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Reading Between the Lines
The National Security Strategy of the
United States
by Nathan Carle
In a bold move, the Bush administration
recently issued to Congress a policy paper outlining the
official United States international relations and national
security policy. The document, entitled "The National
Security Policy of the United States," explains how the
United States sees its place in the world today, the values it
will uphold, and the objectives it plans to pursue.
This declaration is timely, coinciding with President
Bush's congressional request for the authority to act
unilaterally against Iraq. But we ought to regard the document
as more than a political move to garner support for
Bush's Iraq agenda. The National Security Strategy reflects
a new definition of the role of the United States, a
move from an ambiguous "post-Cold War" mindset to a
new era of U.S. Foreign Policy.
A cursory reading of the Strategy reveals
nothing new about U.S. policy. The introduction makes it
clear that the primary obligation of the United States
Federal Government is protection, reading, "Defending
our Nation against its enemies is the first and
fundamental obligation of the Federal Government."
Additionally, the document states that the values of the United
States, and its model for government, are "right and true
for every person, in every society," and that the United
States has a "duty" to "protect these values" against
its "enemies." The extent to which the U.S. will
pursue these goals and the means by which it will pursue
them rest primarily on their correlation to more
pressing national security concerns. Arguing that
instability creates a great risk to U.S. security and interests, it
holds that the U.S. will not risk instability in pursuit
of democratic ideals.
A close examination of the document reveals
a new paradigm in U.S. foreign policy. Three
specific changes evident in the document signify a clear
turning point in the history of U.S. foreign relations.
- The acknowledgement and aggressive
utilization of U.S. dominance in all aspects of
global influence
- the direct identification of non-state actors
as the primary threat to the United States, and
- the willingness of the United
States to
act preemptively in the pursuit of its security concerns.
Most consider the end of World War II the beginning of U.S. super-power statusthe first time
the United States accepted the role of world leader.
Before that time, the U.S. possessed the material strength to
be a major player in world affairs, but lacked the
ideological impetus to accept such a position. The early
20th century saw an extremely isolationist United States, willing
to extend its influence only within the western
Hemisphere and a few parts of the Pacific. A changing world
situation combined with changing domestic attitudes resulted
in a new U.S. foreign policy.
The United States understood it had a
vital interest in containing the spread of Soviet influence
for security and economic reasons. However, the U.S.
did not undertake its struggle against the Soviet
Union unilaterally. The United States worked to establish
and strengthen multinational political and
economic institutions, such as the U.N., the Bretton
Woods agreement (the precursor to the WTO), and NATO.
The U.S. did not oppose the Soviet Union because it
created an obstacle for its own expansion.
Immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States celebrated a victory, but
also began to question how this would affect its foreign policy.
Without a clear threat, leaders asked, should the
U.S. return to its previous policy of hemispheric
dominance and leave the rest of the world alone, or should it use
its power to promote its values across the globe? Throughout the 1990's, the U.S. foreign policy
record demonstrates this uncertainty. The U.S. intervened
in Somalia, but not in Rwanda or Congo. It acted
against Slobodan Milosevic with NATO forces, but simultaneously allowed dictators elsewhere.
Little consistency could be established, primarily because
the United States, policymakers and public alike, had
no clear sense of the nation's role in the post-Cold
War world.
The doctrine in Bush's National Security Strategy acknowledges that the United States
"possesses unprecedentedand unequaledstrength
and influence," and is willing to exercise its
strength internationally to preserve and further the interests
of the United States. The new strategy emphasizes
strategic relationships, for example with Russia and China,
but has little emphasis on international institutions.
Concerning international organizations, the
document says, "The United States is committed to
lasting institutions
In all cases, international obligations
are to be taken seriously. They are not to be
undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal
without furthering its attainment." The implication of
this statement is that the U.S. will not follow
externally imposed rules unless doing so is consistent with
its agenda.
This emphasis on unilateral strength and de-emphasis on international institutions is a clear shift
from the Wilson and FDR doctrines that pervaded our
ideals through the latter half of the
20th century. In fact, rather than inviting other nations as equals into an
international democratic framework as envisioned by Wilson, the
Bush doctrine desires "a distinctly American internationalism."
The emergence of this new official ideal, like the emergence of our Cold War foreign policy,
was sparked by a drastically new vision of the world
orderextremist non-state actors, not a collision of
two superpowers, threaten the world today. Even prior
to September 11th, analysts had predicted that
non-state actors and rogue nations would be the next major threat.
Unfortunately, it took a catastrophe to
completely abandon the mindset that nation-states posed the
greatest threat. Once 9/11 made it clear that the greatest
threat to our security was not any one nation state, but
extremist organizations located in a multitude of states
around the globe, the new foreign policy paradigm
followed closely after. Of course, this giant stimulus to
massive overhaul approach to foreign policy is nothing new
to history.
The United States' primary concern is the risk of a terrorist organization acquiring weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). Today, chemical, biological,
and even nuclear weapons exist in portable sizes, and
at relatively low costs. The Bush administration states,
"The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads
of radicalism and technology." When the threat is
identified as possessing the potential to do catastrophic damage
to the nation and is without clear geopolitical
boundaries, there results a need for the U.S. to extend
itself internationally and to promote its ideals.
While the document does not typecast poverty as a cause of extremism, it does state that it makes
people more vulnerable to extremist ideals. "Poverty does
not make poor people into terrorists and murderers,"
it postulates. "Yet poverty, weak institutions,
and corruption can make weak states vulnerable
"
The United States sees its own model of government as
the best defense against the conditions most suitable
to terrorists, which in turn justifies its global dominance.
Because this is a universal risk, exercising
global influence is necessary, especially in the economic realm.
By opening markets and raising standards of
living, according to Bush, the world will become more
stable and orderlywhich is clearly beneficial for the U.S.
Combating international organizations in a
world comprised of nation-states is a tumultuous task.
While harsh, the Bush administration has made it clear
that any nations that openly harbor terrorists and
support them will be targets, just as the terrorists themselves.
Because terrorists operate globally, such a measure
has obligated all nations to work with the U.S. to root
out terrorism or be considered a threat to U.S. security.
The magnitude of the "with us or against us" attitude
is certainly unique to U.S. foreign policy. While the
world was polarized during the Cold War, the situation
was not so black and whitea lack of support for the
United States could easily be differentiated from Soviet support.
The final and most significant change in U.S. policy is the willingness to act preemptively to
neutralize threats to U.S. interests and security. This
change, stimulated both by our new willingness to utilize
our dominance and the emergence of a new threat,
prompts serious questions. It goes against one of the most
basic ideas previously stressed in U.S. foreign policy and
in international law. While there are exceptions
for preemption, no just nation has ever considered it a
viable option until now.
The document, however, makes a strong case for the possibility of pre-emptive action, using
both historical and contemporary analyses. Clearly
appealing to the failure of appeasement policies prior to
WWII, the document reads, "History will judge harshly
those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the
new world we have entered, the only path to safety is
the path of action." Clearly, the U.S. does not wish to be
on the receiving end of a terrorist attack again, if it
can help it. One certainly does not take war lightly
and strongly desires to avoid it, but in light of recent
events and the lessons of history, the United States's position
is compelling. Further, the document argues
thatunlike during the Cold Warmutually assured destruction
is no longer applicable to the world today. Since
non-state actors have no rational interest in the preservation of
a state and cannot be directly targeted by the United
States, they cannot be deterred conventionally. Before,
the United States proclaimed anti-proliferation, aiming
to prevent new nations from acquiring weapons of
mass destruction simply to reduce the risk of any
possible mishap.
Today, the new doctrine proclaims "counter proliferation." The Bush administration fears that
the existence of weapons of mass destruction,
particularly in the hands of dictators opposed to the United
States, could too easily fall into the hands of
non-deterrable actors. The result is a call for pre-emption, since
the U.S. feels that waiting for WMD to be obtained by
hostile parties would already be too late. Waging war to
prevent a nation from obtaining mass destruction
capabilities seems to be in the interest of the United States.
The document does not state that the United States will always turn to preemptive military action.
Instead, "The United States will not use force in all
cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations
use preemption as a pretext for aggression." This
statement means more than just that. It specifically
dissuades nations other than the United States from
using preemptive force. Some can and will attack this
as hypocritical. From the perspective of a security
strategy, however, it would be absurd not to dissuade other
nations from using potentially de-stabilizing force.
To some readers, the changes identified here
may not seem substantive. It could be argued that
this document reveals no shift in policy, only a shift in
the rhetoric used to describe the same policy.
Regardless, rhetoric cannot be divorced from policy. Subtle shifts
in rhetoric frequently reflect significant changes in
ideology, which should not be ignored. Ultimately, this
document establishes a new tone for U.S. foreign policy, a tone
that has developed since the Bush administration took office.
This tone is best summarized by a phrase from the National Security Strategy,
a phrase that is unique
to the George W. Bush administration"
we
recognize that our best defense is a good offense."
Nathan Carle is a sophomore Political Science and Peace,
War, and Defense double major. He can be contacted
at ncarle@email.unc.edu.
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