Reach, Compromise, and Routine
Abstract
This chapter describes three important ways presidents affect their administration's effectiveness. First, its shows how LBJ shaped his administration's agenda, given the possibilities before it. It not only demonstrates how the Johnson administration changed how the administration settled on its agenda but how it then pressed its congressional support base on each issue in order to maximize its mark on policy. This analysis also uses the historical records to demonstrate how the administration linked issues together in order to build congressional support, both by affecting the order in which issues came up and the trading between interested groups.
Second, the chapter describes how the administration developed strategies for shaping coalitions, including how the administration used the federal largesse to convert members and when and how it made policy compromises. Third, by examining the historical materials and analyzing phone conversations, the chapter assesses how LBJ defined his White House working routines. It describes two central characteristics, pace and focus. For example, measures of administration pace, which describe the level of administration activity, suggest that LBJ's staff worked on more items and made more contacts with outsiders than had the Kennedy administration. This pattern seems particularly pronounced when looking only at Kennedy staff who remained in the Johnson White House. (33 pages)
Return to Summary of Descriptions
Return to the Table of Contents
How LBJ Mattered
Abstract
Taking a number of major policy initiatives, including the Kennedy administration priorities discussed in the transition section, this chapter reflects on how a president can make a difference. For example, on the Kennedy tax cut proposal, LBJ reversed the administration's fortunes by acceding to the letter of conservatives demands for fiscal restraint without jeopardizing the administration's initiative or policy commitments. The changes he introduced then resulted in policy maneuver room without blocking the policies conservatives thought they could stymie. The chapter traces out similar stories for each of a number of important Kennedy/Johnson initiatives, each illustrating a different aspect of presidential advantage. Using headcount information from a number of post-World War II administration, this chapter also presents comparisons between President Johnson and a number of other post-World War II presidents: Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Ford. (36 pages)
Return to Summary of Descriptions
Return to the Table of Contents