THE MILITARY BUILD-UP

THE POLICY:

In a speech to the American People on March 23, 1983, President Reagan spelled out his defense policy. He stressed his premise for defense policy: "The United States does not start fights. We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression--to preserve freedom and peace". Citing the Soviet arms build-up, Reagan outlined the accomplishments of his early years: the building of the B-1 bomber; Trident Submarine; new ICBMs; the army's first new tank in 20 years; and the rebuilding of the navy.


THE LEFT Vs THE RIGHT

Orlando Sentinel
February 10, 1982
"Whatever Happened to 'Cap the Knife'?"

In this editorial, the Orlando Sentinel criticizes Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger for the large increases in defense spending in during the early Reagan years. Both sides of the political spectrum approved of Weinberger's appointment following his tight-fisted handling of the Nixon budgets. The budget increases for the military, the Sentinel argues, are in large measure frivolous and that Weinberger would be more courageous to break away from the political interest lobbies and sharpen his knife on the current budgets.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February 1989 "Cold War Economics" Ann R. Markusen

In her article, Ann Markusen argues that while the United States may have become militarily secure, the Reagan military build-up has cost the country in that it has brought about "a severe recession in nonmilitary manufacturing, prolonged unemployment and underemployment, a worsening trade balance, alarming growth in the deficit, and deteriorating income distribution."

She complains that unlike previous defense build-ups associated with Korea and Vietnam brought commercial thrusts, and that defense spending in the 1980s has not improved the economy through education, public works, and innovations. All of the investment has gone to a concentrated set of industries such as ship and aircraft building, communications equipment and missile production, while commercial industries such as steel, auto, and machinery have been ignored.

The restructuring of the work force is also disturbing to Ms. Markusen. She argues that physicists and mathematicians are favored by the government over biologists and chemists because they can benefit the defense industry. Money for research is heavily concentrated in the defense-friendly sectors. In addition, blue-collar jobs are being replaced by the increased use of computers and robotics. The increased technology has made human-power less necessary for many functions. She also asserts that the new jobs are going to white men, leaving out blacks and women.

Because many of these industries are sensitive to geographic areas, Markusen argues that the ensuing population redistribution is causing harm to the country. As workers move to the "defense perimeter," political redistribution occurs as well. Because most of the beneficiaries of the moves are white middle-class citizens, new political districts are being created which favor the Republican party.

The defense build-up during the Reagan years has been harmful to the country according to Markusen, and "many communities, small businesses, and workers will bear the losses for many years to come." The real goals of the economy should be focused on improving the public's well-being and standard of living.


The paradox of deterrence, according to Weinberger, is that it seems less necessary the longer it succeeds. The government must not lose sight of the need for deterrence, and that a strong defense helps achieve deterrence. The sight must not be lost also when looking at spending. It is easy to think that spending can be cut back in peace times, but this will only jeopardize peace. The neglect from the Carter administration can not be made up in only three years, but that soon spending increases will slow dramatically as the United States achieves parity with the Soviet Union.

Weinberger argues that the budget is achieved not arbitrarily, but by "weighing the threats and challenges to our interests, by refining our strategy for meeting those threats, and by identifying the capabilities we need to fulfill that strategy." As long as this is followed, the United States will move closer to guaranteeing a lasting peace.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
January/February 1989
"Arms Control: Hanging Tough Paid Off"
By John Lewis Gaddis

In his article, Gaddis that Ronald Reagan has "presided over the most dramatic improvement in US--Soviet relations--and the most solid progress in arms control" in the last 40 years. Reagan was successful in several ways: rebuilding self-confidence; spooking the Soviets; negotiation from strength; and responding to Gorbachev.

Gaddis compares Reagan's impact on America's self-confidence to that Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, albeit on a less dramatic scale. Reagan managed to instill self-confidence in the country before any of his policies even had a chance to take effect. Gaddis argues that by projecting his own self-confidence in America, Reagan's psychological impact on America was indeed significant.

Reagan was also successful in persuading the Soviets that its advantage was running out. He achieved this by several ways. Gaddis points to the following actions: the US military buildup which strained an already depressed Soviet economy; the same result was effected through the Strategic Defense Initiative; and the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles while pressing for nuclear reduction talks.

Gaddis argues that Reagan was successful in negotiating by strength because negotiating from weakness is never successful. Reagan was also smart in choosing with whom he chose to negotiate. By waiting for Gorbachev, Reagan avoided failure at the hands of the Soviets. The White House was ready to respond to Gorbachev's modifications of Soviet policy. Reagan was able to bring about a treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces as well as long-range systems. Gaddis asserts that Reagan was deficient in seeing that his Strategic Defense Initiative was better used as a bargaining tool than an actual policy. The initiative did motivate Gorbachev to push for nuclear abolition by the end of the century.

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