the natural element and fire (Agni) the
divine element.'--The assertion that the prâ being
endowed with the capability of producing their effects act
from their own power is unfounded, as we see that some
things which possess the capability of motion, e. g. cars,
actually move only if dragged by bulls and the like.
Hence, as both alternatives are possible [Footnote ref 1], we decide on the ground of scripture that the prâ act under the guidance
of the divinities.--The next Sûtrates the assertion that
from the fact of the divinities guiding the prâ it would
follow that they--and not the embodied soul--are the
enjoyers.
15. (It is not so) (because the prâ are connected)
with that to which the prâ belong (i.e.
the individual soul), (a thing we know) from scripture.
Although there are divinities guiding the prâ, yet we
learn from scripture that those prâ are connected with
the embodied soul which is the Lord of the aggregate of
[Footnote 1 Viz. that something should act by itself, and that it should act under guidance only.]
93
instruments of action. The following passage, e.g. 'where
the sight has entered into the void there is the person of
the eye; the eye itself is the instrument of seeing. He
who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self; the nose is
the instrument of smelling, declares that the prâ are
connected with the embodied soul only. Moreover the
plurality of the divinities guiding the organs renders it
impossible that they should be the enjoyers in this body.
For that there is in this body only one embodied enjoyer
is understood from the possibility of the recognition of
identity and so on [Footnote ref 1].
16. And on account of the permanence of this
(viz. the embodied soul).
This embodied soul abides permanently in this body as
the enjoyer, since it can be affected by good and evil
and can experience pleasure and pain. Not so the gods;
for they exist in the state of highest power and glory and
cannot possibly enter, in this wretched body, into the condition
of enjoyers. So scripture also says, 'Only what is
good approaches him; verily evil does not approach the
devas' (B/ri/. Up. I, 5. 20).--And only with the embodied
soul the prâ are permanently connected, as it is seen
that when the soul passes out &c. the prâ follow it.
This we see from passages such as the following: 'When
it passes out the prâpasses out after it, and when the
prâthus passes out all the other prâ/nprâ after it'
(B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 2). Hence although there are ruling divinities
of the organs, the embodied soul does not cease to be
the enjoyer; for the divinities are connected with the organs
only, not with the state of the soul as enjoyer.
17. They (the prâ) are senses, on account of
being so designated, with the exception of the best
(the mukhya prâ.
We have treated of the mukhya prâand the other
[Footnote 1: Yo*ha/m/ rûpamkadrâksham/ /srin/omîtysrinsomîtyyekasyaivaânam pratishamdhânampratishamdhânam
94
eleven prâ in due order.--Now there arises another
doubt, viz. whether the other prâ are functions of the
mukhya prâor different beings.--The pûrvapûrvapakshin
that they are mere functions, on account of scriptural
statement. For scripture, after having spoken of the chief
prâand the other prâ/nprâroximity, declares that those
other prâ have their Self in the chief prâ/nprâl, let us
all assume his form. Thereupon they all assumed his form'
(B/ri/. Up. I, 5, 2l).--Their unity is moreover ascertained
from the unity of the term applied to them, viz. prâ
Otherwise there either would result the objectionable circumstance
of one word having different senses, or else the
word would in some places have to be taken in its primary
sense, in others in a derived sense. Hence, as prâ apânaapâna
&c. are the five functions of the one chief prâ so the eleven
prâ also which begin with speech are mere functions of
the chief prâ--To this we reply as follows. Speech and
so on are beings different from the chief prâ on account
of the difference of designation.--Which is that difference
of designation?--The eleven prâ remaining if we abstract
from the best one, i.e. the chief prâ are called the sense-organs (indriindriya we see them designated in /S/ruti,rutiom
him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense' (Mu.
Up. II, 1, 3). In this and other passages prâand the
sense--organs are mentioned separately.--But in that case
the mind also would have to be excluded from the class of
sense--organs, like the prâ as we see that like the latter
it is separately mentioned in the passage, 'The mind and all
organs of sense.' True; but in Sm/ri/ti eleven sense-organs
are mentioned, and on that account the mind must, like the
ear, and so on, be comprised in the sense--organs. That the
prâon the other hand is a sense-organ is known neither
from Sm/ri/ti nor /S/ruti.--Now this difference of designation
is appropriate only if there is difference of being. If there
were unity of being it would be contradictory that the prâ
although one should sometimes be designated as sense--organ
and sometimes not. Consequently the other prâ
are different in being from the chief prâ--For this conclusion
the following Sûtraes an additional reason.
95
18. On account of the scriptural statement of
difference.
The prâis everywhere spoken of as different from
speech, &c. The passage, e.g. beginning with 'They said
to speech' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 2), enumerates speech, &c., which
were overwhelmed by the evil of the Asuras, concludes
thereupon the section treating of speech, &c., and then
specially mentions the mukhya prâas overcoming the
Asuras, in the paragraph beginning 'Then they said to the
breath in the mouth.'--Other passages also referring to that
difference may be quoted, so, for instance, 'He made mind,
speech, and breath for himself (B/ri/. Up. I, 5, 3).--For this
reason also the other prâ are different in being from the
chief prâ--Another reason follows.
19. And on account of the difference of characteristics.
There is moreover a difference of characteristics between
the chief prâand the other prâ/nprân speech &c. are
asleep, the chief prâalone is awake. The chief prâ/nprâ
alone is not reached by death, while the other prâ are.
The staying and departing of the chief prâ-not that of
the sense-organs--is the cause of the maintenance and the
destruction of the body. The sense-organs, on the other
hand, are the cause of the perception of the sense-objects,
not the chief prâ Thus there are manifold differences
distinguishing the prâfrom the senses, and this also shows
the latter to be different in being from the prâ--To infer
from the passage, 'thereupon they all assumed his form,'
that the sense--organs are nothing but prâis wrong,
because there also an examination of the context makes us
understand their difference. For there the sense--organs are
enumerated first ('Voice held, I shall speak,' &c.); after
that it is said that speech, &c. were seized by death in the
form of weariness ('Death having become weariness held
them back; therefore speech grows weary'); finally prâ
is mentioned separately as not having been overcome by
death ('but death did not seize the central breath'), and is
96
asserted to be the best ('he is the best of us'). The assuming
of the form of prâhas therefore, in accordance with
the quoted passages, to be understood to mean that
the energizing of speech and so on depends on the
prawa, but not that they are identical with it.--Hence it
follows that the word 'prâ is applied to the sense-organs
in a secondary sense. Thus /S/ruti also says, 'Thereupon
they all assumed his form, and therefore they are called
after him prâ;' a passage declaring that the word prâ/nprâ
which properly refers to the chief prâis secondarily
applied to the sense-organs also. Speech and the other
sense-organs are therefore different in being from the prâ
20. But the fashioning of names and forms belongs
to him who renders tripartite, on account of the
teaching (of scripture).
In the chapter treating of the Being (sat), subsequently
to the account of the creation of fire, water, and food (earth),
the following statement is made, 'That divinity thought,
let me now enter those three beings with this living Self
(/g/îva)âtmâhen evolve names and forms[Footnote ref 1];--let me make each of these three tripartite' (/Kh/. Up. VI,Kh
3, 2; 3).--Here the doubt arises whether the agent in that
evolution of names and forms is the /g/îva living, i.e. the
individual Self or soul) or the highest Lord.--The pûrvapakshin
maintains the former alternative, on account of the
qualification contained in the words 'with this living Self.'
The use of ordinary language does, in such phrases as
'Having entered the army of the enemy by means of a spy
I count it,' attribute the counting of the army in which the
spy is the real agent to the Self of the king who is the
causal agent; which attribution is effected by means of the
use of the first person, 'I count.' So here the sacred text
attributes the evolving of names and forms--in which the
/g/îvahe real agent--to the Self of the divinity which is
the causal agent; the attribution being effected by means
[Footnote 1: Literally, with this living Self having entered let me evolve, &c.]
97
of the use of the first person, 'let me evolve."--Moreover
we see in the case of names such as /D/ittha, /D/avittha, &c.,
and in the case of forms such as jars, dishes and the like
that the individual soul only is the evolving agent[Footnote ref 1]. Hence the evolution of names and forms is the work of the /g/îva.
To this the Sûtra replies: 'But the fashioning of names and
forms belongs to him who renders tripartite.' The particle
'but' discards the pûrvapaksha. Fashioning means evolving.
The term 'he who renders tripartite' denotes the
highest Lord, his agency being designated as beyond contradiction
in the case of the rendering tripartite (of fire, &c.).
The entire evolution of names and forms which is seen, e.g.
in fire, sun, moon, lightning, or in different plants such as
ku/s/a-grass, kâ/s/a-grass, palâ/s/a-trees, or in various living
beings such as cattle, deer, men, all this manifold evolution
according to species and individuals can surely be the
work of the highest Lord only, who fashioned fire, water,
and earth.--Why?--On account of the teaching of the
sacred text.--For the text says at first 'that divinity,' &c.,
and then goes on in the first person 'let me evolve;' which
implies the statement that the highest Brahman only is the
evolving agent.--But we ascertain from the qualification
contained in the words 'with this living Self,' that the agent
in the evolution is the living Self!--No, we reply. The
words 'with this living Self are connected with the words
'having entered,' in proximity to which they stand; not
with the clause 'let me evolve.' If they were connected
with the former words, we should have to assume that the
first person, which refers to the divinity--viz. 'let me
evolve'--is used in a metaphorical sense. And with regard
to all the manifold names and forms such as mountains,
rivers, oceans, &c., no soul, apart from the Lord, possesses
the power of evolution; and if any have such power, it is
dependent on the highest Lord. Nor is the so-called
'living Self' absolutely different from the highest Lord, as
the spy is from the king; as we see from its being qualified
[Footnote 1: Names being given and vessels being shaped by a class of
/g/îvas, viz. men.]
98
as the living Self, and as its being the /g/îva. an individual
soul apparently differing from the universal Self) is due to
the limiting adjuncts only. Hence the evolution of names
and forms which is effected by it is in reality effected by
the highest Lord. And that the highest Lord is he who
evolves the names and forms is a principle acknowledged
by all the Upanishads; as we see from such passages as 'He
who is called ether is the evolver of all forms and names'
(K/h/. Up. VIII, 14). The evolution of names and forms,
therefore, is exclusively the work of the highest Lord, who
is also the author of the tripartite arrangement.--The
meaning of the text is that the evolution of names and
forms was preceded by the tripartition, the evolution of
each particular name and form being already explained by
the account of the origin of fire, water, and earth. The act
of tripartition is expressly described by /S/ruti in the cases
of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, 'The red colour of burning
fire is the colour of fire, the white colour of fire is the colour
of water, the black colour of fire the colour of earth,' &c.
In this way there is evolved the distinctive form of fire, and
in connexion therewith the distinctive name 'fire,' the name
depending on the thing. The same remarks apply to the
cases of the sun, the moon, and lightning. The instance
(given by the text) of the tripartition of fire implies the
statement that the three substances, viz. earth, water, fire,
were rendered tripartite in the same manner; as the beginning
as well as the concluding clause of the passage equally
refers to all three. For the beginning clause says, 'These
three beings became each of them tripartite;' and the concluding
clause says, 'Whatever they thought looked red
they knew was the colour of fire,' &c. &c., up to 'Whatever
they thought was altogether unknown they knew was some
combination of these three beings.' Having thus described
the external tripartition of the three elements the text goes
on to describe another tripartition with reference to man,
those three beings when they reach man become each of
them tripartite.' This tripartition in man the teacher sets
forth (in the following Sûtraording to scripture, with a
view to the refutation of some foreseen objection.
99
21. The flesh, &c., originates from earth, according
to the scriptural statement; and (so also) in the
case of the two other (elements).
From tripartite earth when assimilated by man there are
produced as its effects flesh, &c., according to scripture.
For the text says,' Food (earth) when eaten becomes threefold;
its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion
flesh, its subtlest portion mind.' The meaning is that the
tripartite earth is eaten in the shape of food such as rice,
barley, &c.; that its grossest parts are discharged in the
form of feces, that its middle parts nourish the flesh of the
body, and its subtlest parts feed the mind. Analogously
we have to learn from the text the effects of the two other
elements, viz. fire and water; viz. that urine, blood, and
breath are the effects of water; bone, marrow, and speech
those of fire.--Here now an objection is raised. If all
material things are tripartite (i.e. contain parts of the three
elements alike)--according to the indifferent statement, 'He
made each of these tripartite'--for what reason then has
there been made the distinction of names, 'this is fire, this
is water, this is earth?' And, again, why is it said that
among the elements of the human body, flesh, &c., is the
effect of the eaten earth only; blood, &c, the effect of the
water drunk; bone,&c., the effect of the fire eaten?--To
this objection the next Sûtraies.
22. But on account of their distinctive nature
there is a (distinctive) designation of them.
The word 'but' repels the objection raised. By 'distinctive
nature' we have to understand preponderance.
Although all things are tripartite, yet we observe in
different places a preponderance of different elements;
heat preponderates in fire, water in all that is liquid, food
in earth. This special tripartition aims at rendering possible
the distinctions and terms of ordinary life. For if the
tripartition resulted in sameness, comparable to that of the
three strands of a tripartite rope, we could not distinguish
--and speak of as distinguished--the three elements.--Hence,
100
although there is a tripartition, we are enabled 'on account
of distinctive nature' to give special designations to the
three elements, viz. fire, water, and earth and their products.--The
repetition (of 'designation of them') indicates
the termination of the adhyâya
FIRST PÀDA
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. In obtaining a different (body) (the soul) goes
enveloped (by subtle parts of the elements), (as
appears from) question and explanation.
In the second adhyâyaave refuted the objections
raised against the Vedântic of Brahman on the ground
of Sm/ri/ti and reasoning; we have shown that all other
opinions are devoid of foundation, and that the alleged
mutual contradictions of Vedic texts do not exist. Further
we have demonstrated that the entities different from--but
subordinate to--the individual soul (such as prâ &c.)
spring from Brahman.--Now in the third adhyâyahall
discuss the following subjects: the manner in which the
soul together with its subordinate adjuncts passes through
the sa/m/såraI, 1); the different states of the soul and
the nature of Brahman (III, 2); the separateness or non-separatencss
of the vidyâsthe question whether the
qualities (of Brahman) have to be cumulated or not (III, 3);
the accomplishment of man's highest end by means of perfect
knowledge (sa/m/yagdar/s/ana), the different injunctions
as to the means of perfect knowledge and the absence of
certain rules as to release which is the fruit (of perfect
knowledge[Footnote ref 1]) (III, 4). As occasion leads some other matters
also will be explained.--The first pâdaains,on the ground
of the so-called vidyâhe five fires (/Kh/. Kh. V, 3-10), the
different modes of the soul's passing through the sa/m/sâra
the reason of that doctrine being (the inculcation of) absence
[Footnote 1: I.e. the absence of a rule laying down that release consequent on knowledge takes place in the same existence in which the means of reaching perfect knowledge are employed.]
108
of all desire (vairå,gya accordance with the scriptural
remark at the end (of the vidyâence let a man take care
to himself.'--The soul accompanied by the chief vital air.
the sense-organs and the mind, and taking with itself
nescience (avidyâral good or ill-desert (karmakarmand
the impressions left by its previous existences [Footnote ref 1], leaves its former body and obtains a new body; this is known from
the scriptural passage extending from B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 1
('Then those prâ gather around him') up to IV, 4, 4
('It makes to itself another newer and more beautiful
shape'); which passage forms part of a chapter treating of
the sa/m/sârae. And it moreover follows from the possibility
(thus resulting) of the soul enjoying the fruits of
good and evil actions.--Here the question arises whether
the soul when going to the new body is enveloped or not by
subtle parts of the elements constituting the seeds of the
body.--It is not so enveloped, the pûrvapakshin.--
Why?--Because scripture, while stating that the soul takes
the organs with itself, does not state the same with regard
to the elements. For the expression 'those parts of light'
(te/g/omâtrâ occurs in the passage 'He taking with
him those parts of light,' &c., intimates that the organs only
are taken (and not the elements), since in the complementary
portion of the passage the eye, &c., are spoken of, and
not the subtle parts of the elements. The subtle parts of
the elements can moreover easily be procured anywhere;
for wherever a new body is to be originated they are present,
and the soul's taking them with itself would, therefore,
be useless. Hence we conclude that the soul when going
is not enveloped by them.
To this the teacher replies, 'in obtaining another it goes
enveloped.' That means: we must understand that the soul
when passing from one body to another is enveloped by the
subtle parts of the elements which are the seeds of the new
[Footnote 1: I read avidyâ the commentators (Go. Ân.,
however, mentions the reading 'vidyâo); although vidyâvidyâreferable. Cp. Cp
Max Müller's note 2, p. 175, Upan. II; Deussen, p. 405.--Pûrvagpra gñntarîyanmântarîya Gsa]skâraGi
103
body.--How do we know this?--'From the question and
the explanation.' The question is, 'Do you know why in
the fifth libation water is called man?' (V, 3, 3.) The
explanation, i.e. answer, is given in the entire passage which,
after having explained how the five libations in the form of
/s/raddhâa, rain, food, seed are offered in the five fires,
viz. the heavenly world, Par/g/anya, the earth, man and
woman, concludes, 'For this reason is water in the fifth oblation
called man.' Hence we understand that the soul goes
enveloped by water.--But--an objection will be raised--
another scriptural passage declares that like a caterpillar
the soul does not abandon the old body before it makes an
approach to another body[Footnote ref 1]. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 3, 'And as a caterpillar.')--We reply that what there is compared to the
(action of the) caterpillar is (not the non-abandonment of
the old body but) merely the lengthening out of the creative
effort whose object is the new body to be obtained,
which (new body) is presented by the karman of the soul[Footnote ref 2].Hence there is no contradiction.--As the mode of obtaining
a new body is thus declared by /S/ruti, all hypotheses
which owe their origin to the mind of man only are to be
set aside because they are contradicted by scripture. So
e.g. the opinion (of the Sâ@nkhyas) that the Self and the
organs are both all--pervading[Footnote ref 3], and when obtaining a new body only begin to function in it in consequence of the karman
*or the opinion (of the Bauddhas) that the Self alone
[Footnote 1: Eva/m/ hi sûkshmadehaparishvakto/rat yhet yadyasya
*st????/m/* /s/arîraa/m/rato hatohnaebhaveti astistv asyaavartamânasthûlaarûayoga
âdehântaraprâptesukârinar/s/alâyukânidarn/aanenauttasmânanidarsaadehaparrutivirodhânîna.sûkshmadehaparishvaktorahatîtiBhâ
[Footnote 2: Pratipattavya/h/ prâptavyoehasdehasitadvishayâyâbhâvanâyâ
utpâdanâyârdîrghîbhâvamâtrai.alûkayopamîyateBhâGi
explains: prâptavyoehasdehasitadvishayabhâvanâyâdevo
ityâdikâyâadîrghîbhâvovvyavahitârthâlambanatvatâvanmâtram
ityâdi
[Footnote 3: Kara/n/ânâmikatvâtkârikatvâthtasyaivyâpitvâtâteshâm api-tadâtsmakânâto tvyâpitvam
Sâ@nkhya, the immediate effects of the aha/m/kâiut why all-pervading on that account?]
104
(without the organs) begins to function in a new body, and
that as the body itself, so new sense-organs also are produced
in the new abode of fruition[Footnote ref 1]; or the opinion (of the
Vai/s/eshikas) that the mind only proceeds to the new abode
of fruition[Footnote ref 2]; or the opinion (of the Digambara /G/ainas) that
the individual soul only flying away from the old body
alights in the new one as a parrot flies from one tree to
another.--But--an objection will be raised--from the
quoted question and answer it follows that the soul goes
enveloped by water only, according to the meaning of the
word made use of by scripture, viz. water. How then can
the general statement be maintained that the soul goes
enveloped by subtle parts of all elements?--To this doubt
the next Sûtraies.
2. But on account of (water) consisting of three
(elements) (the soul is enveloped not by water
merely; the latter alone is, however, mentioned)
on account of preponderance.
The word 'but' disposes of the objection raised.--Water
consists of three elements, as we know from the scriptural
statement regarding tripartition. If, therefore, water is
admitted to originate (the new body) the other two elements
also have necessarily to be admitted (as taking part in the
origination). The body moreover consists of three elements,
as the effects of the three, i.e. fire, water, and earth, are
observed in it, and further as it contains three materials,
viz. wind, bile, and phlegm[Footnote ref 3]. Being such it cannot originate from mere water, the other elements being left aside.
Hence the term water made use of in the scriptural question
and answer refers to the fact of water preponderating,
[Footnote 1: Âtmâykhalv/ânasamtânas tasya v/ritasyaa/hri/ttayaâdi/gitabdâdiânâni
tallâbhas/arîrâarîrântareabhavatis kevalaa/nabdasituakaramanasâhityam.âtmanovârayati
[Footnote 2: Kevala/m/ kara/n/air âtmanâtam itrahitam,itiryâvattakaraâninûtanany
eva tatrârabhyante âtmâktuyvibhutvâdiakriyotramtatrarittimâtram
âpnoti Gi.]Gi
[Footnote 3: The last of which only is of prevailingly watery character.]
105
not to its being the only element. As a matter of fact we
see that in all animated bodies liquid substances such as
juices, blood, and the like preponderate.--But we likewise
observe in bodies a large amount of earthy matter!--True,
but the amount of water is larger than that of any other
matter. Moreover, liquid matter prevails in that which is
the seed of the body. Further, we know that works (karman)
constitute the efficient cause for the origination of a
new body, and (sacrificial) works such as the agnihotra, &c.,
consist in the offering of liquid substances such as Soma,
butter, milk and the like. Thereby also the preponderance
of water is established. And on account of that
preponderance the word 'water' implies the subtle parts of
all the elements which constitute the seed of the body.
3. And on account of the going of the prâ.
Scripture states that, when a new body is obtained, the
prâ also go (from the old body to the new one). Cp.Cp
'When he thus departs the (chief) prâdeparts after him,
and when the prâthus departs all the other prâ/nprâ
depart after it' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 2), and similar passages.
Now this going of the prâ is not possible without a base;
hence we infer that water also--mixed with parts of the
other elements--goes (from the old body to the new one),
serving the purpose of supplying a base for the moving
prâ. For the prâ/nprâot, without such a base, either
move or abide anywhere; as we observe in living beings.
4. If it be said (that the prâ do not go) on
account of the scriptural statement as to entering
into Agni, &c., we deny this on account of the
metaphorical nature (of those statements).
Well, the pûrvapakshinmes, we deny that at the
time when a new body is obtained the prâ go with the
soul, because scripture speaks of their going to Agni, &c.
For that at the time of death speech and the other prâ
go to Agni and the other gods the following passage expressly
declares: 'When the speech of the dead person
106
enters into the fire, breath into the air,' &c. (B/ri/, Up. III, 2.
l3).--To this we reply that the objection is of no force on
account of the metaphorical character of those statements.
The entering of speech, &c., into Agni is metaphorical,
because we observe no such entering in the case of the
hairs of the head and body. For although the text says
that 'the hairs of the body enter into the shrubs and the
hairs of the head into the trees;' still we cannot understand
this to mean that the hairs actually fly away from the
body and enter into trees and shrubs. On the other hand,
the soul could not go at all if we denied to it the limiting
adjunct formed by the prâ, and without the latter it
could not, in the new body, enter into the state of fruition.
Besides, other passages distinctly declare that the prâ
go with the soul.--From all this we conclude that the
passage about speech, &c. entering into Agni, metaphorically
expresses that Agni and the other divinities who act as
guides of the prâ and cooperate with them stop their
cooperation at the time of death.
5. If an objection be raised on the ground of
(water) not being mentioned in the first fire, we
refute it by remarking that just it (viz. water) (is
meant), on the ground of fitness.
Well, the pûrvapakshinmes, but how can it be
ascertained that 'in the fifth oblation water is called man,'
considering that water is not mentioned by scripture with
reference to the first fire (altar)? For the text enumerates
five fires--the first of which is the heavenly world--as the
abodes of the five oblations. With reference to the first of
those fires--introduced by the words 'The fire is that
world, O Gautama,' it is stated that /s/raddhâth) is the
material constituting the oblation ('on that altar the devas
offer /s/raddhâhile nothing is said about water being
the offered material. If, with reference to the four following
fires, viz. Par/g/anya, &c., water is assumed to constitute
the offering, we have no objection because in the substances
stated there as forming the oblations, viz. Soma, and so on,
water may preponderate. But to set aside, in the case of
107
the first fire, /s/raddhâ. faith) which is directly mentioned
in the text, and to substitute in its place the assumption of
water, about which the text says nothing, is an arbitrary
proceeding. In reality /s/raddhâ be explained, in conformity
with its ordinary meaning, as a kind of mental
state, viz. faith. Hence it is objectionable to maintain that
water, in the fifth oblation, becomes man.
To this view of the pûrvapakshinemur, because, in
the case of the first fire, the word /s/raddhâo be taken in
the sense of 'water.'--On what ground?--On the ground of
fitness. For on that explanation only beginning, middle,
and end of the passage harmonise so that the syntactical
unity of the whole remains undisturbed. On the other
explanation (i.e. /s/raddha being taken in the sense of
'faith'), if the question were asked how water, in the fifth
oblation, can be called man, and if, in way of reply, the
text could point only to faith, i.e. something which is not
water, as constituting the material of the oblation; then
question and answer would not agree, and so the unity of
the whole passage would be destroyed. The text, moreover,
by concluding 'For this reason is water in the fifth oblation
called man,' indicates the same interpretation[Footnote ref 1].
--Further, the text points out, as effects of /s/raddhâstances in
which water in its gross form preponderates, viz. Soma,
rain, &c. And this again furnishes a reason for interpreting
/s/raddhâater, because the effect generally is cognate in
nature to the cause. Nor again can the mental conception
called faith be taken out from the mind or soul, whose
attribute it is, and be employed as an offering, as the heart
can be cut out of the sacrificial animal. For this reason
also the word /s/raddhâ be taken to mean 'water.'
Water can, moreover, be fitly called by that name, on the
ground of Vedic usage, cp. '/s/raddhâed is water' (TaittTaitt
Sa/m/h. I, 6, 8, 1). Moreover, water when forming the seed
of the body enters into the state of thinness, subtilty, and
herein again resembles faith, so that its being called /s/raddhâ
[Footnote 1: Upasa/m/hârâloapianâyâmaapim apraddhâa tabdatvamnapâmevetytvitiGi
108
is analogous to the case of a man who is as valiant as a lion
being himself called a lion.--Again, the word /s/raddhâ may
fitly be applied to water, because water is intimately connected
with religious works (sacrifices, &c.) which depend
on faith; just as the word 'platform' is applied to men
(standing on the platform). And finally the waters may
fitly be called /s/raddhâ, on account of their being the cause
of faith, according to the scriptural passage, 'Water indeed
produces faith in him for holy works[Footnote 1].'
6. (Should it be said that the souls are not enveloped
by water) on account of this not being
stated by scripture, we refute the objection on the
ground of those who perform ish/t/is, &c., being
understood.
Well, let it be granted that, on account of question and
answer, water, passing through the forms of /s/raddhâ, &c.,
may in the fifth oblation obtain the shape of man. But
still we cannot allow that the souls when moving from one
body into another are enveloped by water. For this is not
directly stated by scripture, there being in the whole
passage no word referring to the souls, while there are
words referring to water. Hence the assertion that the
soul goes enveloped by water is unfounded.--This objection
is invalid, we reply, 'on account of those who perform ish/t/is,
&c., being understood.' For in the passage beginning 'But
they who living in a village practise sacrifices, works of
public utility and alms, they go to the smoke' (V, 3, 10), it
is said that those who perform ish/t/is reach, on the road of
the fathers leading through smoke. &c.. the moon, 'From
ether they go to the moon; that is Soma, the king.' Now
these same persons are meant in the passage about the five
fires also, as we conclude from the equality of scriptural
statement in the passage, 'In that fire the devas offer
[Footnote 1: Âpo heti, asmai pu/m/seadhikâri/n/e sa/m/namante /g/anayanti dar/s/anamâtre/n/a snânâdipu/n/yakarmasiddhyartha/m/ /s/raddhâm ity
artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]
109
/s/raddhâm that oblation rises Soma the king [Footnote 1]. To those [Footnote 2] (persons who have performed ish/tish, &c.) water is supplied in the shape of the materials employed to perform the agnihagnihotra darsadarsapûrnd amâsaifices, viz. sour milk, milk, &c., which substances, as consisting mosly of water,moslydirectly be considered as water. Of these, when offered in the âhavanîya, the âhavanîya the form of an apûrva resulting from theapûrvaFootnote 3], and attach themselves to the performer of the sacrifice. Then (when the sacrificer dies) the priests offer his body, with the funeral ceremonies [Footnote 4], into the crematory fire, with the mantra, '(may) he (go) to the heavenly world, svâhâ.'svâhâ
Then the water forming the oblation--which has connected with deeds resulting from faith [Footnote 5] --having assumed the form of an apûrvalops the souls of those who had performed the sacrifices, and leads them up to the heavenly world to receive their reward.--In accordance with the precepreceedingrpretation scripture says in the agnihagnihotrater also--in the complementary passage constituting the reply to the six questions--that the two agnihagnihotraations go up to the other world in order to originate the fruit (of the work of the sacrificer), 'Those two oblations when offered go up,&c.' (Sat.Br. XI,6, 2, 6). --Hence we conclude that the
[Footnote 1: Both passages speak of something reaching, i.e. becoming
the moon. Now, as that something is, in the passage about the road
of the fathers, the /g/îvashose who have performed ish*sishc., we
conclude that by the /s/raddhâ, from which in the other passage
the moon is said to rise, those /g/îvasmeant, or, properly speaking,
the subtle body of water which envelops those /g/îvasûmâDhûmâdivâkye
pa@/nk/âgnivâkye /k/a somarâvapatvaprâptisravashââviâdieshâd/ishâdikâri
/s/raddhâditabditâdbhirtveshulokitâtdyulokatîtyyântîtibhâtîty
artha/h/. Ân. Gi.].'
[Footnote 2: Ân. Gi. introduces this clause by: nanu mahad iha /s/rutyor vailaksha/n/ya/m/,
/s/raddhâditabditânâm apâhomakva /s/rdyulokehomaruta
kva/k/id ish/t/âdikâriâdikradhûmâdikrame /k/a tesâprâptirnateshâm
âpaantisanti yenaetadveshtânâitânâha/tgatishtatrâha. reshâeti
[Footnote3: I read, with a M.S. of Ân. Gi., âhutûrvapûrvarûpâ
[Footnote 4: The so--called antyesh/t/i.]
[Footnote 5: And is on that account properly called /s/raddhâ
110
souls, when going to the enjoyment of the fruits of their
works, are enveloped by the water of which the oblations
consist[Footnote ref 1].
But how can it be maintained that those who perform
sacrifices, &c., go to the enjoyment of the fruit of their
works, considering that scripture declares them when having
reached the moon--by the path leading through smoke,
&c.--to become food, 'That is Soma the king; that is the
food of the gods; the gods do eat it' (/Kh/. Up. V, 10, 4);
and the corresponding passage, 'Having reached the moon
they become food, and then the Devas feed on them there
as sacrificers feed on Soma as it increases and decreases'
(B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 16)? If, in accordance with these passages,
they are eaten by the gods as by tigers, &c., it is not
possible that they should enjoy the fruit of their deeds.--To
this the following Sûtra replies.
7. Or (the souls' being the food of the gods is)
metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the
Self. For thus (scripture) declares.
The word 'or' is meant to set aside the started objection.
The souls' being food has to be understood in a metaphorical,
not a literal, sense, as otherwise all scriptural statements of
claims (adhikâra)--such as 'He who is desirous of the
heavenly world is to sacrifice'--would be contradicted. If
[Footnote 1: /S/a@nkara's attempts to render plausible the interpretation of /s/raddhâ by 'water,' and to base thereon the doctrine of the souls when going to a new body being enveloped by a subtle involucrum of water (and the other elements contained therein) are, of course, altogether artificial. I do not, however, see that he can be taxed with inconsistency (as he is by Deussen, p. 408). /S/raddhâ is to him in the first place the gross water which constitutes the chief material employed in the sacrifices; in the second place the *apûrva which results from the sacrifice, and which is imagined to consist of the subtle parts of the water whose gross parts have been consumed by the sacrificial fire. These subtle parts attach themselves to the soul, accompany it as an involucrum when it goes to another world, and form the base of any new body which the soul may have to assume in accordance with its previous deeds.
111
the performers of sacrifices, &c., did not, in the sphere of
the moon, enjoy the fruits of their works, why should they
undertake works such as sacrifices, which are to him who
performs them the cause of great trouble? We see, moreover,
that the word 'food,' as denoting in general whatever
is the cause of enjoyment, is metaphorically used of that
also which is not food (in the narrower sense), as, for instance,
in such phrases as 'the Vai/s/yas are the food of
kings, the animals are the food of the Vai/s/yas.' Hence
what is meant there by the term 'eating' is the rejoicing
of the gods with the performers of sacrifices, &c., who
stand in a subordinate (instrumental) relation to that rejoicing--a
rejoicing analogous to that of an ordinary man with
beloved persons such as wife, children, friends, and so on--not
actual eating like the chewing and swallowing of sweetmeats.
For that the gods eat in the ordinary way a
scriptural passage expressly denies (/Kh/. Up. III, 6, 1),
'The gods do not eat or drink; by seeing the nectar they
are satisfied.' At the same time the performers of sacrifices,
although standing in a subordinate relation to the gods.
may themselves be in a state of enjoyment, like servants
who (although subordinate to the king) themselves live on
the king.--That the performers of sacrifices are objects of
enjoyment for the gods follows, moreover, from their quality
of not knowing the Self. For that those who do not know
the Self are objects of enjoyment for the gods the following
scriptural passage shows, 'Now, if a man worships another
deity, thinking the deity is one and he is another, he does
not know. He is like a beast for the Devas' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4,
10). That means: he, in this life, propitiating the gods by
means of oblations and other works, serves them like a beast,
and does so in the other world also, depending on them like
a beast and enjoying the fruits of his works as assigned by
them.--The latter part of the Sûtra can be explained in
another manner also [Footnote ref 1]. Those who do not know the Self
are those who perform works only, such as sacrifices, &c.,
[Footnote 1: Anâtma/s/abda/s/ruter mukbyârthatvânurodhena sûtrâ/ms/asyârtham
uktvâ prakara/n/ânurodhenârthântaram âha. Ân. Gi.]
112
and do not join knowledge to works. We then take the
expression, 'the knowledge of the Self,' as indirectly denoting
the knowledge of the five fires; an explanation which
rests on the general subject-matter. And on account of the
performers of sacrifices being destitute of the knowledge of
the five fires the circumstance of their serving as food is
brought forward as a mere gu/n/avâda[Footnote ref 1] for the purpose of glorifying the knowledge of the five fires. For the latter is
what the text aims at enjoining, as we infer from the
general purport of the passage.--'For thus' another scriptural
passage 'declares,' viz. that enjoyment (on the part of
the /g/îva) takes place in the sphere of the moon, 'Having
enjoyed greatness in the Soma world he returns again' (Pr.
Up. V, 4). Another scriptural passage also declares that
the performers of sacrifices dwelling together with the gods
obtain enjoyment, 'A hundred blessings of the fathers who
have conquered this world make one blessing of the work-gods,
who obtain their godhead by work' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3.
33).--As thus the statement about the performers of sacrifices
becoming food is metaphorical only, we understand
that it is their souls which go, and hence there is no longer
any objection to the doctrine that they go enveloped by
water.
/*
8. On the passing away of the works (the soul
redescends) with a remainder, according to scripture
and Sm/ri/ti, as it went (i.e. passing through the same
stations) and not thus (i.e. in the inverse order).
*/
Scripture states that the souls of those who perform
sacrifices, and the like, rise on the road leading through
smoke, and so on, to the sphere of the moon, and when
they have done with the enjoyment (of the fruits of their
works) again descend, 'Having dwelt there, yâvatsampâtam[Footnote ref 2], they return again that way as they came,' &c., up to 'Those
whose conduct has been good obtain some good birth, the
[Footnote 1: See part i, p. 221.]
[Footnote 2: About which term see further on.]
113
birth of a Brâhma/n/a, &c.--Those whose conduct has been
evil obtain the birth of a dog, &c.' (/Kh/. Up. V, 10, 5-7).
Here it must be considered whether the souls, after having
enjoyed the fruits of all their works, descend without a
remainder (anu/s/aya, of their works), or with such a remainder
(of unrequited works).--The pûrvapakshin says:
without such a remainder.--Why?--On account of the
specification 'yâvat sampâtam.' The word sampâta here
denotes the aggregate of works (karmâ/s/aya)[Footnote ref 1], which is so called because by it the souls pass from this world to that
world for the purpose of enjoying the fruits of the works.
So that the entire clause 'Having dwelt there as far as the
aggregate of the works extends' indicates their works being
completely requited there. The same thing is indicated by
another scriptural passage, 'But when in their case that
(i.e. the effect of their works) ceases' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 2,
16).--Well, but why should we not assume that these passages
(do not mean that all works are requited there but) only
indicate that the soul enjoys in the other world so long as
there are works to be enjoyed there?--It is impossible to
assume this, because elsewhere a reference is made to the
totality of works. For the passage, B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 6, 'Having
obtained the end of whatever deed he does here on earth,
he again returns from that world to this world to action,'
intimates, by means of the comprehensive term 'whatever,'
that all works done here are exhausted there.--Moreover,
death has the power of manifesting those works whose fruit
has not yet begun[Footnote ref 2]; the manifestation of those works not being possible previously to death because then they are obstructed by those works whose fruits have already begun.
Now death must manifest alike all works whose fruits had
not begun previously, because the cause being the same the
effects cannot be different. Analogously a lamp which is
placed at the same distance from a jar and a piece of cloth
* * * * *
[Footnote 1: The Comm. on /Kh/. Up. V, 10, 5, explains it
by 'sampatanti
yeneti sampâta/h/ karma/n/a/h/ kshaya/h/, yâvat sampâtam yâvat
karma/n/a/h/ kshaya/h/.']
[Footnote 2: Abhivyaktu/s/ /k/a kaima/n/â/m/ phalâdanâyonmukhatvam. Ân. Gi.]
114
illuminates the latter as well as the former.--Hence it
follows that the souls descend without a remainder of
unrequited works.
To this we reply as follows: 'On the passing away of the
works with a remainder.' That means: when the aggregate
of works with which the souls had risen to the moon for the
purpose of the enjoyment of their fruits is, by such enjoyment,
exhausted, then the body, consisting of water, which
had originated in the moon for the purpose of such enjoyment,
is dissolved by contact with the fire of the grief
springing from the observation that the enjoyment comes to
an end; just as snow and hail are melted by contact with
the rays of the sun, or the hardness of ghee by contact with
the heat of fire. Then, at the passing away of the works,
i.e. when the works performed, such as sacrifices, &c., are,
by the enjoyment of their fruits, exhausted, the souls
descend with a remainder yet left.--But on what grounds
is that remainder assumed?--On the ground of what is seen
(/S/ruti) and Sm/ri/ti. For scripture declares manifestly that
the souls descend joined with such a remainder, 'Those
whose conduct (/k/ara/n/a) has been good will quickly attain
some good birth, the birth of a Brâhma/n/a, or a Kshattriya,
or a Vai/s/ya. But those whose conduct has been evil will
quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or
a Kâ/nd/âla.' That the word /k/ara/n/a here means the remainder
(of the works) will be shown later on. Moreover,
the different degrees of enjoyment which are implied in the
difference of birth on the part of the living beings point, as
they cannot be accidental, to the existence of such a
remainder of works. For we know from scripture that
good fortune as well as misfortune is caused by good and
evil works. Sm/ri/ti also teaches that the members of the
different castes and â/s/ramas do, in accordance with their
works, at first enjoy the fruit of their works and then enter
into new existences, in which they are distinguished from
each other by locality, caste, family, shape, length of life,
knowledge, conduct, property, pleasure, and intelligence,
which doctrine implies that they descend with a remainder
of their works.--Of what kind then is that so-called re-*
115
*mainder?--Some say that thereby we have to understand
a remainder of the works which had been performed (in the
previous existence) for the sake of the heavenly world, and
whose fruits have (for the greater part) been enjoyed.
That remainder might then be compared to the remainder
of oil which sticks to the inside of a vessel previously filled
with oil even after it has been emptied.--But you have no
right to assume a remainder in the case of works, the fruits
of which have been enjoyed already, since the ad/ri/sh/t/a
(which springs from works) is opposed to the works (so as
to destroy them completely[Footnote ref 1]).--This objection, we reply, is
not valid, as we do not maintain that the works are completely
requited (previously to the new existence).--But the
souls do ascend to the sphere of the moon for the express
purpose of finding there a complete requital of their works!
--True; but when only a little of the effects of their works
is left, they can no longer stay there. For as some courtier
who has joined the king's court with all the requisites
which the king's service demands is unable to remain at
court any longer, when in consequence of his long stay most
of his things are worn out, so that he is perhaps left with a
pair of shoes and an umbrella only; so the soul, when
possessing only a small particle of the effects of its works,
can no longer remain in the sphere of the moon.--But all
this reasoning is in fact altogether unfounded [Footnote ref 2]. For it has already been stated that, on account of (the ad/ri/sh/t/a) being opposed to the work, the continued existence of a remainder
cannot be admitted in the case of works which had been
performed with a view to the heavenly world, and which
have been requited in the moon.--But has it not also been
said above that not all the work whose fruit the heavenly
world is meets with requital there?--Yes, but that statement
is not defensible. For works which are performed for
[Footnote 1: Bhâ/nd/ânusâri/n/a/h/ snehasyâvirodhâd yukta/h/ /s/esha/h/, karma tu
phalodayavirodhitvât phala/m/ keg /g/âta/m/ nash/t/am eveti na tasya /s/eshasiddhir iti /s/a@nkate nanv iti. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 2: Ivakâro madhuroktyâ prayukto vastutas tv evakâro vivakshita/h/. Ân. Gi.]
116
the purpose of obtaining the heaven, world produce their
entire heavenly fruit for the soul only as being as it stays in
heaven, and if we take our stand on scripture we have no
right to assume that they produce even a particle of fruit
for the souls after those have again descended from heaven. That some part of the oil continues to remain in the vessel
is unobjectionable because we see it, and we likewise see
that some part of the courtier's equipment continues to
remain with him; but that some part of those works which
led the soul to heaven continues to exist, that we neither
see nor are able to surmise, because it would contradict the
texts declaring that the heavenly world (alone) is the fruit
of the works.--That of works whose fruit is heaven, such as
sacrifices and the like, no remainder continues to exist, we
must necessarily acknowledge for the following reason also.
If some part of those good works such as sacrifices, &c., on
account of which the agents enjoyed the heavenly world,
were surmised to continue in existence as a remainder, that
remainder would in all cases be itself a good one, would never
be of a contrary nature. But then our supposition would be
in conflict with the scriptural passage which distinguishes
remainders of a different kind, viz. 'Those whose conduct
has been good;--those whose conduct has been evil,' &c.
Hence after the fruits of that set of works which is requited
in the other world have been (completely) enjoyed, the
remaining other set of works whose fruits are to be enjoyed
in this world constitutes the--so-called anu/s/aya with which
the souls re-descend. It was said above that we must assume
the souls to descend without any such remainder, after
having reached, by the enjoyment of the fruits, the end of
all the works alone here below, on account of the comprehensive
statement implied in the expression 'whatever.'
But that assertion cannot be upheld as the existence of
such a remainder has been proved. Hence we have to
understand that the souls re-descend after having exhausted,
by the enjoyment of its fruits, only that entire part of the
works done here below whose fruit belongs to the other
world and is begun to be enjoyed there.--The proof given
by us of the existence of the remainder refutes at the same
time the other assertion made above, viz. that death manifests
equally all works the enjoyment of whose fruits was
not begun here below, and that on that account we are not
entitled to draw a line between works whose fruits begin in
the other world and works whose fruits begin in this world
only (i.e. in a new existence on earth).--We moreover, have
to ask for what reason it is maintained that death manifests
(i.e. lays open and makes ready for requital those works
whose fruits have not begun here below. The answer will
be that in this life the operation of certain words cannot
begin because it is obstructed by other works whose fruits
already begin here below, that, however, that operation does
begin as soon as, at the moment of death, the obstruction
ceases. Well, then, if previously to death those actions
whose fruits have already begun prevent other actions from
beginning their operation, at the time of death also certain
works of less force will be obstructed in their operation by
other works of greater force, it being impossible that the
fruits of works of opposite tendency should begin at the
same time. For it is impossible to maintain that different
deeds whose fruits must be experienced in different existences
should, merely because they have this in common
that their fruits have not begun (previously to death), become
manifest on the occasion of one and the same death,
and originate one new existence only; against this militates
the fact of the definite fruits (attached to each particular
work) being of contrary natures[Footnote ref 1]. Not, on the other hand, can we maintain that at the time of death some works
manifest themselves while others are altogether extinguished;
for that would contradict the fact that absolutely
all works have their fruits. No work in fact can be
extinguished except by means of expiatory actions, &c.[Footnote ref 2]
Sm/ri/ti also declares that works whose operation is ob-*
[Footnote 1: On which account they cannot be experienced in one and the same existence.]
[Footnote 2: Works are extinguished either by expiatory ceremonies or by the knowledge of Brahman or by the full fruition of their consequences.]
118
*structed by other works leading to fruits of a contrary
nature last for a long time, 'Sometimes a good deed
persists immovable as it were, the doer meanwhile remaining
immerged in the sa/m/sâra, until at last he is released
from pain.'
Moreover, if all unrequited works becoming manifest on
the occasion of one and the same death were to begin one
new existence only, the consequence would be that those
who are born again in the heavenly world, or in hell, or as
animals, could, as not entitled thereto, perform no religious
works, and being thus excluded from all chance of acquiring
religious merit and demerit could not enter on any new
forms of existence, as all reason for the latter would be
absent[Footnote ref 1]. And that would further contradict Sm/ri/ti, which
declares that some single actions, such as the murder of a
Brâhma/n/a, are the causes of more than one new existence.
Nor can we assume, for the knowledge of the particular
results springing from religious merit and demerit, any
other cause than the sacred texts[Footnote ref 2]. Nor, again, does death
manifest (bring about the requital of) those works whose
fruit is observed to be enjoyed already here below, as, for
instance, the kârîresh/t/i, &c.[Footnote ref 3] How then can we allow the
assumption that death manifests all actions? The instance
of the lamp (made use of by the pûrvapakshin) is already
refuted by our having shown the relative strength of
actions[Footnote ref 4]. Or else we may look on the matter as analogous
to the manifestation (by a lamp) of bigger and smaller
objects. For as a lamp, although equally distant from a
big and a very small thing, may manifest the former only
[Footnote 1: And in consequence of this they could never obtain final
release.]
[Footnote 2: We have the sacred texts only to teach us what the effects of particular good or evil actions may be.]
[Footnote 3: The kârîresh/t/i is a sacrifice offered by those who are desirous of rain.]
[Footnote 4: I.e. by our having shown that death does not equally manifest
all works, but that, after death has taken place, the stronger works
bring about their requital while the operation of the weaker ones is
retarded thereby.]
119
and not the latter, so death provokes the operation of the
stronger works only, not of the weaker ones, although an equal
opportunity presents itself for both sets of works as hitherto
unrequited.--Hence the doctrine that all works are manifested
by death cannot be maintained, as it is contradicted
by /S/ruti, Sm/ri/ti, and reason alike. That the existence
of a remainder of works should stand in the way of final
release is a misplaced fear, as we know from /S/ruti that all
works whatever are destroyed by perfect knowledge. It
therefore is a settled conclusion that the souls re-descend
with a remainder of works. They descend 'as they came'
(mounted up); 'not thus,' i.e. in inverted order. We conclude
that they descend 'as they came' from the fact of
ether and smoke, which the text includes in the road of the
fathers, being mentioned in the description of the descent
also, and from the expression 'as they came.' That they
follow the inverted order we conclude from night, &c., not
being mentioned, and from the cloud, &c., being added.
9. Should it be objected that on account of conduct
(the assumption of a remainder is not needed),
we deny this because (the scriptural expression
'conduct') is meant to connote (the remainder); so
Kârsh/n/â/g/ini thinks.
But--an objection may be raised--the scriptural passage,
which has been quoted for the purpose of proving that the
existence of a remainder of works ('those whose conduct
has been good,' &c.), declares that the quality of the new
birth depends on /k/ara/n/a, not on anu/s/aya. Now /k/ara/n/a and
anu/s/aya are different things; for /k/ara/n/a is the same as
/k/arit/r/a, â/k/âra, /s/îla, all of which mean conduct[Footnote ref 1], while
anu/s/aya denotes work remaining from requited work.
Scripture also speaks of actions and conduct as different
things, 'According as he acts and according as he conducts
himself so will he be' (B/ri/, Up. IV, 4, 5); and 'Whatever
[Footnote 1: S/îla also means here 'conduct' only, as we see from its being
co-ordinated with /k/ara/n/a, /k/arit/r/a, &c.; not character.]
120
works are blameless those should be regarded, not others;
whatever our good conduct was that should be observed by
thee' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 2). From the passage which proclaims
the dependence of the quality of birth on conduct
the existence of an unrequited remainder of works cannot
therefore be proved.--This objection is without force, we
reply, because the scriptural term 'conduct' is meant to
connote the remainder of the works. This is the opinion of
the teacher Kârsh/n/â/g/ini.
/*
10. If it be said that purposelessness (of conduct
would result therefrom), we deny this on account of
the dependence (of work) on that (conduct).
*/
That may be; but for what reason should we abandon
that meaning which the term '/k/ara/n/a' directly conveys,
viz. the meaning 'conduct,' and accept the merely connotative
meaning 'remainder of the works?' Conduct, which the
text directly mentions, may be supposed to have for its
fruit either a good or an evil birth, according as it is
enjoined or prohibited, good or evil. Some fruit will have
to be allowed to it in any case; for otherwise it would
follow that it is purposeless.--This objection is without
force 'on account of the dependence on it.' Such works as
sacrifices, and the like, depend on conduct in so far as
somebody whose conduct is not good is not entitled to
perform them. This we know from Sm/ri/ti-passages, such
as the following, 'Him who is devoid of good conduct the
Vedas do not purify.'--And also if conduct is considered as
subservient to man[Footnote ref 1] it will not be purposeless. For when
the aggregate of works such as sacrifices, &c.. begins to
originate its fruit, the conduct which has reference to the
sacrifice will originate there (i.e. in the fruit) some addition.
* * * * *
[Footnote 1: I.e. as something which produces in man a sa/m/skâra analogous
to that produced by other preparatory or purificatory rites such as
bathing, &c.--In the preceding sentences conduct had been spoken
of not as purushârtha but as karmâ@nga. In that case it produces
no separate result; while if considered as purushârtha it has a
special result of its own.]
121
And it is known from /S/ruti as well as Sm/ri/ti that work
effects everything[Footnote ref 1]. It is, therefore, the opinion of Kârsh/n/â/g/ini
that the remainder of works only--which is connoted
by the term 'conduct'--is the cause of the souls entering
on new births. For as work may be the cause of new
births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause.
If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will
surely not creep on his knees.
11. But (/k/ara/n/a means) nothing but good and
evil works; thus Bâdari opines.
The teacher Bâdari, however, thinks that the word
'/k/ara/n/a' denotes nothing else but good works and evil
works. It means the same as anush/th/âna (performance) or
karman (work). For we see that the root /k/ar (to walk, to
conduct oneself) is used in the general sense of acting. Of
a man who performs holy works such as sacrifices, &c.,
people say in ordinary language, 'that excellent man walks
in righteousness.' The word â/k/âra also denotes only a kind
of religious duty. That works and /k/ara/n/a (conduct) are
sometimes spoken of as different things is analogous to the
distinction sometimes made between Brâhma/n/as and Parivrâ/g/akas
[Footnote ref 2]. We, therefore, decide that by men of good
/k/ara/n/a are meant those whose works are worthy of praise,
by men of evil /k/ara/n/a those whose works are worthy of
blame.
12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices
(the ascent to the moon) is stated by scripture.
It has been said that those who perform sacrifices, &c., go
to the moon. The question now arises whether those also
who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon or not.--The
pûrvapakshin maintains that it cannot be asserted that
men belonging to the former class only go to the moon,
[Footnote 1: A clause added to guard against the assumption--which might
be based on the preceding remarks--that conduct is, after all,
the cause of the quality of the new birth.]
[Footnote 2: Although the latter are a mere sub-class of the former.]
122
because scripture speaks of the moon as being resorted to
by those also who have not performed sacrifices. For the
Kâushîtakins make the following general statement, 'All
who depart from this world go to the moon' (Kau. Up. I, 2).
Moreover, the origination of a new body in the case of those
who are born again is not possible without their having
(previously) reached the moon, on account of the precise
definition of number contained in the statement, 'In the
fifth oblation' (/Kh/. Up. V, 9, 1)[Footnote ref 1]. Hence all men must be
supposed to resort to the moon. If it be objected that it
does not appear proper that those who perform sacrifices
and those who do not should go to the same place, we reply
that there is no real objection, because those who do not
perform sacrifices do not enjoy anything in the moon.
15. But of the others, after having enjoyed the
fruits of their actions in Sa/m/yamana, ascent and
descent take place; as such a course is declared (by
scripture).
'But' discards the pûrvapaksha. It is not true that all men
go to the moon. For the ascent to the moon is for the purpose
of enjoyment only; it is neither without a special purpose nor
for the mere purpose of subsequent re-descent. Just as a man
climbs on a tree for the purpose of breaking fruit or
blossoms, not either without any aim or for the mere
purpose of coming down again. Now it has been admitted
already that for those who do not offer sacrifices there is
not any enjoyment in the moon; hence those only who
perform sacrifices rise to the moon, not any other persons.
The latter descend to Sa/m/yamana, the abode of Yama,
suffer there the torments of Yama corresponding to their
evil deeds, and then again re-ascend to this world. Such is
their ascent and descent; as we maintain on the ground of
such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural
passage embodying Yama's own words declares that those
who die without having offered sacrifices fall into Yama's
[Footnote 1: Which statement presupposes four other oblations, the first of which is the one from which 'Soma the king rises.']
123
power.' The other world never rises before the eyes of the
careless child deluded by the delusion of wealth. This is
the world, he thinks, there is no other; thus he falls again
and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6). Scripture contains
many other passages likewise leading us to infer that
men fall into Yama's power; cp. e.g. 'Yama, the gathering-*place
of men' (/Ri/. Sa/m/h. X, 14, 1).
14. The Sm/ri/tis also declare this.
Moreover, authorities like Manu, Vyâsa, &c., declare that
in the city Sa/m/yamana evil works are requited under
Yama's rule; cp. the legend of Nâ/k/iketa and others.
15. Moreover there are seven (hells).
Moreover, the purâ/n/a-writers record that there are seven
hells, Raurava, &c., by name, which serve as abodes of
enjoyment of the fruits of evil deeds. As those who do not
sacrifice, &c. go there, how should they reach the moon?--But,
an objection is raised, the assertion that evil doers
suffer punishments allotted by Yama is contradicted by the
circumstance that Sm/ri/ti mentions different other beings,
such as /K/itragupta, &c., who act as superintendents in Rau-*rava
and the other hells.--This objection the next Sûtra
refutes.
16. On account of his activity there also no
contradiction exists.
There is no contradiction, as the same Yama is admitted
to act as chief ruler in those seven hells. Of /K/itragupta
and others Sm/ri/ti merely speaks as superintendents employed
by Yama.
17. But on (the two roads) of knowledge and
works, those two being under discussion.
In that place of the knowledge of the five fires, where the
answer is expected to the question, 'Do you know why that
world never becomes full?' the text runs as follows: 'On
neither of these two ways are those small creatures continually
returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. Theirs
is a third place. Therefore that world never becomes full.'
124
By the two ways mentioned in this passage we have to
understand knowledge and works.--Why?--On account of
their being the subjects under discussion. That means:
knowledge and works are under discussion as the means for
entering on the road of the gods and the road of the fathers.
The clause, 'those who know this,' proclaims knowledge to
be the means whereby to obtain the road of the gods; the
clause, 'sacrifices, works of public utility, and **,' proclaims
works to be that by which we obtain the road of the
fathers. Under the heading of these two paths there stands
the subsequent passage, 'on neither of these two ways, &c.'
To explain. Those who are neither entitled, through
knowledge, to follow the road of the gods, nor, by works,
to follow the road of the fathers, for those there is a third
path on which they repeatedly return to the existence of
small animals. For this reason also those who do not
perform sacrifices. &c. do not reach the moon.--But why
should they not first mount to the sphere of the moon and
thence descending enter on the existence of small animals?
--No, that would imply entire purposelessness of their
mounting. Moreover, if all men when dying would reach
the sphere of the moon, that world would be filled by the
departed, and from that would result an answer contrary to
the question (viz. 'why does not that world become full?').
For an answer is expected showing that that world does
not become full.--Nor can we admit the explanation that
the other world possibly does not become full because
re-descent is admitted; since this is not stated by scripture.
For it is true, indeed, that the not becoming full might be
explained from their re-descending; but scripture actually
explains it from the existence of a third place, 'Theirs is
a third place; therefore that world never becomes full.'
Hence the fact of the other world not becoming full must
be explained from their not-ascending only. For, otherwise,
the descent equally taking place in the case of those
who do perform sacrifices, &c., it would follow that the
statement of a third place is devoid of purpose.--The word
'but' (in the Sûtra) is meant to preclude the idea--arising
from the passage of another /s/âkhâ (i.e. the Kaush. Up.)
[NOTE: Lines beginning with a * indicate places where I could not read the scan. I attempted save the image and enlarge in a separate window, but with little success. This is the best that I could make out, but am still unsure of it.]
[** entire words that I could not make out.]
* that all departed go to the moon. Under the circumstances
* the word 'all' which occurs in that passage has
* to be when as referring only to those qualified, so that
* the sense is 'all those who depart from this world properly
* qualified so to the moon.'--The next Sûtra is directed
* against the ** that all must go to the moon for
* the purpose obtaining a new body, in accordance with
* the definite ** of number ('in the fifth oblation &c.').
* 18. N. ** case of) the third place, as it is
* thus perceived.
With regard to third place, the rule of the oblations
being five in number need not be attended to for the
purpose of obtaining a new body.--Why?--On account
of it being perceived thus. That means; because it is
seen that the third place is reached in the manner described
without any reference to the oblations being
limited to the number five, 'Live and die. That is the
third place.'--Moreover, in the passage, 'In the fifth oblation
water is called man,' the number of the oblations is
stated to be the cause of the water becoming the body of
a man, not of an insect or moth, &c.; the word 'man'
applying to the human species only.--And, further, the
text merely teaches that in the fifth oblation the waters
are called man, and does not at the same time deny that,
where there is no fifth oblation, they are not called man;
for if it did the latter, the sentence would have the imperfection
of having a double sense. We therefore have to
understand that the body of those men who are capable of
ascending and descending originates in connexion with
the fifth oblation, that in the case of other men, however,
a body forms itself from water mixed with the other elements
even without a settled number of oblations.
19. It is, moreover, recorded in the (ordinary)
world.
There are, moreover, traditions, apart from the Veda,
that certain persons like Dro/n/a, Dh/ri/sh/t/adyumna, Sitâ,
Draupadî, &c., were not bora in the ordinary way from
mothers. In the case of Dro/n/a and others there was
absent the oblation which is made into the woman; while
in the case of Dh/ri/sh/t/adyumna and others, even two of
the oblations, viz. the one offered into woman and the one
offered into man, were absent. Hence in other cases also
birth may be supposed to take place independently of the
number of oblations.-It is, moreover, commonly known
that the female crane conceives without a male.
20. And on account of observation.
It is, moreover, observed that out of the four classes of
organic beings-viviparous animals, oviparous animals, animals
springing from heat, and beings springing from germs
(plants)-the two latter classes are produced without sexual
intercourse, so that in their case no regard is had to the
number of oblations. The same may therefore take place
in other cases also. --But, an objection may here be raised,
scripture speaks of those beings as belonging to three
classes only, because there are three modes of origin only;
' That which springs from an egg, that which springs from
a living being, that which springs from a germ' (Kh. Up.
VI, 3, 1). How then can it be maintained that there
are four classes? --To this objection the next Sutra
replies.
21. The third term comprises that which springs
from heat.
The third term in the scriptural passage quoted, i.e.
' that which springs from a germ,' must be understood as
implying those beings also which spring from heat; the
two classes having in common that they spring from earth
or water, i.e. from something stable. Different from their
origin is the origin of those beings which spring from moving
things (viz. animals).-In other places the beings springing
from heat and those springing from germs are spoken of as
constituting separate classes.-Hence there is no contradiction.
22. (On the part of the soul's descending from the
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moon) there is entering into similarity of being (with
ether and so on); as this (only) is possible.
It has been explained that the souls of those who perform
sacrifices, &c., after having reached the moon dwell there as
long as their works last and then re-descend with a remainder
of their works. We now have to inquire into the mode
of that descent. On this point scripture makes the following
statement: 'They return again the way they came, to
the ether, from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer
having become air becomes smoke, having become smoke
he becomes mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud,
having become a cloud he rains down.'--Here a doubt arises
whether the descending souls pass over into a state of
identity with ether, &c., or into a state of similarity.--The
pûrvapakshin maintains that the state is one of identity,
because this is directly stated by the text. Otherwise there
would take place so-called indication (laksha/n/â). Now
whenever the doubt lies between a directly expressed and
a merely indicated meaning the former is to be preferred.
Thus the following words also, 'Having become air he becomes
smoke,' &c., are appropriate only if the soul be understood
to identify itself with them.--Hence it follows that
the souls become identical with ether, &c.--To this we reply
that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether, &c.
When the body, consisting of water which the soul had
assumed in the sphere of the moon for the purpose of enjoyment,
dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes
to an end, then it becomes subtle like ether, passes thereupon
into the power of the air, and then gets mixed with
smoke, &c. This is the meaning of the clauses, 'They return
as they came to the ether, from the ether to the air, &c.'--How
is this known to be the meaning?--Because thus only
it is possible. For it is not possible that one thing should
become another in the literal sense of the word. If, moreover,
the souls became identified with ether they could no
longer descend through air, &c. And as connexion with
the ether is, on account of its all-pervadingness, eternal, no
other connexion (of the souls) with it can here be meant
but their entering into a state of similarity to it
[Footnote ref 1 And in cases where it is impossible to accept the literal meaning of the text it is quite proper to assume the meaning which is merely indicated.--For these reasons the souls' becoming ether, &c., has to be taken in the secondary sense of their passing into a state of similarity to ether, and so on.
23. (The soul passes through the stages of its
descent) in a not very long time; on account of the
special statement.
A doubt arises with reference to the period beginning
with the soul's becoming ether and extending up to its
entering into rice, &c., viz. whether the soul remains a long
time in the state of similarity to each of the stages of its
way before it enters into similarity to the next one, or only
a short time.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that, on account
of the absence of a definite text, no binding rule
exists.--To this we reply that the souls remain in the state
of similarity to ether. &c., for a short period only before they
fall to the earth in raindrops. We infer this from the
circumstance of the text making a special statement. For
after having said that the souls enter into rice, &c., it adds,
'From thence the escape is beset with more pain;' a statement
implying that the escape from the previous states was
comparatively easy and pleasant. Now this difference in
point of pleasantness must be based on the comparative
shortness or length of the escape; for as, at that time, the
body is not yet formed, enjoyment (in the ordinary sense)
is not possible. Hence we conclude that, up to the
moment when the souls enter into rice, &c., their descent
is accomplished in a short time.
[Footnote 1: It might be said that the relation to ether, &c., into which the souls enter, is the relation of conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not the relation of similarity. But as nothing can enter into the relation of sa/m/yoga with ether (everything being in eternal sa/m/yoga with it) we must assume that 'becoming ether' means 'becoming like ether,' and by
parity of reasoning, that 'becoming air, &c.,' means 'becoming like air.']
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24. (The descending souls enter) into (plants)
animated by other (souls), as in the previous cases,
on account of scriptural declaration.
In the description of the souls' descent we read, after their
coming down in raindrops has been mentioned, 'Then they
are born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and
beans.'--Here a doubt arises whether, at this stage of their
descent, the souls to which a remainder of their works continues
to cling really pass over into the different species of
those immoveable things (plants) and enjoy their pleasures
and pains, or if they enter merely into a state of conjunction
with the bodies of those plants which are animated by
different souls.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that they pass
over into those species and enjoy their pleasures and pains,
on account of the remainder of works still attaching to
them; firstly, because that enables us to take the verb 'to
be born' in its literal sense; secondly, because we know from
/S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti that the condition of a plant may be a
place of enjoyment (of the fruits of actions); and thirdly,
because sacrifices and similar actions, being connected
with harm done to animals, &c., may lead to unpleasant
results. We therefore take the 'being born as rice,' &c.,
of those to whom a remainder of their works attaches, in its
literal sense, and consider the case to be analogous to that of
a man who is born either as a dog or a hog or a Kâ/nd/âla,
where we have to understand that the man really becomes
a dog, and so on, and experiences the pleasures and pains
connected with that condition.
To this reasoning we reply as follows:--The souls to which
a remainder attaches enter merely into conjunction with rice
plants, &c., which are already animated by other souls; and
do not enjoy their pleasures and pains; 'as in the previous
cases.' As the souls' becoming air, smoke, &c., was decided
to mean only that they become connected with them [Footnote ref 1], so
here too their becoming rice, &c. merely means that they
[Footnote 1: This does not agree well with what had been said above about the souls becoming similar to ether, air, &c.]
130
become connected with those plants--How is this known?
--From the fact of the statement here also being of the
same nature--Of what nature?--Here, also, as in the case
of the souls becoming ether, &c., down to rain, the text does
not refer to any operation of the works; hence we conclude
that the souls do not enjoy pleasure and pain. Where, on
the other hand, the text wants to intimate that the souls
undergo pleasure and pain, there it refers to the operation
of the former works; so e.g. in the passage which treats of
men of good or evil conduct. Moreover, if we should take
the souls' being born as rice, &c., in its literal sense, it would
follow that when the rice plants are reaped, unhusked, split,
cooked and eaten, the souls which have descended into them
and are animating them would have to leave them; it being
generally known that when a body is destroyed the soul
animating it abandons it. And then (if the souls left the
plants) the text could not state (as it does state. V, 10, 6)
that the souls which had entered into the plants are transmitted
by animal generation (on the part of those who eat
the plants). Hence it follows that the souls which have
descended are merely outwardly connected with the plants
animated by other souls. This suffices to refute the assertions
that 'to be born' must be taken in its literal sense;
and that the state of vegetable existence affords a place
for enjoyment. We do not entirely deny that vegetable
existence may afford a place for enjoyment; it may do so
in the case of other beings which, in consequence of their
unholy deeds, have become plants. We only maintain that
those souls which descend from the moon with an unrequited
remainder of works do not experience the enjoyment
connected with plant life.
25. Should it be said that (sacrificial work is)
unholy; we deny this on the ground of scripture.
We proceed to refute the remark made by the pûrvapakshin
that sacrificial works are unholy because involving
harm done to animals, &c., that they may therefore lead
to unpleasant results, and that hence the statement as to
the souls being born as plants, &c., may be taken in its
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literal sense; in consequence of which it would be uncalled-for
to assume a derived sense.--This reasoning is not valid,
because our knowledge of what is duty and the contrary of
duty depends entirely on scripture. The knowledge of
one action being right and another wrong is based on
scripture only; for it lies out of the cognizance of the
senses, and there moreover is, in the case of right and wrong,
an entire want of binding rules as to place, time, and occasion.
What in one place, at one time, on one occasion
is performed as a right action, is a wrong action in
another place, at another time, on another occasion; none
therefore can know, without scripture, what is either right
or wrong. Now from scripture we derive the certain knowledge
that the /gy/otish/t/oma-sacrifice, which involves harm
done to animals (i.e. the animal sacrifice), &c., is an act of
duty; how then can it be called unholy?--But does not
the scriptural precept, 'Do not harm any creature,' intimate
that to do harm to any being is an act contrary to duty?--
True, but that is a general rule, while the precept, 'Let him
offer an animal to Agnishomau,' embodies an exception;
and general rule and exception have different spheres of
application. The work (i.e. sacrifice) enjoined by the Veda
is therefore holy, being performed by authoritative men and
considered blameless; and to be born as a plant cannot be
its fruit. Nor can to be born as rice and other plants be
considered analogous to being born as dogs, &c. For the
latter birth scripture teaches with reference to men of evil
conduct only; while no such specific qualification is stated
in the case of vegetable existence. Hence we conclude that
when scripture states that the souls descending from the
moon become plants, it only means that they become enclosed
in plants.
26. After that (there takes place) conjunction (of
the soul) with him who performs the act of generation.
The conclusion arrived at under the preceding Sûtra is
confirmed also by scripture stating that the souls, after
having entered into plants, 'become' beings performing the
act of generation, 'for whoever eats the food, whoever performs
the act of generation, that again he (the soul)
becomes.' Here again the soul's 'becoming' he who performs
the act of generation cannot be taken in its literal sense;
for a person becomes capable of generation a long time
after his birth only, viz. when he reaches puberty. How
then should the soul contained in the food eaten enter into
that condition in its true sense? Hence we must interpret
the passage to mean only that the soul enters into conjunction
with one who performs the act of generation; and
from this we again infer that the soul's becoming a plant
merely means its entering into conjunction with a plant.
27. From the yoni a (new) body (springs).
Then, subsequently to the soul having been in conjunction
with a person of generative power, generation takes
place, and a body is produced in which the soul can enjoy
the fruits of that remainder of works which still attaches to
it. This scripture declares in the passage, 'Those whose
conduct has been good,' &c. From this, also, it appears that
the souls to which a remainder clings, when descending and
becoming rice plants, and so on, do not enter into the state
of forming the body of those plants with its attendant
pleasure and pain, but are 'born as plants' in so far only
as they enter into conjunction with them.
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SECOND PÂDA.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. In the intermediate place there is (a real)
creation; for (scripture) says (that).
In the preceding pâda we have set forth, with reference
to the knowledge of the five fires, the various stages of
the soul's passing through the sa/m/sâra. We shall now
set forth the soul's different states (waking, dreaming, &c.)
--Scripture says (B/ri./ Up. IV, 3, 9; 10), 'When he falls
asleep--; there are no chariots in that state, no horses, no
roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads,'
&c.--Here a doubt arises whether the creation thus taking
place in dreams is a real one (pâramârthika) like the creation
seen in the waking state, or whether it consists of
illusion (mâyâ).--The pûrvapakshin maintains that 'in the
intermediate place (or state) there is (a real) creation.' By
intermediate place we have to understand the place of
dreams, in which latter sense the word is used in the Veda,
'There is a third intermediate state, the state of dreams'
(B/ri./ Up. IV, 3, 9). That place is called the intermediate
place because it lies there where the two worlds, or else the
place of waking and the place of bliss (deep sleep), join.
In that intermediate place the creation must be real; because
scripture, which is authoritative, declares it to be so,
'He creates chariots, horses, roads,' &c. We, moreover,
infer this from the concluding clause, 'He indeed is the
maker' (B/ri./ Up. IV, 3, 10).
2. And some (state the Self to be) the shaper
(creator); sons and so on (being the lovely things
which he shapes).
Moreover the members of one /s/âkhâ state that the Self
is, in that intermediate state, the shaper of lovely things,
'He, the person who is awake in us while we are asleep,
shaping one lovely thing after another' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).
134
Kâma (lovely things) in this passage means sons, &c.,
that are so called because they are beloved.--But may
not the term 'kâmâ/h/' denote desires merely?--No,we reply;
the word kâma is here used with reference to sons, &c.;
for those form the general subject of discussion, as we see
from some preceding passages, 'Choose sons and grandsons,'
&c., and 'I make thee the enjoyer of all kâmas'
(Ka. Up. I, 1, 23; 24).--And that that shaper is the highest
Self (prâ/gñ/a) we infer from the general subject-matter and
from the complementary sentence. That the highest Self
is the general subject-matter appears from II, 14, 'That
which thou seest as neither this nor that.' And to that
highest Self there also refers the complementary sentence
II, 5, 8, 'That indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that
alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained
in it, and no one goes beyond.'--Now it is admitted that
the world (creation) of our waking state of which the highest
Self (prâ/gñ/a) is the maker is real; hence the world of our
dreaming state must likewise be real. That the same reasoning
applies to the waking and the sleeping state a scriptural
passage also declares, 'Here they say: No, this is the same
as the place of waking, for what he sees while awake the
same he sees while asleep' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14).--Hence the
world of dreams is real.--To this we reply as follows.
3. But it (viz. the dream world) is mere illusion
(mâyâ), on account of its nature not manifesting
itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality).
The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha. It is not true
that the world of dreams is real; it is mere illusion and
there is not a particle of reality in it.--Why?--'On account
of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality,' i.e.
because the nature of the dream world does not manifest
itself with the totality of the attributes of real things.--
What then do you mean by the 'totality'?--The fulfilment
of the conditions of place, time, and cause, and the circumstance
of non-refutation. All these have their sphere in real
things, but cannot be applied to dreams. In the first place
there is, in a dream, no space for chariots and the like; for
135
those cannot possibly find room in the limited confines of
the body.--Well, but why should not the dreaming person
see the objects of his dream outside of his body? He does
as a matter of fact perceive things as separated from himself
by space; and /S/ruti, moreover, declares that the dream
is outside the body, 'Away from the nest the Immortal moves;
that immortal one goes wherever he likes ' (B/ri./ Up. IV,
3, 12). And this distinction of the conceptions of staying
and going would have no good sense if the being (the soul)
did not really go out.--What you maintain is inadmissible,
we reply. A sleeping being cannot possibly possess the
power to go and return in a moment the distance of a
hundred yo/g/anas. Sometimes, moreover, a person recounts
a dream in which he went to some place without returning
from it, 'Lying on my bed in the land of the Kurus I was
overcome by sleep and went in my dream to the country
of the Pa/ñk/âlas, and being there I awoke.' If, now, that
person had really gone out of his country, he would on
waking find himself in the country of the Pa/ñk/âlas to which
he had gone in his dream; but as a matter of fact he awakes
in the country of the Kurus.--Moreover, while a man
imagines himself in his dream going, in his body, to another
place, the bystanders see that very same body lying on the
couch. Further, a dreaming person does not see, in his
dream, other places such as they really are. But if he in
seeing them did actually go about, they would appear to
him like the things he sees in his waking state. /S/ruti,
moreover, declares that the dream is within the body, cp.
the passage beginning 'But when he moves about in dream,'
and terminating 'He moves about, according to his pleasure,
within his own body' (B/ri./ Up. II, 1, 18). Hence the
passage about the dreamer moving away from his nest
must be taken in a metaphorical sense, as otherwise we
should contradict scripture as well as reason; he who while
remaining within his own body does not use it for any purpose
may be said to be outside the body as it were. The
difference of the ideas of staying within the body and going
outside must, therefore, be viewed as a mere deception.--
In the second place we see that dreams are in conflict with
136
the conditions of time. One person lying asleep at night
dreams that it is day in the Bhârata Varsha; another lives,
during a dream which lasts one muhûrta only, through many
crowds of years.--In the third place there do not exist in
the state of dreaming the requisite efficient causes for either
thought or action; for as, in sleep, the organs are drawn
inward, the dreaming person has no eyes, &c. for perceiving
chariots and other things; and whence should he, in the
space of the twinkling of an eye, have the power of--or
procure the material for--making chariots and the like?--
In the fourth place the chariots, horses, &c., which the
dream creates, are refuted, i.e. shown not to exist by the
waking state. And apart from this, the dream itself refutes
what it creates, as its end often contradicts its beginning;
what at first was considered to be a chariot turns, in a
moment, into a man, and what was conceived to be a man
has all at once become a tree.--Scripture itself, moreover,
clearly declares the chariots, &c., of a dream to have no
real existence, 'There are no chariots in that state, no
horses, no roads, &c.'--Hence the visions of a dream are
mere illusion.
4. (Not altogether) for it (the dream) is indicative
(of the future), according to null; the experts also
declare this.
Well then, as dreams are mere illusion, they do not
contain a particle of reality?--Not so, we reply; for
dreams are prophetic of future good and bad fortune. For
scripture teaches as follows, 'When a man engaged in
some work undertaken for a special wish sees in his dreams
a woman, he may infer success from that dream-vision.'
Other scriptural passages declare that certain dreams
indicate speedy death, so, e.g. 'If he sees a black man
with black teeth, that man will kill him.'--Those also who
understand the science of dreams hold the opinion that to
dream of riding on an elephant and the like is lucky; while
it is unlucky to dream of riding on a donkey, &c.; and that
certain other dreams also caused by special mantras or
devatâs or substances contain a particle of truth.--In all
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these cases the thing indicated may be real; the indicating
dream, however, remains unreal as it is refuted by the
waking state. The doctrine that the dream itself is mere
illusion thus remains uncontradicted.--On this account the
Vedic passage to which the first Sûtra of this pâda refers is
to be explained metaphorically. When we say 'the plough
bears, i.e. supports the bullocks,' we say so because the
plough is the indirect cause of the bullocks being kept [Footnote ref 1],
not because we mean that the plough directly supports
the bullocks. Analogously scripture says that the dreaming
person creates chariots, &c., and is their maker, not
because he creates them directly but because he is the
cause of their creation. By his being their cause we have
to understand that he is that one who performs the good
and evil deeds which are the cause of the delight and
fear produced by the apparition, in his dream, of chariots
and other things[Footnote ref 2].--Moreover, as in the waking state,
owing to the contact of the senses and their objects and
the resulting interference of the light of the sun, &c., the
self-luminousness of the Self is, for the beholder, difficult
to discriminate, scripture gives the description of the
dreaming state for the purpose of that discrimination. If
then the statements about the creation of chariots, &c.,
were taken as they stand (i.e. literally) we could not
ascertain that the Self is self-luminous [Footnote ref 3]. Hence we have
to explain the passage relative to the creation of chariots,
&c., in a metaphorical sense, so as to make it agree with
the statement about the non-existence of chariots, &c.
This explains also the scriptural passage about the
shaping (III, 2, 2). The statement made above that in
the Kâ/th/aka the highest Self is spoken of as the shaper
[Footnote 1: Bullocks have to be kept because the fields must be tilled.]
[Footnote 2: The dreams have the purpose of either cheering or saddening
and frightening the sleeper; so as to requite him for his good and
evil works. His ad/ri/sh/t/a thus furnishes the efficient cause of the
dreams.]
[Footnote 3: Because then there would be no difference between the dreaming
and the waking state.]
138
of dreams is untrue; for another scriptural passage
ascribes that activity to the individual soul, 'He himself
destroying, he himself shaping dreams with his
own splendour, with his own light' (B/ri./ Up. IV, 3, 9)[Footnote ref 1].
And in the Kâ/th/aka Upanishad itself also we infer from
the form of the sentence, 'That one who wakes in us
while we are asleep,'--which is an anuvâda, i.e. an
additional statement about something well known--that
he who is there proclaimed as the shaper of lovely things
is nobody else than the (well-known) individual soul. The
other passage which forms the complementary continuation
of the one just quoted ('That indeed is the Bright, that is
Brahman') discards the notion of the separate existence of
the individual soul and teaches that it is nothing but Brahman,
analogously to the passage 'That art thou.' And this
interpretation does not conflict with Brahman being the
general subject-matter.--Nor do we thereby deny altogether
that the highest (prâ/gñ/a) Self is active in dreams; for as
being the Lord of all it may be considered as the guide
and ruler of the soul in all its states. We only maintain
that the world connected with the intermediate state (i.e.
the world of dreams) is not real in the same sense as the
world consisting of ether and so on is real. On the other
hand we must remember that also the so-called real creation
with its ether, air, &c., is not absolutely real; for as
we have proved before (II, 1, 14) the entire expanse of
things is mere illusion. The world consisting of ether, &c.,
remains fixed and distinct up to the moment when the soul
cognizes that Brahman is the Self of all; the world of
dreams on the other hand is daily sublated by the waking
state. That the latter is mere illusion has, therefore, to be
understood with a distinction.
5. But by the meditation on the highest that
which is hidden (viz. the equality of the Lord and
[Footnote 1: Svaya/m/ vihatya pûrvadcha/m/ ni/sk/esh/t/a/m/ k/ri/tvâ svaya/m/ nirmâyâpûrva/m/
vâsanâmaya/m/ deha/m/ sampâdya svena bhâsâ svakîyabuddhiv/ri/ttyâ
svena /gy/otishâ svarûpa/k/aitanyenety artha/h./ Ân. Gi.]
139
the soul, becomes manifest); for from him (the
Lord) are its (the soul's) bondage and release.
Well, but the individual soul is a part of the highest Self
as the spark is a part of the fire. And as fire and spark
have in common the powers of burning and giving light, so
the individual soul and the Lord have in common the
powers of knowledge and rulership; hence the individual
soul may, by means of its lordship, effect in the dreaming
state a creation of chariots and the like, springing from its
wishes (sa/m/kalpa).--To this we reply that although the
Lord and the individual soul stand to each other in the
relation of whole and part, yet it is manifest to perception
that the attributes of the two are of a different nature.--
Do you then mean to say that the individual soul has
no common attributes with the Lord?--We do not maintain
that; but we say that the equality of attributes, although
existing, is hidden by the veil of Nescience. In the case
of some persons indeed who strenuously meditate on the
Lord and who, their ignorance being dispelled at last,
obtain through the favour of the Lord extraordinary
powers and insight, that hidden equality becomes manifest--just
as through the action of strong medicines the
power of sight of a blind man becomes manifest; but it
does not on its own account reveal itself to all men.--Why
not?--Because 'from him,' i.e. from the Lord there are
bondage and release of it, viz. the individual soul. That
means: bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of
the Lord's true nature; release is due to the presence of
such knowledge. Thus /S/ruti declares, 'When that god is
known all fetters fall off; sufferings are destroyed and
birth and death cease. From meditating on him there
arises, on the dissolution of the body, a third state, that
of universal Lordship; he who is alone is satisfied' (/S/vet.
Up. I, 11), and similar passages.
6. Or that (viz. the concealment of the soul's
powers springs) from its connexion with the body.
But if the soul is a part of the highest Self, why should
its knowledge and lordship be hidden? We should rather
140
expect them to be as manifest as the light and the heat of
the spark.--True, we reply; but the state of concealment
of the soul's knowledge and lordship is due to its being
joined to a body, i.e. to a body, sense-organs, mind,
buddhi, sense-objects, sensations, &c. And to this state
of things there applies the simile: As the heat and light of
the fire are hidden as long as the fire is still hidden in the
wood from which it will be produced by friction, or as long
as it is covered by ashes; so, in consequence of the soul
being connected with limiting adjuncts in the form of a
body, &c., founded on name and form as presented by
Nescience, its knowledge and lordship remain hidden as
long as it is possessed by the erroneous notion of not being
distinct from those adjuncts.--The word 'or' in the Sûtra
is meant to discard the suspicion that the Lord and the
soul might be separate entities.--But why should not the
soul be separate from the Lord, considering the state of
concealment of its knowledge and power? If we allow the
two to be fundamentally separate, we need not assume
that their separateness is due to the soul's connexion with
the body.--It is impossible, we reply, to assume the soul
to be separate from the Lord. For in the scriptural passage
beginning with 'That divinity thought' &c. (/Kh/. Up.
VI, 3, 2) we meet with the clause, 'It entered into those
beings with this living Self (/g/îva âtman); where the
individual soul is referred to as the Self. And then we
have the other passage, 'It is the True; it is the Self;
that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' which again teaches that the
Lord is the Self of the soul. Hence the soul is non-different
from the Lord, but its knowledge and power are
obscured by its connexion with the body. From this it
follows that the dreaming soul is not able to create, from
its mere wishes, chariots and other things. If the soul
possessed that power, nobody would ever have an unpleasant
dream; for nobody ever wishes for something
unpleasant to himself.--We finally deny that the scriptural
passage about the waking state ('dream is the same as the
place of waking' &c.) indicates the reality of dreams. The
statement made there about the equality of the two states
141
is not meant to indicate that dreams are real, for that would
conflict with the soul's self-luminousness (referred to above),
and scripture, moreover, expressly declares that the chariots,
&c., of a dream have no real existence; it merely means
that dreams, because due to mental impressions (vâsanâ)
received in the waking state, are equal to the latter in appearance.--From
all this it follows that dreams are mere
illusion.
/*
7. The absence of that (i.e. of dreams, i.e. dreamless
sleep) takes place in the nâ/d/îs and in the Self;
according to scriptural statement.
*/
The state of dream has been discussed; we are now
going to enquire into the state of deep sleep. A number
of scriptural passages refer to that state. In one place we
read, 'When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest
so that he sees no dream, then he has entered into those
nâ/d/îs' (/Kh/. Up. VIII, 6, 3). In another place it is said
with reference to the nâ/d/îs, 'Through them he moves forth
and rests in the surrounding body' (B/ri/. Up. II, i, 19). So
also in another place, 'In these the person is when sleeping
he sees no dream. Then he becomes one with the prâ/n/a
alone' (Kau. Up. IV, 20). Again in another place, 'That
ether which is within the heart in that he reposes' (B/ri/.
Up. IV, 4, 22). Again, 'Then he becomes united with that
which is; he is gone to his Self (/Kh/. Up. VI, 8, i). And,
'Embraced by the highest Self (prâ/gñ/a) he knows nothing
that is without, nothing that is within' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 21).
Here the doubt arises whether the nâ/d/îs, &c., mentioned in
the above passages are independent from each other and
constitute various places for the soul in the state of deep
sleep, or if they stand in mutual relation so as to constitute
one such place only. The pûrvapakshin takes the former
view on account of the various places mentioned serving one
and the same purpose. Things serving the same purpose,
as, e.g. rice and barley [Footnote ref 1], are never seen to be dependent
[Footnote 1: Either of which may be employed for making the sacrificial
cake.]
142
on each other. That the nâ/d/îs, &c., actually serve the
same purpose appears from the circumstance of their being
all of them exhibited equally in the locative case, 'he has
entered into the nâ/d/îs,' 'he rests in the pericardium,' &c. [Footnote ref 1]
--But in some of the passages quoted the locative case is
not employed, so, e.g. in 'He becomes united with that
which is' (satâ, instrumental case)!--That makes no difference,
we reply, because there also the locative case is
meant. For in the complementary passage the text states
that the soul desirous of rest enters into the Self, 'Finding
no rest elsewhere it settles down on breath' (/Kh/. Up. VI,
8, 2); a passage in which the word 'breath' refers to that
which is (the sat). A place of rest of course implies the
idea of the locative case. The latter case is, moreover,
actually exhibited in a further complementary passage,
'When they have become merged in that which is (sati),
they know not that they are merged in it.'-In all these
passages one and the same state is referred to, viz. the
state of deep sleep which is characterised by the suspension
of all special cognition. Hence we conclude that in the
state of deep sleep the soul optionally goes to any one of
those places, either the nâ/d/îs, or that which is, &c.
To this we make the following reply--'The absence of
that,' i.e. the absence of dreams--which absence constitutes
the essence of deep sleep-takes place 'in the nâ/d/îs and in
the Self;' i.e. in deep sleep the soul goes into both together,
not optionally into either.--How is this known?--
'From scripture.'--Scripture says of all those things, the
nâ/d/îs, &c., that they are the place of deep sleep; and those
statements we must combine into one, as the hypothesis of
option would involve partial refutation[Footnote ref 2]. The assertion
[Footnote 1: The argument of the pûrvapakshin is that the different places
in which the soul is said to abide in the state of deep sleep are all
exhibited by the text in the same case and are on that account
co-ordinate. Mutual relation implying subordination would require
them to be exhibited in different cases enabling us to infer the
exact manner and degree of relation.
[Footnote 2: By allowing option between two Vedic statements we lessen the *]
143
made above that we are compelled to allow option because
the nâ/d/îs, &c., serve one and the same purpose, is without
foundation; for from the mere fact of two things being
exhibited in the same case it does not follow by any means
that they serve the same purpose, and that for that reason
we have to choose between them. We on the contrary see
that one and the same case is employed even where things
serve different purposes and have to be combined; we say,
e.g. 'he sleeps in the palace, he sleeps on the couch[Footnote ref 1].' So
in the present case also the different statements can be
combined into one, 'He sleeps in the nâ/d/îs, in the surrounding
body, in Brahman.' Moreover, the scriptural
passage, 'In these the person is when sleeping he sees no
dream; then he becomes one with the prâ/n/a alone,' declares,
by mentioning them together in one sentence, that
the nâ/d/îs and the prâ/n/a are to be combined in the state of
deep sleep. That by prâ/n/a Brahman is meant we have
already shown (I, 1, 28). Although in another text the
nâ/d/îs are spoken of as an independent place of deep sleep
as it were ('then he has entered into those nâ/d/îs'), yet, in
order not to contradict other passages in which Brahman is
spoken of as the place of deep sleep, we must explain that
text to mean that the soul abides in Brahman through the
nâ/d/îs. Nor is this interpretation opposed to the employment
of the locative case ('into--or in--those nâ/d/îs'); for
if the soul enters into Brahman by means of the nâ/d/îs it is
at the same time in the nâ/d/îs; just as a man who descends
to the sea by means of the river Ganga is at the same time
on the Gangâ.--Moreover that passage about the nâ/d/îs,
because its purpose is to describe the road, consisting of
the rays and nâ/d/îs, to the Brahma world, mentions the
entering of the soul into the nâ/d/îs in order to glorify the
latter (not in order to describe the state of deep sleep); for
the clause following upon the one which refers to the enter-*
-----------------------------------------------------------------
*[Footnote: authority of the Veda; for the adoption of either alternative
sublates, for the time, the other alternative.]
[Footnote 1: Where the two locatives are to be combined into one statement,
'he sleeps on the couch in the palace.' ]
144
*ing praises the nâ/d/îs, 'There no evil touches him.' The
text, moreover, adds a reason for the absence of all evil, in
the words, 'For then he has become united with the light.'
That means that on account of the light contained in the
nâ/d/îs (which is called bile) having overpowered the organs
the person no longer sees the sense-objects. Or else Brahman
may be meant by the 'light;' which term is applied
to Brahman in another passage also, 'It is Brahman only,
light only' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 7). The passage would then
mean that the soul becomes, by means of the nâ/d/îs, united
with Brahman, and that hence no evil touches it. That the
union with Brahman is the reason for the absence of all
contact with evil, is known from other scriptural passages,
such as, 'All evils turn back from it; for the world of
Brahman is free from all evil' (/Kh/. Up. VIII, 4, 1). On
that account we have to combine the nâ/d/îs with Brahman,
which from other passages is known to be the place of deep
sleep.--Analogously we conclude that the pericardium also,
because it is mentioned in a passage treating of Brahman,
is a place of deep sleep only in subordination to Brahman.
For the ether within the heart is at first spoken of as the
place of sleep ('He lies in the ether which is in the heart,'
B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 17), and with reference thereto it is said
later on, 'He rests in the pericardium ' (II, i, 19). Pericardium
(purîtat) is a name of that which envelops the
heart; hence that which rests within the ether of the heart
--which is contained in the pericardium--can itself be said
to rest within the pericardium; just as a man living in a
town surrounded by walls is said to live within the walls.
That the ether within the heart is Brahman has already
been shown (I, 3, l4).--That again the nâ/d/îs and the pericardium
have to be combined as places of deep sleep appears
from their being mentioned together in one sentence
('Through them he moves forth and rests in the puritat).
That that which is (sat) and the intelligent Self (prâg/ñ/a)
are only names of Brahman is well known; hence scripture
mentions only three places of deep sleep, viz. the nâ/d/îs,
the pericardium, and Brahman. Among these three again
Brahman alone is the lasting place of deep sleep; the
145
nâ/d/îs and the pericardium are mere roads leading to it.
Moreover (to explain further the difference of the manner
in which the soul, in deep sleep, enters into the nâ/d/îs, the
pericardium and Brahman respectively), the nâ/d/îs and the
pericardium are (in deep sleep) merely the abode of the
limiting adjuncts of the soul; in them the soul's organs
abide[Footnote ref 1]. For apart from its connexion with the limiting
adjuncts it is impossible for the soul in itself to abide anywhere,
because being non-different from Brahman it rests
in its own glory. And if we say that, in deep sleep, it
abides in Brahman we do not mean thereby that there is a
difference between the abode and that which abides, but
that there is absolute identity of the two. For the text
says, 'With that which is he becomes united, he is gone to
his Self;' which means that the sleeping person has entered
into his true nature.--It cannot, moreover, be said that the
soul is at any time not united with Brahman--for its true
nature can never pass away--; but considering that in the
state of waking and that of dreaming it passes, owing to
the contact with its limiting adjuncts, into something else,
as it were, it may be said that when those adjuncts cease
in deep sleep it passes back into its true nature. Hence it
would be entirely wrong to assume that, in deep sleep, it
sometimes becomes united with Brahman and sometimes
not[Footnote ref 2]. Moreover, even if we admit that there are different
places for the soul in deep sleep, still there does not result,
from that difference of place, any difference in the quality
of deep sleep which is in all cases characterised by the cessation
of special cognition; it is, therefore, more appropriate
to say that the soul does (in deep sleep) not cognize
on account of its oneness, having become united with Brahman;
according to the Sruti, 'How should he know another?'
(B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, l5).--If, further, the sleeping soul
did rest in the nâ/d/îs and the purîtat, it would be impossible
[Footnote 1: Ân. Gi. explains kara/n/âni by karmâ/n/i: nâ/d/îshu purîtati /k/a
/g/îvasyopâdhyantarbhûtani kara/n/âni karmâ/n/i tish/th/antîty upâdhyâ-dhâratvam,
/g/îvasya tv âdhâro brahmaiva.]
[Footnote 2: But with the nâ/d/îs or the pericardium only.]
146
to assign any reason for its not cognizing, because in that
case it would continue to have diversity for its object;
according to the Sruti, 'When there is, as it were, duality,
then one sees the other,' &c.--But in the case of him also
who has diversity for his object, great distance and the like
may be reasons for absence of cognition!--What you say
might indeed apply to our case if the soul were acknowledged
to be limited in itself; then its case would be
analogous to that of Vish/n/umitra, who, when staying in
a foreign land, cannot see his home. But, apart from its
adjuncts, the soul knows no limitation.--Well, then, great
distance, &c., residing in the adjuncts may be the reason
of non-cognition!--Yes, but that leads us to the conclusion
already arrived at, viz. that the soul does not cognize
when, the limiting adjuncts having ceased, it has become
one with Brahman.
Nor do we finally maintain that the nâ/d/îs, the pericardium,
and Brahman are to be added to each other as
being equally places of deep sleep. For by the knowledge
that the nâ/d/îs and the pericardium are places of sleep,
nothing is gained, as scripture teaches neither that some
special fruit is connected with that knowledge nor that it is
the subordinate member of some work, &c., connected with
certain results. We, on the other hand, do want to prove
that that Brahman is the lasting abode of the soul in the state
of deep sleep; that is a knowledge which has its own
uses, viz. the ascertainment of Brahman being the Self of
the soul, and the ascertainment of the soul being essentially
non-connected with the worlds that appear in the waking
and in the dreaming state. Hence the Self alone is the
place of deep sleep.
8. Hence the awaking from that (viz. Brahman).
And because the Self only is the place of deep sleep, on
that account the scriptural chapters treating of sleep invariably
teach that the awaking takes place from that Self.
In the B/ri/ Up. when the time comes for the answer to the
question, 'Whence did he come back?' (II, 1, 16) the text
147
says, 'As small sparks come forth from fire, thus all prâ/n/as
come forth from that Self (II, 1, 20). And /Kh/. Up. VI,
10, 2, we read: 'When they have come back from the True
they do not know that they have come back from the True.'
If there were optional places to which the soul might resort
in deep sleep, scripture would teach us that it awakes sometimes
from the nâ/d/îs, sometimes from the pericardium,
sometimes from the Self.--For that reason also the Self is
the place of deep sleep.
9. But the same (soul returns from Brahman); on
account of work, remembrance, text, and precept.
Here we have to enquire whether the soul when awaking
from the union with Brahman is the same which entered
into union with Brahman, or another one.--The pûrvapakshin
maintains that there is no fixed rule on that point.
For just as a drop of water, when poured into a large quantity
of water, becomes one with the latter, so that when we
again take out a drop it would be hard to manage that it
should be the very same drop: thus the sleeping soul, when
it has become united with Brahman, is merged in bliss and
not able again to rise from it the same. Hence what
actually awakes is either the Lord or some other soul.--To
this we reply that the same soul which in the state of sleep
entered into bliss again arises from it, not any other. We
assert this on the ground of work, remembrance, sacred
text, and precept; which four reasons we will treat separately.
In the first place the person who wakes from sleep
must be the same, because it is seen to finish work left unfinished
before. Men finish in the morning what they had
left incomplete on the day before. Now it is not possible
that one man should proceed to complete work half done
by another man, because this would imply too much. [Footnote ref 1]
[Footnote 1: There would follow from it, e.g. that in the case of sacrifices
occupying more than one day, there would be several sacrificers,
and that consequently it would be doubtful to whom the fruit
of the sacrifice, as promised by the Veda, belongs. And this
would imply a stultification of the sacred text.]
148
Hence we conclude that it is one and the same man who
finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former.--
In the second place the person rising from sleep is the
same who went to sleep, for the reason that otherwise he
could not remember what he had seen, &c., on the day
before; for what one man sees another cannot remember.
And if another Self rose from sleep, the consciousness of
personal identity (âtmânusmara/n/a) expressed in the words,
'I am the same I was before,' would not be possible.--In
the third place we understand from Vedic texts that the
same person rises again, 'He hastens back again as he
came, to the place from which he started, to be awake'
(B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 16); 'All these creatures go day after day
into the Brahma-world and yet do not discover it' (/Kh/. Up.
VIII, 3, 2); 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a
lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat,
or a musquito, that they become again and again' (/Kh/.
Up. VI, 10, 2). These and similar passages met with in
the chapters treating of sleeping and waking have a proper
sense only if the same soul rises again.--In the fourth place
we arrive at the same conclusion on the ground of the injunctions
of works and knowledge, which, on a different
theory, would be meaningless. For if another person did
rise, it would follow that a person might obtain final
release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be
the use of all those works which bear fruit at a later period,
and of knowledge?--Moreover on the hypothesis of another
person rising from sleep, that other person would either be
a soul which had up to that time carried on its phenomenal
life in another body; in that case it would follow that the
practical existence carried on by means of that body would
be cut short. If it be said that the soul which went to
sleep may, in its turn, rise in that other body (so that B
would rise in A's body and A in B's body), we reply that
that would be an altogether useless hypothesis; for what advantage
do we derive from assuming that each soul rises
from sleep not in the same body in which it had gone to
sleep, but that it goes to sleep in one body and rises in
another?--Or else the soul rising (in A's body) would be
149
one which had obtained final release, and that would imply
that final release can have an end. But it is impossible
that a soul which has once freed itself from Nescience
should again rise (enter into phenomenal life). Hereby
it is also shown that the soul which rises cannot be the
Lord, who is everlastingly free from Nescience.--Further,
on the hypothesis of another soul rising, it would be difficult
to escape the conclusion that souls reap the fruits of
deeds not their own, and, on the other hand, are not requited
for what they have done.--From all this it follows that the
person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--
Nor is it difficult to refute the analogical reasoning that the
soul, if once united with Brahman, can no more emerge
from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from
the mass of water into which it had been poured. We
admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of
water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all
the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there
are reasons of distinction, viz. the work and the knowledge
(of each individual soul). Hence the two cases are not
analogous.--Further, we point out that the flamingo, e. g.
is able to distinguish and separate milk and water when
mixed, things which we men are altogether incapable of
distinguishing.--Moreover, what is called individual soul is
not really different from the highest Self, so that it might
be distinguished from the latter in the same way as a drop
of water from the mass of water; but as we have explained
repeatedly, Brahman itself is on account of its connexion
with limiting adjuncts metaphorically called individual
soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as
long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and
the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as
long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts.
Each set of adjuncts continues through the states of sleep
as well as of waking; in the former it is like a seed, in the
latter like the fully developed plant. Hence the proper
inference is that the same soul awakes from sleep.
10. In him who is senseless (in a swoon, &c.)
150
there is half-union; on account of this remaining (as
the only possible hypothesis).
There now arises the question of what kind that state
is which ordinarily is called a swoon or being stunned.
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that we know only of
three states of the soul as long as it abides in a body,
viz. the waking state, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep;
to which may be added, as a fourth state, the soul's passing
out of the body. A fifth state is known neither from /S/ruti
nor Sm/ri/ti; hence what is called fainting must be one of
the four states mentioned.--To this we make the following
reply. In the first place a man lying in a swoon cannot be
said to be awake; for he does not perceive external objects
by means of his senses.--But, it might be objected, may
not his case be analogous to that of the arrow-maker?
Just as the man working at an arrow, although awake, is
so intent on his arrow that he sees nothing else; so the
man also who is stunned, e.g. by a blow, may be awake,
but as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain
caused by the blow of the club, he may not at the time
perceive anything else.--No, we reply, the case is different, on
account of the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker
says, 'For such a length of time I was aware of nothing but
the arrow;' the man, on the other hand, who returns to consciousness
from a swoon, says, 'For such a length of time
I was shut up in blind darkness; I was conscious of nothing.'
--A waking man, moreover, however much his mind may
be concentrated on one object, keeps his body upright;
while the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on
the ground. Hence a man in a swoon is not awake.--Nor,
in the second place, is he dreaming; because he is altogether
unconscious.--Nor, in the third place, is he dead;
for he continues to breathe and to be warm. When a man
has become senseless and people are in doubt whether he
be alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart, in
order to ascertain whether warmth continues in his body
or not, and put their hands to his nostrils to ascertain
whether breathing goes on or not. If, then, they perceive
151
neither warmth nor breath, they conclude that he is dead,
and carry off his body into the forest in order to burn it;
if, on the other hand, they do perceive warmth and breath,
they decide that he is not dead, and begin to sprinkle him
with cold water so that he may recover consciousness.--That
a man who has swooned away is not dead follows,
moreover, from the fact of his rising again (to conscious
life); for from Yama's realm none ever return.--Let us then
say that a man who has swooned lies in deep sleep, as he
is unconscious, and, at the same time, not dead!--No, we
reply; this also is impossible, on account of the different
characteristics of the two states. A man who has become
senseless does sometimes not breathe for a long time; his
body trembles; his face has a frightful expression; his
eyes are staring wide open. The countenance of a sleeping
person, on the other hand, is peaceful, he draws his breath
at regular intervals; his eyes are closed, his body does
not tremble. A sleeping person again may be waked by
a gentle stroking with the hand; a person lying in a swoon
not even by a blow with a club. Moreover, senselessness
and sleep have different causes; the former is produced
by a blow on the head with a club or the like, the latter
by weariness. Nor, finally, is it the common opinion that
stunned or swooning people are asleep.--It thus remains
for us to assume that the state of senselessness (in swooning,
&c.) is a half-union (or half-coincidence) [Footnote ref 1], as it coincides
in so far as it is an unconscious state and does not
coincide in so far as it has different characteristics.--But
how can absence of consciousness in a swoon, &c., be called
half-coincidence (with deep sleep)? With regard to deep
sleep scripture says, 'He becomes united with the True'
(/Kh/. Up. VI, 8, 1); 'Then a thief is not a thief (B/ri/. Up.
IV, 3, 22); 'Day and night do not pass that bank, nor old
age, death, and grief, neither good nor evil deeds' (/Kh/. Up.
VIII, 4, 1). For the good and evil deeds reach the soul in
that way that there arise in it the ideas of being affected by
pleasure or pain. Those ideas are absent in deep sleep, but
[Footnote 1 Viz. with deep sleep, as will be explained below.]
152
they are likewise absent in the case of a person lying in a
swoon; hence we must maintain that, on account of the
cessation of the limiting adjuncts, in the case of a senseless
person as well as of one asleep, complete union takes place,
not only half-union.--To this we make the following reply.
--We do not mean to say that in the case of a man who
lies in a swoon the soul becomes half united with Brahman;
but rather that senselessness belongs with one half to the
side of deep sleep, with the other half to the side of the
other state (i.e. death). In how far it is equal and not
equal to sleep has already been shown. It belongs to death
in so far as it is the door of death. If there remains (unrequited)
work of the soul, speech and mind return (to the
senseless person); if no work remains, breath and warmth
depart from him. Therefore those who know Brahman
declare a swoon and the like to be a half-union.--The objection
that no fifth state is commonly acknowledged, is
without much weight; for as that state occurs occasionally
only it may not be generally known. All the same it is
known from ordinary experience as well as from the âyurveda
(medicine). That it is not considered a separate fifth
state is due to its being avowedly compounded of other
states.
11. Not on account of (difference of) place also
twofold characteristics can belong to the highest;
for everywhere (scripture teaches it to be without
any difference).
We now attempt to ascertain, on the ground of /S/ruti, the
nature of that Brahman with which the individual soul
becomes united in the state of deep sleep and so on, in
consequence of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts.--The
scriptural passages which refer to Brahman are of a double
character; some indicate that Brahman is affected by difference,
so, e.g. 'He to whom belong all works, all desires,
all sweet odours and tastes' (/Kh/. Up. III, 14,2); others,
that it is without difference, so, e.g. 'It is neither coarse nor
fine, neither short nor long,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8). Have
we, on the ground of these passages, to assume that Brah-*
153
man has a double nature, or either nature, and, if either,
that it is affected with difference, or without difference?
This is the point to be discussed.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that, in conformity with the
scriptural passages which indicate a double nature, a double
nature is to be ascribed to Brahman.
To this we reply as follows.--At any rate the highest
Brahman cannot, by itself, possess double characteristics;
for on account of the contradiction implied therein, it is impossible
to admit that one and the same thing should by
itself possess certain qualities, such as colour, &c.. and should
not possess them.--Nor is it possible that Brahman should
possess double characteristics 'on account of place,' i.e. on
account of its conjunction with its limiting adjuncts, such as
earth, &c. For the connexion with limiting adjuncts is
unavailing to impart to a thing of a certain nature an altogether
different nature. The crystal, e.g. which is in itself
clear, does not become dim through its conjunction with a
limiting adjunct in the form of red colour; for that it is
pervaded by the quality of dimness is an altogether erroneous
notion. In the case of Brahman the limiting adjuncts
are, moreover, presented by Nescience merely[Footnote ref 1]. Hence (as
the upâdhis are the product of Nescience) if we embrace
either of the two alternatives, we must decide in favour of
that according to which Brahma is absolutely devoid of all
difference, not in favour of the opposite one. For all passages
whose aim it is to represent the nature of Brahman
(such as, 'It is without sound, without touch, without form,
without decay,' Ka. Up. I, 3, 15) teach that it is free from
all difference.
12. If it be objected that it is not so, on account of
the difference (taught by the Veda); we reply that it
is not so on account of the declaration of (Brahman)
[Footnote 1: The limiting adjunct of the crystal, i.e. the red colour of a thing,
e.g. a flower with which the crystal is in contact, is as real as the
crystal itself; only the effect is an illusion.--But the limiting
adjuncts of Brahman are in themselves illusion.]
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being not such, with reference to each (declaration of
difference).
Let this be, but nevertheless it cannot be maintained
that Brahman is devoid of difference and attributes, and
does not possess double attributes either in itself or on
account of difference of station.--Why not?--'On account
of difference.' The various vidyâs teach different forms of
Brahman; it is said to have four feet (/Kh/. Up. III, 18, 1);
to consist of sixteen parts (Pr. Up. VI, 1); to be characterised
by dwarfishness (Ka. Up. V, 3); to have the three
worlds for its body (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 22); to be named
Vai/s/vanara (/Kh/. Up. V, 11, 2), &c. Hence we must admit
that Brahman is qualified by differences also.--But above
it has been shown that Brahman cannot possess twofold
characteristics!--That also does not contradict our doctrine;
for the difference of Brahman's forms is due to its limiting
adjuncts. Otherwise all those scriptural passages which
refer to those differences would be objectless.
All this reasoning, we say, is without force 'on account of
the declaration of its being not such, with reference to each,'
i.e. because scripture declares, with reference to all the
differences produced by the limiting adjuncts, that there is
no difference in Brahman. Cp. such passages as the following:
'This bright immortal person in this earth, and that
bright immortal person incorporated in the body; he indeed
is the same as that Self (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 1). It, therefore,
cannot be maintained that the connexion of Brahman
with various forms is taught by the Veda.
13. Some also (teach) thus.
The members of one sâkhâ also make a statement
about the cognition of non-difference which is preceded by
a censure of the perception of difference, 'By the mind
alone it is to be perceived, there is in it no diversity. He
who perceives therein any diversity goes from death to
death' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19). Others also ('By knowing the
enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler, everything has been declared
to be threefold, and this is Brahman,' /S/vet. Up. I, 12)
record in their text that the entire world, characterised
by enjoyers, things to be enjoyed, and a ruler, has Brahman
for its true nature.--But as among the scriptural passages
referring to Brahman, there are some which represent it as
having a form, and others teaching that it is devoid of form,
how can it be asserted that Brahman is devoid of form, and not
also the contrary?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
14. For (Brahman) is merely devoid of form, on
account of this being the main purport of scripture.
Brahman, we must definitively assert, is devoid of all form,
colour, and so on, and does not in any way possess form,
and so on.--Why?--'On account of this being the main
purport (of scripture).'--' It is neither coarse nor fine,
neither short nor long' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8); 'That which is
without sound, without touch, without form, without decay'
(Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 'He who is called ether is the revealer
of all forms and names. That within which forms and
names are, that is Brahman' (/Kh/. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'That
heavenly person is without body, he is both without and
within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That Brahman
is without cause and without effect, without anything inside
or outside, this Self is Brahman, omnipresent and omniscient'
(B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19). These and similar passages
have for their purport the true nature of Brahman as non-connected
with any world, and have not any other purport,
as we have proved under I, 1, 4. On the ground of such
passages we therefore must definitively conclude that Brahman
is devoid of form. Those other passages, on the
other hand, which refer to a Brahman qualified by form
do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman, but
rather at enjoining the worship of Brahman. As long as
those latter texts do not contradict those of the former class,
they are to be accepted as they stand; where, however,
contradictions occur, the passages whose main subject is
Brahman must be viewed as having greater force than those
of the other kind.--This is the reason for our deciding that
although there are two different classes of scriptural texts,
Brahman must be held to be altogether without form, not
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at the same time of an opposite nature.--But what then is
the position of those passages which refer to Brahman as
possessing form?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
15. And as light (assumes forms as it were by its
contact with things possessing form, so does Brahman;)
since (the texts ascribing form to Brahman)
are not devoid of meaning.
Just as the light of the sun or the moon after having
passed through space enters into contact with a finger or
some other limiting adjunct, and, according as the latter is
straight or bent, itself becomes straight or bent as it were;
so Brahman also assumes, as it were, the form of the earth
and the other limiting adjuncts with which it enters into
connexion. Hence there is no reason why certain texts
should not teach, with a view to meditative worship, that
Brahman has that and that form. We thus escape the
conclusion that those Vedic passages which ascribe form to
Brahman are devoid of sense; a conclusion altogether unacceptable
since all parts of the Veda are equally authoritative,
and hence must all be assumed to have a meaning.
--But does this not imply a contradiction of the tenet maintained
above, viz. that Brahman does not possess double
characteristics although it is connected with limiting adjuncts?--By
no means, we reply. What is merely due to a
limiting adjunct cannot constitute an attribute of a substance,
and the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented
by Nescience only. That the primeval natural Nescience
leaves room for all practical life and activity--whether ordinary
or based on the Veda--we have explained more
than once.
16. And (scripture) declares (Brahman) to consist
of that (i.e. intelligence).
And scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelligence,
is devoid of any other characteristics, and is altogether
without difference; 'As a mass of salt has neither
inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus,
indeed, has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is alto-*
157
*gether a mass of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). That
means: That Self has neither inside nor outside any characteristic
form but intelligence; simple non-differentiated
intelligence constitutes its nature; just as a lump of salt
has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste,
not any other taste.
17. (This scripture) also shows, and it is likewise
stated in Sm/ri/ti.
That Brahman is without any difference is proved by
those scriptural passages also which expressly deny that it
possesses any other characteristics; so, e.g. 'Next follows
the teaching by No, no' (B/ri/. Up. II, 3, 6); 'It is different
from the known, it is also above the unknown' (Ke. Up. I,
4); 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away
unable to reach it' (Taitt. Up. II, 9). Of a similar purport
is that scriptural passage which relates how Bâhva, being
questioned about Brahman by Vashkalin, explained it to
him by silence, 'He said to him, "Learn Brahman, O friend,"
and became silent. Then, on a second and third question,
he replied, "I am teaching you indeed, but you do not
understand. Silent is that Self."' The same teaching
is conveyed by those Sm/ri/ti-texts which deny of Brahman
all other characteristics; so, e.g. 'I will proclaim
that which is the object of knowledge, knowing which
one reaches immortality; the highest Brahman without
either beginning or end, which cannot be said either to
be or not to be' (Bha. Gîtâ XIII, 12). Of a similar purport
is another Sm/ri/ti-passage, according to which the
omniform Nârâya/n/a instructed Nârada, 'The cause, O Nârada,
of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all
beings is the Mâyâ emitted by me; do not cognize me as
being such (in reality).'
18. For this very reason (there are applied to
Brahman) comparisons such as that of the images of
the sun and the like.
Because that Self is of the nature of intelligence, devoid
of all difference, transcending speech and mind, to be
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described only by denying of it all other characteristics,
therefore the Moksha /S/âstras compare it to the images
of the sun reflected in the water and the like, meaning
thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due
to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the
two following passages: 'As the one luminous sun when
entering into relation to many different waters is himself
rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts; so also the
one divine unborn Self;' and 'The one Self of all beings
separately abides in all the individual beings; hence it
appears one and many at the same time, just as the one
moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water.'
The next Sûtra raises an objection.
19. But there is no parallelism (of the two things
compared), since (in the case of Brahman) there is
not apprehended (any separate substance) comparable
to the water.
Since no substance comparable to the water is apprehended
in the case of Brahman, a parallelism between Brahman
and the reflected images of the sun cannot be
established. In the case of the sun and other material
luminous bodies, there exists a separate material substance
occupying a different place, viz. water; hence the light of
the sun, &c., may be reflected. The Self, on the other
hand, is not a material thing, and, as it is present everywhere
and all is identical with it, there are no limiting adjuncts
different from it and occupying a different place.--Therefore
the instances are not parallel.
The next Sûtra disposes of this objection.
20. Since (the highest Brahman) is inside (of the
limiting adjuncts), it participates in their increase
and decrease; owing to the appropriateness (thus
resulting) of the two (things compared) it is thus
(i.e. the comparison holds good).
The parallel instance (of the sun's reflection in the water)
is unobjectionable, since a common feature--with reference
to which alone the comparison is instituted--does exist.
Whenever two things are compared, they are so only with
reference to some particular point they have in common.
Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated;
indeed if it could be demonstrated there would be an end
of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison.
Nor does the sutrakara institute the comparison objected
to on his own account; he merely sets forth the purport of
a comparison actually met with in scripture.--Now, the
special feature on which the comparison rests is 'the
participation in increase and decrease.' The reflected image
of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands;
it contracts when the water shrinks; it trembles when the
water is agitated; it divides itself when the water is divided.
It thus participates in all the attributes and conditions of
the water; while the real sun remains all the time the same.
--Similarly Brahman, although in reality uniform and never
changing, participates as it were in the attributes and states
of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it
abides; it grows with them as it were, decreases with them
as it were, and so on. As thus the two things compared
possess certain common features no objection can be made
to the comparison.
21. And on account of the declaration (of
scripture).
Scripture moreover declares that the highest Brahman
enters into the body and the other limiting adjuncts, 'He
made bodies with two feet, he made bodies with four feet.
Having first become a bird he entered the bodies as
purusha' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 18); and 'Having entered into
them with this living (individual) Self' (/Kh/. Up. VI, 3, 2).
--For all these reasons the comparison set forth in Sutra
18 is unobjectionable.
Some teachers assume that the preceding discussion
(beginning from Sutra 11) comprises two adhikara/n/as, of
which the former discusses the question whether Brahman is
an absolutely uniform being in which all the plurality of the
apparent world vanishes, or a being multiform as the
apparent world is; while the latter tries to determine
160
whether Brahman--whose absolute uniformity was established
in the former adhikarana--is to be defined as
that which is (sat), or as thought (intelligence; bodha), or as
both.--Against this we remark that in no case there is a
valid reason for beginning a second adhikara/n/a. For what
should be the subject of a special second adhikara/n/a? Sûtra
15 and foll. cannot be meant to disprove that Brahman
possesses a plurality of characteristics; for that hypothesis
is already sufficiently disposed of in Sûtras 11-14. Nor can
they be meant to show that Brahman is to be defined only
as 'that which is,' not also as 'thought;' for that would
imply that the scriptural passage, 'consisting of nothing
but knowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12), is devoid of meaning.
How moreover could Brahman, if devoid of intelligence, be
said to be the Self of the intelligent individual soul?
Nor again can the hypothetical second adhikara/n/a be
assumed to prove that Brahman must be defined as
'thought' only, not at the same time as 'that which is;'
for if it were so, certain scriptural passages--as e.g. Ka.
Up. II, 6, 13, 'He is to be conceived by the words, He is'--
would lose their meaning. And how, moreover, could we
admit thought apart from existence?--Nor can it be said
that Brahman has both those characteristics, since that
would contradict something already admitted. For he who
would maintain that Brahman is characterised by thought
different from existence, and at the same time by existence
different from thought, would virtually maintain that there
is a plurality in Brahman, and that view has already been
disproved in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--But as scripture
teaches both (viz. that Brahman is one only and that it
possesses more than one characteristic) there can be no
objection to such a doctrine!--There is, we reply, for one
being cannot possibly possess more than one nature.--And
if it finally should be said that existence is thought and
thought existence and that the two do not exclude each
other; we remark that in that case there is no reason for
the doubt[Footnote ref 1] whether Brahman is that which is, or intelligence,
[Footnote 1: And hence no reason for a separate adhikara/n/a.]
161
or both.--On the other hand we have shown that the Sûtras
can be explained as constituting one adhikara/n/a only. Moreover,
as the scriptural texts concerning Brahman disagree in
so far as representing Brahman as qualified by form and
again as devoid of form we, when embracing the alternative
of a Brahman devoid of form, must necessarily explain the
position of the other texts, and if taken in that sense the
Sûtras (15-21) acquire a more appropriate meaning. And
if it is maintained that those scriptural passages also which
speak of Brahman as qualified by form have no separate
meaning of their own, but likewise teach that Brahman is
devoid of all form, viz. by intimating that the plurality
referred to has to be annihilated; we reply that this
opinion also appears objectionable. In those cases, indeed,
where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters
treating of the highest knowledge, we may assume them
to be mentioned merely to be abstracted from; so e.g. in
the passage, Bri. Up. II, 5, 19, 'His horses are yoked
hundreds and ten. This is the horses, this is the ten and
the thousands, many and endless,' which passage is
immediately followed by the words, 'This is the Brahman
without cause and without effect, without anything inside
or outside.' But where elements of plurality are referred
to in chapters treating of devout meditation, we have no
right to assume that they are mentioned only to be set
aside. This is the case e.g. in the passage, 'He who consists
of mind, whose body is prâ/n/a, whose form is light'
(Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2), which is connected with an injunction
of devout meditation contained in the preceding passage,
'Let him have this will and belief.' In passages of the
latter kind, where the determinations attributed to Brahman
may be taken as they stand and viewed as subserving the
purposes of devout meditation, we have no right to assume
that they are mentioned with the indirect purpose of being
discarded. Moreover, if all texts concerning Brahman
equally aimed at discarding all thought of plurality, there
would be no opportunity for stating the determinative
reason (why Brahman is to be viewed as devoid of all
form) as was done in Sûtra 14. And further scripture
informs us that devout meditations on Brahman as characterised
by form have results of their own, viz. either the
warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else
release by successive steps. All these reasons determine
us to view the passages concerning devout meditation on
the one hand and the passages concerning Brahman on the
other hand as constituting separate classes, not as forming
one whole. In what way moreover, we ask, could the two
classes of texts be looked upon as constituting one whole?
--Our opponent will perhaps reply, 'Because we apprehend
them to form parts of one injunction, just as we do in the
case of the dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa-sacrifice and the oblations
called prayâ/g/as.'--But this reply we are unable to admit,
since the texts about Brahman, as shown at length under
I, 1, 4, merely determine an existing substance (viz.
Brahman), and do not enjoin any performances. What
kind of activity, we moreover ask, are those texts, according
to our opponent's view, meant to enjoin? For whenever
an injunction is laid upon a person, it has reference to
some kind of work to be undertaken by him.--Our opponent
will perhaps make the following reply. The object
of the injunction is in the present case, the annihilation of
the appearance of duality. As long as the latter is not
destroyed, the true nature of Brahman is not known; hence
the appearance of duality which stands in the way of true
knowledge must be dissolved. Just as the Veda prescribes
the performance of certain sacrifices to him who is desirous
of the heavenly world, so it prescribes the dissolution of
the apparent world to him who is desirous of final release.
Whoever wants to know the true nature of Brahman must
first annihilate the appearance of plurality that obstructs
true knowledge, just as a man wishing to ascertain the
true nature of some jar or similar object placed in a dark
room must at first remove the darkness. For the apparent
world has Brahman for its true nature, not vice versa;
therefore the cognition of Brahman is effected through the
previous annihilation of the apparent world of names and
forms.
This argumentation we meet by asking our opponent
163
of what nature that so-called annihilation of the apparent
world is. Is it analogous to the annihilation of
hardness in butter which is effected by bringing it into
contact with fire? or is the apparent world of names and
forms which is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience
to be dissolved by knowledge, just as the phenomenon of a
double moon which is due to a disease of the eyes is
removed by the application of medicine[Footnote ref 1]? If the former,
the Vedic injunctions bid us to do something impossible;
for no man can actually annihilate this whole existing
world with all its animated bodies and all its elementary
substances such as earth and so on. And if it actually
could be done, the first released person would have done it
once for all, so that at present the whole world would be
empty, earth and all other substances having been finally
annihilated.--If the latter, i.e. if our opponent maintains
that the phenomenal world is superimposed upon Brahman
by Nescience and annihilated by knowledge, we point out
that the only thing needed is that the knowledge of
Brahman should be conveyed by Vedic passages sublating
the apparent plurality superimposed upon Brahman by
Nescience, such as 'Brahman is one, without a second;'
'That is the true, it is the Self and thou art it.' (Kh. Up.
VI, 2, 1; 8, 7.) As soon as Brahman is indicated in this
way, knowledge arising of itself discards Nescience, and
this whole world of names and forms, which had been
hiding Brahman from us, melts away like the imagery of a
dream. As long, on the other hand, as Brahman is not
so indicated, you may say a hundred times, 'Cognize
Brahman! Dissolve this world!' and yet we shall be
unable to do either the one or the other.
But, our opponent may object, even after Brahman has
been indicated by means of the passages quoted, there is room
for injunctions bidding us either to cognize Brahman or to
dissolve the world.--Not so, we reply; for both these
[Footnote 1: i.e. does the injunction bidding us to annihilate the phenomenal
world look on it as real or as fictitious, due to Nescience only?]
164
things are already effected by the indication of the true
nature of Brahman as devoid of all plurality; just as the
pointing out of the true nature of the rope has for its
immediate result the cognition of the true nature of the
rope, and the dissolution of the appearance of a snake or
the like. And what is done once need not be done again [Footnote ref 1].
--We moreover ask the following question: Does the
individual soul on which the injunction is laid belong to
the unreal element of the phenomenal world or to the real
element, i.e. Brahman, which underlies the phenomenal
world? If the former, the soul itself is dissolved just as
earth and the other elements are, as soon as the knowledge
of Brahman's true nature has arisen, and on whom then
should the dissolution of the world be enjoined, or who
should, by acting on that injunction, obtain release?--If
the latter, we are led to the same result. For as soon as
there arises the knowledge that Brahman, which never can
become the subject of an injunction, is the true being of the
soul while the soul as such is due to Nescience, there
remains no being on which injunctions could be laid, and
hence there is no room for injunctions at all.
What then, it may be asked, is the meaning of those
Vedic passages which speak of the highest Brahman as
something to be seen, to be heard, and so on?--They aim,
we reply, not at enjoining the knowledge of truth, but
merely at directing our attention to it. Similarly in
ordinary life imperative phrases such as 'Listen to this!'
'Look at this!' are frequently meant to express not that we
are immediately to cognize this or that, but only that we
are to direct our attention to it. Even when a person is
face to face with some object of knowledge, knowledge
may either arise or not; all that another person wishing
to inform him about the object can do is to point it out to
him; knowledge will thereupon spring up in his mind of
itself, according to the object of knowledge and according
[Footnote 1: I.e. after the true nature of Brahman has been once known,
there is no longer room for a special injunction to annihilate this
apparent world.]
165
to the means of knowledge employed.--Nor must it be
said that an injunction may have the purpose of modifying
the knowledge of a thing which was originally obtained by
some other means of knowledge[Footnote ref 1]. For the modified
knowledge due to such injunctions is not knowledge in the
true sense of the word, but merely a mental energy (i.e. the
product, not of an object of knowledge presented to us
through one of the means of true knowledge, but of an
arbitrary mental activity), and if such modification of
knowledge springs up in the mind of itself (i.e. without a
deliberate mental act) it is mere error. True knowledge
on the other hand, which is produced by the means of true
knowledge and is conformable to its object, can neither be
brought about by hundreds of injunctions nor be checked
by hundreds of prohibitions. For it does not depend on
the will of man, but merely on what really and unalterably
exists.--For this reason also injunctions of the knowledge
of Brahman cannot be admitted.
A further point has to be considered here. If we
admitted that injunctions constitute the sole end and aim
of the entire Veda, there would remain no authority for the,
after all, generally acknowledged truth that Brahman--
which is not subject to any injunction--is the Self of all.
--Nor would it be of avail to maintain that the Veda may
both proclaim the truth stated just now and enjoin on man
the cognition of that truth; for that would involve the
conclusion that the one Brahma-sâstra has two--and moreover
conflicting--meanings.--The theory combated by us
gives moreover rise to a number of other objections which
nobody can refute; it compels us to set aside the text as it
stands and to make assumptions not guaranteed by the
text; it implies the doctrine that final release is, like the
results of sacrificial works, (not the direct result of true
knowledge but) the mediate result of the so-called unseen
[Footnote 1: The pûrvapakshin might refer e.g. to the Vedic injunction,'he
is to meditate upon woman as fire,' and maintain that the object of
this injunction is to modify our knowledge of woman derived from
perception &c., according to which a woman is not fire.]
166
principle (ad/ri/h/t/a), and non-permanent &c. &c.--We
therefore again assert that the texts concerning Brahman
aim at cognition, not at injunction, and that hence the
pretended reason of 'their being apprehended as parts of
one injunction' cannot induce us to look upon the entire
Veda as one whole.
And finally, even if we admitted that the texts concerning
Brahman are of an injunctive character, we should be
unable to prove that the texts denying plurality, and the
texts setting forth plurality enjoin one and the same thing;
for this latter conclusion cannot be accepted in the face of
the several means of proof such as difference of terms [Footnote ref 1], and so on, which intimate that there is a plurality of injunctions. The passages respectively enjoining the dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa-sacrifice and the offerings termed prayâ/g/as may indeed be considered to form one whole, as the qualification on the
part of the sacrificer furnishes an element common to the
two [Footnote ref 2]. But the statements about the Brahman devoid of
qualities and those about the qualified Brahman have not
any element in common; for qualities such as 'having light
for one's body' contribute in noway towards the dissolution
of the world, nor again does the latter help in any way the
former. For the dissolution of the entire phenomenal world
on the one hand, and regard for a part of that world on
the other hand do not allow themselves to be combined
in one and the same subject.--The preferable theory, therefore,
is to distinguish with us two classes of texts, according
as Brahman is represented as possessing form or as
devoid of it.
22. For (the clause 'Not so, not so') denies (of
Brahman) the suchness which forms the topic of
[Footnote 1: 'Difference of terms' (/s/abdântaram) is according to the Pûrva
Mîmâ/m/sâ the first of the six means of proof showing karmabheda
or niyogabheda. Cp. /S/abara bhâshya on II, i, i.]
[Footnote 2: For the sacrifice as well as its subordinate
part--the offering of
the prayâ/g/as--has to be performed by a sacrificer acting for one
end, viz. the obtainment of the heavenly world.].
167
discussion; and (the text) enounces something more
than that.
We read, B/ri/. Up. II, 3, 'Two forms of Brahman there
are indeed, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and
the immortal, the solid and the fluid, sat and tya.' The
text thereupon divides the five elements into two classes,
predicates of the essence of that which is immaterial--which
it calls purusha--saffron-colour, and so on, and then goes on
to say, 'Now then the teaching by Not so, not so! For
there is nothing else higher than this (if one says): It is
not so.' Here we have to enquire what the object of the
negative statement is. We do not observe any definite
thing indicated by words such as 'this' or 'that;' we
merely have the word 'so' in 'Not so, not so!' to which
the word 'not' refers, and which on that account indicates
something meant to be denied. Now we know that the
word 'so' (iti) is used with reference to approximate things,
in the same way as the particle 'evam' is used; compare,
e.g. the sentence 'so (iti) indeed the teacher said' (where the
'so' refers to his immediately preceding speech). And, in
our passage, the context points out what has to be considered
as proximate, viz. the two cosmic forms of Brahman,
and that Brahman itself to which the two forms
belong. Hence there arises a doubt whether the phrase,
'Not so, not so!' negatives both Brahman and its two
forms, or only either; and if the latter, whether it negatives
Brahman and leaves its two forms, or if it negatives the two
forms and leaves Brahman.--We suppose, the pûrvapakshin
says, that the negative statement negatives Brahman as well
as its two forms; both being suggested by the context. As
the word 'not' is repeated twice, there are really two negative
statements, of which the one negatives the cosmic form
of Brahman, the other that which has form, i.e. Brahman
itself. Or else we may suppose that Brahman alone is
negatived. For as Brahman transcends all speech and
thought, its existence is doubtful, and admits of being negatived;
the plurality of cosmic forms on the other hand falls
within the sphere of perception and the other means of right
168
knowledge, and can, therefore, not be negatived.--On this
latter interpretation the repetition of 'not' must be considered
as due to emphasis only.
To this we make the following reply. It is impossible that
the phrase, 'Not so, not so!' should negative both, since
that would imply the doctrine of a general Void. Whenever
we deny something unreal, we do so with reference to
something real; the unreal snake, e.g. is negatived with
reference to the real rope. But this (denial of something
unreal with reference to something real) is possible only if
some entity is left. If everything is denied, no entity is left,
and if no entity is left, the denial of some other entity which
we may wish to undertake, becomes impossible, i.e. that
latter entity becomes real and as such cannot be negatived.
--Nor, in the second place, can Brahman be denied; for
that would contradict the introductory phrase of the chapter,
'Shall I tell you Brahaman?' (B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 1); would show
disregard of the threat conveyed in Taitt. Up. II, 6, 'He who
knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself
non-existing;' would be opposed to definitive assertions such
as 'By the words "He is" is he to be apprehended' (Ka.
Up. II, 6, 13); and would involve a stultification of the
entire Vedânta.--The phrase that Brahman transcends all
speech and thought does certainly not mean to say that
Brahman does not exist; for after the Vedânta-part of
scripture has established at length the existence of Brahman
--in such passages as 'He who knows Brahman obtains the
highest;' 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'--it cannot
be supposed all at once to teach its non-existence. For, as
the common saying is, 'Better than bathing it is not to touch
dirt at all.' The passage, 'from whence all speech with the
mind turns away unable to reach it' (Taitt. Up. II, 4), must,
therefore, rather be viewed as intimating Brahman.
The passage of the B/ri/. Up. under discussion has, therefore,
to be understood as follows. Brahman is that whose
nature is permanent purity, intelligence, and freedom; it
transcends speech and mind, does not fall within the category
of 'object,' and constitutes the inward Self of all. Of
this Brahman our text denies all plurality of forms; but
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Brahman itself it leaves untouched. This the Sûtra expresses
in the words, 'for it denies the suchness which forms the
topic of discussion.' That means: The passage 'Not so,'
&c., denies of Brahman the limited form, material as well
as immaterial, which in the preceding part of the chapter is
described at length with reference to the gods as well as the
body, and also the second form which is produced by the
first, is characterised by mental impressions, forms the
essence of that which is immaterial, is denoted by the term
purusha, rests on the subtle Self (lingâtman) and is described
by means of comparisons with saffron-colour, &c., since the
purusha, which is the essence of what is immaterial, does
not itself possess colour perceivable by the eye. Now these
forms of Brahman are by means of the word 'so' (iti), which
always refers to something approximate brought into connexion
with the negative particle 'not.' Brahman itself, on
the other hand (apart from its forms), is, in the previous
part of the chapter, mentioned not as in itself constituting
the chief topic, but only in so far as it is qualified by its
forms; this appears from the circumstance of Brahman
being exhibited in the genitive case only ('These are two
forms of Brahman'). Now, after the two forms have been
set forth, there arises the desire of knowing that to which
the two forms belong, and hence the text continues, 'Now
then the teaching by means of "Not so, not so."' This passage,
we conclude, conveys information regarding the nature
of Brahman by denying the reality of the forms fictitiously
attributed to it; for the phrase, 'Not so, not so!' negatives
the whole aggregate of effects superimposed on Brahman.
Effects we know to have no real existence, and they can
therefore be negatived; not so, however, Brahman, which
constitutes the necessary basis for all fictitious superimposition.
--Nor must the question be asked here, how the
sacred text, after having itself set forth the two forms of
Brahman, can negative them in the end, contrary to the
principle that not to touch dirt is better than bathing after
having done so. For the text does not set forth the two
forms of Brahman as something the truth of which is to be
established, but merely mentions those two forms, which in
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the sphere of ordinary thought are fictitiously attributed to
Brahman, in order finally to negative them and establish
thereby the true nature of the formless Brahman.
The double repetition of the negation may either serve
the purpose of furnishing a special denial of the material as
well as the immaterial form of Brahman; or the first 'Not
so' may negative the aggregate of material elements, while
the second denies the aggregate of mental impressions. Or
else the repetition may be an emphatic one, intimating that
whatever can be thought is not Brahman. This is, perhaps,
the better explanation. For if a limited number of things
are denied each individually, there still remains the desire
to know whether something else may not be Brahman; an
emphatic repetition of the denial on the other hand shows
that the entire aggregate of objects is denied and that
Brahman is the inward Self; whereby all further enquiry
is checked.--The final conclusion, therefore, is, that the text
negatives only the cosmic plurality fictitiously superimposed
on Brahman, but leaves Brahman itself untouched.
The Sutra gives another argument establishing the same
conclusion, 'and the text enounces something more than
that,' i.e. more than the preceding negation. The words
of the text meant are '(not) is there anything beyond.'--If
the negation, 'Not so, not so!' were meant to negative
all things whatever, and this terminated in absolute non-existence,
the text could not even allude to 'anything
beyond.'--The words of the text are to be connected as
follows. After the clause, 'Not so, not so!' has given information
about Brahman, the clause next following illustrates
this teaching by saying: There is nothing beyond or separate
from this Brahman; therefore Brahman is expressed
by 'Not so, not so!' which latter words do not mean that
Brahman itself does not exist. The implied meaning rather
is that different from everything else there exists the
'non-negatived' Brahman.--The words of the text admit, however,
of another interpretation also; for they may mean
that there is no teaching of Brahman higher than that
teaching which is implied in the negation of plurality expressed
by 'Not so, not so!' On this latter interpretation
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the words of the Sûtra, 'and the text enounces something
more than that,' must be taken to refer to the name mentioned
in the text, 'Then comes the name, the True of the
True; the senses being the True and he the True of them.'--This
again has a sense only if the previous negative
clause denies everything but Brahman, not everything but
absolute non-existence. For, if the latter were the case,
what then could be called the True of the True?--We therefore
decide that the clause, 'Not so, not so!' negatives not
absolutely everything, but only everything but Brahman.
23. That (Brahman) is unevolved; for (thus
scripture) says.
If that highest Brahman which is different from the world
that is negatived in the passage discussed above really
exists, why then is it not apprehended?--Because, the
Sûtrakâra replies, it is unevolved, not to be apprehended by
the senses; for it is the witness of whatever is apprehended
(i.e. the subject in all apprehension). Thus /S/ruti says,
'He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech, nor by
the other senses, not by penance or good works' (Mu. Up.
III, 1, 8); 'That Self is to be described by No, no! He is
incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended' (B/ri/.
Up. III, 9, 26); 'That which cannot be seen nor apprehended'
(Mu. Up. I, 1, 6); 'When in that which is invisible,
incorporeal, undefined, unsupported ' &c. (Taitt. Up.
II, 7). Similar statements are made in Sm/ri/ti-passages;
so e. g. 'He is called unevolved, not to be fathomed by
thought, unchangeable.'
24. And in the state of perfect conciliation also
(the Yogins apprehend the highest Brahman),
according to /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti.
At the time of perfect conciliation the Yogins see the
unevolved Self free from all plurality. By 'perfect conciliation'
we understand the presentation before the mind
(of the highest Self), which is effected through meditation
and devotion.--This is vouched for by /S/ruti as well as
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Sm/ri/ti. So, e.g. Ka. Up. IV, 1, 'The Self-existent pierced the
openings of the senses so that they turn outward; therefore
man looks without, not within himself. Some wise
man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for
immortality, saw the Self within.' And Mu. Up. III, 1, 8,
'When a man's mind has become purified by the serene
light of knowledge then he sees him, meditating on him
as without parts.' Sm/ri/ti-passages of the same tendency
are the following ones, 'He who is seen as light by the
Yogins meditating on him sleepless, with suspended breath,
with contented minds, with subdued senses; reverence be
to him [Footnote ref 1] !' and 'The Yogins see him, the august, eternal one.'
But if in the state of perfect conciliation there is a being
to be conciliated and a being conciliating, does not this
Involve the distinction of a higher and a lower Self?--No,
the next Sûtra replies.
25. And as in the case of (physical) light and the
like, there is non-distinction (of the two Selfs), the
light (i.e. the intelligent Self) (being divided) by
its activity; according to the repeated declarations
of scripture.
As light, ether, the sun and so on appear differentiated
as it were through their objects such as fingers, vessels,
water and so on which constitute limiting adjuncts [Footnote ref 2], while
in reality they preserve their essential non-differentiatedness;
so the distinction of different Selfs is due to limiting
adjuncts only, while the unity of all Selfs is natural and
original. For on the doctrine of the non-difference of the
individual soul and the highest Self the Vedânta-texts
insist again and again. [Footnote ref 3]
[Footnote 1 Whose Self is Yoga.]
[Footnote 2 Light is differentiated as it were by the various objects on
which it shines; the all-pervading ether is divided into parts as it
were by hollow bodies; the sun is multiplied as it were by its
reflections in the water.]
[Footnote 3 It certainly looks here as if the Bhâshyakâra did not know
what to do with the words of the Sûtra. The ' karma/n/i,' which is] *[footnote continues]
173
26. Hence (the soul enters into unity) with the
infinite (i.e. the highest Self); for this scripture
indicates.
Hence i.e. because the non-difference of all Selfs is
essential and their difference due to Nescience only, the
individual soul after having dispelled Nescience by true
knowledge passes over into unity with the highest Self. For
this is indicated by scripture, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. III, 2, 9,
'He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even
Brahman;' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 6, 'Being Brahman he goes to
Brahman.'
27. But on account of twofold designation, (the
relation of the highest Self to the individual soul
has to be viewed) like that of the snake to its coils.
In order to justify his own view as to the relation of the
conciliating individual soul and the conciliated highest Self,
the Sûtrakâra mentions a different view of the same matter.
--Some scriptural passages refer to the highest Self and
the individual soul as distinct entities, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. III,
1, 8,' Then he sees him meditating on him as without parts,'
where the highest Self appears as the object of the soul's
vision and meditation; Mu. Up. III, 2, 8, 'He goes to the
divine Person who is greater than the great;' and 'B/ri/. Up.
III, 7, 15, 'Who rules all beings within;' in which passages
the highest Self is represented as the object of approach
and as the ruler of the individual soul. In other places
again the two are spoken of as non-different, so e.g. Kh.
Up. VI, 8, 7, 'Thou art that;' Bri. Up. I, 4, 10, 'I am
Brahman;' B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 1, 'This is thy Self who is
within all;' B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 15, 'He is thy Self, the ruler
within, the immortal.'--As thus difference and non-difference
are equally vouched for by scripture, the acceptation
of absolute non-difference would render futile all those
[*footnote continued: as good as passed over by him, is explained by Go. Ân. as
'dhyânâdikarma/n/y upâdhau.' Ân. Gi. says, 'âtmâprakâ/s/a/s/abdi-to*-/gn/ânatatkârye
karma/n/y upâdhau savi/s/eshas' &c.]
174
texts which speak of difference. We therefore look on the
relation of the highest Self and the soul as analogous to
that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole the
snake is one, non-different, while an element of difference
appears if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, erect
posture and so on.
28. Or else like that of light to its substratum,
both being fire.
Or else the relation of the two may be viewed as follows.
Just as the light of the sun and its substratum, i.e. the sun
himself, are not absolutely different--for they both consist
of fire--and yet are spoken of as different, so also the soul
and the highest Self.
29. Or else (the relation of the two is to be
conceived) in the manner stated above.
Or else the relation of the two has to be conceived in
the manner suggested by Sûtra 25. For if the bondage of
the soul is due to Nescience only, final release is possible.
But if the soul is really and truly bound--whether the soul
be considered as a certain condition or state of the highest
Self as suggested in Sûtra 27, or as a part of the highest
Self as suggested in Sûtra 28--its real bondage cannot be
done away with, and thus the scriptural doctrine of final
release becomes absurd.--Nor, finally, can it be said that
/S/ruti equally teaches difference and non-difference. For
non-difference only is what it aims at establishing; while,
when engaged in setting forth something else, it merely
refers to difference as something known from other sources
of knowledge (viz. perception, &c.).--Hence the conclusion
stands that the soul is not different from the highest Self,
as explained in Sûtra 25.
30. And on account of the denial.
The conclusion arrived at above is confirmed by the fact
of scripture expressly denying that there exists any intelligent
being apart from the highest Self. Cp. 'There is no
other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23). And the same
175
conclusion follows from those passages which deny the
existence of a world apart from Brahman and thus leave
Brahman alone remaining, viz. 'Now then the teaching,
Not so, not so!' (B/ri/. Up. II, 3, 6); 'That Brahman is
without cause and without effect, without anything inside
or outside' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19).
31. Beyond (Brahman, there is something) further,
on account of the designations of bank, measure,
connexion, separation.
With reference to this Brahman which we have ascertained
to be free from all plurality there now arises the
doubt--due to the conflicting nature of various scriptural
statements--whether something exists beyond it or not.
We therefore enter on the task of explaining the true
meaning of those scriptural passages which seem to indicate
that there is some entity beyond, i.e. apart from Brahman.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that some entity must be
admitted apart from Brahman, because Brahman is spoken
of as being a bank; as having size; as being connected;
as being separated.--As a bank it is spoken of in the
passage, Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1, 'That Self is a bank, a
boundary.' The word 'bank' (setu) ordinarily denotes
a structure of earth, wood and the like, serving the purpose
of checking the flow of water. Here, being applied to the
Self, it intimates that there exists something apart from
the Self, just as there exists something different from an
ordinary bank. The same conclusion is confirmed by the
words, 'Having passed the bank' (VIII, 4, 2). For as in
ordinary life a man after having crossed a bank reaches
some place which is not a bank, let us say a forest; so,
we must understand, a man after having crossed, i.e. passed
beyond the Self reaches something which is not the Self.--As
having size Brahman is spoken of in the following
passages, 'This Brahman has four feet (quarters), eight
hoofs, sixteen parts.' Now it is well known from ordinary
experience that wherever an object, a coin, e.g. has a
definite limited size, there exists something different from
that object; we therefore must assume that there also
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exists something different from Brahman.--Brahman is
declared to be connected in the following passages, 'Then
he is united with the True' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1), and 'The
embodied Self is embraced by the highest Self (B/ri/.
Up. IV, 3, 21). Now we observe that non-measured
things are connected with things measured, men, e.g.
with a town. And scripture declares that the individual
souls are, in the state of deep sleep, connected with
Brahman. Hence we conclude that beyond Brahman
there is something unmeasured.--The same conclusion
is finally confirmed by those texts which proclaim
difference, so e. g. the passage, I, 6, 6 ff. ('Now that
golden person who is seen within the sun' &c.), which at
first refers to a Lord residing in the sun and then mentions
a Lord residing in the eye, distinct from the former ('Now
the person who is seen within the eye'). The text distinctly
transfers to the latter the form &c. of the former[Footnote ref 1]
('The form of that person is the same as the form of the
other' &c.), and moreover declares that the lordly power of
both is limited, 'He obtains through the one the worlds
beyond that and the wishes of the devas' &c.; which is
very much as if one should say, 'This is the reign of the
king of Magadha and that the reign of the king of Videha.'
From all this it follows that there exists something
different from Brahman.
32. But (Brahman is called a bank &c.) on account
of (a certain) equality.
The word 'but' is meant to set aside the previously
established conclusion.--There can exist nothing different
from Brahman, since we are unable to observe a proof for
such existence. That all existences which have a beginning
spring from, subsist through, and return into Brahman
we have already ascertained, and have shown that the
effect is non-different from the cause.--Nor can there
exist, apart from Brahman, something which has no
beginning, since scripture affirms that 'Being only this was
[Footnote 1 Which would be unnecessary if the two were not distinct.]
in the beginning, one, without a second.' The promise
moreover that through the cognition of one thing everything
will be known, renders it impossible that there
should exist anything different from Brahman.--But does
not the fact that the Self is called a bank, &c. indicate
that there exists something beyond the Self?--No, we
reply; the passages quoted by the pûrvapakshin have no
power to prove his conclusion. For the text only says
that the Self is a bank, not that there is something beyond
it. Nor are we entitled to assume the existence of some
such thing, merely to the end of accounting for the Self
being called a bank; for the simple assumption of something
unknown is a mere piece of arbitrariness. If, moreover,
the mere fact of the Self being called a bank implied
the existence of something beyond it, as in the case of an
ordinary bank, we should also be compelled to conclude
that the Self is made of earth and stones; which would
run counter to the scriptural doctrine that the Self is not
something produced.--The proper explanation is that the
Self is called a bank because it resembles a bank in a
certain respect; as a bank dams back the water and
marks the boundary of contiguous fields, so the Self
supports the world and its boundaries. The Self is thus
glorified by the name of bank because it resembles one.--In
the clause quoted above, 'having passed that bank,'
the verb 'to pass' cannot be taken in the sense of 'going
beyond,' but must rather mean 'to reach fully.' In the
same way we say of a student, 'he has passed the
science of grammar,' meaning thereby that he has fully
mastered it.
33. (The statement as to Brahman having size)
subserves the purpose of the mind; in the manner
of the four feet (quarters).
In reply to the pûrvapakshin's contention that the statements
as to Brahman's size, prove that there exists something
different from Brahman, we remark that those statements
merely serve the purposes of the mind, i.e. of devout
meditation.--But how can the cognition of something con-*
178
*sisting of four, or eight, or sixteen parts be referred to
Brahman?--Through its modifications (effects), we reply,
Brahman is assumed to be subject to measure. For as some
men are of inferior, others of middling, others again of
superior intelligence, not all are capable of fixing their mind
on the infinite Brahman, devoid of all effects. 'In the
manner of the four feet,' i.e. in the same way as (Kh. Up.
III, 18), for the purpose of pious meditation, speech and
three other feet are ascribed to mind viewed as the personal
manifestation of Brahman, and fire and three other feet to
the ether viewed as the cosmic manifestation of Brahman.--Or
else the phrase, 'in the manner of the four quarters,'
may be explained as follows. In the same way as to facilitate
commerce, a kârshâpa/n/a is assumed to be divided into
four parts--for there being no fixed rule as to the value of
bargains, people cannot always carry on their transactions
with whole kârshâpa/n/as only--, (so, in order to facilitate
pious meditation on the part of less intelligent people, four
feet, &c., are ascribed to Brahman).
34. (The statements concerning connexion and
difference) are due to difference of place; in the
manner of light and so on.
The present Sûtra refutes the allegation that something
different from Brahman exists, firstly, because things are
said to be connected with Brahman, and secondly, because
things are said to be separate from it. The fact is, that all
those statements regarding connexion and difference are
made with a view to difference of place. When the cognition
of difference which is produced by the Selfs connexion
with different places, i.e. with the buddhi and the
other limiting adjuncts, ceases on account of the cessation
of those limiting adjuncts themselves, connexion with the
highest Self is metaphorically said to take place; but that
is done with a view to the limiting adjuncts only, not with
a view to any limitation on the part of the Self.--In the
same way, all statements regarding difference have reference
to the difference of Brahman's limiting adjuncts only, not
to any difference affecting Brahman's own nature.--All this
179
is analogous to the case of light and the like. For the light of
the sun or the moon also is differentiated by its connexion
with limiting adjuncts, and is, on account of these adjuncts,
spoken of as divided, and, when the adjuncts are removed, it
is said to enter into connexion (union). Other instances of
the effect of limiting adjuncts are furnished by the ether
entering into connexion with the eyes of needles and the
like.
35. And because (only such a connexion) is
possible.
Moreover, only such a connexion as described above is
possible. For scriptural passages, such as 'He is gone to
his Self (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1), declare that the connexion of
the soul with the highest Self is one of essential nature.
But as the essential nature of a thing is imperishable, the
connexion cannot be analogous to that of the inhabitants
with the town, but can only be explained with reference
to an obscuration, owing to Nescience, of the soul's true
nature.--Similarly the difference spoken of by scripture
cannot be real, but only such as is due to Nescience; for
many texts declare that there exists only one Lord. Analogously,
scripture teaches that the one ether is made
manifold as it were by its connexion with different places
'The ether which is outside man is the ether which is
inside man, and the ether within the heart' (Kh. Up.
III, 12, 7 ff.).
36. (The same thing follows) from the express
denial of other (existences).
Having thus refuted the arguments of the pûrvapakshin,
the Sûtrakâra in conclusion strengthens his view by a
further reason. A great number of Vedic passages--which,
considering the context in which they stand, cannot be
explained otherwise--distinctly deny that there exists anything
apart from Brahman; 'He indeed is below; I am
below; the Self is below' (/Kh/. Up. VII, 25, 1; 2); 'Whosoever
looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self was
abandoned by everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman
180
alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this'
(/Kh/. Up. VII, 25, 2): 'In it there is no diversity' (B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 19); 'He to whom there is nothing superior, from
whom there is nothing different' (/S/vet. Up. III, 9); 'This
is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without
anything inside or outside' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19).--And that
there is no other Self within the highest Self, follows from
that scriptural passage which teaches Brahman to be within
everything (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19).
37. Thereby the omnipresence (of Brahman is
established), in accordance with the statements about
(Brahman's) extent.
The preceding demonstration that the texts calling
Brahman a bank, and so on, are not to be taken literally,
and that, on the other hand, the texts denying all plurality
must be accepted as they stand., moreover, serves to prove
that the Self is omnipresent. If the former texts were taken
literally, banks and the like would have to be looked upon
as belonging to the Self, and thence it would follow that the
Self is limited. And if the texts of the latter class were
not accepted as valid, there would be substances exclusive
of each other, and thus the Self would again be limited.--That
the Self is omnipresent follows from the texts proclaiming
its extent, &c., cp. /Kh/. Up. VIII, 1, 3, 'As large
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart;'
'Like the ether, he is omnipresent and eternal;' 'He is
greater than the sky, greater than the ether' (/S/at. Br. X,
6, 3, 2); 'He is eternal, omnipresent, firm, immoveable'
(Bha. Gîtâ II, 24); and other similar passages from /S/ruti and
Sm/ri/ti.
38. From him (i.e. the Lord, there comes) the
fruit (of works); for (that only) is possible.
We now turn to another characteristic belonging to
Brahman, in so far as it is connected with the every-day
world in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of
his rule.--There arises the question whether the threefold
fruits of action which are enjoyed by the creatures in their
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sa/m/sâra-state--viz. pain, pleasure, and a mixture of the
two-spring from the actions themselves or come from the
Lord.--The Sûtrakâra embraces the latter alternative,
on the ground that it is the only possible one. The ruler
of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsistence
and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all
the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of
effecting all those modes of requital which are in accordance
with the merit of the agents; actions, on the other
hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of
bringing about results at some future time, since nothing
can spring from nothing. Nor can the latter difficulty be
overcome by the assumption that an action passes away
only after having produced some result according to its
nature, and that the agent will at some future time enjoy
that fruit of his action. For the fruit of an action is such
only through being enjoyed by the agent; only at the
moment when some pleasure or some pain--the result of
some deed--is enjoyed by the doer of the deed people
understand it to be a 'fruit.'--Nor in the second place.
have we the right to assume that the fruit will, at some
future time, spring from the so-called supersensuous
principle (apurva), which itself is supposed to be a direct
result of the deed; for that so-called supersensuous
principle is something of non-intelligent nature, comparable
to a piece of wood or metal, and as such cannot act
unless moved by some intelligent being. And moreover
there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an
apûrva.--But is it not proved by the fact that deeds are
actually requited?--By no means, we reply; for the fact of
requital may be accounted for by the action of the Lord.
39. And because it is declared by scripture.
We assume the Lord to bring about the fruits of actions,
not only because no other assumption appears plausible, but
also because we have direct scriptural statement on our
side. Cp. e.g. the passage, 'This indeed is the great, unborn
Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth' (B/ri/. Up. IV.
4, 24).
40. /G/aimini (thinks) for the same reasons that
religious merit (is what brings about the fruits of
actions).
/G/aimini bases a contrary opinion on the reasons specified
in the last two Sûtras. Scripture, he argues, proclaims
injunctions such as the following one, 'He who is desirous
of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' Now as it is admitted
that such scriptural injunctions must have an object,
we conclude that the sacrifice itself brings about the result,
i.e. the obtainment of the heavenly world; for if this were
not so, nobody would perform sacrifices and thereby
scriptural injunctions would be rendered purposeless.--But
has not this view of the matter already been abandoned,
on the ground that an action which passes away as
soon as done can have no fruit?--We must, the reply is,
follow the authority of scripture and assume such a connexion
of action and fruit as agrees with scriptural statement.
Now it is clear that a deed cannot effect a result
at some future time, unless, before passing away, it gives
birth to some unseen result; we therefore assume that
there exists some result which we call apûrva, and which
may be viewed either as an imperceptible after-state of the
deed or as an imperceptible antecedent state of the result.
This hypothesis removes all difficulties, while on the other
hand it is impossible that the Lord should effect the results
of actions. For in the first place, one uniform cause
cannot be made to account for a great variety of effects;
in the second place, the Lord would have to be taxed with
partiality and cruelty; and in the third place, if the deed
itself did not bring about its own fruit, it would be useless
to perform it at all.--For all these reasons the result
springs from the deed only, whether meritorious or non-meritorious.
41. Bâdâraya/n/a, however, thinks the former (i.e.
the Lord, to be the cause of the fruits of action),
since he is designated as the cause (of the actions
themselves).
183
The teacher Bâdâraya/n/a thinks that the previously-mentioned
Lord is the cause of the fruits of action. The
word 'however' sets aside the view of the fruit being produced
either by the mere deed or the mere apûrva.--The
final conclusion then is that the fruits come from the Lord
acting with a view to the deeds done by the souls, or, if it
be so preferred, with a view to the apûrva springing from
the deeds. This view is proved by the circumstance of
scripture representing the Lord not only as the giver of
fruits but also as the causal agent with reference to all
actions whether good or evil. Compare the passage, Kau.
Up. III, 8, 'He makes him whom he wishes to lead up
from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes
him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a
bad deed.' The same is said in the Bhagavadgîtâ (VII,
21), 'Whichever divine form a devotee wishes to worship
with faith, to that form I render his faith steady. Holding
that faith he strives to propitiate the deity and obtains
from it the benefits he desires, as ordained by me.'
All Vedânta-texts moreover declare that the Lord is the
only cause of all creation. And his creating all creatures
in forms and conditions corresponding to--and retributive
of--their former deeds, is just what entitles us to call the
Lord the cause of all fruits of actions. And as the Lord
has regard to the merit and demerit of the souls, the
objections raised above--as to one uniform cause being
inadequate to the production of various effects, &c.--are
without any foundation.
THIRD PÂDA.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. (The cognitions) intimated by all the Vedânta-texts
(are identical), on account of the non-difference
of injunction and so on.
In the preceding part of this work we have explained
the nature of the object of cognition, i.e. Brahman. We
now enter on the discussion of the question whether the
cognitions of Brahman, which form the subject of the
different Vedânta-texts, are separate cognitions or not.
But, an objection may here be raised, so far we have
determined that Brahman is free from all distinctions
whatever, one, of absolutely uniform nature like a lump of
salt; hence there appears to be no reason for even raising
the question whether the cognitions of Brahman are
separate cognitions or constitute only one cognition. For
as Brahman is one and of uniform nature, it certainly cannot
be maintained that the Vedânta-texts aim at establishing
a plurality in Brahman comparable to the plurality of
works (inculcated by the karmakâ/nd/a of the Veda). Nor
can it be said that although Brahman is uniform, yet it
may be the object of divers cognitions; for any difference
in nature between the cognition and the object known
points to a mistake committed. If, on the other hand,
it should be assumed that the different Vedânta-texts aim
at teaching different cognitions of Brahman, it would
follow that only one cognition can be the right one while
all others are mistaken, and that would lead to a general
distrust of all Vedânta.--Hence the question whether each
individual Vedânta-text teaches a separate cognition of
Brahman or not cannot even be raised.--Nor, supposing
that question were raised after all, can the non-difference of
the cognition of Brahman be demonstrated (as the Sûtra
attempts) on the ground that all Vedânta-texts are equally
injunctions, since the cognition of Brahman is not of the
nature of an injunction. For the teacher has proved at
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length (I, 1, 4) that the knowledge of Brahman is produced
by passages which treat of Brahman as an existing
accomplished thing and thus do not aim at enjoining anything.--Why
then begin at all this discussion about the
difference or non-difference of the cognitions of Brahman?
To all this we reply that no objection can be raised
against a discussion of that kind, since the latter has for its
object only the qualified Brahman and prâ/n/a and the like.
For devout meditations on the qualified Brahman may, like
acts, be either identical or different. Scripture moreover
teaches that, like acts, they have various results; some of
them have visible results, others unseen results, and others
again--as conducive to the springing up of perfect knowledge--have
for their result release by successive steps.
With a view to those meditations, therefore, we may raise
the question whether the individual Vedânta-texts teach
different cognitions of Brahman or not.
The arguments which may here be set forth by the
pûrvapakshin are as follows. In the first place it is known
that difference may be proved by names, as e.g. in the case
of the sacrificial performance called 'light' (/g/yotis)[Footnote ref 1]. And
the cognitions of Brahman which are enjoined in the
different Vedânta-texts are connected with different names
such as the Taittirîyaka, the Vâ/g/asaneyaka, the Kauthumaka,
the Kaushîtaka, the /S/â/t/yâyanaka, &c.-In the second
place the separateness of actions is proved by the difference
of form (characteristics; rûpa). So e.g. with reference to
the passage, 'the milk is for the Vi/s/vedevas, the water for
the vâ/g/ins.' [Footnote ref 2]
[Footnote 1 See the sa/mgñ/âk/ri/takarmabhedâdhikara/n/a, Pû. Mî. Sû. II, 2,
22, where the decision is that the word /g/yotis (in 'athaisha /g/yotir'
&c.) denotes not the /g/yorish/t/oma but a separate sacrificial performance.]
[Footnote 2 See Pû. Mî. Sû. II, 2, 23. The offering of water made to the
divinities called vâ/g/in is separate from the offering of milk to the
Vi/s/vedevas; for the material offered as well as the divinity to
which the offering is'made (i.e. the two rûpa of the sacrifice)
differs in the two cases.]
186
Now similar differences of form are met with in the
Vedânta-texts; the followers of one Sâkhâ, e.g. mention,
in the chapter called 'the knowledge of the five fires,' a
sixth fire, while other Sâkhâs mention five only; and in
the colloquy of the prâ/n/as some texts mention a lesser,
others a greater number of organs and powers of the body.--In
the third place differences in qualifying particulars
(dharma) are supposed to prove difference of acts, and such
differences also are met with in the Vedanta-texts; only in
the Mu/nd/aka-Upanishad. e.g. it is said that the science of
Brahman must be imparted to those only who have performed
the rite of carrying fire on the head (Mu. Up. III,
2, 10).--In the same way the other reasons which are
admitted to prove the separateness of actions, such as repetition
and so on, are to be applied in a suitable manner to
the different Vedânta-texts also.--We therefore maintain
that each separate Vedânta-text teaches a different cognition
of Brahman.
To this argumentation of the pûrvapakshin we make the
following reply.--The cognitions enjoined by all the
Vedânta-texts are the same, owing to the non-difference
of injunction and so on. The 'and so on' refers to the
other reasons proving non-difference of acts which are
enumerated in the Siddhânta-sûtra of the adhikara/n/a
treating of the different Sâkhâs (Pu. Mi. II,4, 9.' (the act) is
one on account of the non-difference of connexion of form,
of injunction, and of name'). Thus, as the agnihotra
though described in different Sâkhâs is yet one, the same
kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of
the words, 'He is to offer;' so the injunction met with in
the text of the Vâgasaneyins (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 1), 'He who
knows the oldest and the best,' &c., is the same as that
which occurs in the text of the /Kh/andogas, 'He who knows
the first and the best' (/Kh/. Up. V, 1, 1). The connexion
of the meditation enjoined with its aim is likewise the
same in both texts, 'He becomes the first and best among
his people.' In both texts again the cognition enjoined
has the same form. For in both the object of knowledge
is the true nature of the prana which is characterised by
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certain qualities such as being the first and best, and just
as the material and the divinity constitute the form of the
sacrifice, so the object known constitutes the form of the
cognition. And finally both cognitions have the same name,
viz. the knowledge of the prâ/n/a.--For these reasons we
declare that the different Vedânta-texts enjoin identical
cognitions.--A similar line of reasoning applies to other
cognitions which are met with in more than one Vedânta-text,
so e. g. to the knowledge of the five fires, the knowledge
of Vai/s/vânara, the knowledge of Sâ/nd/ilya. and so on.--Of
the apparent reasons on the ground of which the
pûrvapakshin above tried to show that the meditations are
not identical but separate a refutation is to be found in the
Pûrvâ Mimâ/m/sâ-sûtras II, 4, 10 ff.
The next Sûtra disposes of a doubt which may remain
even after the preceding discussion.
2. (If it be said that the vidyâs are separate) on
account of the difference (of secondary matters),
we deny that, since even in one and the same vidyâ
(different secondary matters may find place).
In spite of the preceding argumentation we cannot admit
that the different cognitions of Brahman are equally
intimated by all Vedânta-texts, because we meet with
differences in secondary matters (gu/n/a). Thus the Vâ/g/asaneyins
mention in their text of the knowledge of the
five fires a sixth fire ('And then the fire is indeed fire,'
B/ri./ Up. VI, 2, 14), while the /Kh/andogas mention no sixth
fire but conclude their text of the pa/ñk/âgnividyâ with
the express mention of five fires ('But he who thus knows
the five fires,' /Kh./ Up. V, 10, 10).
Now it is impossible to admit that the cognition of those
who admit that particular qualification (i. e. the sixth fire)
and of those who do not should be one and the same. Nor
may we attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that the
sixth fire may be tacitly included in the vidyâ of the
/Kh/andogas; for that would contradict the number 'five'
expressly stated by them.--In the colloquy of the prâ/n/as
188
again the /Kh/andogas mention, in addition to the most
important prâ/n/a, four other prânas, viz. speech, the eye, the
ear, and the mind; while the Vâ/g/asaneyins mention a fifth
one also, ' Seed indeed is generation. He who knows that
becomes rich in offspring and cattle ' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 6).--Now
a difference of procedure in the point of addition and
omission effects a difference in the object known, and the
latter again effects a difference in the vidyâ, just as a
difference in the point of material and divinity distinguishes
one sacrifice from another.
To this we make the following reply.--Your objection
is without force, since such differences of qualification
as are met with in the above instances are possible
even in one and the same vidya. In the /Kh/ândogya-text
a sixth fire is indeed not included; yet, as five fires,
beginning with the heavenly world, are recognised as
the same in both texts the mentioned difference cannot
effect a split of the vidyâ; not any more than the
âtirâtra-sacrifice is differentiated by the sho/d/asin-rite
being either used or not-used. Moreover, the /Kh/ândogya-text
also actually mentions a sixth fire, viz. in the passage,
V, 9, 2, 'When he has departed, his friends carry him, as
appointed, to the fire'. The Vâ/g/asaneyins, on the other
hand, mention their sixth fire ('and then the fire is indeed
fire, the fuel fuel,' &c.) for the purpose of cutting short the
fanciful assumption regarding fuel, smoke, and so on, which
runs through the description of the five fires with which the
heavenly world and so on are imaginatively identified.
Their statement regarding the sixth fire (has therefore not
the purpose of enjoining it as an object of meditation but)
is merely a remark about something already established
(known)[Footnote ref 1]. And even if we assume that the statement
about the sixth fire has the purpose of representing that
fire as an object of devout meditation, yet the fire may be
inserted in the vidya of the /Kh/andogas without any fear of
its being in conflict with the number five mentioned there;
[Footnote 1 Viz. the real fire in which the dead body is burned and which
is known from perception.]
189
for that number is not an essential part of the injunction [Footnote ref 1],
but merely makes an additional statement regarding something
known already from the text, viz. the five fires with
which the heavenly world and so on are identified [Footnote ref 2]. Similarly
nothing stands in the way of some additional qualification
being included in the vidyâ concerning the colloquy
of the prâ/n/as and so on. The addition or omission of
some particular qualification is unable to introduce difference
into the object of knowledge and thereby into the
knowledge itself; for although the objects of knowledge
may differ partly, yet their greater part and at the same
time the knowing person are understood to be the same.
Hence the vidyâ also remains the same.
3. (The rite of carrying fire on the head is an
attribute) of the study of the Veda (of the Âtharva/n/ikas);
because in the Samâ/k/âra (it is mentioned)
as being such. (This also follows) from the general
subject-matter, and the limitation (of the rite to the
Âtharva/n/ikas) is analogous to that of the libations,
With reference to the pûrvapakshin's averment that the
rite of carrying fire on the head is connected with the vidyâ
of the followers of the Atharva-veda only, not with any
other vidyâ, and that thereby the vidyâ of the Âtharva/n/ikas
is separated from all other vidyâs, the following remarks
have to be made.--The rite of carrying fire on the head is
an attribute not of the vidyâ, but merely of the study of the
Veda on the part of the Âtharva/n/ikas. This we infer from
the circumstance that the Âtharva/n/ikas, in the book called
'Samâ/k/âra' which treats of Vedic observances, record the
above rite also as being of such a nature, i.e. as constituting
an attribute of the study of the Veda. At the close of the
Upanishad moreover we have the following sentence, 'A
[Footnote 1 I.e. the /Kh/ândogya-text contains no injunction that five fires
only are to be meditated upon.]
[Footnote 2 So that there stands nothing in the way of our amplifying our
meditation by the addition of a sixth fire.]
190
man who has not performed the rites does not read this;'
here we conclude from the word 'this' which refers to the
subject previously treated, and from the fact of 'reading'
being mentioned, that the rite is an attribute of the study of
the Upanishad of the Âtharva/n/ikas (but has nothing to do
with the Upanishad itself).--But what about the immediately
preceding passage, 'Let a man tell this science of Brahman
to those only by whom the rite of carrying fire on the head
has been performed according to rule?' Here the rite in
question is connected with the science of Brahman, and as
all science of Brahman is one only, it follows that the rite
has to be connected with all science of Brahman!--Not so,
we reply; for in the above passage also the word 'this'
refers back to what forms the subject of the antecedent part
of the Upanishad, and that subject is constituted by the
science of Brahman only in so far as depending on a particular
book (viz. the Mu/nd/aka-Upanishad); hence the rite
also is connected with that particular book only.--The
Sutra adds another illustrative instance in the words 'and as
in the case of the libations there is limitation of that.' As
the seven libations--from the saurya libation up to the
sataudana libation--since they are not connected with the
triad of fires taught in the other Vedas, but only with the
one fire which is taught in the Atharvan, are thereby enjoined
exclusively on the followers of the Atharvan; so the
rite of carrying fire on the head also is limited to the study
of that particular Veda with which scriptural statements
connect it.--The doctrine of the unity of the vidyâs thus
remains unshaken.
4. (Scripture) also declares this.
The Veda also declares the identity of the vidyâs; for all
Vedânta-texts represent the object of knowledge as one;
cp. e.g. Kâ. Up. I, 2, 15, 'That word which all the Vedas
record;' Ait. Âr. Ill, 2,3,12, 'Him only the Bahv/rik/as consider
in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial
fire, the /Kh/andogas in the Mahâvrata ceremony.'--To quote
some other instances proving the unity of the vidyâs: Kâ.
Up. I, 6, 2, mentions as one of the Lord's qualities that he
191
causes fear; now this very same quality is referred to in
the Taitt. Up. II, 7, in order to intimate disapprobation of
those who are opposed to the absolute unity of that which
is, 'For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it (the
Self), there is fear for him. But that fear is only for him
who knows (a difference) and does not know (the oneness).'
--Similarly the Vai/s/vânara, who in the Vâ/g/asaneyaka is
imaginatively represented as a span long, is referred to in
the /Kh/ândogya as something well known, 'But he who
worships that Vai/s/vânara Self which is a span long,' &c.
(/Kh./ Up. V, 18, 1).
And as, on the ground of all Vedânta-texts intimating
the same matters, hymns and the like which are enjoined in
one place are employed in other places (where they are not
expressly enjoined) for the purposes of devout meditation, it
follows that all Vedânta-texts intimate also (identical) devout
meditations.
5. In the case of (a devout meditation) common
(to several /S/âkhâs) (the particulars mentioned in
each /S/âkhâ) have to be combined, since there is no
difference of essential matter; just as in the case of
what is complementary to injunctions.
[This Sûtra states the practical outcome of the discussion
carried on in the first four Sûtras.] It having been determined
that the cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated
by all Vedânta-texts, it follows that as long as the cognition
is one and the same its specific determinations mentioned in
one text are to be introduced into other texts also where
they are not mentioned. For if the matter of these determinations
subserves some particular cognition in one place,
it subserves it in another place also, since in both places
we have to do with one and the same cognition. The
case is analogous to that of the things subordinate to
some sacrificial performance, as, e g. the agnihotra. The
agnihotra also is one performance, and therefore its
subordinate members, although they may be mentioned in
different texts, have to be combined into one whole.--If the
192
cognitions were separate, the particulars mentioned in
different texts could not be combined; for they would be
confined each to its own cognition and would not stand to
each other in that relation in which the typical form of a
sacrifice stands to its modifications [Footnote ref 1]. But as the cognitions
are one, things lie differently--The above Sûtra will be
explained and applied at length further on, in Sûtra 10 ff.
6. If it be said that (the udgîtha vidyâ of the B/ri/.
Up. and that of the /Kh/ând. Up.) are separate on
account (of the difference) of the texts; we deny this
on the ground of their (essential) non-difference.
We read in the Vâ/g/asaneyaka I, 3, 1, 'The Devas said,
well, let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means
of the Udgîtha. They said to speech: Do thou sing out for
us.--Yes, said speech,' &c. The text thereupon relates how
speech and the other prâ/n/as were pierced by the Asuras
with evil, and therefore unable to effect what was expected
from them, and how in the end recourse was had to the
chief vital air, 'Then they said to the breath in the mouth:
Do thou sing for us.--Yes, said the breath, and sang.'--A
similar story is met with in the /Kh/ândogya I, 2. There we
read at first that 'the devas took the udgîtha, thinking they
would vanquish the Asuras with it;' the text then relates
how the other prâ/n/as were pierced with evil and thus foiled
by the Asuras, and how the Devas in the end had recourse
to the chief vital air, 'Then comes this chief vital air; on
that they meditated as udgîtha.'--As both these passages
glorify the chief vital air, it follows that they both are injunctions
of a meditation on the vital air. A doubt, however,
arises whether the two vidyâs are separate vidyâs or
one vidyâ only.
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that for the reasons
specified in the first adhikara/n/a of the present pâda the two
[Footnote 1: The Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ teaches that all subordinate things which
the Veda prescribes for some typical sacrifice are eo ipso prescribed
for the modified forms of the sacrifice also.]
vidyâs have to be considered as one.--But, an objection is
raised, there is a difference of procedure which contradicts
the assumption of unity. The Vâ/g/asaneyins represent the
chief vital air as the producer of the udgîtha ('Do thou sing
out for us'), while the /Kh/andogas speak of it as itself being
the udgîtha ('on that they meditated as udgîtha'). How
can this divergence be reconciled with the assumption of the
unity of the vidyâs?--The difference pointed out, the pûrvapakshin
replies, is not important enough to bring about
a separation of the two vidyâs, since we observe that
the two both agree in a plurality of points. Both texts
relate that the Devas and the Asuras were fighting;
both at first glorify speech and the other pranas in their
relation to the udgîtha, and thereupon, finding fault with
them, pass on to the chief vital air; both tell how through
the strength of the latter the Asuras were scattered as
a ball of earth is scattered when hitting a solid stone.
And, moreover, the text of the Vâ/g/asaneyaka also coordinates
the chief vital air and the udgîtha in the clause,
'He is udgîtha' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 23). We therefore have to
assume that in the /Kh/ândogya also the chief prâ/n/a has
secondarily to be looked upon as the producer of the udgîtha.
--The two texts thus constitute one vidyâ only.
7. Or rather there is no (unity of the vidyâs),
owing to the difference of subject-matter.
Setting aside the view maintained by the pûrvapakshin,
we have rather to say that, owing to the difference "of subject-matter,
the two vidyâs are separate.--In the /Kh/ândogya
the introductory sentence (I, i, i), 'Let a man meditate on
the syllable Om (as) the udgîtha,' represents as the object
of meditation the syllable Om which is a part of the
udgîtha; thereupon proceeds to give an account of its
qualities such as being the inmost essence of all ('The full
account, however, of Om is this,' &c.); and later on tells,
with reference to the same syllable Om which is a part of
the udgîtha, a story about the Gods and Asuras in which
there occurs the statement,' They meditated on the udgîtha
194
as that breath[Footnote ref 1].' If now we should assume[Footnote ref 2] that the term
'udgîtha' denotes here the whole act of worship (not only
the syllable Om which is a part of the udgîtha), and that
(in the passage, 'they meditated on the udgîtha as that
breath') the performer of that worship, i.e. the Udgât/ri/-priest.
is said to be meditated upon as breath; our interpretation
would be open to two objections: in the first
place it would be opposed to the introductory sentence
(which directly declares the syllable Om to be the object
of devotion); and in the second place it would oblige us
to take the word udgîtha (in 'they meditated on the udgîtha'),
not in its direct sense, but as denoting by implication
the udgât/ri/. But the rule is that in one and the
same connected passage the interpretation of later passages
has to adapt itself to the earlier passages. We
therefore conclude the passage last quoted to teach that
the syllable Om which is a part of the udgîtha is to be
meditated upon as prâ/n/a.--In the Vâ/g/asaneyaka on the
other hand there is no reason for taking the word udgîtha
to denote a part of the udgîtha only, and we therefore
must interpret it to denote the whole; and in the
passage, 'Do thou sing out for us,' the performer of the
worship, i.e. the Udgât/ri/-priest, is described as prâ/n/a.
In reply to the pûrvapakshin's remark that in the Vâ/g/asaneyaka
also the udgîtha and the prâ/n/a occur in co-ordination
(in the passage, 'He is udgîtha'), we point out that
that statement merely aims at showing that the Self of all
is that prâ/n/a which the text wishes to represent as udgât/ri/.
The statement, therefore, docs not imply the unity of the
two vidyâs. Moreover, there also the term udgîtha denotes
the whole act of worship (while in the /Kh/ândogya it denotes
the omkâra only). Nor must it be said that the prâ/n/a can
[Footnote 1: From which it appears that the /Kh/ândogya enjoin--: throughout
a meditation on the syllable Om which is only a part of the
udgîtha; while the object of meditation enjoined in the B/ri/had-âra/n/yaka is the whole udgîtha.]
[Footnote 2: Viz. for the purpose of making out that the object of meditation
is the same in the /Kh/ândogya and the B/ri/had-âra/n/yaka.]
195
impossibly be an udgât/ri/, and that on that account our interpretation
of the B/ri/had-âra/n/yaka passage is erroneous; for
with a view to pious meditation scripture may represent
the prâ/n/a as udgât/ri/ as well as udgîtha. And, moreover,
the Udgât/ri/ actually performs his work by the strength of
his breath; hence the prâ/n/a may be called udgât/ri/. In
accordance with this the text says (I, 3, 24). 'He sang it
indeed as speech and breath.'--And if we understand that
the text clearly intends to convey a difference of matter we
have no right to conclude from merely apparent similarities
of expression that only one matter is intended to be expressed.
To quote an analogous instance from the karma-kâ/nd/a:
In the section relative to the unexpected rising of
the moon during the dar/s/a-sacrifice, as well as in the section
about the offering to be made by him who is desirous of
cattle, we meet with identical injunctions such as the following
one, 'He is to divide, the grains into three portions,
and to make those of medium size into a cake offered on
eight potsherds to Agni the Giver,' &c.; nevertheless it
follows from the difference of the introductory passages of
the two sections that the offerings to be made on account
of the moon's rising are indeed not connected with the
divinities of the dar/s/a-sacrifice (but do not constitute a new
sacrifice separate from the dar/s/a), while the section about
him who is desirous of cattle enjoins a separate sacrificial
performance[Footnote ref 1].--Analogously a difference in the nature of
the introductory clauses effects a difference of the vidyâs,
'As in the case of that which is greater than great.' That
means: Just as the meditation on the udgîtha enjoined in
the passage, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest;
he is indeed the udgîtha, greater than great, he is without
end' (/Kh/. Up. I, 9, 1), and the other meditation on the udgîtha
as possessing the qualities of abiding within the eye
and the sun, &c. (/Kh/. Up. I, 6), are separate meditations,
although in both the udgîtha is identified with the highest
Self; so it is with vidyâs in general. The special features
of different vidyâs are not to be combined even when the
[Footnote 1: Cp. Taitt. Sa/m/h. II, 5, 5, 2; Pû, Mî. Sû. VI, 5, 1.]
196
vidyâs belong to one and the same /S/âkhâ; much less then
when they belong to different /S/âkhâs.
8. If it be said (that the vidyâs are one) on account
of (the identity of) name; (we reply that) that is
explained (already); moreover that (identity of name)
is (found in the case of admittedly separate vidyâs).
Here it might be said that after all the unity of the two
vidyâs discussed must be admitted, since they are called by
one and the same name, viz. ' the science of the udgîtha.'--But
this argument is of no avail against what has been
said under the preceding Sûtra. The decision there advocated
has the advantage of following the letter of the
revealed text; the name 'udgîtha-vidyâ' on the other
hand is not a part of the revealed text, but given to the
vidyâs for convenience sake by ordinary men for the reason
that the word 'udgîtha' is met with in the text.--Moreover,
we observe that admittedly separate meditations such
as the two mentioned under the last Sûtra have one and
the same name. Similarly altogether separate sacrificial
performances, such as the agnihotra, the darsapûr/n/amâsa,
and so on, are all comprised under the one name Kâ/th/aka,
merely because they are recorded in the one book called
Kâ/th/aka.--Where, on the other hand, there is no special
reason for assuming the difference of vidyâs, their unity may
be declared on the ground of identity of name; as, e.g. in
the case of the Sa/m/vargavidyâs.
9. And on account of the (omkâra) extending over
the whole (Veda), (the view that the term udgîtha
expresses a specialisation) is appropriate.
In the passage, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om
(as) the udgîtha,' the two words 'omkâra' and 'udgîtha'
are placed in co-ordination. [Footnote ref 1] The question then arises
[Footnote 1 Sâmânâdhikara/n/ya, i.e. literally, 'the relation of abiding in a
common substratum.'--The two words are shown to stand in that
relation by their being exhibited in the same case.]
197
whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these
two words stand to each other is the relation of super-imposition
(adhyâsa) or sublation (apavâda) or unity
(ekatva) or specification (vi/s/esha/n/a); for primâ facie each
of these relations may present itself to the mind.--Adhyasa
takes place when the idea of one of two things not being
dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is
superimposed on that of the first thing; so that together
with the superimposed idea the former idea remains
attached to the thing on which the second idea is superimposed.
When e.g. the idea of (the entity) Brahman
superimposes itself upon the idea of the name, the
latter idea continues in the mind and is not driven out
by the former. A similar instance is furnished by the
superimposition of the idea of the god Vish/n/u on a statue
of Vish/n/u. So, in the case under discussion also, the idea
of the udgîtha may be superimposed on the omkâra or the
idea of the omkâra on the udgîtha.--We, in the second
place, have apavâda when an idea previously attached to
some object is recognised as false and driven out by the
true idea springing up after the false one. So e.g. when
the false idea of the body, the senses, and so on being the
Self is driven out by the true idea springing up later--and
expressed by judgments such as 'Thou art that'--that the
idea of the Self is to be attached to the Self only. Or, to
quote another example, when a previous mistaken notion
as to the direction of the points of the compass is replaced
by the true notion. So here also the idea of the udgîtha
may drive out the idea of the omkara or vice versâ.--The
relation would, in the third place, be that of 'unity' if the
terms 'omkâra' and 'udgîtha' were co-extensive in meaning ;
just as the terms, 'the Best of the Twice-born,' 'the
Brâhma/n/a,' 'the god among men,' all denote an individual
of the noblest caste.--The relation will, finally, be that of
specification if, there being a possibility of our understanding
the omkâra in so far as co-extensive with all the Vedas,
the term 'udgîtha' calls up the idea of the sphere of action
of the udgât/ri/. The passage would then mean, 'Let a man
meditate on that omkâra which is the udgîtha,' and would
198
be analogous to an injunction such as 'Let him bring that
lotus-flower which is blue.'
All these alterations present themselves to the mind, and
as there is no reason for deciding in favour of any one, the
question must remain an unsettled one.
To this pûrvapaksha-view the Sûtra replies, 'And on
account of extending over the whole, it is appropriate.'
The word 'and' stands here in place of 'but,' and is
meant to discard the three other alternatives. Three out
of the four alternatives are to be set aside as objectionable;
the fourth, against which nothing can be urged, is to be
adopted.--The objections lying against the first three
alternatives are as follows. In the case of adhyâsa we
should have to admit that the word which expresses the
idea superimposed is not to be taken in its direct sense,
but in an implied sense[Footnote ref 1]; and we should moreover have to
imagine some fruit for a meditation of that kind. [Footnote ref 2] Nor
can it be said that we need not imagine such a fruit, as
scripture itself mentions it in the passage, 'He becomes
indeed a fulfiller of desires' (I, i, 7); for this passage
indicates the fruit, not of the ideal superimposition of the
udgîtha on the omkâra, but of the meditation in which the
omkâra is viewed as the fulfilment of desires.--Against the
hypothesis of an apavada there likewise lies the objection
that no fruit is to be seen. The cessation of wrong knowledge
can certainly not be alleged as such; for we see no
reason why the cessation of the idea that the ornkara
is udgîtha and not omkâra or vice versâ should be beneficial
to man. Sublation of the one idea by the other
is moreover not even possible in our case; for to the
omkâra the idea of the omkâra remains always attached,
and so to the udgîtha the idea of the udgîtha. The
passage, moreover, does not aim at teaching the true
[Footnote 1: i.e. in the present case we should have to assume that the word
udgîtha means, by implication, the omkâra.--Recourse may be had
to implied meanings only when the direct meaning is clearly
impossible.]
[Footnote 2: For a special adhyâsa-meditation must be attended with a
special result.]
199
nature of something, but at enjoining a meditation of a
certain kind.--The hypothesis of unity again is precluded
by the consideration that as in that case one term would
suffice to convey the intended meaning, the employment of
two terms would be purposeless. And moreover the term
'udgîtha' is never used to denote the omkara in its
connexion with the /Ri/g-veda and Ya/g/ur-veda; nor is the
word 'omkâra' used to denote that entire second subdivision
of a sâman which is denoted by the word 'udgîtha.'
Hence it cannot be said that we have to do with different
words only denoting one and the same thing.--There thus
remains the fourth alternative, 'On account of its comprising
all the Vedas.' That means: In order that the omkâra
may not be understood here as that one which comprises
all the Vedas, it is specified by means of the word 'udgîtha,'
in order that that omkâra which constitutes a part of the
udgîtha may be apprehended.--But does not this interpretation
also involve the admission of implication, as
according to it the word 'udgîtha' denotes not the whole
udgîtha but only a part of it, viz. the omkâra?--True, but
we have to distinguish those cases in which the implied
meaning is not far remote from the direct meaning
and those in which it is remote. If, in the present case,
we embrace the alternative of adhyâsa, we have to
assume an altogether remote implication, the idea of one
matter being superimposed on the idea of an altogether
different matter. If, on the other hand, we adopt the
alternative of specification, the implication connected therewith
is an easy one, the word which in its direct sense
denotes the whole being understood to denote the part.
And that words denoting the whole do duty for words
denoting the part is a matter of common occurrence; the
words 'cloth,' 'village,' and many others are used in this
fashion [Footnote ref 1].--For all these reasons we declare that the appropriate
view of the /Kh/ândogya-passage is to take the word
'udgîtha' as specialising the term 'omkâra [Footnote ref 2].'
[Footnote 1: We say, e.g. 'the cloth is burned,' even if only a part of the
cloth is burned.]
[Footnote 2: We therefore, according to, /S/anhkara, have to render the passage
200
10. Those (qualities which are attributed to the
subject of a vidyâ in one /S/âkhâ only) (are to be
inserted) in other places (also), since (the vidyâs) are
non-different on the whole.
In the colloquy of the prâ/n/as recorded by the Vâgasaneyîns
and the /Kh/andogas the prâ/n/a, endowed with various
qualities such as being the best and so on, is represented as
the object of meditation, and various qualities such as being
the richest and the like are ascribed to speech and the other
organs. And these latter qualities are in the end attributed
to the prâ/n/a also, 'If I am the richest thou art the richest,'
&c. Now in other /S/âkhâs also, as e. g. that of the Kaushî-takins,
the former set of qualities such as being the best and
so on is ascribed to the prâ/n/a (cp. Kau. Up. II, 14, 'Now
follows the Ni/h/reyasâdâna,' &c.), but at the same time the
latter set of attributes, viz. being the richest and so on, is
not mentioned.--The question then is whether those qualities
which are mentioned in some places only are, for the
purposes of meditation, to be inserted there also where
nothing is said about them.
They are not so to be inserted, the pûrvapakshin maintains,
on account of the employment of the word 'thus.' In
the Kaushîtakin-text we meet with the clause, 'He who
knows thus, having recognised the pre-eminence in prâ/n/a.'
Now the word 'thus' which here indicates the object of
knowledge always refers to something mentioned not far off,
and cannot therefore denote a set of qualities mentioned in
other /S/âkhâs only. We therefore maintain that each of
the colloquies of the prâ/n/as must be considered complete
with the qualities stated in itself.
To this we make the following reply. The qualities
mentioned in one text are to be inserted in the other corresponding
texts also, 'Since on the whole they are non-different,'
i.e. because the prâna-vidyâs are recognised to be
the same in all essential points. And if they are the same,
*[Footnote: under discussion as follows, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable
Om which is (i. e. which is a part of) the udgîtha.']
201
why should the qualities stated in one not be inserted in the
others also?--But how about the objection founded by the
pûrvapakshin on the employment of the word 'thus?'--
Although it is true, we reply, that the word 'thus' in the
Kaushtîakin-brâhma/n/a does not denote the set of qualities
mentioned in the Vâ/g/asaneyin-brâhma/n/a, yet that set of
qualities is denoted by the'thus' met within the Vâ/g/asaneyin-brâhma/n/a,
while the vidyâ is, as proved by us, one
and the same; hence no difference has to be made between
qualities mentioned in one's own /S/âkhâ and qualities mentioned
in another /S/âkhâ, as long as the vidyâ is one and the
same. Nor does this by any means imply a disregard of the
text of scripture, and the assumption of things not warranted
by the text. The qualities declared in one Sâkhâ are valid
for all scripture as long as the thing to which the qualities
belong is the same. Devadatta, who in his own country is
known to possess valour and certain other qualities, does
not lose those qualities by going to a foreign land, although
the inhabitants of that land may know nothing about them.
And through better acquaintance his qualities will become
manifest to the people of the foreign country also. Similarly
the qualities stated in one /S/âkhâ may, through special
application, be inserted in another /S/âkhâ.--Hence the attributes
belonging to one and the same subject have to be
combined wherever that subject is referred to, although
they may be expressly stated in one place only.
11. Bliss and other (qualities) as belonging to the
subject of the qualities (have to be attributed to
Brahman everywhere).
Those scriptural texts which aim at intimating the
characteristics of Brahman separately ascribe to it various
qualities, such as having bliss for its nature, being one mass
of knowledge, being omnipresent, being the Self of all and
so on. Now the doubt here presents itself whether in each
place where Brahman is spoken of we have to understand
only those qualities which actually are mentioned there,
or whether we have to combine all qualities of Brahman
mentioned anywhere.
202
The pûrvapakshin maintains that only the attributes
actually stated are to be understood as referred to in each
particular scriptural text.--But this view the Sûtrakâra discards
by declaring that delight and all the other qualities
which belong to the subject, i.e. Brahman, are all of them
to be understood in each place. The reason for this conclusion
is the one given in Sûtra 10. In all the passages treating
of Brahman the subject to which the qualities belong is
one, non-different; hence, as explained at length under the
preceding Sûtra, the qualities attributed to Brahman in
any one place have to be combined wherever Brahman is
spoken of.
But in that case also such qualities as having joy for its
head. &c., would have to be ascribed to Brahman everywhere;
for we read in the Taittirîyaka with reference to the
Self consisting of Bliss, 'Joy is its head, satisfaction is its
right arm, great satisfaction its left arm, bliss is its trunk,
Brahman is its tail, its support' (II, 5).
To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
12. (Such qualities as) joy being its head and so
on have no force (for other passages); for increase
and decrease belong to plurality (only).
Attributes such as having joy for its head and so on,
which are recorded in the Taittirîyaka, are not to be viewed
as having force with regard to other passages treating of
Brahman, because the successive terms, 'Joy,' 'Satisfaction,'
'Great Satisfaction,' 'Bliss,' indicate qualities possessing
lower and higher degrees with regard to each other and to
other enjoyers. Now for higher and lower degrees there is
room only where there is plurality; and Brahman is without
all plurality, as we know from many scriptural passages
('One only, without a Second').--Moreover, we have already
demonstrated under I, 1, 12, that having joy for one's head
and so on are qualities not of Brahman, but of the so-called
involucrum of delight. And further, those qualities are
attributed to the highest Brahman merely as means of
fixing one's mind on it, not as themselves being objects of
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contemplation, and from this also it follows that they are
not valid everywhere[Footnote ref 1].--That the Â/k/ârya refers to them, in
the Sûtra, as attributes of Brahman (while in reality they are
attributes of the ânandamaya ko/s/a) is merely done for the
purpose of establishing a general principle to be extended
to all attributes of Brahman--also the undoubted ones--which
are stated with a view to a special form of meditation
only; such as the quality of being that towards which all
blessings go (/Kh/. Up. IV, 15, 2), or he whose desires are true
(/Kh/. Up. VIII, 7, 1). For those passages may all indeed
have to do with the one Brahman as the object of meditation,
but as owing to the different nature of the opening
sentences the meditations are different ones, the attributes
mentioned in any one are not valid for the others. The
case is analogous to that of two wives ministering to one
king, one with a fly-flap, the other with an umbrella; there
also the object of their ministrations is one, but the acts of
ministration themselves are distinct and have each their
own particular attributes. So in the case under discussion
also. Qualities in which lower and higher degrees can be
distinguished belong to the qualified Brahman only in which
plurality is admitted, not to the highest Brahman raised
above all qualification. Such attributes therefore as having
true desires and the like which are mentioned in some
particular place only have no validity for other meditations
on Brahman.
13. But other (attributes are valid for all passages
relative to Brahman), the purport being the same.
Other attributes, however, such as bliss and so on which
scripture sets forth for the purpose of teaching the true
nature of Brahman are to be viewed as valid for all passages
referring to Brahman; for their purport, i.e. the Brahman
[Footnote 1: For if they are not real attributes of Brahman there is all the
less reason to maintain them to be universally valid. The mere
means of fixing the mind, moreover, are special to each separate
upâsana.]
204
whose nature is to be taught, is one. Those attributes are
mentioned with a view to knowledge only, not to meditation.
14. (The passage, Kâ/th/aka I, 3, 10, gives information
about the person) for the purpose of pious
meditation, as there is no use (of the knowledge of
the objects being higher than the senses and so on).
We read in the Kâ/th/aka (I, 3, 10), 'Higher than the senses
are the objects, higher than the objects there is the mind,
&c. &c.; higher than the person there is nothing--this is
the goal, the highest road.'--Here the doubt arises whether
the purport of the passage is to intimate that each of the
things successively enumerated is higher than the preceding
one, or only that the person is higher than all of them.
The pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative, for
the reason that the text expressly declares the objects to be
higher than the senses, the mind higher than the objects
and so on.
The objection that the assumption of the passage intending
to represent many things as successively superior to
their antecedents would involve a so-called split of the
sentence, he meets by the remark that the passage may be
viewed as containing a plurality of sentences. Many sentences
may represent many things as superior to their
antecedents, and hence each clause of the passage must be
viewed as containing a separate statement of the superiority
of something to other things.
To this we reply as follows.
We must assume that the whole passage aims at intimating
only that the person is higher than everything. Any
information as to the relative superiority of the preceding
members of the series would be devoid of all purpose; for
of the knowledge derived from such observation a use is
neither to be seen nor declared by scripture. Of the knowledge,
on the other hand, of the person being higher than
the senses and everything else, raised above all evil, we do
see a purpose, viz. the accomplishment of final release. And
so scripture also says, 'He who has perceived that is freed
205
from the jaws of death' (I, 3, 15). Moreover, the text by
declaring that nothing is higher than the person and that he
is the highest goal intimates reverence for the person, and
thereby shows that the whole series of objects is enumerated
only to the end of giving information about the person.--
'For the purnose of pious meditation,' i. e. for the purpose
of perfect knowledge which has pious meditation for its
antecedent. For the passage under consideration does not
teach pious meditation by itself.
15. And on account of the word 'Self.'
The above conclusion is confirmed by the circumstance
that the person under discussion is called the Self in I,
3, 12, 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not
shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their
sharp and subtle intellect.' From this we conclude that
the text wishes to represent the other beings enumerated
as the Non-Self. The passage quoted, moreover, indicates
that the person is hard to know, and to be reached by sharp
minds only.--Again, the passage (I, 3, 13), 'A wise man
should keep down speech and mind,' enjoins pious meditation
as a means of the knowledge of the highest person,
as we have explained under I, 4, 1.--It thus follows that
scripture indicates various excellences in the case of the
purusha only, and not in that of the other beings enumerated.--The
passage, moreover, 'He reaches the end of his journey
and that is the highest place of Vish/n/u,' suggests
the question as to who is the end of the journey
and so on, and we therefore conclude that the enumeration
of the senses, objects, &c., has merely the purpose of
teaching the highest place of Vish/n/u (not of teaching anything
about the relation of the senses, objects, and so on).
16. The (highest) Self has to be understood (in
Ait. Âr. II, 4, i), as in other places; on account of
the subsequent (qualification).
We read in the Aitareyaka (II, 4, i), 'Verily, in the
beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing
206
else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth
worlds? He sent forth these worlds, the (heavenly) waters,
the rays, the mortal (earth), and water.'--Here the doubt
presents itself whether the term 'Self' denotes the highest
Self or some other being.
The pûrvapakshin maintains the latter view, which is
borne out, he says, by an examination of the connected
sense of the whole passage.--But, an objection is raised, an
examination of that kind rather leads to the conclusion that
the highest Self is meant; for the passage says that before
the creation the Self only existed and that the creation was
preceded by thought.--No such conclusion is possible, the
pûrvapakshin replies, since the passage relates the creation
of the worlds. If it aimed at representing the highest Self
as the creator, it would speak of the creation of the elements,
of which the worlds are only certain combinations. That
the worlds are meant by the terms 'water,' &c., appears
from the subsequent clause (4), 'That water is above the
heaven,'&c.--Now /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti teach that the creation
of the worlds is accomplished by some inferior Lord different
from--and superintended by--the highest Self; cp.
e.g. B/ri/. Up.I, 4, 1, 'In the beginning this was Self alone, in
the shape of a person,' and the Sm/ri/ti-passage, 'He is the
first embodied soul, he is called the person; he the prime
creator of the beings was in the beginning evolved from
Brahman.' And the Aitareyins themselves record in a previous
prakara/n/a (II, 1, 3, 1, 'Next follows the origin of
seed. The seed of Pra/g/âpati are the Devas ') that this
manifold creation was accomplished by Pra/g/âpati. That
to the latter being the word 'Self' is sometimes applied
appears from the passage quoted above from the--B/ri/. Up.
And Pra/g/âpati also may be spoken of as being before the
creation one only, if we consider that then his products did
not yet exist; and thought also may be ascribed to him as
he, of course, is of an intelligent nature. Moreover, the
passages, 'He led a cow towards them; he led a horse
towards them; he led man towards them; then they said,'
&c. (11,4, 2, 2), which are in agreement with what is known
about the various activities of particular qualified Selfs be-*
207
longing to the apparent world, show that in the Aitareyaka
also some such qualified Self is meant.
To this we reply that the highest Self is meant in the Aitareyaka
'as in other places.' As in other accounts of the
creation ('From that Self ether was produced,' Taitt. Up. II,
1, &c.) the highest Self has to be understood, and, as in other
cases where the term 'Self' is applied to particular Selfs, the
'Self within' (i.e. the highest Self) has to be understood in
the first place; so it is here also.--In those passages, on the
other hand, where the Self is qualified by some other attribute,
such as 'having the shape of a person,' we must understand
that some particular Self is meant.--In the Aitareyaka,
however, we meet with a qualification, subsequent to
the first reference to the Self, which agrees only with the
highest Self; we mean the one implied in the passage, 'He
thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these
worlds.'--Hence we maintain that the highest Self is
meant.
17. Should it be said that on account of the connected
meaning (of the whole passage) (the highest
Self cannot be meant); (we reply that) it is so, on
account of the assertion.
We now have to refute the objection, made above by the
pûrvapakshin, that the highest Self cannot be meant 'on
account of the connected meaning of the passage.'--The
Sûtrakâra remarks, 'It is so, on account of the assertion.'
That means: It is appropriate to understand the passage
as referring to the highest Self, because thus the assertion
that the Self, previously to the creation, was one only, gives
a fully satisfactory sense, while on the other interpretation
it would be far from doing so. The creation of the worlds
recorded in the Aitareyaka we connect with the creation of
the elements recorded in other Vedic texts, in that way that
we understand the worlds to have been created subsequently
to the elements; just as we showed above (II, 4, 1) that
the passage, 'It sent forth fire,' must be understood to say
that the creation of fire followed on the creation of ether
208
and air as known from other texts. For, as proved by us
before, particulars mentioned in one scriptural text have to
be combined with particulars mentioned in other texts, if
only the chief subject of the passages is the same.--The
details about the activity of the Self referred to by the pûrvapakshin
have likewise to be understood in such a way as
to agree with the general matter about which the text desires
to make assertions. For we must by no means assume
that the text is interested in setting forth all the details of
the story on their own account; the knowledge of them
would be in no way beneficial to man. The only thing the
text really means to teach is the truth that Brahman is the
Self of everything. Hence it first relates how the different
worlds and the guardians of the worlds, viz. Agni and so
on, were created; explains thereupon the origination of the
organs and the body, their abode; and shows how the
creator having thought, 'How can all this be without me?'
(II, 4, 3, 4), entered into this body, 'Opening the suture of
the skull he got in by that door' (7). Then again the text
relates how the Self after having considered the activities
of all the organs ('if speech names,' &c.; 6) asked himself
the question, 'What am I?' and thereupon 'saw this person
as the widely spread Brahman' (10). The aim of all which
is to declare that Brahman is the universal Self. The same
truth is inculcated in a subsequent passage also, viz. II, 6,
1, 5; 6, where the text at first enumerates the whole aggregate
of individual existences together with the elements,
and then continues, 'All this is led by knowledge (i.e. the
highest Self); it rests on knowledge. The world is led by
knowledge, knowledge is its rest, knowledge is Brahman."
--For all these reasons the view that the highest Brahman
is meant in the Aitareyaka is not open to any objections.
The two preceding Sûtras may also be explained with
reference to some other Vedic passages. We read in the
Vâ/g/asaneyaka (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7), 'Who is that Self?--
He who is within the heart, surrounded by the prâ/n/as,
consisting of knowledge, the person of light.' Of the Self
here first mentioned the text goes on to show that it is
free from all contact and thus proves it to have Brahman
209
for its Self, the concluding statement being, 'This great
unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is
indeed Brahman' (IV, 4, 25).--In the /Kh/ândogya again
we have a chapter in which the introductory statement
does not use the term 'Self ('Being only this was in the
beginning, one, without a second'), while at the conclusion
the term 'Self' is used in the declaration of identity ('That
is the Self. Thou art that').--A doubt here arises whether
these two scriptural texts treat of the same matter or not.
They do not, the pûrvapakshin maintains, since they are
not equal. Since the determination of the sense depends
on the letter of the text, we have no right to maintain
equality of sense where the texts differ. In the Vâ/g/asaneyaka
the initial statement about the Self shows that the
whole passage conveys instruction about the true nature of
the Self. In the /Kh/ândogya, on the other hand, the initial
clause is of a different kind, and we therefore must assume
that the whole passage imparts instruction differing in nature
from that of the Vâ/g/asaneyaka.--But has it not been said
that the /Kh/ândogya-passage also teaches in the end the
doctrine of universal identity with the Self?--That has been
said indeed (but wrongly); for as the concluding passage
must be made to agree with the initial passage (which latter
does not say anything about the identity of the Self and
Brahman), we assume that the concluding passage merely
enjoins an imaginative combination (sampatti) of the Self
and Brahman.
To this we reply that also the passage, 'Being only this
was in the beginning,' has to be understood as referring
to the Self; 'as other places,' i.e. in the same way as
the passage quoted from the Vâ/g/asaneyaka. For what
reason?--'On account of the subsequent (statement),' viz.
the statement as to identity. And if it be said that 'on
account of the connected meaning' of the initial passage
in which no mention is made of the Self, the chapter
cannot be understood to refer to the Self; we reply 'that
it may be so understood on account of the assertion' made
in the passage about that 'by which we hear what is not
heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not
210
known.' For this passage asserts that through the knowledge
of one thing all things become known, and to make
good this assertion the text later on declares that 'Being
only this was,' &c. Now this knowledge of all things
through one thing is possible only if we understand the passage
last quoted to refer to the Self; for if the principal
Self were not known, how could all things be known?
Moreover the assertion that, before creation, there existed
one thing only, and the reference to the individual soul
by means of the word 'Self,' and the statement that in
deep sleep the soul becomes united with the True, and the
repeated inquiries on the part of /S/vetaketu, and the
repeated assertions, 'Thou art that,'--all this is appropriate
only if the aim of the whole section is not to enjoin an
imaginative meditation on all things as identical with the
Self, but to teach that the Self really is everything.--Nor
must it be said that, in the section under discussion, the
concluding passage must be interpreted so as to agree
with the introductory clause (and cannot on that account
teach anything about the Self); for the introductory
passage declares neither that the Self is everything, nor
that the Non-self is everything (but merely makes a
statement regarding what is in general), and such an
altogether general statement cannot be in conflict with
any particular statement made in a supplementary passage,
but rather is in want of some such particular statement
whereby to define itself [Footnote ref 1].--And moreover (to view the
matter from a different point of view), the word 'Being'
if looked into closely can denote nothing else but the
principal Self, since we have proved, under II, 1, 14, the
unreality of the whole aggregate of being different from
the Self.--Nor, finally, does a difference of expression
necessarily imply a difference of sense; not any more than
in ordinary language the to phrases, 'Bring that vessel
[Footnote 1 I.e. the definite statement about the Self in the concluding
passage may be used for defining the sense of the indefinite initial
statement about that which is. 'That which is' comprises the
Self as well as the Not-Self.]
211
over there,' and, 'That vessel over there, bring it,' have
different meanings.-It therefore remains a settled conclusion
that in texts such as discussed above, the matter
of instruction is the same, however much the mode may
vary in which the instruction is conveyed.
18. As (scripture where speaking of the rinsing of
the mouth with water) makes a reference to an act
(established by Sm/ri/ti), (that act is not enjoined by
Sruti, but rather) the new (act of meditation on the
water viewed as the dress of prâ/n/a).
The /Kh/andogas as well as the Vâ/g/asaneyins record, in
the colloquy of the prâ/n/as, that the food of Breath comprizes
everything even unto dogs and birds, and that water
is its dress. To this the /Kh/andogas add, 'Therefore when
going to eat food they surround it before and after with
water' (/Kh/. Up. V, 2, 2). And the Vâ/g/asaneyins add
(B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 14), '/S/rotriyas who know this rinse the
mouth with water when they are going to eat and rinse
the mouth with water after they have eaten, thinking that
thereby they make the breath dressed. Therefore a man
knowing this is to rinse the mouth with water when going
to eat and after having eaten; he thereby makes that
breath dressed.'--These texts intimate two things, rinsing
of the mouth and meditation on the breath as dressed.
The doubt then arises whether the texts enjoin both these
matters, or only the rinsing of the mouth, or only the
meditation on breath as dressed.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the text enjoins both,
since the one as well as the other is intimated by the text,
and since both matters not being settled by any other
means of knowledge are worthy of being enjoined by the
Veda.--Or else, he says, the rinsing of the mouth only is
enjoined, since with reference to the latter only the text
exhibits the particular injunctive verbal form ('he is to
rinse'). In this latter case the mention made in the text
of the meditation on breath as dressed has merely the
purpose of glorifying the act of rinsing.
212
To this we make the following reply.--The rinsing of
the mouth cannot possibly be enjoined by the quoted
passages 'since they merely contain references to an act,'
i.e. since they merely contain remarks concerning the
purificatory act of rinsing the mouth which is known from
and settled by Sm/ri/ti.--But are not the very /S/ruti-passages
under discussion to be looked upon as the fundamental texts
on which the Sm/ri/ti-injunctions regarding the rinsing of
the mouth are based?--This is not possible, we reply, since
the Sruti and Sm/ri/ti-passages refer to different matters.
All the Sm/ri/ti-passages enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth
only in so far as it purifies man; while the quoted /S/ruti
texts which occur in prâ/n/a-vidyâs, if enjoining the rinsing of
the mouth at all, enjoin it with reference to the knowledge
of prâ/n/a. And a /S/ruti-passage cannot constitute the basis
of a Sm/ri/ti-passage referring to an altogether different
matter. Nor can it be maintained that the /S/ruti-passage
enjoins some altogether new rinsing of the mouth connected
with the prâ/n/a-vidyâ, as we recognise the rinsing mentioned
in /S/ruti as the ordinary rinsing performed by men for the
sake of purification.--The preceding argumentation already
precludes the alternative of two matters being enjoined,
which would moreover lead to a so-called split of the sentence.--We
therefore conclude that the text--with reference
to the rinsing of the mouth before and after eating which is
enjoined by Sm/ri/ti-enjoins (by means of the passage,
'thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed') a
new mental resolve with regard to the water used for rinsing
purposes, viz. that that water should act as a means for
clothing the prâ/n/a. The statement about the clothing of the
prâ/n/a cannot (as suggested by the purvapakshin) be taken
as a glorification of the act of rinsing the mouth; for in the
first place the act of rinsing is not enjoined in the Vcdic
passage[Footnote ref 1], and in the second place we apprehend that the
passage itself conveys an injunction, viz. of the mental
[Footnote 1 A glorifying arthavâda-passage would be in its place only if
it were preceded by some injunction; for the glorification of
certain acts is meant to induce men to comply with the injunctions
concerning those acts.]
213
resolve to provide clothing for the prâ/n/a. Nor must the
objection be raised that in that case two purposes are
admitted for the one act of rinsing the mouth, viz. the
purpose of purification and the purpose of providing the
prâ/n/a with clothing. For we have actually to do not with
one action, but with two separate actions. For one action
is the rinsing of the mouth which serves the purpose of
purifying man, and another action is the mental resolve
that that water should serve the purpose of clothing the
prâ/n/a. Similarly the preceding passage, 'Whatever there
is, even unto dogs, &c., that is thy food,' does not enjoin
the promiscuous use of food of all kinds--for that would be
contrary to scripture and impossible in itself--but merely
enjoins the meditation on all food as food of the prâ/n/a. We
therefore conclude that also the passage, 'Water is thy dress,"
which forms the immediate continuation of the passage last
quoted does not enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth but
merely the act of meditating on the rinsing-water as constituting
the dress of the prâ/n/a.
Moreover the mere present-form, 'they rinse the mouth
with water,' has no enjoining force.--But also in the passage,
'They think that thereby they make the breath dressed,' we
have a mere present-form without injunctive power (and yet
you maintain that that passage conveys an injunction)!--
True; but as necessarily one of the two must be enjoined[Footnote ref 1],
we assume, on the ground of what the text says about the
making of a dress, that what is enjoined is the meditation
on water being the dress of prana; for this is something
'new,' i.e. not established by other means of knowledge[Footnote ref 2].
The rinsing of the mouth with water, on the other hand, is
already established by other means (i.e. Sm/ri/ti), and therefore
need not be enjoined again.--The argument founded
[Footnote 1: Because otherwise we should have only arthavâdas. But
arthavâdas have a meaning only in so far as connected with an
injunction.]
[Footnote 2: The above argumentation avails itself of the Sûtra, putting a
new construction on it.--Tarhi dvayor avidheyatvam ity âsankyânu-vâdâmatrasyâ ki/ñ/kitkaratvâd anyataravidher âva/s/yakatve samkalpanam
eva vidheyam iti vidhântare/n/a sûtra/m/ yogayati. Ân. Gi.]
214
by the pûrvapakshin on the circumstance that, in the B/ri/.
Up., the verb 'to rinse' is found in the injunctive form
('therefore a man, &c., is to rinse'), is already refuted by
our showing that the act of rinsing the mouth is not a new
one (and therefore requires no Vedic injunction).
For the very reason that the text does not aim at enjoining
the rinsing of the mouth, the Kanvas (in their recension
of the B/ri/. Up.) conclude the chapter with the clause, 'They
think,' &c., and do not add the concluding clause of the
Madhyandinas, 'Therefore a man,' &c. From this we have
to conclude that what is enjoined in the text of the Mâdhyandinas
also is 'the knowledge of that,' i.e. the knowledge
of the water being the dress of the previously mentioned
prâ/n/a.--Nor finally can it be maintained that in one place
(i.e. the Madhyandina-/s/âkha) the rinsing of the mouth
is enjoined, and in other places the knowledge of water
as the dress of prâ/n/a; for the introductory passage, 'Water
is the dress,' is the same everywhere.--We are therefore
entitled to conclude that what is enjoined in all /S/âkhas is
the cognition of water being the dress of the prâ/n/a.
19. In the same (/S/âkha also) it is thus (i.e. there
is unity of vidyâ), on account of the non-difference
(of the object of meditation).
In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Vâ/g/asaneyi-/s/âkha.
there is a vidyâ called the Sâ/n/dilya-vidyâ, in which we
meet with the following statement of particulars, 'Let him
meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the
prâ/n/a for its body and light for its form,' &c.--In the
B/ri/had-âra/n/yaka again, which belongs to the same /S/âkhâ, we
read (V, 10,6), 'That person consisting of mind, whose being
is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or
barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all--he rules all
this whatsoever exists.'--A doubt here presents itself
whether these two passages are to be taken as one vidyâ in
which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be
combined or not.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two
separate vidyâs whose particulars cannot be combined. For
215
otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the
reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do
with texts belonging to different /S/âkhâs we can rebut the
charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the
texts are read and known by separate classes of men; we
can then ascertain the unity of the vidyas and combine the
particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned
in the others; so e.g. in the colloquy of the prâ/n/as. On the
other hand, texts belonging to one and the same /S/âkhâ
cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same
persons study and know them, and passages occurring in
different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidyâ.
Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the
texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one
text to enjoin the vidyâ and that of the other to enjoin the
particulars of the vidyâ. For in that case each of the
two passages would mention only such particulars as are
not mentioned in the other one; while as a matter of
fact particulars common to both as well as not common to
both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the
one passage are not to be combined with those of the other.
To this we make the following reply. Just as passages
met with in different /S/âkhâs form one vidyâ in which the
different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages
under discussion also, although belonging to one and the
same /S/âkhâ, constitute one vidyâ only, since the object of
meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise
Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of
mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes
the character of a meditation; as long as there is no difference
of character we cannot determine difference of vidyâ;
and if there is no difference of vidyâ the particulars mentioned
in different places cannot be held apart.--But has it
not been demonstrated above that the vidyâs have to be
held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise?--Tautology
does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be
understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them
enjoining the vidyâ, and the other the particulars of the
vidyâ.--But in that case the B/ri/had-âra/n/yaka ought to
216
mention only those points which are not mentioned in the
Agnirahasya, as e.g. 'he is the Lord of all;' while it ought
not to mention what is already mentioned in the Agnirahasya,
as e.g. the Selfs consisting of mind!--Not so, we
reply. Only the repetition, in one passage, of what is
already mentioned in the other passage enables us to
recognise the vidyâ. The B/ri/had-âra/n/yaka-passage, by
mentioning some common qualities, first enables us to
recognise the /S/â/nd/ilya-vidyâ, and then teaches certain
particulars with reference to the latter; how otherwise
should we know that the B/ri/.-passage is meant to enjoin
particulars for the /S/â/nd/ilya-vidyâ? Moreover, as in a
passage which has a purpose of its own in so far as it
teaches something not yet established, a reference to something
already established is justified on the ground of its
being a (so-called) nityânuvâda, we cannot overlook the
recognition (of the identity of the passage with another one)
which is rendered possible through that anuvâda. Hence,
although the two passages belong to one and the same
/S/âkhâ, they yet constitute one vidyâ only, and their particulars
have to be combined into one whole.
20. Thus in other cases also, on account of the connexion
(of particulars with one and the same vidyâ).
We read in the B/ri/had-âra/n/yaka (V, 5), 'The true is
Brahman,' and, further on, 'Now what is the true, that is the
Aditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person
in the right eye.' Having thus declared the different abodes
of that true Brahman with reference to the gods and with
reference to the body, and having, in what follows, identified
its body with the sacred syllables (bhû/h/, &c.), the text
teaches its two secret names (upanishad), 'Its secret name
is ahar' with reference to the gods; and 'its secret name is
aham' with reference to the body.--A doubt here arises
whether these two secret names are both to be applied to
the deva-abode of Brahman as well as to its bodily abode,
or only one name to each.
The above Sûtra maintains the pûrvapaksha view. Just
as certain particulars though recorded elsewhere are yet
217
to be combined with the Sâ/nd/ilya-vidyâ, so we have to
proceed in other cases also, as e.g. the one under discussion,
because the particulars mentioned are all connected
with one vidyâ. The vidyâ of the True with its double
reference to the Devas and to the body is one only, as we
infer from the fact of its having one exordium only ('The
true is Brahman'), and from the way in which the text
interconnects Âditya and the person in the eye. Why
then should an attribute belonging to one of the latter
not belong to the other also? For, to quote an analogous
case, certain rules of life which are prescribed for a teacher
--as e.g. having a following of pupils--remain equally valid
whether the teacher be in a village or in a wood. For
these reasons both secret names equally belong to the
Âditya as well as to the person within the eye. This view
the next Sûtra refutes.
21. Or this is not so, on account of the difference
(of place).
The two secret names do not apply quite equally to
the two persons mentioned, because they are connected
with different places in the vidyâ. For the clause, 'Its
secret name is ahar,' the text exhibits in connexion with
the person in the solar orb, while the clause, 'Its secret
name is aham,' occurs in connexion with the person in the
eye. Now the pronoun 'its' always refers to something
mentioned close by; we therefore conclude that the text
teaches each secret name as belonging to one special abode
of Brahman only. How then can both names be valid for
both?--But, an objection is raised, the person within the
orb of the sun and the person within the eye are one only;
for the text teaches them both to be abodes of the one
true Brahman!--True, we reply; but as each secret name
is taught only with reference to the one Brahman as conditioned
by a particular state, the name applies to Brahman
only in so far as it is in that state. We on our part also
illustrate the case by a comparison. The teacher always
remains the teacher; yet those kinds of services which the
pupil has to do to the teacher when sitting have not to be
218
done when he stands; and vice versa.--The comparison,
on the other hand, instituted by the pûrvapakshin is ill
chosen, since the duties of the disciple towards his teacher
depend on the latter's character as teacher, and that is not
changed by his being either in the village or the forest.--
Hence the two secret names have to be held apart.
22. (Scripture) also declares that.
Scripture moreover contains a distinct intimation that
the attributes under discussion are to be held apart. We
read, /Kh/. Up. I, 8, 5, 'The form of that person is the same
as the form of the other person, the joints of the one are
the joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of
the other.'--But how does this passage convey the desired
intimation?--By expressly transferring the attributes of
the person within the sun to the person within the eye;
for this express transfer shows that the text looks upon
the attributes of the two as separated by the difference
of abode and therefore not to be combined (unless specially
enjoined to be so combined).--The conclusion therefore
is that the two secret names are to be held apart.
23. And for the same reason the holding together
and the pervading the sky (attributed to Brahman
in the Râ/n/âyanîya-khila) (are not to be inserted in
other vidyâs).
In the khilas (supplementary writings) of the Râ/n/âyanîyas
we meet with a passage, 'Held together are the
powers among which Brahman is the best; the best
Brahman in the beginning stretched out the sky[Footnote ref 1],' which
mentions certain energies of Brahman, such as holding
together its powers, entering into the sky, &c. And in the
[Footnote 1: Vîryâ vîryâ/n/i parâkramabhedâ/h/, anye hi purushâ/h/ sahâyân
apekshya vikramân bibhrati tena tatparâkramâ/n/âm na ta eva
niyat-apûrvatvarûpakâra/n/atvena /g/yesh/th/â bhavanti ki/m/ tu tatsahakâri/n/o
*pi, brahmavîryâ/n/âm tu brahmaiva /g/yesh/tham/ brahma /g/yesh/tham/
yeshâ/m/ tâni tathâ brahma khalv ananyâpeksha/m/ /g/aga/gg/anmâdi
karoti. Ki/m/ /k/ânyeshâm parâkramâ/n/âm balavadbhir madhye
bhahga/h/ sambhavati tena te svavîryâ/n/i na bibhrati, brahmavîryâni
tu brahma/n/â sambh/ri/tâni avighnena sambh/ri/tâny ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]
219
Upanishad of the same (i.e. the Râ/n/âyanîyas) we meet
with vidyâs of Brahman among which the /S/â/nd/ilya-vidyâ
is the first.--The question then arises whether the energies
of Brahman just mentioned are to be inserted in those
Brahma-vidyâs or not. To the pûrvapaksha view that
they are to be so inserted because they are connected with
Brahman, the Sûtrakâra replies that the holding together
and pervading the sky are not to be inserted in the
/S/â/nd/ilya-vidyâ and other vidyâs, for the same reason,
i.e. on account of their being connected with different
abodes. In the /S/a/nd/ilya-vidyâ, Brahman is said to have
its abode in the heart, 'He is the Self within the heart'
(/Kh/. Up. III, 14, 3); the same statement is made in the
dahara-vidyâ, 'There is the palace, the small lotus (of the
heart), and in it that small ether' (VIII, 1, 1). In the
Upako/s/ala-vidyâ again, Brahman is said to reside within
the eye, 'That person that is seen in the eye' (IV, 15, 1).
In all these vidyâs Brahman is described as residing within
the body; it is therefore impossible to insert into them
the energies of Brahman which the khila of the Râ/n/â-*yanîyas
mentions, and which are connected with the Devas
(i.e. external nature).--But the vidyâs of the /Kh/ândogya
likewise mention such powers of Brahman as are connected
with the Devas; cp. e.g. III, 14, 3, 'He is greater than the
heaven, greater than these worlds;' IV, 15, 4, 'He is also
Bhâmanî, for he shines in all worlds;' VIII, 1, 3, 'As large
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart.
Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' And again
there are other vidyâs of Brahman, such as the one which
represents Brahman as comprising sixteen parts, in which
not any special abode is mentioned.--True; but there is a
special reason why the attributes stated in the Râ/n/âyanîya-khila
cannot be introduced into the other vidyâs. Particulars
mentioned in one place can indeed be inserted in
vidyâs met with in another place if the latter are suggested
to the mind by containing some reference to agreeing particulars;
the qualities of holding together, however, on one
side and those mentioned in the /S/â/nd/ilya-vidyâ, &c., on
the other side are of such a nature as to exclude each
220
other, and therefore do not mutually suggest each other.
The mere circumstance of all the particulars being connected
with Brahman does not suffice to suggest vidyâs
occurring in other places; for even in vidyâs which are
avowedly separate, all the particulars may be connected
with Brahman. And it is an established fact that Brahman,
although one only, is, owing to the plurality of its powers,
meditated upon in more than one way, as shown under
Sûtra 7.--The conclusion therefore is that the attributes
of holding together its powers and so on are not to be
inserted in the Sâ/nd/ilya. and similar vidyâs.
24. And as the record of others (viz. the Taittirîyaka)
is not such as in the purusha-vidyâ (of the
/Kh/ândogya), (the two purusha-vidyâs are not to be
combined).
In the Rahasya-brâhma/n/a of the Tâ/nd/ins and the
Pai@ngins (the /Kh/ândogya) there is a vidyâ treating of
man, in which man is fancifully identified with the sacrifice,
the three periods of his life with the three libations, his
hunger and so on, with the dîkshâ, &c. And other particulars
also are mentioned there, such as formulas of
prayer, use of mantras and so on.--A similar fanciful
assimilation of the sacrifice and man the Taittirîyakas
exhibit, 'For him who knows thus the Self of the sacrifice
is the sacrificer, Faith is the wife of the sacrificer,' and so
on (Taitt. Âr. X, 64).--The doubt here arises whether the
particulars of the man-sacrifice given in the /Kh/ândogya
are to be inserted in the Taittirîyaka or not.
Against the view of the pûrvapakshin that they are so
to be inserted because in both places we have a purusha-ya/gñ/a,
we maintain that they are not to be inserted because
the characteristics of the purusha-ya/gñ/a of the /Kh/andogas
are not recognised in the Taittînya-text. This the Sûtra-kâra
expresses by saying, 'As (the record of the followers
of some /S/âkhâs, viz. the Tâ/nd/ins and Pai@ngins, is) in the
purusha-vidyâ, not such is the record of others,' viz. the
Taittirîyakas. For the latter exhibit an identification of
man with the sacrifice, in which the wife, the sacrificer, the
221
Veda, the vedi, the sacrificial grass, the post, the butter,
the sacrificial animal, the priest, &c., are mentioned in
succession; none of which particulars are mentioned in the
/Kh/ândogya. The use also to which the Taittirîyaka turns
the three libations is different from the /Kh/ândogya, And
the few points in which the two texts agree, such as the identification of the Avab/ri/tha-ceremony with death, lose their
significance side by side with the greater number of dissimilarities,
and are therefore not able to effect the recognition
of the vidyâ.--Moreover the Taittirîyaka does not
represent man as the sacrifice (as the /Kh/ândogya does);
for the two genitives ('of him who thus knows' and 'of
the sacrifice') are not co-ordinate, and the passage therefore
cannot be construed to mean, 'The knowing one who
is the sacrifice, of him the Self is,' &c. For it cannot be
said that man is the sacrifice, in the literal sense of the
word. [Footnote ref 1] The two genitives are rather to be taken in that
way, that one qualifies the other, 'The sacrifice of him
who thus knows, of that sacrifice,' &c. For the connexion
of the sacrifice with man (which is expressed by the genitive,
'the sacrifice of him') is really and literally true;
and to take a passage in its literal meaning, if possible at
all, is always preferable to having recourse to a secondary
metaphorical meaning. [Footnote ref 2] Moreover the words next following
in the Taittirîyaka-passage, 'the Self is the sacrificer,'
declare that man (man's Self) is the sacrificer, and this
again shows that man's relation to the sacrifice is not that
of co-ordination. [Footnote ref 3] Moreover as the section beginning with
'Of him who thus knows' forms an anuvâda of something
previously established (and as such forms one vâkya to
which one sense only must be ascribed), we must not
bring about 'a split of the sentence' by interpreting it as
[Footnote 1: And therefore we are not warranted in taking the two genitives
as co-ordinate, as otherwise they might be taken.]
[Footnote 2: Which latter would be the case if we should take the two
genitives as co-ordinate and therefore expressing an imaginative
identification of the man and the sacrifice.]
[Footnote 3: If man is the sacrificer he cannot be identified with the
sacrifice; he is rather the Lord of the sacrifice.]
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teaching in the first place that man is the sacrifice, and
in the second place that the Self and the other beings
enumerated are the sacrificer and so on. And as we see
that the passage, 'Of him who thus knows,' &c., follows
upon some instruction about the knowledge of the Self
coupled with sa/m/nyâsa, we apprehend that the Taittirîyaka-chapter
is not an independent vidyâ but merely
supplementary to the instruction previously given. In
agreement with this conclusion we observe that the Taittirîyaka
promises only one result for both chapters, viz.
the one stated in the passage, 'He obtains the greatness
of Brahman.'--On the other hand the text embodying the
purusha-vidyâ in the /Kh/ândogya is an independent text;
for we see that an independent result is attached to it,
viz. an increase of length of life, 'He who knows this lives
on to a hundred and sixteen years.'--Hence the particulars
mentioned in the purusha-vidyâ of another Sakha, such as
formulas of prayer, mantras and so on, are not to be combined
with the Taittirîya-text of the vidyâ.
25. Because the matter (of certain mantras) such
as piercing and so on is different (from the matter
of the approximate vidyas) (the former have not to
be combined with the latter).
At the beginning of an Upanishad of the Âtharva/n/ikas
the following mantra is recorded, 'Pierce him (the enemy)
whole, pierce his heart: crush his veins, crush his head;
thrice crushed,' &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad
of the Tâ/nd/ins we have the mantra, 'O God Savitar, produce
the sacrifice.' At the beginning of that of the /S/â/t/yâyanins,
'Thou hast a white horse and art green as grass,'
&c.; at the beginning of that of the Ka/th/as and the Taittirîyakas,
'May Mitra be propitious to us and Varu/n/a,' &c.
At the beginning of the Upanishad of the Vâ/g/asaneyins we
have a Brâhma/n/a-passage about the pravargya-ceremony,
'The gods indeed sat down to a sattra;' and at the beginning
of that of the Kaushîtakins there is a Brâhma/n/a-passage
about the agnish/t/oma, 'Brahman indeed is the Agnish/t/oma,
Brahman is that day; through Brahman they pass into
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Brahman, immortality those reach who observe that day.'--
The point to be inquired into with reference to all these
mantras and the sacrifices referred to in the Brâhma/n/a-passages
is whether they are to be combined with the vidyâs
(contained in the Upanishads) or not.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that they are so to be
combined, because the text exhibits them in proximity to
the Upanishad-portions of the Brâhma/n/as whose chief
contents are formed by the vidyâs.--But we do not observe
those mantras and sacrifices to be actually enjoined as subordinate
members of the vidyâs!--True, but in spite of this
we, on the ground of proximity, infer them to be connected
with the vidyâs. For we have no right to set aside the
fact of proximity as irrelevant as long as an inference can
be established on it.--But we are unable to see that the
mantras have anything to do with the vidyâs, and how can
it be assumed that ceremonies, such as the pravargya which
scripture enjoins with reference to other occasions, sacrifices,
and so on, stand in any relation to the vidyâs!--Never mind,
the pûrvapakshin replies. In the case of mantras we can
always imagine some meaning which connects them with
the vidyâs; the first mantra quoted, e.g. may be viewed as
glorifying the heart. For the heart and other parts of the
body are often represented, in the vidyâs, as abodes of
meditation, and hence mantras glorifying the heart, &c.,
may appropriately form subordinate members of those
vidyâs. Some mantras, moreover, we clearly see to be
enjoined with reference to vidyâs, so, e.g. the mantra, 'I
turn to Bhû/h/ with such and such' (/Kh/. Up. III, 15, 3).
Sacrificial acts again may indeed be enjoined in connexion
with other occasions; yet there is no reason why they
should not also be applied to the vidyâs, just as the
offering called B/ri/haspatisava is a subordinate part of the
Vâ/g/apeya-sacrifice [Footnote ref 1].
To this we make the following reply. The mantras and
[Footnote 1: The B/ri/haspatisava, although enjoined with special reference to
him who is desirous of Brahmavar/k/as, is yet at the same time a
subordinate part of the Vâ/g/apeya-sacrifice. Cp. Pû. Mî. Sû. IV,
3, 29.]
224
ceremonies mentioned cannot be drawn into connexion
with the vidyâs, 'because their matter, such as piercing the
heart, &c., is different (from the matter of the vidyas),' and
therefore cannot be connected with the latter.--But has
it not been said above that the mantras may be connected
with the meditations enjoined in the vidyâs, on the ground
of their coming of use in meditations on the heart, &c.?--
The mantras, we reply, might be so employed, if their
entire contents were glorification of the heart, and the like;
but this is by no means the case. The mantra first quoted,
e.g. clearly expresses hostility to somebody, and is therefore
to be connected, not with the vidyâs of the Upanishads,
but with some ceremony meant to hurt an enemy. The
mantra of the Tâ/nd/ins again, 'O God Savitar, produce the
sacrifice,' indicates by its very words that it is connected
with some sacrifice; with what particular sacrifice it is
connected has to be established by other means of proof.
Similarly other mantras also--which, either by 'indication'
(li@nga), or 'syntactical connexion' (vâkya), or some
other means of proof, are shown to be subordinate to
certain sacrificial actions--cannot, because they occur in
the Upanishads also, be connected with the vidyâs on the
ground of mere proximity. For that 'proximity,' as a
means of proof regarding the connexion of subordinate
matters with principal matters, is weaker than direct enunciation
(/S/ruti), and so on, is demonstrated in the former
science (i.e. in the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ) under III, 3, 14. Of
sacrificial works also, such as the pravargya, which are primarily
enjoined with reference to other occasions, it cannot
be demonstrated that they are supplementary to vidyâs
with which they have nothing in common. The case of
the B/ri/haspatisava, quoted by the pûrvapakshin, is of an
altogether different kind, as there we have an injunction
clearly showing that that oblation is a subordinate member
of the Vâ/g/apeya, viz. 'Having offered the Vâ/g/apeya he
offers the B/ri/haspatisava.' And, moreover, if the one
pravargya-ceremony has once been enjoined for a definite
purpose by a means of proof of superior strength, we must
not, on the strength of an inferior means of proof, assume
225
it to be enjoined for some different purpose. A proceeding
of that kind would be possible only if the difference of the
means of proof were not apprehended; but in our case this
latter possibility is excluded since the relative strength
and weakness of the various means of proof is fully apprehended
(on the ground of the conclusions arrived at in the
Purva Mîmâ/m/sâ).--For these reasons the mentioned mantras
and acts are not, on the ground of mere textual collocation,
to be viewed as supplementary to the vidyâs of the
Upanishads. To account for the fact of their textual collocation
with the latter we must keep in view that the mantras, &c.
as well as the vidyâs have to be studied, &c. in the woods.
26. Where the getting rid (of good and evil) is
mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by
others has to be added) because the statement about
the obtaining is supplementary (to the statement
about the getting rid of), as in the case of the ku/s/âs,
the metres, the praise and the singing. This (i.e.
the reason for this) has been stated (in the Pûrva
Mîmâ/m/sâ).
In the text of the Tâ/nd/ins we meet with the following
passage: 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair,
and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from
the mouth of Rahu, I obtain self made and satisfied the
uncreated world of Brahman' (/Kh/. Up. VIII, 13). Again,
in the text of the Âtharva/n/ikas, we read, 'Then knowing,
shaking off good and evil he reaches the highest oneness,
free from passion' (Mu. Up. III. 1, 3). The Sâ/t/yâyanins
read, 'His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the
good, his enemies the evil he has done.' And the
Kaushîtakins, 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds.
His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved
relatives the evil he has done' (Kau. Up. I, 4).--Of these
texts two state that the man who has reached true knowledge
rids himself of his good and evil deeds; one, that his
friends and enemies obtain his good and evil deeds respectively;
and one finally declares that both things take place.
226
This latter text calls for no remark; nor again that one which
refers only to his friends and enemies obtaining his good
and evil deeds; for in order that they may obtain those
he must necessarily first have got rid of them, and the act
of getting rid of them has therefore to be supplied in the
text. Those passages, however, which merely mention a
man's shaking off his deeds, give rise to a discussion
whether those deeds, when shaken off, are obtained by
his friends and enemies, or not. Here the pûrvapakshin
maintains that the latter circumstance is not to be supplied
in the two passages mentioned-firstly because the text
does not state it; secondly because what other /S/âkhâs
say about it falls within the sphere of a different vidyâ;
and thirdly because the getting rid of the evil and good
deeds is something done by the man himself, while the
obtaining of them is the work of others. As thus there
is no necessary connexion between the two, we have no
right to supply the latter on the basis of the former.
To this we make the following reply. Although the
text mentions only the getting rid of the deeds, yet the
obtaining of them by others must necessarily be added,
because the statement concerning the latter is merely
supplementary to the statement about the former, as
appears from the text of the Kaushitakins.--In reply to
the arguments brought forward by the pûrvapakshin we
offer the following remarks.
The separation of the different passages would indeed
have to be insisted upon, if anybody intended to introduce
an injunction about something to be done, which is contained
in one text only, into some other text also. But
in the passages under discussion the act of getting rid of--
and the act of obtaining--the good and evil deeds are
not mentioned as something to be performed, but merely
as implying a glorification of knowledge; the intended
sense being, 'Glorious indeed is that knowledge through
whose power the good and evil deeds, the causes of the
sa/m/sâra, are shaken off by him who knows, and are transferred
to his friends and enemies.' The passage thus
being glorificatery only, the teacher is of opinion that,
227
to the end of strengthening the glorification, the obtaining
of the good and evil deeds by the friends and enemies--which
in some passages is represented as the consequence
of their being shaken off by the man who knows--must
be supplied in those passages also which mention only the
shaking off. That one arthavâda-passage often depends
on another arthavada-passage is a well-known fact; the
following passage, e.g. 'The twenty-first indeed from this
world is that sun,' would be unintelligible if no regard
were paid to the other passage, 'Twelve are the months,
five the seasons, three these worlds; that sun is the twenty-first.'
Similarly the passage, 'The two Trish/t/ubh verses
are for strengthening,' necessarily requires to be taken,in
connexion with the other passage, 'Strength of the senses
indeed is Trish/t/ubh.' And as the statement about the
obtaining of the good and evil deeds has only the purpose
of glorifying knowledge (and is not made on its own
account), we need not insist too much on the question how
the results of actions done by one man can be obtained
by others. That the obtaining of the deeds by others is
connected with their being got rid of by the man who
knows, merely for the purpose of glorifying knowledge,
the Sûtrakâra moreover indicates by making use of the
expression, 'because the statement about obtaining is
supplementary to,' &c.; for if he wished to intimate that
the actual circumstance of other persons obtaining a man's
good and evil deeds is to be inserted in those vidyâs where
it is not mentioned he would say, 'because the fact of
obtaining.' &c. The Sûtra therefore, availing itself of the
opportunity offered by the discussion of the combination of
particular qualities, shows how mere glorificatory passages
have to be inserted in texts where they are wanting.
The remaining part of the Sutra, 'Like the ku/s/âs the
metres, the praise and the singing, 'introduces some analogous
instances.--The case under discussion is analogous
to the case of the ku/s/âs[Footnote ref 1]. Those, a mantra of the Bhâl-*
[Footnote 1: I.e. according to the commentators, small wooden rods used
by the Udgât/ris/ in counting the stotras.]
lavins ('You ku/s/âs are the children of the tree, do you
protect me!') represents as coming from trees in general,
without any specification. The corresponding mantra of
the /S/â/t/yâyanins on the other hand is, 'You ku/s/âs are
the children of the Udumbara-tree;' a particularizing
statement which must be considered as valid for the ku/s/âs
in general.--Another analogous case is that of the metres.
In some places no special statement is made about their
order of succession; but the text of the Pai@ngins, 'The metres
of the Devas come first,' determines the general priority
of the metres of the Devas to those of the Asuras[Footnote ref 1].--
Similarly the time of the stotra accompanying the performance
of the Sho/d/a/s/in-rite which in some texts is left
undefined is settled by the text of the /Ri/g-vedins (âr/k/âh),
'when the Sun has half risen.'--And similarly a particularizing
text of the Bhâllavins defines what priests have
to join in the singing; a point left unsettled in other
/S/rutis[Footnote ref 2].--As in these parallel cases, so we have to proceed
in the case under discussion also. For if we refused to
define a general text by another more particular one,
we should be driven to assume optional procedure (vikalpa),
and that the latter is if possible to be avoided is a well-known
principle. This is stated in the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras X, 8, 15.
The passages about the shaking (off) can be viewed as
giving rise to a different discussion also, and the Sûtra
can accordingly be explained in a different manner. The
question can be raised whether the 'shaking' means the
getting rid of one's good and evil deeds or something else.--
The pûrvapaksha will in that case have to be established
in the following manner. Shaking (dhû) here does not
mean 'getting rid of,' since the root 'dhû' according to
grammar means shaking in an intransitive sense or
trembling; of flags streaming in the wind we say, for
[Footnote 1: Metres of less than ten syllables belong to the Asuras, those of
ten and more to the Devas.]
[Footnote 2: The general text is, according to the commentators, 'The
priests join in the singing;' the defining text of the Bhâllavins, 'The adhvaryu does not join in the singing.']
229
instance, 'the flags are shaking' (dodhûyante). We therefore
take the word in the same sense in the passages under
discussion and understand by the 'trembling' of the good
and evil deeds the fact of their not meeting, for a certain
time, with their results.
To this pûrvapaksha we make the following reply. The
word 'shaking' has to be taken in the sense of 'getting
rid of,' because it is supplemented by the statement of
others obtaining the good and evil deeds. For those
deeds cannot be obtained by others unless they are got
rid of by their former owner. Hence although it is not
easily imaginable that the deeds got rid of by one man
should be obtained by others, we yet, on the ground of
its being mentioned, may determine accordingly that
'shaking' means 'getting rid of.' And although only in
some passages the statement about the obtaining is
actually found in proximity to the statement about the
shaking, it yet has, on the ground of the latter, to be
supplied everywhere and thus becomes a general reason
of decision (viz. that 'shaking' means 'getting rid of).
Against the pûrvapakshin's view we further remark that
good and evil deeds cannot be said to 'tremble' in the
literal sense of the word, like flags in the wind, since
they are not of substantial nature.--(Nor must it be
said that of the horse which exemplifies the shaking,
the text only says that it shakes its hair, not that it
casts anything off, for) the horse when shaking itself
shakes off dust and also old hairs. And with that shaking
(which at the same time is a shaking off) the text expressly
compares the shaking (off) of evil.--Nor do we when
assigning different meanings to one and the same root
enter thereby into conflict with /S/m/ri/ti (grammar). The
clause 'this has been stated' we have already explained.
27. At the (moment of) departing (he frees himself
from his works), there being nothing to be
reached (by him, on the way to Brahman, through
those works); for thus others (declare, in their sacred
texts).
230
The Kaushîtakins record in the parya@nka-vidyâ how the
man (who possesses true knowledge) when approaching
Brahman seated on the couch frees himself on the way
from his good and evil deeds, 'He having reached the path
of the gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3),
and later on (I, 4), 'He comes to the river Vi/g/arâ and crosses
it by the mind alone and there shakes off his good and evil
deeds.'--The question here arises whether in strict agreement
with the text we have to understand that the deceased
man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way
to Brahman, or rather that he does so at the outset when he
departs from his body.
The letter of the text favouring the former alternative,
the Sûtrakâra rebuts it by declaring 'at the going,' i.e. at
the time of departing from the body the man frees himself,
through the strength of his knowledge, from his good and
evil deeds. The reason for this averment is assigned in the
words, 'On account of the absence of anything to be reached.'
For when the man possessing true knowledge has departed
from the body and is, through his knowledge, about to reach
Brahman, there exists nothing to be reached by him on the
way through his good and evil works, and we therefore
have no reason to assume the latter to remain uneffaced
during a certain number of moments. We rather have to
conclude that as the results of his good and evil works are
contrary to the result of knowledge, they are destroyed by
the power of the latter; and that hence the moment of their
destruction is that moment in which he sets out toward the
fruit of his knowledge (i.e. the world of Brahman).--The
conclusion thus is that the deliverance of the man from his
works takes place early, and is only mentioned later on in
the text of the Kaushitakins.--Thus other Sakhas also, as
that of the Tâ/nd/ins and /S/â/t/yâyanins, declare that he frees
himself from his deeds at an earlier stage; cp. the passages,
'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair,' and 'His
sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies
the evil he has done.'
28. And because (on the above interpretation)
231
there is no contradiction to both (i.e. man's making
an effort to free himself from his deeds and actually
freeing himself) according to his liking.
Moreover if we assumed that the man frees himself from
his good and evil deeds on the way--after having departed
from the body and having entered on the path of the gods
--we should implicate ourselves in impossibilities; for after
the body has been left behind, man can no longer accomplish,
according to his liking, that effort which consists in self-restraint
and pursuit of knowledge, and which is the cause
of the obliteration of all his good and evil deeds, and
consequently that obliteration also cannot take place. We
therefore must assume that the requisite effort is made--
and its result takes place--at an earlier moment, viz. in the
state in which man is able to effect it, and that in consequence
thereof man rids himself of his good and evil deeds.
Nothing then stands in the way of the conditioning and
the conditioned events taking place, and the assumption
moreover agrees with the statements of the Tâ/nd/ins and
Sâ/t/yâyanins.
29. A purpose has to be attributed to the going
(on the path of the gods) in a twofold manner;
otherwise there would be contradiction of scripture.
In some scriptural texts the (dead man's) going on the
path of the gods is mentioned in connexion with his freeing
himself from good and evil; in other texts it is not mentioned.
The doubt then arises whether the two things go
together in all cases or only in certain cases.--The pûrvapakshin
maintains that the two are to be connected in all
cases, just as the man's freeing himself from his good and
evil deeds is always followed by their passing over to his
friends and enemies.
To this we make the following reply. That a man's
going on the path of the gods has a purpose is to be
admitted in a twofold manner, i.e. with a distinction only.
His going on that path has a sense in certain cases, in
others not. For otherwise, i.e. if we admitted that men,
232
in all cases, proceed on that path, we should have to
assume that even the passage, Mu. Up. III, 1, 3, 'Shaking
off good and evil, free from passions, he reaches the highest
unity,' refers to actual going through which another place
is reached, and that would clearly be contrary to reason.
For a person free from all desire and therefore non-moving
does not go to another place, and the highest unity is not
to be reached by a man transporting himself to another
locality.
30. (The twofold view taken above) is justified
because we observe a purpose characterised thereby
(i.e. a purpose of the going); as in ordinary life.
Our view of the matter, viz. that a man's proceeding on
the path of the gods has a meaning in certain cases but not
in others, is justified by the following consideration. In
meditations on the qualified Brahman such as the parya@nka-vidyâ
we see a reason for the man's proceeding on the path
of the gods; for the text mentions certain results which can
be reached only by the man going to different places, such as
his mounting a couch, his holding a colloquy with Brahman
seated on the couch, his perceiving various odours and so
on. On the other hand we do not see that going on the
path of the gods has anything to do with perfect knowledge.
For those who have risen to the intuition of the
Self's unity, whose every wish is fulfilled, in whom the
potentiality of all suffering is already destroyed here below,
have nothing further to look for but the dissolution of the
abode of activity and enjoyment of former deeds, i.e. the
body; in their case therefore to proceed on the road of the
gods would be purposeless.--The distinction is analogous
to what is observed in ordinary life. If we want to reach
some village we have to proceed on a path leading there;
but no moving on a path is required when we wish to attain
freedom from sickness.--The distinction made here will be
established more carefully in the fourth adhyâya.
31. There is no restriction (as to the going on the
path of the gods) for any vidyâ; nor any contra-*
233
*diction (of the general subject-matter), according to
scripture and inference (i.e. Sm/r/iti).
We have shown that the going on the path of the gods
is valid only for the vidyâs of the qualified Brahman, not for
the knowledge of the highest Brahman which is destitute of
all qualities.--Now we observe that the going on the path
of the gods is mentioned only in some of the qualified
vidyâs such as the parya@nka-vidyâ, the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ. the
upako/s/ala-vidyâ, the dahara-vidyâ; while it is not mentioned
in others, such as the madhu-vidyâ,the /s/â/nd/ilya-vidyâ,
the sho/d/a/s/akala-vidyâ, the vai/s/vânara-vidyâ.--The doubt
then arises whether the going on the path of the gods is to
be connected with those vidyâs only in which it is actually
mentioned or generally with all vidyâs of that kind.
The pûrvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he
says, the limitative force of the general subject-matter of
each particular section compels us to connect the going on
the path of the gods with those vidyâs only which actually
mention it. If we transferred it to other vidyâs also, the
authoritativeness of scripture would suffer; for then anything
might be the sense of anything. Moreover, the
details about the path of the gods beginning with light and
so on are given equally in the upako/s/ala-vidyâ and the
pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, which would be a useless repetition if as a
matter of course the going on the path of the gods were
connected with all vidyâs.
To this we make the following reply. The going on the
path of the gods is not to be restricted but to be connected
equally with all those qualified vidyâs which have exaltation
(abhyudaya) for their result. The objection above raised
by the pûrvapakshin that thereby we contradict the general
subject-matter, we refute by appealing to scripture and
Sm/ri/ti. Scripture in the first place declares that not only
those 'who know this,' i.e. the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ (/Kh/. Up. V,
10, 1), proceed on the path of the gods, but also those who
understand other vidyâs, 'and also those who in the forest
follow faith and austerities.'--But how do we know that the
latter passage refers to those who are conversant with other
*vidyas? The text certainly speaks of those only who are
intent on faith and austerities!--Not by faith and austerities
alone, we reply, unaided by knowledge, can that path be
attained; for another scriptural passage says, 'Through
knowledge they mount to that place from which all wishes
have passed away; those who are skilled in works only do
not go there, nor penitents devoid of knowledge' (/S/at. Brâ.
X,5, 4,16). We therefore conclude that faith and austerities
denote at the same time other vidyâs.-The Vâ/g/asaneyins
again read in the Pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, 'Those who thus know
this and those who in the forest worship faith and the True.'
The latter part of this passage we must explain to mean,
'Those who in the forest with faith worship the True, i.e.
Brahman;' the term 'the True' being often employed to
denote Brahman. And as those who know the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ
are in the above passage referred to as 'those who
thus know this,' we must understand the clause, 'and those
who in the forest,' &c., as referring to men in the possession
of other vidyâs. And, moreover, also the passage, 'Those,
however, who know neither of these two paths become
worms, birds, and creeping things' (VI, 2, 16), which teaches
that those who miss the two paths have to go downwards,
intimates that those who possess other vidyâs have to proceed
either on the path of the gods or that of the fathers,
and as their vidyâs are as such not different from the
pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, we conclude that they proceed on the path
of the gods (not on that of the fathers)[Footnote ref. l]
In the second place Sm/ri/ti also confirms the same
doctrine, 'These two, the white and the black path, are
known as the eternal paths of the world; on the one man
goes not to return, on the other he again returns' (Bha. Gî.
VIII, 26).
With regard, finally, to the circumstance that the details
about the path of the gods are given in the Upako/s/ala-*
[Footnote 1 ]Ita/s/ /k/a vidyântara/s/îlinâ/m/ gatir iti li@ngadar/s/ana/m/ samu/kh/inoti atheti, etân iti vidyântaraparâ g/rî/nyante, tathâpi katha/m/ devayânayogas teshâm ity â/s/a@nkya yogyatayety âha tatrâpiti. Ân. Gi. ...Footnote end]
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vidyâ as well as the Pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, we remark that the
repetition is meant to assist reflection.
For all these reasons the going on the path of the gods
is not limited to those vidyâs in which it is actually
mentioned.
32. Of those who have a certain office there is
subsistence (of the body) as long as the office lasts.
The question here is whether for him who has reached
true knowledge a new body originates after he has parted
with the old one or not.--But an objection is here raised
at the outset there is really no occasion for inquiring
whether knowledge when reaching its perfection brings
about its due effect, viz. complete isolation of the Self
from all bodies or not; not any more than there is room
for an inquiry whether there is cooked rice or not, after
the process of cooking has reached its due termination;
or, for an inquiry whether a man is satisfied by eating or
not. Not so, we reply. There is indeed room for the
inquiry proposed, as we know from itihâsa and purâ/n/a that
some persons although knowing Brahman yet obtained new
bodies. Tradition informs us, e. g. that Apântaratamas,
an ancient /ri/shi and teacher of the Vedas, was, by the
order of Vish/n/u, born on this earth as K/ri/sh/n/a Dvaipâyana
at the time when the Dvâparayuga was succeeded by the
Kaliyuga. Similarly Vasish/th/a, the son of Brahman's
mind, having parted from his former body in consequence
of the curse of Nimi, was, on the order of Brahman, again
procreated by Mitra and Varu/n/a. Sm/ri/ti further relates
that Bh/ri/gu and other sons of Brahman's mind were again
born at the sacrifice of Varu/n/a. Sanatkumâra also, who
likewise was a son of Brahman's mind, was, in consequence
of a boon being granted to Rudra, born again as Skanda.
And there are similar tales about Daksha, Nârada, and
others having, for various reasons, assumed new bodies.
Stories of the same kind are met with in the mantras and
arthavâdas of /S/ruti. Of some of the persons mentioned
it is said that they assumed a new body after the old body
had perished; of others that they assumed, through their
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supernatural powers, various new bodies, while the old
body remained intact all the while. And all of them are
known to have completely mastered the contents of the
Vedas.
On the ground of all this the pûrvapakshin maintains
that the knowledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either
be or not be the cause of final release.
This we deny, for the reason that the continuance of
the bodily existence of Aparântamas and others--who
are entrusted with offices conducive to the subsistence
of the worlds, such as the promulgation of the Vedas and
the like--depends on those their offices. As Savitar (the
sun), who after having for thousands of yugas performed the
office of watching over these worlds, at the end of that period
enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises
nor sets, according to /Kh/. Up. III, 11, 1, 'When from
thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets. He
is alone, standing in the centre;' and as the present knowers
of Brahman reach the state of isolation after the enjoyment
of those results of action, which have begun to operate,
has come to an end, accoiding to /Kh/. Up. VI, 14, 2, 'For
him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered from
the body;' so Aparântamas and other Lords to whom the
highest Lord has entrusted certain offices, last--although
they possess complete knowledge, the cause of release--as
long as their office lasts, their woiks not yet being exhausted,
and obtain release only when their office comes
to an end. For gradually exhausting the aggregate of
works the consequences of which have once begun, so as to
enable them to discharge their offices; passing according
to their free will from one body into another, as if from
one house into another, in order to accomplish the duties
of their offices; preserving all the time the memory of their
identity; they create for themselves through their power
over the material of the body and the sense organs new
bodies, and occupy them either all at once or in succession.
Nor can it be said that when passing into new bodies they
remember only the fact of their former existence (not their
individuality); for it is known that they preserve the sense
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of their individuality[Footnote ref 1]. Sm/ri/ti tells us, e.g. that Sulabhâ, a
woman conversant with Brahman, wishing to dispute with
/G/anaka, left her own body, entered into that of /G/anaka,
carried on a discussion with him, and again returned into her
own body. If in addition to the works the consequences of
which are already in operation, other works manifested themselves,
constituting the cause of further embodiments, the
result would be that in the same way further works also,
whose potentiality would in that case not be destroyed, would
take place, and then it might be suspected that the knowledge
of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the
cause of final release. But such a suspicion is inadmissible
since it is known from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti that knowledge
completely destroys the potentiality of action. For /S/ruti
says, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are
solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld
who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); and, 'When the
memory remains firm, then all the ties are loosened' (/Kh/.
Up. VII, 26, 2). And Sm/ri/ti similarly says, 'As a fire
well kindled, O Ar/g/una, reduces fuel to ashes, so the fire
of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes;' and, 'As seeds
burned by fire do not sprout again, so the Self is not again
touched by the afflictions which knowledge has burned.'
Nor is it possible that when the afflictions such as ignorance
and the like are burned, the aggregate of works
which is the seed of affliction should be partly burned,
but partly keep the power of again springing up; not any
more than the seed of the /S/âli, when burned, preserves
the power of sprouting again with some part. The
aggregate of works, however, whose fruits have once
begun to develop themselves comes to rest through
effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the
body, just as an arrow discharged stops in the end owing to
the gradual cessation of its impetus; this in agreement
with /Kh/. Up. VI, 14, 2, 'For him there is only delay,' &c.
We have thus shown that persons to whom an office is
[Footnote 1: Utpadyamânânâm aparimushitasmaratve*pi /g/âtismaratvam eva
na vasish/th/âdinânatvam ity â/s/ankyâha na /k/eti. Ân. Gi.]
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entrusted last as long as their office lasts, and that nevertheless
there is absolutely only one result of true knowledge.--In
accordance with this, scripture declares that
the result of knowledge on the part of all beings is
equally final release, cp. 'So whatever Deva was awakened
he indeed became that, and the same with /Ri/shis and
men' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). Moreover[Footnote ref 1] it may be the case
that (some) great /ri/shis had attached their minds to other
cognitions whose result is lordly power and the like, and
that later on only when they became aware of the transitory
nature of those results they turned from them and
fixed their minds on the highest Self, whereby they
obtained final release. As Sm/ri/ti says, 'When the mahâpralaya
has arrived and the highest (i. e. Hira/n/yagarbha)
himself comes to an end, then they all, ith well-prepared
minds, reach together with Brahman the highest place.'--Another
reason precluding the suspicion that true knowledge
may be destitute of its result is that that result is
the object of immediate intuition. In the case of such
results of action as the heavenly world and the like which
are not present to intuitional knowledge, there may be a
doubt; but not so in the case of the fruit of true knowledge,
with regard to which scripture says. 'The Brahman
which is present to intuition, not hidden' (B/ri/. Up. Ill,
4, 1), and which in the passage, 'That art thou,' is referred
to as something already accomplished. This latter passage
cannot be interpreted to mean, 'Thou wilt be that after
thou hast died;' for another Vedic passage declares that
the fruit of complete knowledge, viz. union with the
universal Self, springs up at the moment when complete
knowledge is attained, 'The /Ri/shi Vâmadeva saw and
understood it, singing, "I was Manu, I was the sun."
For all these reasons we maintain that those who possess
true knowledge reach in all cases final release.
33. But the (denials of) conceptions concerning the
[Footnote 1: Api /k/a nâdhikâravatâ/m/ sarveshâm /ri/shî/n/âm âi*matativa/gñ/âna/m/
tenâvyâpako-py ayam pûrvapaksha ity âha /gñ/ânântarushu /k/eti. Bhâ.]
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akshara are to be comprehended (in all meditations
on the akshara), on account of the equality and of
the object being the same, as in the case of the
upasad; this has been explained (in the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ).
We read in the Vâjasaneyaka, 'O Gârgî, the Brâhma/n/as
call this the Akshara. It is neither coarse, nor fine, nor
short, nor long,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8). Similarly the
Âtharva/n/a says, 'The higher knowledge is that by which
the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be
seen nor seized, which has no family and no caste,' &c.
(Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6). In other places also the highest
Brahman, under the name of Akshara, is described as
that of which all qualities are to be denied. Now in some
places qualities are denied of Brahman which are not
denied in other places, and hence a doubt arises whether
the mental conception of these particular denials is to
form part of all those passages or not.
To the assertion of the pûrvapakshin that each denial
is valid only for that passage in which the text actually
exhibits it, we make the following reply.--The conceptions
of the akshara, i.e. the conceptions of the particular
denials concerning the akshara, are to be included in all
those passages, 'on account of the equality and on account
of the same object being referred to.' The equality consists
therein that all the texts alluded to convey an idea
of Brahman in the same way, viz. by denying of it all
attributes; and we recognise in all of them the same object
of instruction, viz. the one undivided Brahman. Why
then should the conceptions stated in one passage not be
valid for all others also? To the present case the same
argumentation applies which had been made use of under
III, 3, 11. There positive attributes were discussed; here
we are concerned with negative ones. The division of the
discussion into two (instead of disposing of positive and
negative attributes in one adhikara/n/a) is due to the wish
of explaining the differences in detail. The clause, 'as in
the case of the upasads,' introduces a parallel case. For
the /G/âmadagnya-ahîna-sacrifice [Footnote ref 1] the text enjoins that the upasad offerings are to consist of puro/d/â/s/as. Now although the mantras accompanying the offering of the puro/d/â/s/as are originally enjoined in the Veda of the Udgât/ri/s (Tâ/nd/ya
Brâ. XXI, 10, 11, 'Agni, promote the hotra,' &c.), yet they
are to be enounced by the adhvaryu; for the offering of
the puro/d/â/s/as is the work of the adhvaryu, and subordinate
matters (i.e. here, the mantras) are governed by the principal
matter (i.e. the offering of the puro/d/â/s/a). Similarly,
in the case under discussion, the attributes of the akshara
have, because they are subordinate to the akshara itself,
to be connected with the latter everywhere, in whatever
places the text may originally state them.--The principle
of decision employed is explained in the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras
III, 3, 9.
34. On account of (the same) number being recorded.
The Âtharva/n/ikas exhibit, with reference to the Self,
the following mantra, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling
to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the
other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, i). The
same mantra is found in the text of the /S/vetâ/s/vataras
(IV, 6). The Ka/th/as again read, 'There are the two
drinking their reward in the world of their own works,
entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit.
Those who know Brahman call them shade and light, likewise
those householders who perform the Tri/n/a/k/iketa-sacrifice.'--The
doubt here arises whether the two sections introduced
by these mantras constitute one vidyâ or two
vidyâs. Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that we have to
do with two separate vidyâs, because the texts exhibit certain
differences. For the mantra of the Mu/nd/aka and /S/vetâ-/s/vatara
Upanishads represents one bird as enjoying and the
other as not enjoying; while in the mantra of the Ka/th/as
[Footnote 1: I.e. a sacrifice lasting four days, called /G/âmadagnya, because first offered by /G/amadagni. Cp. Taitt. Sa/m/h. VII, i, 9.]
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both are said to enjoy.--As thus the objects of knowledge
differ in character, the vidyâs themselves must be looked
upon as separate.
To this we make the following reply. The vidyâ is one
only because both mantras exhibit the character of the
objects of knowledge as one and the same, viz. as defined
by the number two.--But has not the pûrvapakshin shown
that there exists a certain difference of character?--By no
means, we reply. Both texts intimate one and the same
matter, viz. the Lord together with the individual soul. In
the Mu/nd/aka-text the clause, 'The other looks on without
eating,' intimates the highest Self which is raised above all
desire; the same highest Self forms also the subject of the
complementary passage, 'But when he sees the other Lord
contented.' And the Ka/th/a-text intimates the same highest
Self which is raised above all desire; only, as it is mentioned
together with the enjoying individual soul, it is itself metaphorically
spoken of as enjoying; just as we speak of the
'men with the umbrella,' although only one out of several
carries an umbrella. For that in the Ka/th/a-text also the
highest Self forms the general subject-matter we have to
conclude from the preceding passage, 'That which thou
seest as neither this nor that' (I, 2, 14), and from the complementary
passage referring to the same Self, 'Which is
a bridge for sacrificers, which is the highest imperishable
Brahman' (I, 3, 2). All this has been explained at length
under I, 2, 11. As therefore there is one object of knowledge
only, the vidyâ also is one.--Moreover, if we carefully
examine the context of the three mantras quoted, we observe
that they are concerned merely with the knowledge of the
highest Self, and that they mention the individual soul not
as a new object of instruction but merely to show its identity
with the highest Self. And that, as far as the knowledge of
the highest Self is concerned, the question as to the oneness
or separateness of vidyâs cannot be even raised, we have
already shown above. The present Sûtra therefore merely
aims at a fuller discussion of the matter, the practical outcome
of which is that any particulars stated in one of the
texts only have to be supplied in the others also.
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35. As the Self is within all, as in the case of the
aggregate of the elements, (there is oneness of
vidyâ).
The Vâ/g/asaneyins record, in the questions asked by
Ushastaand by Kahola, the same passage twice in succession,
'Tell me the Brahman which is present to intuition, not
hidden; the Self who is within all' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 1; 5,
1).--The question here presents itself whether the two sections
introduced by the questions constitute one vidyâ only or
two separate vidyâs.
Two separate vidyas, the pûrvapakshin maintains; owing
to the force of repetition. For if the second passage added
nothing to--or took nothing away from--the contents of
the first, the repetition would be altogether meaningless.
We therefore conclude that the repetition intimates the
separateness of the two vidyâs, just as in the Pûrva
Mîmâ/m/sâ repetition shows two sacrificial actions to be
separate.
To this we make the following reply. As both texts
equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be
taken as constituting one vidyâ only. In both passages
question and answer equally refer to a Self which is
within everything. For in one body there cannot be
two Selfs, each of which is inside everything else. One
Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything,
but of a second