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Reading Between the Lines
The National Security Strategy of the United States

by Nathan Carle

In a bold move, the Bush administration recently issued to Congress a policy paper outlining the official United States international relations and national security policy. The document, entitled "The National Security Policy of the United States," explains how the United States sees its place in the world today, the values it will uphold, and the objectives it plans to pursue. This declaration is timely, coinciding with President Bush's congressional request for the authority to act unilaterally against Iraq. But we ought to regard the document as more than a political move to garner support for Bush's Iraq agenda. The National Security Strategy reflects a new definition of the role of the United States, a move from an ambiguous "post-Cold War" mindset to a new era of U.S. Foreign Policy.

A cursory reading of the Strategy reveals nothing new about U.S. policy. The introduction makes it clear that the primary obligation of the United States Federal Government is protection, reading, "Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental obligation of the Federal Government." Additionally, the document states that the values of the United States, and its model for government, are "right and true for every person, in every society," and that the United States has a "duty" to "protect these values" against its "enemies." The extent to which the U.S. will pursue these goals and the means by which it will pursue them rest primarily on their correlation to more pressing national security concerns. Arguing that instability creates a great risk to U.S. security and interests, it holds that the U.S. will not risk instability in pursuit of democratic ideals.

A close examination of the document reveals a new paradigm in U.S. foreign policy. Three specific changes evident in the document signify a clear turning point in the history of U.S. foreign relations.

  • The acknowledgement and aggressive utilization of U.S. dominance in all aspects of global influence
  • the direct identification of non-state actors as the primary threat to the United States, and
  • the willingness of the United States to act preemptively in the pursuit of its security concerns.

Most consider the end of World War II the beginning of U.S. super-power status—the first time the United States accepted the role of world leader. Before that time, the U.S. possessed the material strength to be a major player in world affairs, but lacked the ideological impetus to accept such a position. The early 20th century saw an extremely isolationist United States, willing to extend its influence only within the western Hemisphere and a few parts of the Pacific. A changing world situation combined with changing domestic attitudes resulted in a new U.S. foreign policy.

The United States understood it had a vital interest in containing the spread of Soviet influence for security and economic reasons. However, the U.S. did not undertake its struggle against the Soviet Union unilaterally. The United States worked to establish and strengthen multinational political and economic institutions, such as the U.N., the Bretton Woods agreement (the precursor to the WTO), and NATO. The U.S. did not oppose the Soviet Union because it created an obstacle for its own expansion.

Immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States celebrated a victory, but also began to question how this would affect its foreign policy. Without a clear threat, leaders asked, should the U.S. return to its previous policy of hemispheric dominance and leave the rest of the world alone, or should it use its power to promote its values across the globe? Throughout the 1990's, the U.S. foreign policy record demonstrates this uncertainty. The U.S. intervened in Somalia, but not in Rwanda or Congo. It acted against Slobodan Milosevic with NATO forces, but simultaneously allowed dictators elsewhere. Little consistency could be established, primarily because the United States, policymakers and public alike, had no clear sense of the nation's role in the post-Cold War world.

The doctrine in Bush's National Security Strategy acknowledges that the United States "possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence," and is willing to exercise its strength internationally to preserve and further the interests of the United States. The new strategy emphasizes strategic relationships, for example with Russia and China, but has little emphasis on international institutions. Concerning international organizations, the document says, "The United States is committed to lasting institutions…In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment." The implication of this statement is that the U.S. will not follow externally imposed rules unless doing so is consistent with its agenda.

This emphasis on unilateral strength and de-emphasis on international institutions is a clear shift from the Wilson and FDR doctrines that pervaded our ideals through the latter half of the 20th century. In fact, rather than inviting other nations as equals into an international democratic framework as envisioned by Wilson, the Bush doctrine desires "a distinctly American internationalism."

The emergence of this new official ideal, like the emergence of our Cold War foreign policy, was sparked by a drastically new vision of the world order—extremist non-state actors, not a collision of two superpowers, threaten the world today. Even prior to September 11th, analysts had predicted that non-state actors and rogue nations would be the next major threat. Unfortunately, it took a catastrophe to completely abandon the mindset that nation-states posed the greatest threat. Once 9/11 made it clear that the greatest threat to our security was not any one nation state, but extremist organizations located in a multitude of states around the globe, the new foreign policy paradigm followed closely after. Of course, this giant stimulus to massive overhaul approach to foreign policy is nothing new to history.

The United States' primary concern is the risk of a terrorist organization acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Today, chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons exist in portable sizes, and at relatively low costs. The Bush administration states, "The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology." When the threat is identified as possessing the potential to do catastrophic damage to the nation and is without clear geopolitical boundaries, there results a need for the U.S. to extend itself internationally and to promote its ideals.

While the document does not typecast poverty as a cause of extremism, it does state that it makes people more vulnerable to extremist ideals. "Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers," it postulates. "Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable…" The United States sees its own model of government as the best defense against the conditions most suitable to terrorists, which in turn justifies its global dominance. Because this is a universal risk, exercising global influence is necessary, especially in the economic realm. By opening markets and raising standards of living, according to Bush, the world will become more stable and orderly—which is clearly beneficial for the U.S.

Combating international organizations in a world comprised of nation-states is a tumultuous task. While harsh, the Bush administration has made it clear that any nations that openly harbor terrorists and support them will be targets, just as the terrorists themselves. Because terrorists operate globally, such a measure has obligated all nations to work with the U.S. to root out terrorism or be considered a threat to U.S. security. The magnitude of the "with us or against us" attitude is certainly unique to U.S. foreign policy. While the world was polarized during the Cold War, the situation was not so black and white—a lack of support for the United States could easily be differentiated from Soviet support.

The final and most significant change in U.S. policy is the willingness to act preemptively to neutralize threats to U.S. interests and security. This change, stimulated both by our new willingness to utilize our dominance and the emergence of a new threat, prompts serious questions. It goes against one of the most basic ideas previously stressed in U.S. foreign policy and in international law. While there are exceptions for preemption, no just nation has ever considered it a viable option until now.

The document, however, makes a strong case for the possibility of pre-emptive action, using both historical and contemporary analyses. Clearly appealing to the failure of appeasement policies prior to WWII, the document reads, "History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action." Clearly, the U.S. does not wish to be on the receiving end of a terrorist attack again, if it can help it. One certainly does not take war lightly and strongly desires to avoid it, but in light of recent events and the lessons of history, the United States's position is compelling. Further, the document argues that—unlike during the Cold War—mutually assured destruction is no longer applicable to the world today. Since non-state actors have no rational interest in the preservation of a state and cannot be directly targeted by the United States, they cannot be deterred conventionally. Before, the United States proclaimed anti-proliferation, aiming to prevent new nations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction simply to reduce the risk of any possible mishap.

Today, the new doctrine proclaims "counter proliferation." The Bush administration fears that the existence of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the hands of dictators opposed to the United States, could too easily fall into the hands of non-deterrable actors. The result is a call for pre-emption, since the U.S. feels that waiting for WMD to be obtained by hostile parties would already be too late. Waging war to prevent a nation from obtaining mass destruction capabilities seems to be in the interest of the United States.

The document does not state that the United States will always turn to preemptive military action. Instead, "The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression." This statement means more than just that. It specifically dissuades nations other than the United States from using preemptive force. Some can and will attack this as hypocritical. From the perspective of a security strategy, however, it would be absurd not to dissuade other nations from using potentially de-stabilizing force.

To some readers, the changes identified here may not seem substantive. It could be argued that this document reveals no shift in policy, only a shift in the rhetoric used to describe the same policy. Regardless, rhetoric cannot be divorced from policy. Subtle shifts in rhetoric frequently reflect significant changes in ideology, which should not be ignored. Ultimately, this document establishes a new tone for U.S. foreign policy, a tone that has developed since the Bush administration took office. This tone is best summarized by a phrase from the National Security Strategy, a phrase that is unique to the George W. Bush administration—"… we recognize that our best defense is a good offense."

Nathan Carle is a sophomore Political Science and Peace, War, and Defense double major. He can be contacted at ncarle@email.unc.edu.

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