Research in Progress


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Modeling Presidential Persuasion: Constitutional Position, Bargaining, and Dead Ducks, with Scott DeMarchi.
This paper studies presidential bargaining in two ways. First, it specifies a game that describes the negotiations between the President and members of Congress. The model focuses on the strategic considerations which guide Members actions, most particularly how to signal the administration. Second, this paper derives and then tests predictions about expectations of congressional behavior. It demonstrates that the presidential "time horizon" (the time remaining in office) plays an important role in member calculations: when the presidents time horizon shortens members feel less concerned for their bargaining "reputations" and more willing to bluff the administration. It also demonstrates that career independence affects bargaining responses to a shifting horizon: senior, more successful members seem less affected by shifting horizons because they bargain with less regard for their reputations.


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MODELING PERSUASIVE EXCHANGES: Presidential Persuasion, Commitment, and the Head of State Vantage

This paper explores the persuasive exchanges between the President of the United States and Members of Congress using data drawn from the administration of Lyndon Johnson. The model tests theories about the use of persuasive strategies including models deriving from psychology, mass communications studies, and bargaining theory. The preliminary results support most fully the bargaining model.


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